A visitor to tamilnation.org from Malaysia wrote:
"I came to understand that some elements among the
Tamils act as informers and cooperate fully with the
Sinhalese army. How bad is this situation? If it is
so, then how is it that nobody has exposed them and
their deeds? Is it because the fighters want to show
a front of solidarity? I will be thankful for your
explanation."
The matters you raise is an important one. Over the
past two decades, it is true that some Tamils have
acted as informers and have collaborated with the
Sinhala army.
Of course, this is something that has happened in other
occupied countries as well. During Hitler's occupation
of Norway (in World War II) a Norwegian called Quisling
collaborated with the Nazis - his name has now become a
part of the English vocabulary to describe a traitor.
In the case of France, we had the Vichy 'government'.
These agents of the alien ruler, on the one hand,
dispensed favours to sections of the populace and on
the other hand, helped to identify and eliminate those
who resisted alien rule.
In Sri Lanka, the Sinhala authorities have recruited,
from time to time, Tamils to achieve similar
objectives. Some Tamils become willing channels,
through whom the Sinhala ruler dispenses favours to
sections of the Tamil populace, as the price for their
support for alien Sinhala rule - and 'peace'. At the
same time, other Tamils act as informers and identify
those who continue to resist Sinhala rule. These Tamil
informers wear hoods with slits for them to see through
and shake or nod their head as suspected Tamil
supporters of the LTTE are paraded before them. They
have come to be known as 'thalayattis'.
The irony in the Sri Lankan case, is that many of these
'thalayattis', belong to Tamil 'militant' groups which
at one time, had the liberation of Tamil Eelam as their
stated goal. Indeed, these 'militant' groups which now
work alongside with the Sinhala government continue to
use their old names - PLOTE (the People's Liberation
Organisation of Tamil Eelam), TELO (Tamil Eelam
Liberation Organisation), EPRLF (Eelam People's
Revolutionary Liberation Front) etc!
The reason, perhaps, is not far to seek. Each of these
groups started life as a militant response to alien
Sinhala rule. But the growth of militancy does not
follow a preordained order and pattern. Initially each
militant group believes that it alone can lead the
Tamil people to the promised land. However, an armed
resistance movement is no afternoon tea party. It
requires both skill and commitment of a high order. The
commitment is a commitment of one's life to the cause
of liberation - and not every body is able to maintain
that commitment as the suffering and pain mount. Again,
not everybody has the skill and acumen to survive,
consolidate and direct an armed resistance movement -
and retain its integrity.
For instance, with India's involvement in the 1980s,
some of the militant groups relied on Indian support
more than others. India's own foreign
policy objectives were eventually seen to be at
variance with the demand for Tamil Eelam.
Those groups which were more dependent on Indian
support for their survival, were more easily persuaded
to the view that it was unwise to continue to struggle
for Tamil Eelam in the face of Indian opposition.
And, unsurprisingly, the Indian intelligence
services in Tamil Nadu, and the IPKF in Sri Lanka, (in
1987/88) were not slow to make use of these differences
between the militant groups. Eduardo Marino reported
to International Alert in December 1987:
"Indian Intelligence services in Tamil Nadu, and
the IPKF in Sri Lanka, have been making use of the
rivalry and violent bickering between the LTTE and
the other Tamil militant groups.
Moreover, India has obviously exacerbated the
intra-Tamil militant conflict by rewarding materially
- offering to do it politically in future as well -
the assistance received from PLOTE, TELO and EPRLF to
identify LTTE members living underground with the
population, and also in the refugee camps - a process
of identification that the recently arrived Indian
soldiers cannot obviously do. This is one of the
oldest classical tactics by occupation armies...
....the Tamil people by and large seem to resent such
a fratricidal mercenarisation of their youngsters,
which corrupts a situation already vile enough. Also,
information-gathering tactics such as the use of
relief and recourse to mercenarisation suggest that
the population has not been volunteering information
to the Indian Army which, in turn, may suggest either
or both of two things : that by and large the Tamil
population has turned, if only passively, against the
Indian Army, and that popular support for the LTTE is
more solid and widespread that anyone anywhere seems
to want to acknowledge..."
One result of the actions taken by the LTTE against the TELO in 1986 and
the EPRLF in 1987 (though such actions were directed to
secure the integrity of the struggle for Tamil Eelam)
was that the remnants of these groups, later found
refuge in the welcoming hands of the Sri Lanka
authorities - and Sri Lanka, (as indeed India, before
it) sought to use these ex militant groups to further
undermine the Tamil struggle. However, the numbers
involved were only a few hundred at most.
Here, Velupillai
Pirabaharan's remarks on Maha Veerar Naal, 1996
bear repetition:
"From the beginning up to now, we are resolutely
committed to our cause....It is because of our firm commitment to our
cause we have our importance, individuality and
history."
Having said that, it is generally true that securing
intelligence is perhaps the most important part of any
campaign against a guerrilla movement - particularly
when that movement enjoys broad based support among the
people. To secure intelligence, the enemy will need to
get informers who are (or were) in touch with the
activities of the guerrilla movement.
The enemy may also make careful efforts to infiltrate a
guerrilla movement, by using individual grievances that
a person may have, family connections and so on. And
where the situation demands it, this will be backed up
by cash inducements. Mark Lloyd, in his recent book
'Special Forces - The Changing Face of Warfare'
comments:
"(This infiltration) is best achieved by targeting
a participant whose heart is not in it or who is
suffering from obvious family pressures. Initial
meetings with the target may only be conducted by
highly trained operators, and for obvious reasons
must take place in the utmost secrecy. The 'need to
know' principle, whereby only those within the
intelligence network who actively require details of
the agent are given them, must be imposed
rigidly.."
In recent years, the LTTE has, from time to time,
taken action against those who have been proved to be
informers and collaborators. At the same time, it
appears that the LTTE is not unaware of the danger that
such 'actions' by a guerrilla movement (without
permanent courts of law where traitors may be charged
and their guilt determined according to law), may lay
it open to the charge of acting 'arbitrarily'.
The principles of natural justice demand that no one
shall be punished without being heard, that those who
judge shall be impartial and not moved by personal
considerations. Again, justice must not only be done
but must also be (publicly) seen to done. These are not
matters simply of procedural law or social contract.
They are deep rooted and seem to touch our innate
(natural) sense of justice - and humanity.
In the absence of an established judicial system, a
guerrilla movement will need to take care to ensure
that any action that it takes against a 'traitor' does
in fact accord with the principles of natural justice -
however difficult that such an approach may sometimes
appear to be for those on the ground, engaged as they
are in a daily battle for survival against an enemy
with a great reservoir of material resources.
An internal contradiction within the Tamil
people cannot be addressed in the same way as the
external contradiction between the Tamil people and the
Sinhala people.
Any action that the LTTE may take against the
Sinhala armed forces in combat will be acknowledged as
justified without need for further elucidation - and
will strengthen the solidarity of the Tamil people.
But, any action that the LTTE may take against a Tamil
(even though he be a traitor) sets one Tamil (family)
against other Tamils, and will divide and erode the
solidarity of the Tamil people, unless the justice of
the action and the reasons for the action are publicly
known and accepted.
The Tamil people are a people not without common-sense
and they will have no sympathy with those who are
proven traitors and who have, by their actions, placed
the lives of those who are struggling for freedom at
risk. In the end, a guerrilla movement derives its
strength from the people whose cause it represents -
and it will need to place its trust on the wisdom of
that people. Indeed, if it is to succeed, it has no
other option.
Unless the actions taken by the guerrilla movement are
seen to be patently just, public support for the
guerrilla movement will erode and the 'desire of
waverers' to cross over to the enemy may increase. And
the enemy will spare no effort to promote this
movement.
This may lead to further information being made
available to the enemy and further retaliatory 'action'
by the guerrilla movement against the 'new' informers -
a vicious cycle that is often deliberately encouraged
and directed by the enemy to lead ultimately to the
disintegration of support for the guerrilla movement.
Mark Lloyd, comments in 'Special Forces - The Changing
Face of Warfare' :
"This policy (leading to disintegration) worked
with excellent results against the Mau Mau in Kenya
and against the communist terrorists (sic) in Malaya,
and to a lesser extent against various other
guerrilla organisations in South America.."
The responses of the LTTE to the activities of some
Tamil elements who are co-operating with the Sinhala
government, suggest that it is mindful, on the one
hand, of the dangers posed by informers, and on the
other hand, of the difficulties of responding to such
dangers, within the framework of a guerrilla movement
without a stable judicial system. But, that is not to
say that the LTTE has always succeeded in its efforts
to address these issues.
