The air is full of talks about talks. It all started
with President Premadasa's statement on the 8th of July
1990 that "it is only with the involvement of the
international community in a manner acceptable to us
that the dialogue (with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam) can recommence."
President Premadasa did not, however, specify the
sort of involvement that he was thinking of, nor
whether he had any mediators in mind. However, it is
unlikely that he would have made the public declaration
that he did, without having thought through some of
these attendant matters of concern.
A few days after President Premadasa's statement,
questions were raised in the Sri Lankan Parliament by
the Sinhala opposition alleging that the UK High
Commission in Colombo was involved in some way with the
mediating process.
Again, a week or so later, the Australian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr.Gareth Evans visited Sri Lanka
to discuss the Tamil question. On the one hand
Mr.Gareth Evans was critical of the LTTE in resorting
to armed resistance, and on the other hand he refused
to accede to Sri Lanka's request for arms supplies.
International mediation - but without
India
In the meantime, President Premadasa modified his
stand somewhat and said that though his government
believed in building a healthy relationship with the
outside world, no country would be allowed to 'meddle'
in the island's internal affairs.
He went on to accuse the LTTE of making concerted
efforts to bring India into the picture and declared
that the problem did not concern India and was a matter
that 'has to be resolved by the government of Sri Lanka
without external interference'.
But it appears that it was not only the 'concerted
efforts' of the LTTE that concerned President
Premadasa. India Abroad reported in its issue of the
20th of July that the Sri Lankan "authorities are
perturbed over the arrival of former senior Cabinet
Minister Gamini Dissanayake in New Delhi. Without
naming him, the state controlled Sunday Observer said
in a front page box:
'Indian circles whisper that he had been picked
up by agents of RAW to sabotage current moves to
bring about peace through the involvement of the
international community which India may not
approve.'
But the paper failed to say how Dissanayake who was
dropped by President Premadasa in February this year,
would achieve this objective. Dissanayake was one of
the architects of the Indo Sri Lanka agreement of
1987.
The inference was clear. Whilst President Premadasa
would find mediation by the 'international community'
acceptable, he did not want India meddling in Sri
Lanka's 'internal affairs'. In President Premadasa's
lexicon, the 'international community' may include
India but did not mean India alone. Be that as it
may, it was clear that the stand of the Indian
government to the mediatory process, had become a
matter of central importance.
What then, was the stand of the Indian
government?
What then, was the stand of the Indian government? A
week before President Premadasa's statement, the Indian
government had, expressed its concern that more than
21,000 refugees have arrived in Tamil Nadu since the
outbreak of the recent hostilities. It had also
expressed its concern at the possible involvement of
'third countries' (Pakistan and Israel) in Sri Lanka in
view of the flare up. Prime Minister V.P.Singh also
declared in an interview with Frontline:
'Whilst we stand for the sovereignty and integrity
of all neighbours we also have concern for the life
of the people of Indian origin, their safety,
security and their democratic aspirations.'
The Indian government sent two navy vessels to the
Indian side of the narrow Palk Straits presumably to
'ensure safe passage of Tamil refugee boats across'.
Significantly, the Indian government did not seek to
impose a blockade on traffic between Jaffna and Tamil
Nadu across the Palk Strait.
At the same time, Indian External Affairs Minister,
Inder Kumar Gujral, at high level talks with Prime
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in the Kremlin on the 23rd of
July, outlined India's proposal to share costs with Sri
Lanka to maintain Tamil refugees on Sri Lankan soil,
away from the theatre of violence in the
north-east.
India Abroad reported in its issue of the 3rd of
August that the Soviet Union had endorsed India's
proposal and further that:
'The proposal was mooted to Sri Lankan Foreign
Secretary Bernard Tilakratne when he came here
earlier this month and followed up in talks last week
with Presidential Adviser, Bradman Weerakoon.
Following this, Ranjan Wijeratne, Minister of State
for Defence, offered to relocate the Tamil Refugees
in Sri Lanka at his post cabinet briefing...
New Delhi had been worried for some time at the way
some of Karunanidhi's officials had taken a pronounced
pro-LTTE stance and were covertly assisting the group
in recruiting and training cadres from among refugees
for its separatist war against the Sri Lankan
government. The Indian government would not be averse
to situating these camps anywhere in Sri Lanka, even
near Colombo, so long as the refugees feel safe and do
not see the necessity of crossing the seas to Tamil
Nadu.'
'It is imperative to move out the (Tamil) people
en masse from the Jaffna peninsula'…
Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne appears to have
taken India's proposal a stage further by declaring in
the Sri Lankan Parliament on the 10th of August:
'It is imperative to move out the (Tamil)
people en masse from the Jaffna peninsula to enable
the security forces to deal with the LTTE and thrash
them out of sight. Once the civilians are vacated,
the LTTE leaders can decide whether to face the
bullets or swim across the Palk Strait to their bosom
friends in Tamil Nadu.'
Faced with this declaration of genocidal intent, the
LTTE Central Committee Member, Mr. Sathasivam
Krishnakumar appealed from London to the Government of
India on the 11th of August:
'There are 9 lakhs of Tamils in the Jaffna
peninsula. The Sri Lankan government has said it
would drive the entire Tamil population from the
peninsula and fight the LTTE. It shows that this is a
war and a genocide is definitely taking place. India
should not look at it as a a secessionist problem but
view it as an issue where the Tamil race is being
subjected to genocide. The only solution is to create
a separate State for ourselves. The Tamils should
have an army for themselves. There can be no other
solution to this. Therefore this is not an argument
for secessionism. This is only an attempt to protect
our people'.
Mr.Krishnakumar's appeal from London reflected an
earlier statement by the LTTE's Political Adviser,
Anton Balasingham, in an interview with journalists,
reported in the Hindu on the 5th of August:
'I think that India can play a role
diplomatically, because whether Sri Lanka likes it or
not, Sri Lanka is of strategic importance to India.
The LTTE would be opposed to any form of
international military intervention such as a U.N.
peace keeping force. They were not in favour of an
international effort which would circumvent
India.'
The international frame..
The interest shown by members of the 'international
community', during recent months, in the conflict in
Sri Lanka, focuses attention yet again on the
international frame of the Tamil national liberation
struggle. Recent happenings in Eastern Europe have
underlined the political reality that today, we are
moving from a bipolar world of confrontation into a
multi polar one, not so much of cooperation but of
competition and manoeuvre.
It would be unwise to look at events simply
through cold war eyes. We see this, for instance,
in the stance taken by the Soviet Union in relation to
the current Iraqi - Kuwait war. Whilst the Soviet Union
has condemned the invasion, it has also kept open its
avenues of communication with the Iraqi government and
seeks to play the role of an influential mediator.
That the Indian government should have considered it
necessary to raise the Tamil question at discussions
with the Soviet Prime Minister and secure the
endorsement of the Soviet Union is not without
significance. In so far as the Indian region is
concerned, India continues to have Soviet support for
its role as a regional power and the United States,
will no doubt, pay due regard to that political
reality.
Again, whilst V.P.Singh's Indian government
maintains relatively friendly relations with the United
States, it is crucial to an understanding of India's
foreign policy, to recognise that India is a large
country with a large market and therefore a relatively
large, powerful and influential 'national'
bourgeoisie.
Whilst such a national bourgeoisie may have links
with the industrialised West, at the same time it has
also sought to protect its own interests by securing
the continuance of import controls and licensing of
industries. India seeks to build its own strength
and compete on more equal terms in the world market and
it feels that it has the capacity to succeed.
Successive Indian governments have been unwilling to
'open up' the Indian economy to foreign imports and
this has remained a bone of contention between the U.S.
and India. In a sense, this contradiction is structural
and will tend to grow rather than lessen in the years
to come.
A US diplomat in Washington in early 1985, put it in
rather direct terms: 'India is not a super power and
should not seek to behave as one'. But in the
increasingly multi polar world towards which we are
moving, viewpoints expressed in such harsh terms, may
become less significant, as India may rightly have
aspirations towards playing a larger role as one of the
greater powers of the world.
When you say 'India' which 'India' are you
talking about?"…
Ofcourse, when one speaks of 'India', one is
reminded of something that an Indian who works for a
human rights Organisation in Geneva said sometime in
early 1985:
"You know, the current joke is that in India, the
upper middle class and many Parliamentarians are pro
Western, the bureaucrats and the defence
establishment are pro Soviet and the revolutionaries
are pro Chinese - and so, when you say 'India' which
'India' are you talking about?"
Today, the fact that V.P.Singh's government is a
minority government dependent on the support of both
the C.P.(M) and the B.J.P. lends even greater
significance to the question 'which India are you
talking about?'
The actions of the Indian government, from time
to time, can be properly understood only in the context
of the interplay of the different forces within the
Indian political frame. But here too, it is to the
nuances of the various relationships that one must look
- manoeuvre and not confrontation is the order of the
day. But, the broad elements of India's strategic
policy remain clear.
The Indian government seeks to deny any intermediary
role to extra regional powers in the affairs of the
Indian region and it seeks to obtain the support of the
Soviet Union to secure this end.
In what way does President Premadasa plan to use
the international frame to his
advantage?…
If these are some of the parameters of the
international frame, in what way does President
Premadasa plan to use this frame to his advantage? His
government has adopted a twin track approach to further
its objectives - the 'stick and carrot' approach.
On the one hand it is engaged in widespread
aerial bombardment of the Tamil civilian population
coupled with extra judicial killings of hundreds of
Tamil civilians in those areas which are within the
control of the Sri Lankan army. At the same time it
seeks to isolate the Tamil people from the LTTE and
thereby weaken both the Tamil people and the
LTTE.
On the other hand, it talks of 'de militarized
zones' and 'mediation'. Defence Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne gives expression to the 'rough, tough '
approach whilst the soft spoken Minister for
Industries, Mr.Ranil Wickremasinghe, talks about
'political solutions'.
Jeff and Mutt Act - or stick and carrot
It is what was once described by the United States
Supreme Court as the 'Jeff and Mutt' act - Mr.Ranil
Wickremasinghe plays the soft and kind Jeff to
Mr.Ranjan Wijeratne's rough and tough Mutt act. But,
ofcourse, both Jeff and Mutt are in it together and
their actions are intended to serve President
Premadasa's effort to 'soften up' Tamil resistance and
push the LTTE to 'talks' in the most unfavourable
conditions, so that the subjugation of the Tamil people
within the constitutional frame of a unitary Sri Lanka
can be satisfactorily concluded.
But in order that it may implement this policy of
'stick and carrot', the Sri Lankan government must
obtain arms and aid from 'the international community'.
India Abroad reported in its issue of the 13th of
July:
"Locked in an increasingly brutal battle for
territory in its war ravaged northern and eastern
provinces, the Sri Lankan government is scouring the
world markets for weapons to fight the Tamil
separatist movement spearheaded by the LTTE.
Desperately in need of counter insurgency equipment,
including helicopter gunships, mine resistant vehicles,
armoured cars, night vision sights, artillery and
ammunition, Sri Lanka is seeking weapons from China,
Pakistan, Britain, South Korea, Singapore and
others...
At the end of last year, Sri Lanka earmarked $255
million for defence spending for 1990. The
supplementary estimate of $125 million approved last
month has pushed the military budget to $380 million.
Sri Lanka is now one of the most militarized nations in
South Asia.
Since the current fighting in the north and east is
expected to be drawn out, Sri Lanka will be forced to
divert some of its resources from development to the
military, pushing defence spending even higher.
The Washington based Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency has estimated that between 1983 and 1987, Sri
Lanka imported more than $95 million worth of military
equipment, of which $40 million worth came from China,
currently the biggest single arms supplier. Sri Lanka
has also been buying weapons from Italy, West Germany,
Israel, South Africa, Yugoslavia and the United
States."
The dependence of Sri Lanka for arms and aid on
external sources...
The dependence of Sri Lanka for arms and aid on
external sources has provided the 'international
community' with the necessary leverage to persuade Sri
Lanka to accept the mediatory path - that is, so long
as the broad interests of the 'international community'
in the Indian region are also furthered.
Let us recognise that there is no such thing as a
free lunch. The 'international community' has also
sought to bring some pressure to bear on Tamil opinion
to recognise the urgent need to start talks. On
occasions, this has been done by open statements by
western government sources which statements are
critical of the present LTTE campaign in the north and
east. A recent instance was the carefully worded
statement of the UK High Commissioner in Madras that
the LTTE was 'at the moment' carrying on a terrorist
campaign but that he saw no reason to close the LTTE
office in London, because their activities in the UK
did not contravene English law.
The 'international community' has ofcourse,
recognised for sometime that in relation to any
mediatory process to settle the conflict in Sri Lanka,
India would be unwilling to surrender its regional role
to a power outside the Indian region.
The 'international community' through its support
for the Sri Lankan government with arms and aid, has
sought to bring home to India that it cannot resolve
the conflict on its own, without the involvement of the
'international community'.
At the same time it is well known that it was
India's concerns which led Indira Gandhi's government
to give covert support to the Tamil militant movement
in 1980s. Today, the threat that India may once again
give such support, may serve as a restraint on the
extent of the aid and arms that the 'international
community' may give the Sri Lankan government.
Again, both India and the so called 'international
community' do share a common interest in securing
stability in the Indian region - and they may have both
probably come to recognise that stability cannot be
achieved by pumping more and more arms into the
region.
India may support mediation …
It may be thought therefore that a stage has been
reached today that, in relation to the conflict in Sri
Lanka, even though India may be unwilling to allow a
country from outside the region to intervene as a
mediator, India may support a mediating process
initiated by say, a non governmental agency,
particularly if the agency itself had some 'non
aligned' credentials and if India was assured of its
own say in the mediating process once it was underway -
however difficult this latter safeguard may be a
difficult one to structure.
Such an approach would presumably be acceptable to
the 'international community' which clearly recognises
that it will not be possible to ignore India's role in
any mediating process involving affairs in the Indian
region.
The bottom line however will be that any such
mediation by an agency from outside India, will erode
the fundamental premise of India's strategic policy -
and that is to deny any intermediary role to extra
regional powers in the affairs of South Asia. This,
then is the crux of the matter.
To put it another way, whilst President Premadasa
is willing to accept an erosion of the sovereignty of
Sri Lanka by accepting 'international' mediation, India
may be less willing to accept an erosion of its role in
the Indian region, which such 'international' mediation
may involve.
In what way, may the struggle of the Tamils of
Eelam be taken forward?
In the context of this matrix of power influences,
in what way, may the struggle of the Tamils of Eelam
for national self determination be taken forward?
Because in the same way as India has its own interests,
and the so called 'international community' has its own
interests, and the Sri Lankan government has its own
interests, the Tamils of Eelam too have their interests
- interests for which many thousands of Tamils have so
willingly given their lives during the past several
years.
What then should be our response to the mediatory
process? It appears that three matters arise for
consideration. Should we talk? Who should be the
preferred mediator? What shall we talk about?
We are a reasonable people, and our struggle for
national self determination is a reasonable cause. We
should not fear to talk. What do we gain by talking? On
the one hand, participation in an international
mediatory process will give formal international
recognition to our struggle.
Again, whilst, in the end, the strength of the Tamil
people to defend both north and east and the strength
of the Sri Lankan government to continue its onslaught
on the Tamil people will have much to do with the
success that our struggle will achieve, we need to
recognise that the 'international community' has the
capacity to help President Premadasa to sustain the war
effort.
However, they will do so only if such a step will
secure stability in Sri Lanka and in the Indian region.
The talks will afford a forum for the Tamil people to
bring home to the 'international community' that
stability will come to the Indian region only if the
'international community' use their not inconsiderable
influence on the Sri Lankan government, to put into
place structures which recognise the right of self
determination of the Tamils of Eelam.
National liberation struggles cannot be easily
suppressed and a genocidal onslaught on the Tamils of
Eelam will eventually lead to a consolidation of the
feelings of solidarity amongst more than 50 million
Tamils in the Indian region.
Again, it would not have escaped the notice of the
'international community' that though President
Premadasa's government has been responsible for the
killings of more than 30,000 persons in the South
during a period of less than two years, the JVP has
recently staged a resurgence in Sinhala areas.
An international mediatory process, properly
handled, can serve to focus attention on the central
issues of the Tamil national liberation struggle and
help to show that our struggle is not in opposition to
the search for stability in the Indian region, but that
on the contrary, the success of our struggle will
secure such stability.
Who should be our preferred mediator?
Should our preferred mediator be Australia? Or the
United Kingdom? Or the Commonwealth Secretariat? Or
Norway? Or the European Community? Or a Non
Governmental Agency? Or an appointee of the Secretary
General of the United Nations? Or India? These
questions reduce themselves to the question whether the
primary mediatory role should be played by the so
called 'international community' or by India.
It would appear that President Premadasa does not
welcome India as the mediator and this may be a
reflection of his dependence on his patrons in the
'international community'. But though President
Premadasa may seek to deny the links of the Sinhala
people with India, we are Tamils and we do not deny our
links with the Indian sub continent.
It is not only a matter of geography. It is also a
matter of our history. We share an Indian heritage with
our brothers and sisters of India. The national
liberation struggle of the Tamils of Eelam cannot be,
will not be and is not in opposition to the interests
of the people of India.
The long term interests of the Tamils of Eelam
lie within structures that will need to be developed to
strengthen the economic and political union of the
several nations which belong to the Indian
region.
It is true that we live in an increasingly small
world and that we need to recognise the international
influences at work. By all means let us open our
windows to the world, but let us not get blown off our
feet - let us ensure that our feet are firmly rooted in
our own heritage - and that heritage is India.
It is not that the 'international community' has
no role to play in the mediatory process. It has. But
the national liberation struggle of the Tamils of Eelam
is taking place in the Indian region and the mediatory
process must recognise that India's role is not of
peripheral but of primary importance.
What shall we talk about?
Given the genocidal attack launched on the Tamil
people, which continues today in our homelands, we must
secure that the talks themselves are not utilised by
the Sri Lankan government to perpetuate the subjugation
of the Tamils of Eelam. The talks must be structured in
such a way so as to lead to a meaningful dialogue in
respect of the central issues of the struggle.
Here, let us remind those who continue to talk today
about 'devolution' as the way to resolve the conflict,
that more than 60 years have passed since we first
talked about 'devolution' in 1928 and that we have
moved from Provincial Councils to Regional Councils and
from Regional Councils to District Councils and from
District Councils to Development Councils and again to
Provincial Councils. We have had the 'early
consideration' of Mrs.Srimavo Bandaranaike and the
'earnest consideration' of the late Mr. Dudley
Senanayake. There has been no shortage of Committees
and Commissions, of reports and recommendations on
'devolution'.
But the failure of the Sinhala majority to genuinely
'devolve' power was no accidental omission. Because,
whilst the talking continued for more than 60 years,
the relentless attempt to 'integrate' and 'assimilate'
the Tamils of Eelam also continued - unabated and with
increasing ferocity, within the frame work of a so
called 'parliamentary democracy' in a unitary
state.
Whilst democracy may mean acceding to the rule of
the majority, democracy also means government by
discussion and persuasion. It is the belief that the
minority of today may become the majority of tomorrow
that ensures the stability of a functioning
democracy.
But in Ceylon, where a unitary state, has sought to
govern a territory inhabited by two peoples, the
arithmetic of democracy has resulted in the continued
and permanent dominance of one people by another. The
reality of democracy in Ceylon is that no Tamil has
ever been be elected to a predominantly Sinhala
electorate and no Sinhalese has ever been elected to a
predominantly Tamil electorate. And so the practise of
democracy within the confines of a unitary state has
inevitably resulted in rule by a permanent ethnic
majority.
The Tamils of Eelam are not only a people, but
clearly, they are also a people who are ruled by an
alien people who do not speak their language and who
do not share their culture and their heritage, and
who, today, seek to perpetuate their rule by armed
might.
The law of nations declares that a people who
are subjugated by an alien people are entitled to the
right of self determination and it is to secure this
right of self determination, guarantied by
international law, that the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam have engaged in an armed struggle against
the Sri Lankan government for more than 17
years.
Let us remind those who continue to talk about
the so called 'devolution' of power, that devolution
means that power 'devolves' from some higher body,
legitimately clothed with the power of the state.
Devolution means that the power that is so devolved is
subject to the control and direction of that higher
body.
The Tamils of Eelam do not seek a so called
'devolution' of power which is subject to the control
and direction of a Sinhala government - but they are
certainly prepared to sit and talk, as equals, about
the way in which the Tamil nation and the Sinhala
nation may live in peace and harmony in the island of
Ceylon.
Any effort to settle the conflict must surely
begin with the open recognition that there are two
peoples - the Tamil people and the Sinhala
people
The national liberation struggle of the Tamils of
Eelam is not the expression of an exaggerated
nationalism. The Tamils of Eelam are not chauvinists.
They know that they are a nation but they also know
that no nation is an island.
The Tamil people do not deny the existence of the
Sinhala nation in Ceylon. They recognise the existence
of the Sinhala people as a people. The question is
whether the Sinhala people are ready and willing to
recognise the Tamils of Eelam as a people and talk to
the representatives of the Tamil people on equal terms.
It is this which led the Tamil people to declare at the
Thimpu
Talks on the 17th of August 1985 :
"...we say, very respectfully, please understand
that we too are a people and please deal with us on
that basis, or not at all. Please do not give us the
niceties of legal interpretations. Please tell us
straight: do you regard us as a people or not? We are
here because we seek to engage you in the serious
business of talking about the problems that have
arisen between the Sinhala people and the Tamil
people. And that is why, as a reasonable people, we
say at the beginning, please tell us with whom do you
say you are talking with?... And for our part, we
declare here at Thimpu, without rancour and with
patience, that we shall speak at Thimpu, or for that
matter any where else, on behalf of the Tamil nation
or not at all..."
This approach is basic and fundamental to any
question about what we shall talk about. Because,
on the answer to this basic question, depends not only
the political status of the parties to any negotiating
process intended to settle the conflict, but also the
nature and content of any political solution, and the
political will of both the Tamil people and the Sinhala
people to work for the implementation of that which may
be agreed.
The question whether in Sri Lanka today, there are
two nations, the Tamil nation and the Sinhala nation,
is a question which addresses itself openly and
directly to the claims of an exaggerated Sinhala
nationalism which has sought to feed on the latent fear
of the Sinhala people of the Tamils of neighbouring
Tamil Nadu in South India and which has sought to
encourage the belief that a 'Sinhala national identity'
can be secured only at the expense of erasing the
identity of the Tamils as a 'people' in Sri Lanka, if
not now, at least at some future date.
It is a Sinhala chauvinism which has sought to
assimilate and integrate the Tamil people into a so
called 'Sri Lankan nation' within the confines of an
unitary state whose main official language is Sinhala
and whose official religion is Buddhism - a Sinhala
chauvinism which in pursuance of its objectives, has
logically, sought to deny the existence of the Tamil
nation in Eelam, and which in addition seeks to
masquerade as 'Sri Lankan nationalism' by denying the
existence of the Sinhala nation as well.
If it is the case that the existence of the Tamil
nation is denied, then it must necessarily follow that
talks conducted on the basis of such denial, are
intended to secure the evolution of a single
homogeneous Sinhala nation, masquerading as the so
called 'Sri Lankan nation' in the island of Ceylon.
The concerns of the Tamil people for their 'physical
security, employment and education' cannot be resolved
by a negotiating process unless the Sinhala people
recognise the Tamils as a people and the two people,
together fashion a constitutional structure on the
basis of such recognition.
It surely stands to reason that any effort to
settle the conflict between the Tamil people and the
Sinhala people must begin with the open recognition
that in the island of Ceylon, there are two peoples -
the Tamil people and the Sinhala people.
It will be idle to pretend that equity will be
achieved through a negotiating process which does not
itself commence and continue on an equitable footing.
If this equitable footing is achieved, then that which
the Tamil people jointly and unanimously declared at
Thimpu in 1985 contains the answer to the question:
what shall we talk about?
"It is our considered view that any meaningful
solution to the Tamil national question must be based
on the following four cardinal principles -
1. recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a
nation
2. recognition of the existence of an
identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon
3. recognition of the right of self
determination of the Tamil nation
4. recognition of the right to citizenship and
the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon
the island as their country.
"Different countries have fashioned different
systems of governments to ensure these principles. We
have demanded and struggled for an independent Tamil
state as the answer to this problem arising out of
the denial of these basic rights of our people...
However, in view of our earnest desire for peace, we
are prepared to give consideration to any set of
proposals, in keeping with the above-mentioned
principles, that the Sri Lankan government may place
before us."
It should not be beyond the good sense and the
capacity of the parties to a negotiating process
structured on these lines, to resolve the conflict
between the Tamil people and the Sinhala people - a
conflict which has taken such a heavy toll in human
suffering.
Two nations cannot be compelled to live together by
force of arms. But they may agree to live together by
force of reason. The question is: on what terms? Here,
it will be futile to straight jacket the political
reality on the ground into constitutional models
belonging to a different time and place. On the
contrary, the need is to work out constitutional
structures which accord with the poltical reality on
the ground - and that reality is that in the island of
Ceylon there are two nations, the Tamil nation and the
Sinhala nation.
The Tamil national liberation struggle is by no
means unique. If the post war years from 1945 to the
1980s belonged to the colonial liberation movements,
the 1990s will prove to be the decade
of post colonial nationalism.
We hear the voice of emergent nations being raised
within existing state boundaries in the Soviet Union,
in Eastern Europe, in Yugoslavia, in Iraq, and in the
Indian region.
In Western Europe, we see the eroding of the powers
of existing states, in the opposite direction, by the
maturing trans state role of the European
Community.
In Sri Lanka the challenge will be to
create structures which on the one hand recognise the
political force generated by the two nations which
exist in the island of Ceylon and which on the other
hand recognises that nations do not live in the
stratosphere but on land, in relation to each other -
and with each other.
