Introduction
The period of counter-revolution in
Russia brought not only "thunder and lightning" in its train,
but also disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in common
forces. As long as people believed in "a bright future," they
fought side by side irrespective of nationality -- common questions
first and foremost! But when doubt crept into people's hearts, they
began to depart, each to his own national tent -- let every man count
only upon himself! The "national question" first and foremost!
At the same time a profound upheaval was taking place in the
economic life of the country. The year 1905 had not been in vain: one
more blow had been struck at the survivals of serfdom in the
countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded the famine
years, and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the progress of
capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the
towns, the development of trade and means of communication all took a
big stride forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And
it could not but hasten the process of economic consolidation of the
nationalities of Russia. They were bound to be stirred into movement.
The "constitutional regime" established at that time
also acted in the same direction of awakening the nationalities. The
spread of newspapers and of literature generally, a certain freedom of
the press and cultural institutions, an increase in the number of
national theatres, and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen
"national sentiments." The Duma, with its election campaign
and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of
the nations and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilization.
And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above and the series
of repressive measures taken by the "powers that be" in
vengeance on the border regions for their "love of freedom,"
evoked an answering wave of nationalism below, which at times took the
form of crude chauvinism.
The spread of Zionism [1]
among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among
the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and
Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism --
all these are generally known facts. The wave of nationalism swept
onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the
workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more
plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.
At this
difficult time Social-Democracy had a high mission -- to resist
nationalism and to protect the masses from the general
"epidemic." For Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone,
could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of
internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class
struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the
louder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity
among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this
connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of
the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist
movement.
But not all Social-Democrats proved equal to the task --
and this applies particularly to the Social-Democrats of the border
regions. The Bund, which had previously laid stress on the common tasks,
now began to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist
aims: it went to the length of declaring "observance of the
Sabbath" and "recognition of Yiddish" a fighting issue in
its election campaign. [2]
The Bund was followed by
the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, which, like
the rest of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected
"cultural-national autonomy," are now making it an immediate
demand. [3] This is without mentioning the conference
of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to
nationalist vacillations. [4] But from this it
follows that the views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national
question are not yet clear to all Social-Democrats. It is evident
that a serious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is
required. Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and
indefatigably against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what
quarter it proceeds.
The Nation
What is a nation? A nation is primarily a
community, a definite community of people. This community is not
racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from
Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French
nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The
same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were
formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes. Thus,
a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted
community of people.
On the other hand, it is unquestionable that
the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations,
although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of
different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and
loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined
together according to the victories or defeats of this or that
conqueror. Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral
conglomeration, but a stable community of people.
But not every
stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also
stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a
national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that
a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a
state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and
the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common
language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by
the fact that there are a number of different languages within their
borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the
people and not to the official governmental languages. Thus, a
common language is one of the characteristic features of a nation.
This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and
everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language
necessarily constitute one nation. A common language for every
nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations!
There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks several
languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations
speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language,
but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the
Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.
But why, for
instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in
spite of their common language? Firstly, because they do not live
together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as
a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people
living together generation after generation. But people cannot
live together, for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory.
Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory,
England, and constituted one nation.
Later, one section of the English
emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the
new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American
nation. Difference of. territory led to the formation of different
nations. Thus, a common territory is one of the
characteristic features of a nation. But this is not all. Common
territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in
addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the
nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and
America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans
themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the
different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a
result of division of labour between them, the development of means of
communication, and so forth.
Take the Georgians, for instance. The
Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one
language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one
nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected
principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for
centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other,
each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral
and casual union of the principalities which some successful king
sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial
administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices
of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be
otherwise in economically disunited Georgia .
Georgia came on the
scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the
country, the development of means of communication and the rise of
capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts
of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the
principalities and bound them together into a single whole. The
same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the
stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism. Thus, a
common economic life, economic cohesion, is one of the
characteristic features of a nation.
But even this is not all.
Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific
spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ
not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion,
which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England,
America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute
three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar
psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation
as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence. Of course, by
itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called,
"national character," is something intangible for the
observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture
common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.
Needless to say, "national character" is not a thing
that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the
conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves
its impress on the physiognomy of the nation. Thus, a common
psychological make-up, which manifests itself in a common culture,
is one of the characteristic features of a nation. We have now
exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.
A nation is
a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the
basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological
make-up manifested in a common culture.
It goes without saying
that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law
of change, has its history, its beginning and end. It must be
emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is
sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a
single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases
to be a nation. It is possible to conceive of people possessing a
common "national character" who, nevertheless, cannot be said
to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited,
inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth.
Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and
Caucasian Highland Jews, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a
single nation.
It is possible to conceive of people with a common
territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a
single nation because they have no common language and no common
"national character." Such, for instance, are the Germans and
Letts in the Baltic region. Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes
speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to
the absence of the other characteristics. It is only when all
these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.
It might appear that "national character" is not one of
the characteristics but the sole essential characteristic of a
nation, and that all the other characteristics are, properly speaking,
only conditions for the development of a nation, rather than its
characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R. Springer,
and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic
theoreticians on the national question well known in Austria. Let
us examine their theory of the nation.
According to Springer, "a nation is a union of similarly thinking
and similarly speaking persons." It is "a cultural community
of modern people no longer tied to the 'soil.'" [5]
(our italics).
Thus, a "union" of similarly thinking and similarly speaking
people, no matter how disconnected they may be, no matter where they
live, is a nation. Bauer goes even further.
"What is a nation?" he asks. "Is it a common language
which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish ... speak
the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have no
common language and yet are a nation." [6]
What, then, is a nation?
"A nation is a relative community of character."
But what is character, in this case national character?
National character is "the sum total of characteristics which
distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another
nationality -- the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics
which distinguish one nation from another."
Bauer knows, of course, that national character does not drop from the
skies, and he therefore adds:
"The character of people is determined by nothing so much as by
their destiny.... A nation is nothing but a community with a common
destiny" which, in turn, is determined "by the conditions
under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute
the products of their labour."
We thus arrive at the most "complete," as Bauer calls it,
definition of a nation:
"A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of
character by a common destiny."
We thus have common national character based on a common destiny, but
not necessarily connected with a common territory, language or economic
life. But what in that case remains of the nation? What common
nationality can there be among people who are economically disconnected,
inhabit different territories and from generation to generation speak
different languages? Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation,
although they "have no common language"; but what "common
destiny" and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the
Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely
separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak
different languages?
The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead
their economic and political life in common with the Georgians,
Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in the
same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definite
impress on their national character; if there is anything common to them
left, it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of
the national character. All this is beyond question. But how can it be
seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading
psychological relics affect the "destiny" of these Jews more
powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment
that surrounds them? And it is only on this assumption that it is
possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.
What,
then, distinguishes Bauer's nation from the mystical and self-sufficient
"national spirit" of the spiritualists? Bauer sets up an
impassable barrier between the "distinctive feature" of
nations (national character) and the "conditions" of their
life, divorcing the one from the other. But what is national character
if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of
impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to
national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that
gave rise to it? Further, what indeed distinguished the English
nation from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America was still known as
New England? Not national character, of course; for the Americans had
originated from England and had brought with them to America not only
the English language, but also the English national character, which, of
course, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of
the new conditions, they would naturally be developing their own
specific character. Yet, despite their more or less common character,
they at that time already constituted a nation distinct from England!
Obviously, New England as a nation differed then from England as a
nation not by its specific national character, or not so much by its
national character, as by its environment and conditions of life, which
were distinct from those of England. It is therefore clear that
there is in fact no single distinguishing characteristic of a
nation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when
nations are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character),
sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic
conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the
combination of all these characteristics taken together. Bauer's
point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character,
divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible,
self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but
something mystical, intangible and supernatural.
For, I repeat, what
sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of
Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of
which do not understand each other (since they speak different
languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each
other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time
of war?! No, it is not for such paper "nations" that
Social-Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon only
with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being
reckoned with. Bauer is obviously confusing nation, which
is a historical category, with tribe, which is an ethnographical
category. However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness of
his position. While in the beginning of his book he definitely declares
the Jews to be a nation, he corrects himself at the end of the book and
states that "in general capitalist society makes it impossible for
them (the Jews) to continue as a nation," by causing them to
assimilate with other nations.
The reason, it appears, is that "the
Jews have no closed territory of settlement," whereas the Czechs,
for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will
survive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a
territory. By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish
workers cannot demand national autonomy, but he thereby inadvertently
refuted his own theory, which denies that a common territory is one of
the characteristics of a nation. But Bauer goes further. In the
beginning of his book he definitely declares that "the Jews have no
common language, and yet are a nation." But hardly has he
reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitely
declares that "unquestionably, no nation is possible without a
common language" (our italics). Bauer wanted to prove
that "language is the most important instrument of human
intercourse," but at the same time he inadvertently proved
something he did not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own
theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common language.
Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes
itself.
The National Movement
A nation is not merely a historical category but
a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising
capitalism.
The process of elimination of feudalism and development of
capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people
into nations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The
British, French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations
at the time of the victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over
feudal disunity. But the formation of nations in those instances
at the same time signified their conversion into independent national
states. The British, French and other nations are at the same time
British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in this
process, does not alter the general picture.
Matters proceeded
somewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations
developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed,
states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and
Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most
developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian
nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state
organization were the Magyars -- the core of the Hungarian nationalities
-- and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the uniting of the
nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who were headed by a
historically formed, powerful and well-organized aristocratic military
bureaucracy. That was how matters proceeded in the East.
This
special method of formation of states could take place only where
feudalism had not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly'
developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the
background had not yet been able to consolidate themselves economically
into integral nations. But capitalism also began to develop in the
Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were developing. Large
towns were springing up. The nations were becoming economically
consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the
nationalities which had been pushed into the background, was arousing
them and stirring them into action. The development of the press and the
theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma
(Russia) were helping to strengthen "national sentiments." The
intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued with "the national
idea" and was acting in the same direction....
But the
nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened
to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent
national states; they encountered on their -path the very powerful
resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long
ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late!... In
this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in
Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians,
Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an
exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.
In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a
national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to
respond in the same fashion. Thus arose the circumstances which
impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle.
The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations
as a whole, but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and
of those that had been pushed into the background. The struggle is
usually conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation
against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans),
or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the
landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole
"national" bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the
ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the
Ukraine in Russia).
The bourgeoisie plays the leading role. The
chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market.
Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition
with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to
secure its "own," its "home" market. The market is
the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism. But
matters are usually not confined to the market. The semi-feudal,
semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant nation intervenes in the
struggle with its own methods of "arresting and preventing."
The bourgeoisie -- whether big or small -- of the dominant nation is
able to deal more "swiftly" and "decisively" with
its competitor. "Forces" are united and a series of
restrictive measures is put into operation against the "alien"
bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression.
The struggle
spreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction of
freedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise,
closing of schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon
the head of the "competitor." Of course, such measures are
designed not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of the
dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically caste aims,
so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy. But from the point of view
of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes
and the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand -- whether it be in
Austria-Hungary or in Russia.
The bourgeoisie of the oppressed
nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It
appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout about the
"fatherland,'; claiming that its own cause is the cause of the
nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its
"countrymen" in the interests of ... the
"fatherland." Nor do the "folk" always remain
unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: the
repression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.
Thus the national movement begins. The strength of the
national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata
of the nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it. Whether
the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends
on the degree of development of class antagonisms, on the class
consciousness and degree of organization of the proletariat. The
class-conscious proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to
rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie. As far as the peasants are
concerned, their participation in the national movement depends
primarily on the character of the repressions.
If the repressions affect
the "land," as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the
peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.
On the other hand, if, for example, there is no serious
anti-Russian nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily because there
are neither Russian landlords nor a Russian big bourgeoisie there to
supply the fuel for such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there is
anti-Armenian nationalism; but this is because there is still an
Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting the better of the small
and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to
anti-Armenian nationalism. .
Depending on these factors, the
national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as
in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty
collisions, degenerating into squabbles and "fights" over
signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia). The content
of the national movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it
is wholly determined by the diverse demands made by the movement. In
Ireland the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a
"language" character; in one place the demand is for civil
equality and religious freedom, in another for the nation's
"own" officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not
infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterize a nation in
general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never
meet with a demand based on Bauer's all-embracing "national
character." And this is natural: "national character" in
itself is something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J.
Strasser, "a politician can't do anything with it." [7]
Such, in general, are the forms and character of the national
movement. From what has been said it will be clear that the
national struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism is a
struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimes the
bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national
movement, and then the national struggle externally assumes a
"nation-wide" character. But this is so only externally. In
its essence it is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the
advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie. But it does not by
any means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against
the policy of national oppression. Restriction of freedom of
movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools,
and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more,
than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard
the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of
subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the
intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not
allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his
schools are closed down.
But the policy of nationalist persecution
is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It
diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions
of the class struggle, to national questions, questions
"common" to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this
creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about "harmony of
interests," for glossing over the class interests of the
proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers. This
creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all
nationalities. If a considerable proportion of the Polish workers are
still in intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they
still stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly
because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the "powers that be"
creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the
workers from it. But the policy of persecution does not stop
there.
It not infrequently passes from a "system" of oppression
to a "system" of inciting nations against each other,
to a "system" of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter
system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible
-- in the absence of elementary civil rights -- it frequently assumes
horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the
workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and south Russia furnish
numerous examples. "Divide and rule" -- such is the purpose of
the policy of incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a
tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause
of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state. But
the workers are interested in the complete amalgamation of all their
fellow-workers into a single international army, in their speedy and
final emancipation from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in
the full and free development of the intellectual forces of their
brothers, whatever nation they may belong to.
The workers
therefore combat and will continue to combat the policy of national
oppression in all its forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as
well as the policy of inciting nations against each other in all its
forms Social-Democracy in all countries therefore proclaims the
right of nations to self-determination. The right of
self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to
determine its destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to
interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its schools and
other institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress
its language, or curtail its rights. This, of course, does
not mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution
of a nation.
While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold
only the right of the nation itself to determine its own destiny,
at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of
that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to
emancipate themselves from them. The right of self-determination
means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has
the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right
to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to
complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal
rights.
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will
support every demand of a nation. A nation has the right even to return
to the old order of things; but this does not mean that Social-Democracy
will subscribe to such a decision if taken by some institution of a
particular nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, which defends
the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which
consists of various classes, are two different things. In fighting
for the right of nations to self-determination, the aim of
Social-Democracy is to put an end to the policy of national oppression,
to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds of strife
between nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to a
minimum.
This is what essentially distinguishes the policy of the
class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the bourgeoisie, which
attempts to aggravate and fan the national struggle and to prolong and
sharpen the national movement. And that is why the class-conscious
proletariat cannot rally under the "national" flag of the
bourgeoisie. That is why the so-called "evolutionary
national" policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of the
proletariat. Bauer's attempt to identify his "evolutionary
national" policy with the policy of the "modern working
class" is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers to
the struggle of the nations.
The fate of a national movement,
which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with
the fate of the bourgeoisie. The -final disappearance of a national
movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only
under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even
within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national
struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as
harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example,
by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country should be
democratized and the nations be given the opportunity of free
development.
Presentation of the Question
A nation has the right freely to determine its
own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit,
without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is
beyond dispute. But how exactly should it arrange its own
life, what forms should its future constitution take, if the
interests of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the
proletariat are to be borne in mind? A nation has the right to
arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede.
But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances,
that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous
for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata.
The
Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their
Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide
to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state.
According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are
fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling
strata of the Tatar nation? Can Social-Democracy look on indifferently
when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the
solution of the national question? Should not Social-Democracy
interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a
definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the
solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for
the Tatar masses? But what solution would be most compatible with
the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation?
All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the
concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself.
More than that; conditions, like everything else, change, and a
decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be
entirely unsuitable at another.
In the middle of the nineteenth
century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he
was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture
from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that
time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question, but a
practical one, a question of actual reality.... At the end of the
nineteenth century the Polish Marxists were already declaring against
the secession of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty
years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia
and Poland closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that
period the question of secession had been converted from a practical
matter into a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except
perhaps intellectuals abroad.
This, of course, by no means
precludes the possibility that certain internal and external conditions
may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland may again
come on the order of the day. The solution of the national
question is possible only in connection with the historical conditions
taken in their development. The economic, political and cultural
conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question how
a particular nation ought to arrange its life and what forms its
future constitution ought to take.
It is possible that a specific
solution of the question will be required for each nation. If the
dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is required
here, in the national question. In view of this we must declare
our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary
manner of "solving" the national question, which owes its
inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to
Austrian and South-Slav [8] Social-Democracy, which
has supposedly already solved the national question and whose solution
the Russian Social-Democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed that
whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for Russia. The most
important and decisive factor is lost sight of here, namely, the
concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the life of
each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular. Listen, for
example, to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:
"When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of the
question (i.e., the national question -- J. St.) were
discussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to
settle the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav
Social-Democratic Party met with general approval." [9]
And the result was that "the congress unanimously adopted" ...
national autonomy. And that was all! No analysis of the actual
conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the Jews in
Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav
Social-Democratic Party, then they "approved" it, and finally
they "unanimously adopted" it! This is the way the Bundists
present and "solve" the national question in Russia.
As
a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent entirely different
conditions. This explains why the Social-Democrats in Austria, when they
adopted their national programme at Br�nn (1899) [10]
in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic
Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached
the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of
course, solved it in a non-Russian way. First, as to the
presentation of the question. How is the question presented by the
Austrian theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters
of the Br�nn national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav
Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?
"Whether a multi-national state is possible," says Springer,
"and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are
obliged to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not
answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not
concede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of
course, be purposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these
nations are obliged to live together, what legal forms
will enable them to live together in the best possible way?"
(Springer's italics). [11]
Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of Austria. Bauer
says the same thing:
"We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian nations
will remain in the same state union in which they exist at present and
inquire how the nations within this union will arrange their relations
among themselves and to the state."
Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria. Can
Russian Social-Democracy present the question in this way? No, it
cannot. And it cannot because from the very outset it holds the view of
the right of nations to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation
has the right of secession. Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at
the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter could
not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblatt
said on that occasion:
"Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. If
any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. If
Poland does not wish to enter into lawful wedlock with Russia, it is
not for us to interfere with her."
All this is true. But it follows that the starting points of the
Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, far from being identical, are
diametrically opposite. After this, can there be any question of
borrowing the national programme of the Austrians? Furthermore,
the Austrians hope to achieve the "freedom of nationalities"
by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose
cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on
any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they
do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand,
associate the "freedom of nationalities" with a probable
radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no
grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in
regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.
"Of course," says Bauer, "there is little probability
that national autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a
bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by
step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe
struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration
will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will not
be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of separate
enactments for individual provinces and individual communities."
Springer says the same thing.
"I am very well aware," he writes, "that institutions
of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy -- J. St.) are
not created in a single year or a single decade. The reorganization of
the Prussian administration alone took considerable time.... It took
the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic
administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any
illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome
in Austria."
All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists avoid
associating the national question with "bold actions"? Can
they count on partial reforms, on "a multitude of separate
enactments" as a means for achieving the "freedom of
nationalities"? But if they cannot and must not do so, is it not
clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians and
their prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of
affairs can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water
cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either
those who are in favour of borrowing do not count on "bold
actions" in Russia, or they do count on such actions but "know
not what they do."
Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia
and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate different
methods of solving the national question. In Austria parliamentarism
prevails, and under present conditions no development in Austria is
possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in
Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill by severe
conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronic
political crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering.
Hence, in Austria the national question is the very hub of political
life; it is the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the
Austrian Social-Democratic politicians should first of all try in one
way or another to find a solution for the national conflicts -- of
course on the basis of the existing parliamentary system, by
parliamentary methods.... Not so with Russia. In the first place,
in Russia "there is no parliament, thank God." [13]
In the second place -- and this is the main point -- the hub of the
political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question.
Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the
"liberation" of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with
the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the
relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That
explains why in Russia the national question is not an independent and
decisive one, but a part of the general and more important question of
the emancipation of the country.
"The barrenness of the Austrian parliament," writes
Springer, "is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives
rise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their
unity. The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that
smacks of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if
the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve
them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant
groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention to
the solution of economic and social problems."
Bauer says the same thing.
"National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The
state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by the
very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited
people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school."
All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national question in
Russia is on an entirely different plane. It is not the national, but
the agrarian question , that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The
national question is a subordinate one. And so we have different
presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of
struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being
the state of affairs, only pedants who "solve" the national
question without reference to space and time can think of adopting
examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme? To repeat: the
concrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the
dialectical presentation of the question as the only correct way of
presenting it -- such is the key to solving the national question.
Cultural-National Autonomy
We spoke above of the formal aspect of the
Austrian national programme and of the methodological grounds which make
it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of
Austrian Social-Democracy and make the latter's programme their own.
Let us now examine the essence of the programme itself What
then is the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats? It
is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy. This means,
firstly, that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or
Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs
and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of
Austria they inhabit.
That is why this autonomy is called national
and not territorial. It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles,
Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, taken
personally, as individuals, are to be organized into integral nations,
and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria
would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of
autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory. It
means, thirdly, that the national institutions which are to be created
for this purpose for the Poles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have
jurisdiction only over "cultural," not "political"
questions. Specifically political questions would be reserved for the
Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat). That is why this autonomy is
also called cultural, cultural-national autonomy.
And here
is the text of the programme adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic
Party at the Br�nn Congress in 1899. [14] Having
referred to the fact that "national dissension in Austria is
hindering political progress," that "the final solution of the
national question... is primarily a cultural necessity," and that
"the solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society,
constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage,"
the programme goes on to say:
"The preservation and development of the national
peculiarities [15] of the peoples of Austria is
possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding all
oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal
privileges of individual provinces must first of all be rejected.
"Under these conditions, and only under these conditions,
will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place of
national dissension, namely, on the following principles: "1.
Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation of
nationalities. "2. The historical crown provinces must be
replaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each
of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national
parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal
suffrage. "3. All the self-governing regions of one and the
same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shall
manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis. "4.
The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by a special law
passed by the Imperial Parliament."
The programme ends with an appeal for the solidarity of all the nations
of Austria. [16] It is not difficult to see
that this programme retains certain traces of
"territorialism," but that in general it gives a formulation
of national autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the
first agitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with
enthusiasm; Bauer also supports this programme, calling it a
"theoretical victory" for national autonomy; only, in the
interests of greater clarity, he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a
more definite formulation, which would declare the necessity of
"constituting the national minority within each self-governing
region into a public corporation" for the management of educational
and other cultural affairs.
Such is the national programme of
Austrian Social-Democracy. Let us examine its scientific
foundations. Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party
justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates. Let us turn
to the theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.
The starting point of national autonomy is the conception of a
nation as a union of individuals without regard to a definite territory.
"Nationality," according to Springer, "is not
essentially connected with territory"; nations are
"autonomous unions of persons."
Bauer also speaks of a nation as a "community of persons"
which does not enjoy "exclusive sovereignty in any particular
region." But the persons constituting a nation do not always
live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided into groups, and
in that form are interspersed among alien national organisms.
It is
capitalism which drives them into various regions and cities in search
of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign national territories and
there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by the local
national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language,
schools, etc. Hence national conflicts.
Hence the
"unsuitability" of territorial autonomy. The only solution to
such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organize the
minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts of the
state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such a union
alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests of national
minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to national
discord.
"Hence the necessity," says Springer, "to organize the
nationalities, to invest them with rights and
responsibilities...." Of course, "a law is easily drafted,
but will it be effective? "... "If one wants to make a law
for nations, one must first create the nations..." "Unless
the nationalities are constituted it is impossible to create national
rights and eliminate national dissension."
Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he proposed, as "a
demand of the working class," that "the minorities should be
constituted into public corporations based on the personal
principle." But how is a nation to be organized? How is one
to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?
"Nationality," says Springer, "will be determined by
certificates; every individual domiciled in a given region must
declare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that
region." "The personal principle," says Bauer,
"presumes that the population will be divided into
nationalities.... On the basis of the free declaration of the adult
citizens national registers must be drawn up."
Further.
"All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts," says
Bauer, "and all the Germans entered in the national registers in
the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a National
Council."
The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on.
"The National Council," according to Springer,
"is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered to establish
the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over
national education, national literature, art and science, the
formation of academies, museums, galleries, theatres," etc.
Such will be the organization of a nation and its central institution.
According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is
striving, by the creation of these inter-class institutions "to
make national culture ... the possession of the whole people and thereby
unite all the members of the nation into a national-cultural
community." (our italics). One might think that all this
concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically
declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states
which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.
"In the multi-national state," according to Bauer, "the
working class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of
the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy."
Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the
self-determination of nations, he continues:
"Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will
necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat of
all the nations in a multi-national state."
But he goes still further. He profoundly believes that the inter-class
"national unions" "constituted" by him and Springer
will serve as a sort of prototype of the future socialist society. For
he knows that "the socialist system of society... will divide
humanity into nationally delimited communities"; that under
socialism there will take place "a grouping of humanity into
autonomous national communities," that thus, "socialist
society will undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions
of persons and territorial corporations, and that accordingly "the
socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national
principle and national autonomy."
Enough, it would seem. These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in
the works of Bauer and Springer. The first thing that strikes the
eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable
substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One
or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of
self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or other
deliberately narrowed its meaning.
For there is no doubt a) that
cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the
multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the
framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a
nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only
with "cultural" rights. That in the first place. In the
second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully
possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the
nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from
Austria.
Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at the Br�nn Party
Congress announce their readiness to unite the "two parts" of
their people into one whole? [17] What, in such a
case, becomes of national autonomy, which is "inevitable for the
proletariat of all the nations"? What sort of
"solution" of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes
nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?
Further:
National autonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of
nations. It calls for the organization of nations; but can they be
artificially welded together if life, if economic development tears
whole groups from them and disperses these groups over various regions?
There is no doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become
welded together.
But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of
capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby
a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going off in
search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in other
regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their
old connections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from
generation to generation acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly
a new language.
The question arises: is it possible to unite into a
single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the
magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for
instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of
Transcaucasia can be "united into a single nation"? But if it
is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy
differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn
back the wheel of history? But the unity of a nation diminishes
not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal
causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle.
In the
early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a "common
culture" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale
industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and more acute,
this "common culture" begins to melt away. One cannot
seriously speak of the "common culture" of a nation when
employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand
each other. What "common destiny" can there be when the
bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares "war on
war"? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such
opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of the "union of
all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community"?
Is it not obvious that national autonomy is contrary to the whole course
of the class struggle?
But let us assume for a moment that the
slogan "organize the nation" is practicable. One might
understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to
"organize" a nation for the purpose of securing additional
votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy themselves
with "organizing" nations, "constituting" nations,
"creating" nations? What sort of Social-Democrats are
they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle
organize inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, as well as
every other, Social-Democratic party, had one task before it: namely, to
organize the proletariat. That task has apparently become
"antiquated." Springer and Bauer are now setting a
"new" task, a more absorbing task, namely, to
"create," to "organize" a nation.
However,
logic has its obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also
adopt this "new" task; but to adopt the latter means to
abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism. Springer's
and Bauer's cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.
And it is by no means fortuitous that the national programme of
the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a concern for the "preservation
and development of the national peculiarities of the
peoples." Just think: to "preserve" such "national
peculiarities" of the Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at
the festival of Shakhsei-Vakhsei; or to "develop" such
"national peculiarities" of the Georgians as the vendetta! ...
A demand of this character is in place in an outright bourgeois
nationalist programme; and if it appears in the programme of the
Austrian Social-Democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such
demands, it does not contradict them. But if national autonomy is
unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future,
socialist society. Bauer's prophecy regarding the "division
of humanity into nationally delimited communities" is refuted by
the whole course of development of modern human society. National
barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather than becoming
firmer.
As early as the 'forties Marx declared that "national
differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more
vanishing" and that "the supremacy of the proletariat will
cause them to vanish still faster." [18] The
subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the colossal
growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of nationalities and
the union of people within ever larger territories, emphatically
confirms Marx's thought. Bauer's desire to represent socialist
society as a "checkered picture of national unions of persons and
territorial corporations" is a timid attempt to substitute for
Marx's conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin's
conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt
contains the elements of inevitable failure.
There is no need to
mention the kind of "socialist principle of nationality"
glorified by Bauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist
principle of the class struggle the bourgeois "principle
of nationality." If national autonomy is based on such a
dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to
the working-class movement. True, such nationalism is not so
transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is
all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can always
cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned.
It is much
more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and
unrecognizable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism,
it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among the workers,
it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust
and segregation among the workers of the different nationalities. But
this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares
the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for
breaking up the united labour movement.
The idea of national autonomy
creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united
workers' party into separate parties built on national lines. The
breakup of the party is followed by the breakup of the trade unions, and
complete segregation is the result. In this way the united class
movement is broken up into separate national rivulets. Austria,
the home of "national autonomy," provides the most deplorable
examples of this. As early as 1897 (the Wimberg Party Congress [19])
the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up into
separate parties. The breakup became still more marked after the Br�nn
Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy.
Matters have
finally come to such a pass that in place of a united international
party there are now six national parties, of which the Czech
Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the
German Social-Democratic Party. But with the parties are
associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the
trade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same
Social-Democratic workers.
There was therefore reason to fear that
separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions and
that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what
happened: the trade unions have also divided according to nationality.
Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers will even break a
strike of German workers, or will unite at municipal elections with the
Czech bourgeois against the German workers. It will be seen from
the foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the
national question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the
question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the
unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers
according to nationality and intensifies friction among them. Such
is the harvest of national autonomy.
The Bund, its Nationalism, its Separatism
We said above that Bauer, while granting the
necessity of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so on,
nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. In answer to the
question, "Should the working class demand autonomy for the Jewish
people?" Bauer says that "national autonomy cannot be demanded
by the Jewish workers."
According to Bauer, the reason is that
"capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews -- J.
St.) to continue as a nation." In brief, the Jewish
nation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national
autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated. This view of the
fate of the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx
as early as the 'forties, [20] [21]
in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It was repeated by Kautsky in
1903, [22] in reference to the Russian Jews. It is
now being repeated by Bauer in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the
difference, however, that he denies not the present but the future of
the Jewish nation.
Bauer explains the impossibility of preserving
the existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that "the Jews
have no closed territory of settlement." This explanation, in the
main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth. The fact
of the matter is primarily that among the Jews there is no large and
stable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the
nation together, serving not only as its framework but also as a
"national" market. Of the five or six million Russian Jews,
only three to four per cent are connected with agriculture in any way.
The remaining ninety-six per cent are employed in trade, industry, in
urban institutions, and in general are town dwellers; moreover, they are
spread all over Russia and do not constitute a majority in a single
gubernia.
Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas
inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a rule serve
"foreign" nations as manufacturers and traders and as members
of the liberal professions, naturally adapting themselves to the
"foreign nations" in respect to language and so forth. All
this, taken together with the increasing re-shuffling of nationalities
characteristic of developed forms of capitalism, leads to the
assimilation of the Jews. The abolition of the "Pale of
Settlement" would only serve to hasten this process of
assimilation. The question of national autonomy for the Russian
Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character: autonomy is
being proposed for a nation whose future is denied and whose existence
has still to be proved! Nevertheless, this was the curious and
shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress (1905) it
adopted a "national programme" on the fines of national
autonomy.
Two circumstances impelled the Bund to take this step.
The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund as an
organization of Jewish, and only Jewish, Social-Democratic workers. Even
before 1897 the Social-Democratic groups active among the Jewish workers
set themselves the aim of creating "a special Jewish workers'
organization." [23] They founded such an
organization in 1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time
when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet
exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread, and stood out more and more
vividly against the background of the bleak days of Russian
Social-Democracy....
Then came the 1900's. A mass labour movement
came into being. Polish Social-Democracy grew and drew the Jewish
workers into the mass struggle. Russian Social-Democracy grew and
attracted the "Bund" workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the
national framework of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund was
faced with the problem of either merging with the general international
tide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorial
organization. The Bund chose the latter course.
Thus grew up the
"theory" that the Bund is "the sole representative of the
Jewish proletariat." But to justify this strange
"theory" in any "simple" way became impossible. Some
kind of foundation "on principle," some justification "on
principle," was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such a
foundation.
The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian
Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the Bund
would have invented it in order to justify its independent existence
"on principle." Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901 (the
Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a "national programme"
in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).
The second circumstance is the
peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within
compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We have
already said that this position is undermining the existence of the Jews
as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this is an
objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, it provokes a
reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of a
national minority, for a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it
does the vitality of the Jewish "nationality," the Bund could
not avoid being in favour of a "guarantee."
And, having taken
up this position, it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the
Bund could seize upon any autonomy at all, it could only be national
autonomy, i.e., cultural-national autonomy; there could be no
question of territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the Jews
have no definite integral territory. It is noteworthy that the
Bund from the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as a
guarantee of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the
"free development" of nations.
Nor was it fortuitous that the
representative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the Russian
Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as
"institutions which guarantee them (i.e., nations -- J.
St.) complete freedom of cultural development." [24]
A similar proposal was made by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to
the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma.... In this way the
Bund adopted the curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.
We have examined above national autonomy in general. The
examination showed that national autonomy leads to nationalism. We shall
see later that the Bund has arrived at the same end point. But the Bund
also regards national autonomy from a special aspect, namely, from the
aspect of guarantees of the rights of national minorities. Let us
also examine the question from this special aspect. It is all the more
necessary since the problem of national minorities -- and not of the
Jewish minorities alone -- is one of serious moment for
Social-Democracy. And so, it is a question of "institutions
which guarantee" nations "complete freedom of cultural
development" (our italics -- J. St.).
But what are
these "institutions which guarantee," etc.? They are
primarily the "National Council" of Springer and Bauer,
something in the nature of a Diet for cultural affairs. But can
these institutions guarantee a nation "complete freedom of cultural
development"? Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation
against nationalist persecution? The Bund believes it can. But
history proves the contrary. At one time a Diet existed in Russian
Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to guarantee
freedom of "cultural development" for the Poles. But, far from
succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the unequal struggle
against the political conditions generally prevailing in Russia.
A
Diet has been in existence for a long time in Finland, and it too
endeavours to protect the Finnish nationality from
"encroachments," but how far it succeeds in doing so everybody
can see. Of course, there are Diets and Diets, and it is not so
easy to cope with the democratically organized Finnish Diet as it was
with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the decisive factor,
nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the general regime in Russia. If such
a grossly Asiatic social and political regime existed in Russia now as
in the past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go
much harder with the Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of
"encroachments" upon Finland is growing, and it cannot be said
that it has met with defeat....
If such is the case with old,
historically evolved institutions -- political Diets -- still less will
young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble institutions as
"cultural" Diets, be able to guarantee the free development of
nations. Obviously, it is not a question of
"institutions," but of the general regime prevailing in the
country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no
guarantees of "complete freedom for cultural development" of
nationalities. One may say with certainty that the more democratic a
country is the fewer are the "encroachments" made on the
"freedom of nationalities," and the greater are the guarantees
against such "encroachments."
Russia is a semi-Asiatic
country, and therefore in Russia the policy of "encroachments"
not infrequently assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need
hardly be said that in Russia "guarantees" have been reduced
to the very minimum. Germany is, however, European, and she enjoys
a measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that the policy of
"encroachments" there never takes the form of pogroms. In
France, of course, there are still more "guarantees," for
France is more democratic than Germany. There is no need to
mention Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although
bourgeois democracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a
minority or a majority.
Thus the Bund adopts a false position when
it asserts that "institutions" by themselves are able to
guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities. It may
be said that the Bund itself regards the establishment of democracy in
Russia as a preliminary condition for the "creation of
institutions" and guarantees of freedom. But this is not the case.
From the report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund [25]
it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure
"institutions" on the basis of the present system in
Russia, by "reforming" the Jewish community.
"The community," one of the leaders of the Bund said at this
conference, "may become the nucleus of future cultural-national
autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form of self-service on the
part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. The community
form conceals within itself a similar content. They are links in the
same chain, stages in the same evolution." [26]
On this basis, the conference decided that it was necessary to strive
"for reforming the Jewish community and transforming it by legislative
means into a secular institution," democratically organized
(our italics -- J. St.). It is evident that the Bund
considers as the condition and guarantee not the democratization of
Russia, but some future "secular institution" of the Jews,
obtained by "reforming the Jewish community," so to speak, by
"legislative" means, through the Duma:
But we have
already seen that "institutions" in themselves cannot serve as
"guarantees" if the regime in the state generally is not a
democratic one. But what, it may be asked, will be - the position
under a future democratic system? Will not special "cultural
institutions which guarantee," etc., be required even under
democracy? What is the position in this respect in democratic
Switzerland, for example? Are there special cultural institutions in
Switzerland on the pattern of Springer's "National Council"?
No, there are not. But do not the cultural interests of, for
instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority there, suffer for that
reason?
One does not seem to hear that they do. And that is quite
natural: in Switzerland all special cultural "institutions,"
which supposedly "guarantee," etc., are rendered superfluous
by democracy. And so, impotent in the present and superfluous in
the future -- such are the institutions of cultural-national
autonomy, and such is national autonomy. But it becomes still more
harmful when it is thrust upon a "nation" whose existence and
future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national
autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar features
of the "nation," the bad as well as the good, just for the
sake of "saving the nation" from assimilation, just for the
sake of "preserving" it.
That the Bund should take this
dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to
the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the
"Sabbath," "Yiddish," etc. Social-Democracy
strives to secure for all nations the right to use their own
language. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "the
rights of the Jewish language" (our italics -- J. St.)
be championed with "exceptional persistence," and the Bund
itself in the elections to the Fourth Duma declared that it would give
"preference to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake to
defend the rights of the Jewish language." Not the general
right of all nations to use their own language, but the particular
right of the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various
nationalities fight primarily for their own language: the Jews
for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so forth.
The struggle for
the general right of all nations is a secondary matter. You do not have
to recognize the right of all oppressed nationalities to use their own
language; but if you have recognized the right of Yiddish, know that the
Bund will vote for you, the Bund will "prefer" you. But
in what way then does the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?
Social-Democracy strives to secure the establishment of a
compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it
demands that "by legislative means" "the Jewish
proletariat should be guaranteed the right to observe their Sabbath and
be relieved of the obligation to observe another day. "
It
is to be expected that the Bund will take another "step
forward" and demand the right to observe all the ancient Hebrew
holidays. And if, to the misfortune of the Bund, the Jewish workers have
discarded religious prejudices and do not want to observe these
holidays, the Bund with its agitation for "the right to the
Sabbath," will remind them of the Sabbath, it will, so to speak,
cultivate among them "the Sabbatarian spirit. "... Quite
comprehensible, therefore, are the "passionate speeches"
delivered at the Eighth Conference of the Bund demanding "Jewish
hospitals," a demand that was based on the argument that "a
patient feels more at home among his own people," that "the
Jewish worker will not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel
at ease among Jewish shopkeepers."
Preservation of everything
Jewish, conservation of all the national peculiarities of the
Jews, even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation
of the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of
special hospitals -- that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!
Comrade Plekhanov was right a thousand times over when he said
that the Bund "is adapting socialism to nationalism." Of
course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists like him may denounce Plekhanov as a
"demagogue" [27] [28] --
paper will put up with anything that is written on it -- but those who
are familiar with the activities of the Bund will easily realize that
these brave fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth about themselves
and are hiding behind strong language about "demagogy. "...
But since it holds such a position on the national question, the
Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter of organization also, to take
the path of segregating the Jewish workers, the path of formation of
national curiae within Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national
autonomy! And, in fact, the Bund did pass from the theory of
"sole representation" to the theory of "national
demarcation" of workers. The Bund demands that Russian
Social-Democracy should "in its organizational structure introduce
demarcation according to nationalities."
From
"demarcation" it made a "step forward" to the theory
of "segregation." It is not for nothing that speeches were
made at the Eighth Conference of the Bund declaring that "national
existence lies in segregation." Organizational federalism
harbours the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund is
heading for separatism. And, indeed, there is nothing else it can
head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorial organization drives
it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definite integral
territory; it operates on "foreign" territories, whereas the
neighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian Social-Democracies are
international territorial collective bodies. But the result is that
every extension of these collective bodies means a "loss" to
the Bund and a restriction of its field of action.
There are two
alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy as a whole must be
reconstructed on the basis of national federalism -- which will enable
the Bund to "secure" the Jewish proletariat for itself; or the
territorial-international principle of these collective bodies remains
in force -- in which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis of
internationalism, as is the case with the Polish and Lettish
Social-Democracies. This explains why the Bund from the very
beginning demanded "the reorganization of Russian Social-Democracy
on a federal basis." [29] In 1906,
yielding to the pressure from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a
middle path and joined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join?
Whereas the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose
of peaceable joint action, the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war
for a federation. That is exactly what Medem, the leader of the Bundists,
said at the time:
"We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, but in order to
fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one in the
near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head to
foot." [30]
It would be wrong to regard this as an expression of evil intent on
Medem's part. It is not a matter of evil intent, but of the peculiar
position of the Bund, which compels it to fight Russian
Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis of internationalism. And
in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interests of unity.
Finally, matters went so far that the Bund formally broke with Russian
Social-Democracy, violating its statutes, and in the elections to the
Fourth Duma joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the
Polish Social-Democrats. The Bund has apparently found that a
rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity. And so the
"principle" of organizational "demarcation" led to
separatism and to a complete rupture. In a controversy with the
old Iskra [31] on the question of federalism,
the Bund once wrote:
"Iskra wants to assure us that federal relations between
the Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties
between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice
in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does
not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely
instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a
federal character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of
1897."
That was written in 1902. But we are now in the year 1913. We now
have both Russian "practice" and the "experience of
Social-Democracy in Austria." What do they tell us? Let
us begin with "the extremely instructive experience of
Social-Democracy in Austria." Up to 1896 there was a united
Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that year the Czechs at the
International Congress in London for the first time demanded separate
representation, and were given it. In 1897, at the Vienna (Wimberg)
Party Congress, the united party was formally Liquidated and in its
place a federal league of six national "Social-Democratic
groups" was set up. Subsequently these "groups" were
converted into independent parties, which gradually severed contact with
one another. Following the parties, the parliamentary group broke up --
national "clubs" were formed. Next came the trade unions,
which also split according to nationalities. Even the co-operative
societies were affected, the Czech separatists calling upon the workers
to split them up. [32]
We will not dwell on the fact
that separatist agitation weakens the workers' sense of solidarity and
frequently drives them to strike-breaking. Thus "the
extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria"
speaks against the Bund and for the old Iskra. Federalism
in the Austrian party has led to the most outrageous separatism, to the
destruction of the unity of the labour movement. We have seen
above that "practical experience in Russia" also bears this
out. Like the Czech separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken
with the general Russian Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade
unions, the Bundist trade unions, from the outset they were organized on
national lines, that is to say, they were cut off from the workers of
other nationalities. Complete segregation and complete rupture --
that is what is revealed by the "Russian practical experience"
of federalism. It is not surprising that the effect of this state
of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity and
to demoralize them; and the latter process is also penetrating the Bund.
We are referring to the increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish
workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of speech that
was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference of the Bund:
"... We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, as
pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we break them.
Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply to
Jewish workers not being allowed into the factories by not allowing
Polish workers near the benches.... If we do not take this matter
into our own hands the workers will follow others" (our
italics -- J. St.)
That is the way they talk about solidarity at a Bundist conference.
You cannot go further than that in the way of
"demarcation" and "segregation." The Bund has
achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the workers of
different nationalities to the point of conflicts and strike-breaking.
And there is no other course: "If we do not take this matter into
our own hands the workers will follow others...." Disorganization
of the labour movement, demoralization of the Social-Democratic ranks --
that is what the federalism of the Bund leads to. Thus the idea of
cultural-national autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be
even more harmful in Russia than in Austria.
The Caucasions, the Conference of the Liquidators
We spoke above of the waverings of one section of
the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to withstand the
nationalist "epidemic." These waverings were revealed in the
fact that, strange as it may seem, the above-mentioned Social-Democrats
followed in the footsteps of the Bund and proclaimed cultural-national
autonomy. Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as a whole and
cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the Caucasus -- that
is the way these Social-Democrats, who, incidentally, are linked with
the Russian Liquidators, formulate their demand. Listen to their
acknowledged leader, the not unknown N.
"Everybody knows that the Caucasus differs profoundly from the
central gubernias, both as regards the racial composition of its
population and as regards its territory and agricultural development.
The exploitation and material development of such a region require
local workers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to
the local climate and culture. All laws designed to further the
exploitation of the local territory should be issued locally and put
into effect by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the
central organ of Caucasian self-government should extend to
legislation on local questions.... Hence, the functions of the
Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of laws designed to
further the economic exploitation of the local territory and the
material prosperity of the region." [33]
Thus -- regional autonomy for the Caucasus. If we abstract
ourselves from the rather confused and incoherent arguments of N.,
it must be admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy
for the Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution,
which N. does not deny, is indeed essential because of the
peculiarities of its composition and its conditions of life. This was
also acknowledged by the Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at its
Second Congress proclaimed "regional self-government for those
border regions which in respect of their conditions of life and the
composition of their population differ from the regions of Russia
proper." When Martov submitted this point for discussion at
the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds that "the vast
extent of Russia and the experience of our centralized administration
point to the necessity and expediency of regional self-government for
such large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus."
But it follows that regional self-government is to be
interpreted as regional autonomy. But N. goes
further. According to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers
"only one aspect of the question."
"So far we have spoken only of the material development of local
life. But the economic development of a region is facilitated not only
by economic activity but also by spiritual, cultural
activity."... "A culturally strong nation is strong also in
the economic sphere. "... "But the cultural development of
nations is possible only in the national languages."...
"Consequently, all questions connected with the native language
are questions of national culture. Such are the questions of
education! the judicature, the church, literature, art, science, the
theatre, etc.
If the material development of a region unites nations,
matters of national culture disunite them and place each in a separate
sphere. Activities of the former kind are associated with a definite
territory."... "This is not the case with matters of
national culture. These are associated not with a definite territory
but with the existence of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian
language interests a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a
sign of profound ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only
the Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian
church. Armenians of various localities and states take part in the
administration of its affairs. Territory plays no part here. Or, for
instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not only the
Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St.
Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control of all affairs
of national culture must be left to the nations concerned. we proclaim
in favour of cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian
nationalities." [34]
In short, since culture is not territory, and territory is not culture,
cultural-national autonomy is required. That is all N. can say in
the latter's favour. We shall not stop to discuss again
national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its
objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while
being unsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also
meaningless and nonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions. And
for the following reason: Cultural-national autonomy presumes more
or less developed nationalities, with a developed culture and
literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense and
becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus there are a number of
nationalities each possessing a primitive culture, a separate language,
but without its own literature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a
state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and partly continuing
to develop.
How is cultural-national autonomy to be applied to them?
What is to be done with such nationalities? How are they to be
"organized" into separate cultural-national unions, as is
undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy? What is to be
done with the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians,
the Lesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not
possess a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be
attached? Can they be "organized" into national unions? Around
what "cultural affairs" are they to be "organized"?
What is to be done with the Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian
Ossetians are becoming assimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly
assimilated) by the Georgians, while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are
partly being assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to
develop and are creating their own literature? How are they to be
"organized" into a single national union? To what
national union should one attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian
language, but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of
Islam? Shall they be "organized" separately from the Georgians
with regard to religious affairs and together with the Georgians with
regard to other cultural affairs? And what about the Kobuletians,
the Ingushes, the Inghilois?
What kind of autonomy is that which
excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list? No, that
is not a solution of the national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.
But let us grant the impossible and assume that our N.'s
national-cultural autonomy has been put into effect. Where would it lead
to, what would be its results? Take, for instance, the Transcaucasian
Tatars, with their minimum percentage of literates, their schools
controlled by the omnipotent mullahs and their culture permeated by the
religious spirit....
It is not difficult to understand that to
"organize" them into a cultural national union would mean to
place them under the control of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the
tender mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of
spiritual enslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy. But
since when have Social-Democrats made it a practice to bring grist to
the mill of the reactionaries? Could the Caucasian Liquidators
really find nothing better to "proclaim" than the isolation of
the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union which would
place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries? No,
that is no solution of the national question.
The national
question in the Caucasus can be solved only by drawing the belated
nations and nationalities into the common stream of a higher culture.
It is the only progressive solution and the only solution acceptable to
Social-Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable
because it would draw the belated nations into the common cultural
development; it would help them to cast off the shell of small nation
insularity; it would impel them forward and facilitate access to the
benefits of higher culture.
Cultural-national autonomy, however, acts in
a diametrically opposite direction, because it shuts up the nations
within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages of cultural
development and prevents them from rising to the higher stages of
culture. In this way national autonomy counteracts the beneficial
aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies it. That is why the
mixed type of autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and
regional autonomy as proposed by N. is also unsuitable.
This
unnatural combination does not improve matters but makes them worse,
because in addition to retarding the development of the belated nations
it transforms regional autonomy into an arena of conflict between the
nations organized in the national unions. Thus cultural-national
autonomy, which is unsuitable generally, would be a senseless,
reactionary undertaking in the Caucasus. So much for the
cultural-national autonomy of N. and his Caucasian
fellow-thinkers. Whether the Caucasian Liquidators will take
"a step forward" and follow in the footsteps of the Bund on
the question of organization also, the future will show. So far, in the
history of Social-Democracy federalism in organization always preceded
national autonomy in programme. The Austrian Social-Democrats introduced
organizational federalism as far back as 1897, and it was only two years
later (1899) that they adopted national autonomy.
The Bundists spoke
distinctly of national autonomy for the first time in 1901, whereas
organizational federalism had been practiced by them since 1897. The
Caucasian Liquidators have begun from the end, from national autonomy.
If they continue to follow in the footsteps of the Bund they will first
have to demolish the whole existing organizational edifice, which was
erected at the end of the 'nineties on the basis of internationalism.
But, easy though it was to adopt national autonomy, which is still
not understood by the workers, it will be difficult to demolish an
edifice which it has taken years to build and which has been raised and
cherished by the workers of all the nationalities of the Caucasus. This
Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and the eyes of the
workers will be opened to the nationalist character of cultural-national
autonomy.
While the Caucasians are settling the national
question in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written discussion,
the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators has invented a most
unusual method. It is a simple and easy method. Listen to this:
"Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation to
the effect that... it is necessary to demand national-cultural
autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits
of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of
the programme which recognizes the right of every nationality to
self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the
programme."
Thus, first of all they "express no opinion on the merits" of
the question, and then they "declare." An original method....
And what does this original conference "declare"? That
the "demand" for national-cultural autonomy "does not
contradict the precise meaning "of the programme, which recognizes
the right of nations to self-determination. Let us examine this
proposition. The clause on self-determination speaks of the rights
of nations. According to this clause, nations have the right not only of
autonomy but also of secession. It is a question of political
self-determination.
Whom did the Liquidators want to fool when they
endeavoured to misinterpret this right of nations to political
self-determination, which has long been recognized by the whole of
international Social-Democracy? Or perhaps the Liquidators will
try to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves by the sophism
that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict" the
rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given state
agree to arrange their affairs on the basis of cultural-national
autonomy, they, the given sum of nations, are fully entitled to do so
and nobody may forcibly impose a different form of political life
on them. This is both new and clever.
Should it not be added that,
speaking generally, a nation has the right to abolish its own
constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and revert to the old
order on the grounds that the nation, and the nation alone, has the
right to determine its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neither
cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist reaction
"contradicts" the rights of nations. Is that what
the esteemed conference wanted to say? No, not that. It
specifically says that cultural-national autonomy "does not
contradict," not the rights of nations, but "the precise
meaning" of the programme.
The point here is the programme and
not the rights of nations. And that is quite understandable. If it
were some nation that addressed itself to the conference of Liquidators,
the conference might have directly declared that the nation has a right
to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a nation that addressed
itself to the conference, but a "delegation" of Caucasian
Social-Democrats -- bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but
Social-Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the rights of
nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy contradicted the principles
of Social-Democracy, whether it did not "contradict" "the
precise meaning" of the programme of Social-Democracy.
Thus,
the rights of nations and "the precise meaning" of the
programme of Social-Democracy are not one and the same thing. Evidently,
there are demands which, while they do not contradict the rights of
nations, may yet contradict "the precise meaning" of the
programme. For example. The programme of the Social-Democrats
contains a clause on freedom of religion. According to this clause any
group of persons have the right to profess any religion they
please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc.
Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious persecution, be it
of members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does this
mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc., "do not contradict the
precise meaning" of the programme? No, it does not.
Social-Democrats will always protest against persecution of Catholicism
or Protestantism; they will always defend the right of nations to
profess any religion they please; but at the same time, on the basis of
a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, they will
carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism and the religion
of the Orthodox Church in order to achieve the triumph of the socialist
world outlook. And they will do so just because there is no doubt
that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church,
etc., "contradict the precise meaning" of the programme, i.e.,
the correctly understood interests of the proletariat.
The same
must be said of self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange
their affairs as they please; they have a right to preserve any of their
national institutions, whether beneficial or harmful -- nobody can
(nobody has a right to!) forcibly interfere in the life of a
nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democracy will not combat and
agitate against the harmful institutions of nations and against the
inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of
Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence
the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the
way that will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For
this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations to
self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against
the secession of the Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for
the Caucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting the rights
of these nations, do contradict "the precise meaning" of
the programme, i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.
Obviously, "the rights of nations" and the "precise
meaning" of the programme are on two entirely different planes.
Whereas the "precise meaning" of the programme expresses the
interests of the proletariat, as scientifically formulated in the
programme of the latter, the rights of nations may express the interests
of any class -- bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc. -- depending on
the strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand are the duties
of Marxists, on the other the rights of nations, which consist of
various classes. The rights of nations and the principles of
Social-Democracy may or may not "contradict" each other, just
as, say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous
conference of the Liquidators.
They are simply not comparable. But
it follows that the esteemed conference most unpardonably muddled two
entirely different things. The result obtained was not a solution of the
national question but an absurdity, according to which the rights of
nations and the principles of Social-Democracy "do not
contradict" each other, and, consequently; every demand of a nation
may be made compatible with the interests of the proletariat;
consequently, no demand of a nation which is striving for
self-determination will "contradict the precise meaning" of
the programme! They pay no heed to logic....
It was this
absurdity that gave rise to the now famous resolution of the conference
of the Liquidators which declares that the demand for national-cultural
autonomy "does not contradict the precise meaning" of the
programme. But it was not only the laws of logic that were
violated by the conference of the Liquidators. By sanctioning
cultural-national autonomy it also violated its duty to Russian
Social-Democracy. It most definitely did violate "the precise
meaning" of the programme, for it is well known that the Second
Congress, which adopted the programme, emphatically repudiated
cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the congress in
this connection:
"Goldblatt (Bundist): ...1 deem it necessary that special
institutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development
of nationalities, and I therefore propose that the following words be
added to � 8: 'and the creation of institutions which will
guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development.'"
(This, as we know, is the Bund's definition of cultural-national
autonomy. -- J. St.) "Martynov pointed out
that general institutions must be so constituted as to protect
particular interests also. It is impossible to create a special
institution to guarantee freedom for cultural development of the
nationalities. "Yegorov: On the question of
nationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed
to all restrictions upon nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are
not concerned with whether any particular nationality will develop as
such. That is a spontaneous process. "Koltsov: The
delegates from the Bund are always offended when their nationalism is
referred to. Yet the amendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund
is of a purely nationalist character. We are asked to take purely
offensive measures in order to support even nationalities that are
dying out." In the end "Goldblatt's amendment was
rejected by the majority, only three votes being cast for it."
Thus it is clear that the conference of the Liquidators did
"contradict the precise meaning" of the programme. It violated
the programme. The Liquidators are now trying to justify
themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they allege
sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky writes:
"As we know, according to the agreement adopted by the Stockholm
Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its national programme
(pending a decision on the national question by a general Party
congress). This congress recorded that national-cultural autonomy at
any rate does not contradict the general Party programme." [35]
But the efforts of the Liquidators are in vain. The Stockholm Congress
never thought of sanctioning the programme of the Bund -- it merely
agreed to leave the question open for the time being. The brave
Kossovsky did not have enough courage to tell the whole truth. But the
facts speak for themselves. Here they are:
"An amendment was moved by Galin: 'The question of the national
programme is left open in view of the fact that it is not being
examined by the congress.' (For -- 50 votes, against
-- 32.) "Voice: What does that mean -- open? "Chairman:
When we say that the national question is left open, it means that the
Bund may maintain its decision on this question until the next
congress" [36] (our italics. -- J. St.).
As you see, the congress even did "not examine" the question
of the national programme of the Bund -- it simply left it
"open," leaving the Bund itself to decide the fate of its
programme until the next general congress met. In other words, the
Stockholm Congress avoided the question, expressing no opinion on
cultural-national autonomy one way or another. The conference of
the Liquidators, however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion
on the matter, declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and
endorses it in the name of the Party programme. The difference is
only too evident. Thus, in spite of all its artifices, the
conference of the Liquidators did not advance the national question a
single step. All it could do was to squirm before the Bund and the
Caucasian national-Liquidators.
The National Question in Russia
It remains for us to suggest a positive solution
of the national question. We take as our starting point that the
question can be solved only in intimate connection with the present
situation in Russia. Russia is in a transitional period, when
"normal," "constitutional" life has not yet been
established and when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days
of storm and "complications" are ahead. And this gives rise to
the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which is
to achieve complete democratization. It is in connection with this
movement that the national question must be examined.
Thus the
complete democratization of the country is the basis and
condition for the solution of the national question. When seeking
a solution of the question we must take into account not only the
situation at home but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated
between Europe and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of
democracy in Asia is inevitable.
The growth of imperialism in Europe is
not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it
is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets,
cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external
complications and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War [37]
is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quite
possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external
conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may
find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence.
And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such
cases. But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense with
the right of nations to self-determination. Thus, the right of
self-determination is an essential element in the solution of the
national question. Further. What must be our attitude towards
nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the
framework of the whole? We have seen that cultural-national
autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, for
it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom the
march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to every
corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it
leads to the viewpoint in favour of the "demarcation" of
people according to national curiae, the "organization" of
nations, the "preservation" and cultivation of "national
peculiarities" -- all of which are entirely incompatible with
Social-Democracy.
It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists in
the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German
Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois
deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian "kolo." Nor
is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves
involved in nationalism by acclaiming the "Sabbath" and
"Yiddish." There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but
in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in
the "controlling institutions" of which the Bund is arranging,
for a beginning, a "get-together" of the Jewish workers and
bourgeois. Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy. Thus, national
autonomy does not solve the problem.
What, then, is the way out?
The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy
for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the
Caucasus, etc. The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first
of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of
territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite
territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does
not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these
barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way
for division of a different kind, division according to classes.
Finally; it makes it possible to utilize the natural wealth of the
region and to develop its productive forces in the best possible way
without awaiting the decisions of a common centre -- functions which are
not inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.
Thus, regional
autonomy is an essential element in the solution of the national
question. Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact,
homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities.
Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the
Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared,
therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the national
majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order
continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy
and all grounds for fear will vanish.
It is proposed to bind the
dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what the
minorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the
localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them without
complete democratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a
national union when there is complete democratization? What
is it that particularly agitates a national minority? A minority
is discontented not because there is no national union but because it
does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use
its native language and the discontent will pass of itself. A
minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but
because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and
all grounds for discontent will disappear. A minority is
discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does
not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of
movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be
discontented.
Thus, equal rights of nations in all forms
(language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of
the national question. Consequently, a state law based on complete
democratization of the country is required, prohibiting all national
privileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction
on the rights of national minorities. That, and that alone, is the
real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority. One may
or may not dispute the existence of a logical connection between
organizational federalism and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot
dispute the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring
unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, into separatism.
If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy,
passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that
an important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that
is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not
fortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go hand
in hand. It is quite. understandable. Both demand demarcation according
to nationalities. Both presume organization according to nationalities.
The similarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one
case the population as a whole is divided, while in the other it is the
Social-Democratic workers who are divided. We know where the
demarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The
disintegration of a united workers' party, the splitting of trade unions
according to nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national
strikebreaking, complete demoralization within the ranks of
Social-Democracy -- such are the results of organizational federalism.
This is eloquently borne out by the history of Social-Democracy in
Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia. The only cure
for 'this is organization on the basis of internationalism. To
unite locally the workers of all nationalities of Russia into single,
integral collective bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a single
party -- such is the task. It goes without saying that a party
structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes,
wide autonomy for the regions within the single integral party.
The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency of this type
of organization.
If the Caucasians have succeeded in overcoming the
national friction between the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have
succeeded in safeguarding the population against the possibility of
massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of
national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible, and if
it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single current
of a powerful movement, then the international structure of the
Caucasian Social-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing this
about.
The type of organization influences not only practical
work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental life of the
worker. The worker lives the life of his organization, which stimulates
his intellectual growth and educates him. And thus, acting within his
organization and continually meeting there comrades from other
nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggle under
the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued
with the idea that workers are primarily members of one class
family, members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot but
have a tremendous educational value for large sections of the working
class.
Therefore, the international type of organization serves as
a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor
on behalf of internationalism. But this is not the case with an
organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are
organized according to nationality they isolate themselves within their
national shells, fenced off from each other by organizational barriers.
The stress is laid not on what is common to the workers but on
what distinguishes them from each other. In this type of organization
the worker is primarily a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole,
and so on. It is not surprising that national federalism in
organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of national seclusion.
Therefore, the national type of organization is a school of
national narrow-mindedness and stagnation. Thus we are confronted
by two fundamentally different types of organization: the type
based on international solidarity and the type based on the
organizational "demarcation" of the workers according to
nationalities. Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far
been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party
drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in the air.
The Austrian
party fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it.
"Compromise" proved to be not only utopian, but harmful.
Strasser is right when he says that "separatism achieved its first
triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress." [38] The
same is true in Russia. The "compromise" with the federalism
of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended in a
complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm compromise. Ever since
the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union
of the workers locally in a single organization, which would
include workers of all nationalities.
And the Bund has obstinately
persisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907
and in 1908 Russian Social-Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity
should at last be established. from below among the workers of all
nationalities. [39] The Bund, which began with
organizational national autonomy, in fact passed to federalism, only to
end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking with the Russian
Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganization in the
ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair, [40]
for instance. The path of "compromise" must therefore be
discarded as utopian and harmful.
One thing or the other: either
the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic
Party must re-form itself on a basis of "demarcation" of the
workers according to nationalities; or an international type of
organization, in which case the Bund must reform itself on a basis of
territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and
Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of
the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of
Russia. There is no middle course: principles triumph, they do not
"compromise." Thus, the principle of international
solidarity of the workers is an essential element in the solution of
the national question.
