Report of the UN Secretary-General
on the situation concerning Western Sahara
Peace plan for self-determination
of the people of Western Sahara - Baker Plan II
S/2003/565, Security Council
23 May 2003
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1469 (2003) of 25 March 2003, by which the Council,
reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara, in
particular resolution 1429 (2002) of 30 July 2002, extended the
mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 May 2003 and requested me to provide a
report on the situation concerning Western Sahara by 19 May,
including the views of the parties to the proposal that was
presented to them by my Personal Envoy in January 2003. The present
report covers developments since my previous report to the Council
on the situation concerning Western Sahara, dated 16 January 2003
(S/2003/59).
II. Developments on the ground
A. Activities of my Special Representative
2. During the reporting period, my Special Representative for
Western Sahara, William Lacy Swing (United States of America),
continued to maintain regular contacts with representatives of the
parties. He met regularly with officials of the Government of
Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberaci�n de Sagu�a el-Hamra
y del R�o de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) in Laayoune and the Tindouf
area, in order to keep an open channel of communication with them
and to review the situation on the ground. Mr. Swing also met
regularly with senior officials of the parties and of neighbouring
countries during his visits to Rabat in February and to Tindouf,
Algiers and Nouakchott in April. 3. From 4 to 7 March, my Special
Representative met with senior officials from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme
(WFP) in Geneva and Rome to discuss the resolution of pending
humanitarian issues related to the conflict, including the
implementation by UNHCR, in cooperation with MINURSO, of
confidence-building measures; the continuing food shortages in the
Tindouf area refugee camps; the Moroccan prisoners of war; and the
fate of persons unaccounted for on either side since the beginning
of the conflict. He also met there with representatives of major
donor countries.
B. Activities of the Identification Commission
4. During the reporting period, the Identification Commission
continued its work on the electronic archiving of the 244,643
individual files of persons who applied to be included in the list
of voters for the referendum in Western Sahara. The Commission
finished the work in mid-May. Hence, all the files have now been
scanned, archived and safely stored on both hard disks and back-up
tapes to ensure maximum security of the database.
C. Military aspects
5. As at 10 May 2003, the military component of MINURSO stood at 229
military observers and troops, against the authorized strength of
230 (see annex I). Under the command of Major General Gyorgy Sz�raz
(Hungary), the component continued to monitor the ceasefire between
the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO military forces,
which has been in effect since 6 September 1991. During the
reporting period, the Mission's area of responsibility remained
calm, and there has been no indication on the ground that either
side intends to resume hostilities in the near future.
6. MINURSO ground and air patrols continued to visit and inspect, on
both sides of the defensive sand wall, or berm, Royal Moroccan Army
and Frente POLISARIO ground units larger than company size, in
accordance with the ceasefire arrangements between MINURSO, on the
one hand, and the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO on
the other. Both the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO
military forces have continued to carry out routine maintenance and
training activities.
7. The Frente POLISARIO continues to impose some minor limitations
on the Mission's freedom of movement. While these limitations do not
significantly affect the ability of MINURSO to monitor the situation
east of the berm, their removal would increase the efficiency of the
Mission's ground and air patrolling activities.
8. MINURSO has continued to cooperate with the parties on the
marking and disposal of mines and unexploded ordnance. During the
reporting period, MINURSO discovered and marked 14 mines and pieces
of unexploded ordnance and monitored 16 disposal operations carried
out by the Royal Moroccan Army. On 19 February, the Frente POLISARIO
reported a mine accident resulting in the death of one civilian in
the area of responsibility of MINURSO team site Mijek (southern
sector). MINURSO is also assisting the Mine Action Service of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in preparing a regional
landmine and unexploded ordnance safety workshop for Western Sahara,
to be held in Mauritania from 25 to 28 June 2003, for United Nations
peacekeepers and civilian staff in the area.
9. Work has begun on the establishment in MINURSO of an Information
Management System Unit using the Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA), which is expected to become operational in the
second half of 2003. On behalf of the Mine Action Service, the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has undertaken
to provide MINURSO with installation support, training, software
maintenance and upgrades, as well as general support services, as
the IMSMA project develops. With IMSMA, MINURSO will be able to
consolidate the data on mines and unexploded ordnance that it has
collected over the years for use in planning any future mine action
in the area.
D. Civilian police aspects
10. As at 10 May, the strength of the civilian police component of
MINURSO stood at 26 officers (see annex I), under the command of
Inspector General Om Prakash Rathor (India). The component continued
to carry out protection duties in relation to files and sensitive
materials at the Identification Commission centres in Laayoune and
Tindouf. Training of civilian police officers has continued,
including briefings by UNHCR on the protection aspects of voluntary
repatriation and international instruments concerning refugees.
E. Prisoners of war, other detainees and persons unaccounted for
11. My Special Representative has continued to impress upon the
Frente POLISARIO the need to release all remaining prisoners of war
and upon both parties the need to cooperate actively with ICRC in
determining the fate of persons who are unaccounted for. On 7
February he visited a detention centre in the Tindouf area in which
prisoners of war were being held.
12. On 26 February ICRC repatriated to Morocco 100 prisoners of war,
whose release the Frente POLISARIO had announced on 10 February in
response to a request by a Member State. The Frente POLISARIO
continues to hold 1,160 prisoners of war, some of whom have been in
detention for more than 20 years.
F. Western Saharan refugees
13. It will be recalled that a senior UNHCR official and my Special
Representative held discussions with the parties in November and
December 2002 on the implementation of UNHCR confidence-building
measures. The Governments of Algeria and Mauritania were also
consulted with regard to the proposed activities. Although agreeing
in principle to such measures, the Frente POLISARIO and the
Government of Morocco expressed divergent views on the selection
criteria of family visits between the Tindouf area refugees and
their communities of origin in Western Sahara. Efforts to achieve a
compromise formula have failed thus far, as neither side is willing
to reconsider its position on the use of the provisional list of
voters as the primary basis for participant selection.
14. UNHCR and my Special Representative nevertheless continued their
efforts to implement confidence-building measures, focusing on those
activities that were not contested. My Special Representative met
individually with officials of the Frente POLISARIO and the
Government of Morocco in February to discuss a reduced and
simplified UNHCR proposal on confidence-building measures to provide
limited, UNHCR-operated telephone and personal mail services between
some of the Tindouf area refugee camps and the Territory. The new
proposal did not include any activities involving the movement of
persons across the berm, although such activities could be revisited
at a later stage. Following the talks, in March the Frente POLISARIO
and the Government of Morocco formally concurred in the commencement
of those limited services. My Special Representative informed the
Governments of Algeria and Mauritania of this development in April.
15. Accordingly, on 15 April UNHCR inaugurated a free one-way,
telephone service between the "27 February" refugee camp and the
Territory. On 16 April, however, the Frente POLISARIO requested that
the service be suspended until the end of April in order to put in
place logistical arrangements enabling refugees from other, distant
camps with no telephone service to travel to the UNHCR telephone
centre to use the service. As at 14 May, the telephone service had
not yet been reactivated. Given its useful impact on
person-to-person contact, UNHCR and my Special Representative will
continue to advocate the quick resumption of the telephone service.
16. UNHCR also intended to inaugurate on 15 May a two-way personal
mail exchange between the Tindouf refugee camps and the city of
Laayoune in the Territory. The start of this service has been
postponed pursuant to a request of the Government of Morocco,
pending further technical discussions with UNHCR regarding the
modalities of its implementation.
17. UNHCR remains ready to resume the suspended telephone service,
launch the mail service and begin preparations, in close cooperation
with MINURSO, for the extension in mid-June of the UNHCR telephone
service to camp El Ayun and, later, to other refugee camps and of
the personal mail service to other Western Saharan cities. All these
activities are, of course, subject to the availability of funding,
continued interest from beneficiaries and the full cooperation of
the parties.
18. Although the overall situation of food assistance to the Western
Saharan refugees in the Tindouf area has improved slightly,
shortages remain of some critical items, such as cereals and
vegetable oil, and the overall level of donor support for the WFP
assistance programme for Western Saharan refugees continues to be
low.
G. African Union
19. On 20 February a delegation of senior African Union
representatives visited the Tindouf area refugee camps to conduct an
evaluation of the situation and deliver a symbolic $100,000 donation
for the refugees. On 22 April the interim Chairperson of the
Commission of the African Union, Amara Essy, met in the Tindouf area
with senior Frente POLISARIO leaders.
20. During the reporting period, the African Union observer
delegation to MINURSO, led by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia),
continued to provide valuable support and cooperation to the
Mission.
III. Financial aspects
21. By its resolution 56/298 of 27 June 2002, the General Assembly
appropriated an amount of $43,412,900 gross to the Special Account
for MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, which
comprised $41,529,500 for the maintenance of the Mission, $1,681,900
for the support account for peacekeeping operations and $201,500 for
the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. From its
inception on 29 April 1991 to 30 April 2003, the total costs of
maintaining MINURSO amounted to some $495.2 million.
22. As at 30 April 2003, unpaid assessed contributions to the
Special Account for MINURSO amounted to $54,452,011. The total
outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations
at that date amounted to $1,375,914,354.
IV. Assessment of progress and problems since the appointment of my
Personal Envoy
23. In my report to the Security Council of 20 June 2001
(S/2001/613), I described in some detail the difficulties that the
United Nations had encountered over the past 11 years in its effort
to implement the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1).
Despite those efforts, the process of identifying voters for the
referendum broke down repeatedly. After a particularly long impasse,
from the end of 1995 to the beginning of 1997, I appointed James A.
Baker III as my Personal Envoy in March 1997, and asked him to
assess, in consultation with the parties, the implementability of
the plan in its present form and to examine whether there were
adjustments acceptable to the parties that would significantly
improve the chances of implementing it in the near future and, if
not, to advise me on other possible ways of resolving the conflict.
Following a tour of the region, during which my Personal Envoy met
with the leadership of the two parties and the neighbouring
countries, he informed me that, despite the difficulties and delays
in the process, neither side had indicated a willingness to pursue
any political solution other than the implementation of the
settlement plan.
24. My Personal Envoy believed that the only realistic way to assess
the feasibility of implementing the plan would be by arranging
direct talks between the parties. He was aware, however, that
previous efforts by the United Nations to organize such direct talks
had not succeeded, mainly because of the reluctance of the
Government of Morocco to meet face-to-face with the Frente
POLISARIO.
25. At the invitation of my Personal Envoy, the parties met in
Lisbon on 23 June 1997, marking the first time in many years that
they had met to discuss matters of substance. The meeting lasted
only one day, as it became apparent that both sides had difficulties
accepting the proposal submitted by my Personal Envoy to bridge
their differences in regard to the identification process, and that
both needed to consult with their principals before responding. This
was to become a pattern, repeated during three subsequent rounds of
direct talks held in 1997, reflecting the parties' great reluctance
to agree to the bridging proposals aimed at resolving their
differences on the issues hindering the implementation of the
settlement plan. Nevertheless, through the perseverance of my
Personal Envoy and his team, agreement was reached on all the issues
where problems existed in the positions of the parties during the
round of talks held at Houston, Texas (United States) from 14 to 16
September 1997. What became known as the "Houston accords"
(S/1997/742, annex III) allowed for the resumption of the
identification process and, therefore, the implementation of the
settlement plan.
26. In my report of June 2001 (S/2001/613, paras. 27-29), I
described the serious difficulties encountered in carrying out and
concluding the identification process and enumerated the remaining
key unresolved issues of the settlement plan following the
conclusion of the Houston accords. The report noted that since the
conclusion of the identification process at the end of 1999, MINURSO
had received a total of 131,038 appeals. The appeals process
promised to be even lengthier and more cumbersome and contentious
than the identification process, which itself lasted for five and a
half years.
27. In view of these developments, in early 2000 I asked my Personal
Envoy to undertake new consultations with the parties and
neighbouring countries. After a visit to the region from 8 to 11
April, my Personal Envoy informed me that another face-to-face
meeting between the parties was required in order to consider
persistent problems in the implementation of the settlement plan and
the Houston accords, as well as to explore other possible
approaches.
28. The first of three such meetings in 2000 was held in London on
14 May. Representatives of the neighbouring countries Algeria and
Mauritania also attended. The meeting proved to be inconclusive in
resolving the problems separating the parties. My Personal Envoy
therefore invited the parties to come forward at the next meeting
with concrete solutions to the multiple problems of the settlement
plan to which they could both agree, or, if that was not possible,
to be prepared to discuss other ways of achieving an early, durable
and agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara.
29. During the second meeting, held in London on 28 June, each party
identified areas, mainly concerning the appeals process and the
repatriation of refugees, that in its view presented difficulties
with respect to the implementation of the plan. However, neither
party offered any specific proposals to which both could agree in
order to resolve multiple problems in the implementation of the
settlement plan. At that time, my Personal Envoy indicated that, in
his view, other issues remained unresolved, such as enforcement of
the results of the referendum, release of prisoners of war and
Western Saharan political detainees and possible problems relating
to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum
campaign.
30. My Personal Envoy also expressed concern that the parties had so
far failed to negotiate these problems owing to the high level of
animosity between them. In his view, neither party had shown any
disposition to depart from a winner-take-all mentality or appeared
willing to discuss any possible political solution in which each
could achieve some, but not all, of what it wanted, allowing the
other side to achieve the same. After again asking the parties for
concrete proposals to bridge their differences, and again receiving
no such proposals, my Personal Envoy expressed the view that the
meeting, instead of achieving progress, had deepened the differences
between the parties.
31. Nevertheless, my Personal Envoy considered that a political
solution was achievable through direct dialogue between the parties,
and asked them to meet again in order to try to arrive at a
political solution. At that time he stressed to the parties that,
should they agree to discuss a political solution other than the
settlement plan, they would not prejudice their final positions
since, according to the rules of the consultations, nothing would be
agreed to until everything had been agreed.
32. The third meeting of the parties held under the auspices of my
Personal Envoy was held in Berlin on 28 September 2000. During a
discussion on the status of the settlement plan, the parties
reiterated their positions; both, however, pledged their cooperation
with the United Nations. My Personal Envoy pointed out to the
parties that he had heard the same arguments and pledges of
cooperation since 1997 and was therefore sceptical about their
validity.
33. My Personal Envoy recalled that he had asked the parties whether
they had come with new positions on any issue. Neither party had
presented any new positions on any issue, so he felt that there was
no political will on either side to move forward. At the same time,
he reiterated that there were many ways to achieve
self-determination. It could be achieved through war or revolution;
it could be achieved through elections, but this required good will;
or it could be achieved through agreement, as had been done by
parties to other disputes. When asked by my Personal Envoy whether
they would be willing to try the latter route without abandoning the
settlement plan, both parties reiterated their commitment to the
plan, although they expressed fundamental differences and
perceptions as to its correct implementation.
34. My Personal Envoy then suggested that the parties explore ways
to move the appeals process forward, as the Frente POLISARIO wished,
and at the same time search for a mutually acceptable political
solution, as the Security Council had requested in its resolution
1309 (2000) of 25 July 2000. The Moroccan delegation pointed out
that the question of appeals had been extensively covered and was
exhausted. In the view of Morocco, that issue was deadlocked, not on
technicalities, but on principles.
35. My Personal Envoy then asked the parties whether, without
abandoning the settlement plan, they would be willing to pursue a
political solution that might or might not be confirmed by a later
referendum. The Frente POLISARIO responded that it was not ready to
discuss anything outside the settlement plan. For its part, the
Moroccan delegation stated that it was prepared to initiate a
sincere and frank dialogue with the Frente POLISARIO, with the
assistance of my Personal Envoy, to work out a lasting and
definitive solution that would take account of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Morocco, as well as the specifics of the
region, in compliance with the democratic and decentralization
principles that Morocco wished to develop and apply, beginning with
the Sahara region.
36. The Frente POLISARIO rejected the Moroccan proposal and
reiterated that it would cooperate and pursue dialogue only in the
context of the settlement plan.
37. At the conclusion of these consultations, my Personal Envoy
expressed the view, which I shared, that further meetings of the
parties to seek a political solution could not succeed, and indeed
could be counterproductive, unless the Government of Morocco, as the
administrative power in Western Sahara, was prepared to offer or
support some devolution of governmental authority for all
inhabitants and former inhabitants of the Territory that would be
genuine, substantial and in keeping with international norms.
38. In early 2001 my Personal Envoy was able to determine that
Morocco, as the administrative power in Western Sahara, was prepared
to support a draft framework agreement on the status of Western
Sahara (see S/2001/613, annex I), which envisaged a devolution of
authority to the inhabitants of the Territory with final status to
be determined by a referendum five years later. Once he ascertained
the willingness of the Government of Morocco to support the draft
framework agreement, my Personal Envoy presented it to the
Government of Algeria and to the Frente POLISARIO, which provided
their views on the agreement (ibid., annexes II and IV).
39. In view of the strong reservations expressed by the Government
of Algeria and the unwillingness of the Frente POLISARIO to consider
the draft framework agreement, the Security Council, in its
resolution 1359 (2001) of 29 June 2001, supported my proposal to
invite all the parties to meet directly or through proximity talks
under the auspices of my Personal Envoy to discuss the framework
agreement and to negotiate any specific changes that they would like
to see in it. The Council also encouraged the parties to discuss any
other proposal for a political solution that might be put forward by
them to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. The Council
affirmed that, while such discussions went on, the proposals
submitted by the Frente POLISARIO to overcome the obstacles
preventing implementation of the settlement plan would be
considered.
40. As recounted in my reports of 10 January (S/2002/41) and 19
February 2002 (S/2002/178), following the adoption of resolution
1359 (2001) my Personal Envoy met with high-level representatives of
the Frente POLISARIO and the Governments of Algeria and Mauritania
at Pinedale, Wyoming (United States), in August 2001. Neither the
Government of Algeria nor the Frente POLISARIO was willing to engage
in a detailed discussion of the draft framework agreement,
notwithstanding indications of flexibility by the Government of
Morocco conveyed to them by my Personal Envoy. In view of the
responses received from the Government of Algeria and the Frente
POLISARIO, in which they rejected the draft framework agreement
(S/2002/41, annexes I and II), my Personal Envoy did not see any
real likelihood that the parties would ultimately agree voluntarily
to this approach to solving their dispute over Western Sahara. He
was also of the view, which I shared, that the proposal submitted by
Algeria in lieu of the draft framework agreement, by which the
United Nations would assume sovereignty over Western Sahara in order
to implement provisions that appeared identical to those of the
settlement plan, had no more chance than the settlement plan of
bringing about an early, durable and agreed resolution of the
conflict over Western Sahara.
41. Subsequently, my Personal Envoy met with President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika and other high-level officials of the Government of
Algeria on 2 November 2001 at the James Baker Institute in Houston,
Texas (United States) and then twice with King Mohammed VI and
high-level officials of the Moroccan Government in Morocco on 24 and
25 January 2002.
42. As indicated in my reports of June 2001 (S/2001/613) and
February 2002 (S/2002/178), my Personal Envoy is of the view
&emdash; based on his assessment of United Nations efforts over the
past 11 years to implement the settlement plan, including the 6
years during which he has been involved in the process &emdash; that
it is highly unlikely that the settlement plan can be implemented in
its present form in a way that will bring about an early, durable
and agreed resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara.
43. Owing to the parties' incompatible positions with respect to the
possibility of negotiating changes in the draft framework agreement,
which was favoured by Morocco, or the proposal to divide the
Territory, which was favoured by Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO, I
presented four options, which would not have required the
concurrence of the parties, which the Security Council could
consider in addressing the conflict over Western Sahara (see
S/2002/178).
44. As a first option, the United Nations could have resumed its
efforts to implement the settlement plan without requiring the
concurrence of both parties before action could be taken. This
effort would have begun with the appeals process, but, even under
this non-consensual approach, the United Nations in the years ahead
would have faced most of the problems and obstacles that it had
faced in the preceding 10 years. In that connection, Morocco
expressed its unwillingness to go forward with the settlement plan;
the United Nations might not be able to hold a free and fair
referendum the results of which would be accepted by both sides; and
there would still be no mechanism to enforce the results of the
referendum. Under this option, the Identification Commission of
MINURSO would have been reinforced, and indeed the overall size of
the operation would have been increased.
45. As a second option, my Personal Envoy could have undertaken to
revise the draft framework agreement, taking into account the
concerns expressed by the parties and others with experience in such
documents. However, in that event, my Personal Envoy would not have
sought the concurrence of the parties, as had been done in the past
with respect to the settlement plan and the draft framework
agreement. The revised framework agreement would have been submitted
to the Security Council, which would then have presented it to the
parties on a nonnegotiable basis. If the Council had agreed to this
option, the composition of MINURSO might have been reduced.
46. As a third option, the Security Council could have asked my
Personal Envoy to explore with the parties one final time whether or
not they were willing to discuss, under his auspices, directly or
through proximity talks, a possible division of the Territory, with
the understanding that nothing would be decided until everything was
decided. Under this option, in the event that the parties had been
unwilling or unable to agree upon a division of the Territory by 1
November 2002, my Personal Envoy would have been asked to show to
the parties a proposal for division of the Territory that would also
have been submitted to the Council. The Council would then have
presented the proposal to the parties on a non-negotiable basis.
Such an approach to a political solution would have given each party
some, but not all, of what it wanted and would have followed the
precedent, but not necessarily the same territorial arrangements, of
the division agreed to in 1976 between Morocco and Mauritania. If
the Council had chosen this option, MINURSO could have been
maintained at its present size or its composition reduced.
47. As a fourth option, the Security Council could have decided to
terminate MINURSO, thereby recognizing and acknowledging that after
the passage of more than 11 years and the expenditure of about
one-half billion dollars, the United Nations was not going to solve
the problem of Western Sahara without requiring that one or both of
the parties did something that they did not voluntarily agree to do.
48. The Security Council was not able to agree on any of the
options. Instead, by its resolution 1429 (2002), it expressed its
continued strong support for my efforts and those of my Personal
Envoy to find a political solution to this long-standing dispute,
and invited my Personal Envoy to pursue those efforts, taking into
account the concerns expressed by the parties. The Council also
expressed its readiness to consider any approach providing for
self-determination that might be proposed by me and my Personal
Envoy, consulting, as appropriate, others with relevant experience.
The Council also called upon the parties and the States in the
region to cooperate fully with me and my Personal Envoy in that
regard.
49. Pursuant to this request, my Personal Envoy, assisted by a
constitutional expert, drafted a peace plan for self-determination
for the people of Western Sahara (see annex II), which he presented
and explained to the parties and neighbouring countries during his
visit to the region from 14 to 17 January of this year. My Personal
Envoy also shared the plan with members of the Security Council in
early March. I believe that the peace plan provides a fair and
balanced approach towards a political solution to the question of
Western Sahara, providing each side some, but perhaps not all, of
what it wants. It incorporates elements of the draft framework
agreement that had been accepted by Morocco, as well as elements of
the settlement plan and of the Houston accords, agreed to by both
sides and favoured by the Frente POLISARIO. It envisages a period of
transition during which there would be a division of
responsibilities between the parties before the holding of a
referendum for self-determination that would provide the bona fide
residents of Western Sahara with an opportunity to decide their
future. Unlike the settlement plan, the peace plan does not require
the consent of both parties at each and every step of its
implementation. The responses of the parties and neighbouring
countries to the plan are provided in annex III.
V. Observations and recommendations
50. After many years of exemplary efforts by my Personal Envoy, the
proposed peace plan offers what could be an optimum political
solution to the conflict over Western Sahara, providing the bona
fide residents of Western Sahara, following an appropriate
transitional period, the opportunity to determine their own future,
which, in turn, would promote peace and stability in the region and
would open the way to enhanced exchanges and cooperation between the
countries of the Arab Maghreb Union. By combining elements of the
framework agreement, favoured by Morocco, and the settlement plan,
favoured by the Frente POLISARIO, it represents a fair and balanced
approach, providing each side some, but perhaps not all, of what it
wants. The peace plan, therefore, represents a compromise. And,
unlike the settlement plan, it does not require the consent of both
parties at each and every stage of implementation.
51. The main objection of Morocco to the peace plan seems to be that
in the referendum to determine the final status of Western Sahara,
one of the ballot choices is independence. However, independence is
also one of the two ballot choices under the settlement plan, which
Morocco had accepted.
52. It is difficult to envision a political solution that, as
required by Security Council resolution 1429 (2002), provides for
self-determination but that nevertheless precludes the possibility
of independence as one of several ballot questions. This is
particularly difficult to envision given: (a) the stated commitment
of Morocco to the settlement plan (wherein independence is one of
two ballot choices, the other being integration with Morocco) over
so many years; and (b) the inclusion in the electorate for the
referendum foreseen under the peace plan of all those who have
resided continuously in Western Sahara since 30 December 1999, as
opposed to only those who would be included in the voter list, which
was created on the basis of the work of the Identification
Commission.
53. There is one amendment to the peace plan that might assuage the
concern of Morocco over the ballot for the referendum. This would be
to provide a third ballot choice providing for "continuation of the
division of authority set forth in article III of the peace plan",
in other words, self-government or autonomy. Morocco has for some
time supported the concept of self-government or autonomy as the
solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. My Personal Envoy and
I propose that this third ballot question be included on the ballot
for the referendum on the peace plan. If none of the three ballot
questions obtained a majority of votes, the one receiving the fewest
votes would be eliminated and a run-off referendum would be held to
allow voters to choose between the two remaining questions. If the
third option, selfgovernment or autonomy, prevailed, the electorate
for future elections of the executive and legislative bodies of the
Western Sahara Authority would be the bona fide residents of Western
Sahara over the age of 18.
54. The chief objection of the Frente POLISARIO to the peace plan
seems to be that it is not the settlement plan. The Frente POLISARIO
suggests that the parties revert to the implementation of the
settlement plan, with two new elements: (a) that the Identification
Commission would process all 130,000 appeals, with no requirement
that sheikhs participate, with the Commission's decisions to be
accepted as final; and (b) that a mechanism would be added to
provide for enforcement of the results of the referendum under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. However, even with
these two new elements, the settlement plan would still require the
parties' consent at every stage of its implementation. It is
difficult to envision Morocco consenting to the proposal of the
Frente POLISARIO as a way of implementing the settlement plan. As
far as adding a Chapter VII mechanism to enforce the results of the
referendum, it should be recalled that, following my report of
February 2002 (S/2002/178), the Security Council would not choose
any of the four options proposed by my Personal Envoy and me because
both parties would not consent or agree to one of them. It is
therefore quite unlikely that the Council would decide to enforce
the result of the referendum under Chapter VII.
55. The responses of the parties also contain a number of ostensibly
technical objections to the peace plan. However, when taken
together, these objections suggest that the parties still lack the
genuine will required to achieve a political solution to the
conflict.
56. The Security Council should not exclude the possibility that it
may be asked by one or both parties to support a process in which
objections and/or changes to the peace plan would be negotiated
between them, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations.
However, I do not believe that such an approach would be conducive
to moving forward. Rather, my Personal Envoy and I believe that the
parties should accept the plan as proposed. It should be recalled,
in this connection, that over the six-year period of his involvement
with this issue, my Personal Envoy has convened the parties nine
times in four years in Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Germany and the United States of America,
usually with discouraging results.
57. After more than 11 years and an amount of assessed contributions
close to $500 million, it should be acknowledged that the Security
Council is not going to solve the problem of Western Sahara without
asking that one or both of the parties do something they are not
otherwise prepared to do.
58. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1429 (2002), my Personal
Envoy has now developed a fifth option, "the peace plan for
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara", in addition to
the four that were described in my report of 19 February 2002
(S/2002/178). I recommend that the Council endorse the peace plan.
It combines elements of the draft framework agreement and agreed
elements of the settlement plan. It is fair and balanced and,
following a transitional period of selfgovernment, offers the bona
fide residents of Western Sahara an opportunity to determine their
future for themselves. The four earlier options could, of course,
still be considered, but if the Council is not prepared to revisit
them with a view to making a choice, I recommend that the parties be
asked by the Council to agree to the peace plan and to work with the
United Nations to implement it.
59. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that unless and until
the parties demonstrate their readiness to assume their own
responsibilities and make the compromises necessary to reach a
successful outcome to the conflict, a fresh initiative to find a
solution to the question of Western Sahara is likely to suffer the
same fate as the earlier ones. Accordingly, I urge the Security
Council to seize this opportunity to address effectively the
long-outstanding issue of Western Sahara by requesting the parties
to agree to the peace plan as amended and to work with the United
Nations in its implementation.
60. If the parties cannot agree on an approach for a political
solution and if the Security Council is not in a position to ask
them to take steps that they do not perceive to be in their own
interest, despite the fact that it may clearly be in the interest of
the population of Western Sahara, the Council may wish to consider
whether it wishes to remain actively seized of this political
process. 61. In order to give the Security Council sufficient time
to reflect on its decision, I propose that the mandate of MINURSO be
extended for two months, until 31 July 2003.
Annex I
Contributions to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara as at 10 May 2003
Annex II :
Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara
I. Purpose
1. The present peace plan for self-determination of the people of
Western Sahara is an agreement by and between the Kingdom of Morocco and the
Frente POLISARIO (which are the interested parties), joined by the People's
Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (which are
the neighbouring countries) and the United Nations. The purpose of the plan is
to achieve a political solution to the conflict in Western Sahara that provides
for selfdetermination, as contemplated in paragraph 1 of Security Council
resolution 1429 (2002), of 30 July 2002. The effective date of the plan is the
date when all interested parties, neighbouring countries and the United Nations
have signed it. The final status of Western Sahara shall be determined by a
referendum conducted in accordance with part II of the plan. During the period
between the effective date of the plan and the implementation of the results of
the referendum on final status, governmental authority shall be exercised in
Western Sahara in accordance with part III of the plan.
II. Self-determination referendum
2. A referendum to determine the final status of Western Sahara
shall be held no earlier than four and no later than five years after the
effective date of the plan. The options or ballot questions to be included in
the referendum will include: (a) those previously agreed to in the settlement
plan; and (b) any additional options or ballot questions agreed to by the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Western Sahara Authority (as defined in para. 8 (a)
below).
3. A referendum option or ballot question shall be deemed to have
been adopted if it receives more than 50 per cent of the votes cast in the
referendum. If more than two options or ballot questions are presented and none
receives a majority of the votes cast in the first round, a second round shall
be held in which the two options or ballot questions that received the most
votes shall be presented to the voters.
4. The referendum shall be organized and conducted by the United
Nations and monitored by international observers accredited by the United
Nations.
5. Those eligible to vote in the referendum are those persons who
are at least 18 years of age and: (a) who have been identified as qualified to
vote by the Identification Commission of the United Nations Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), as reflected on the provisional voter
list of 30 December 1999 (without giving effect to any appeals or other
objections); (b) whose names appear on the repatriation list drawn up by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as at 31 October 2000; or
(c) who have resided continuously in Western Sahara since 30 December 1999.
Those eligible to vote shall be determined by the United Nations, whose decision
shall be final and without appeal.
6. The addition to the list of qualified voters of any person whose
name does not appear either on the provisional voter list of 30 December 1999 or
on the repatriation list drawn up by UNHCR as at 31 October 2000 can occur only
if the status of that person as a continuous resident of Western Sahara since 30
December 1999 is supported by testimony from at least three credible persons
and/or credible documentary evidence. The United Nations shall: (a) determine
the credibility and legal sufficiency of all such testimony and other evidence;
and (b) based on that testimony and other evidence, determine who is (and is
not) entitled to be added to the list of qualified voters under this paragraph.
These determinations by the United Nations shall be final and without appeal.
7. All interested parties and neighbouring countries agree to accept
and respect the results of the referendum.
III. Authority in Western Sahara
8. Governmental authority in Western Sahara between the effective
date of this plan and such time as a new government shall take office in
implementation of the result of the referendum on final status shall be as set
forth in this plan, and in particular in the present paragraph: (a) The
population of Western Sahara, acting through the executive, legislative and
judicial bodies established under the plan - herein sometimes referred to as the
Western Sahara Authority - shall be responsible for and have exclusive
competence over local government, the territorial budget, taxation, economic
development, internal security, law enforcement, social welfare, cultural
affairs, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries,
industry, environment, housing and urban development, water and electricity,
roads and other basic infrastructure; (b) Morocco shall be responsible for and
have exclusive competence over foreign relations (including international
agreements and conventions), national security and external defence (including
the determination of borders - maritime, aerial, and terrestrial - and their
protection by all appropriate means), all matters relating to the production,
sale, ownership and use of weapons and explosives (except for the duly
authorized use of weapons by the law enforcement authorities of the Western
Sahara Authority) and the preservation of territorial integrity against
secessionist attempts, whether from within or outside the Territory, provided,
however, that the right to preserve territorial integrity shall not authorize
any action whatsoever that would prevent, suppress, or stifle peaceful public
debate, discourse or campaign activity, particularly during any election or
referendum period. In addition, the flag, currency, customs, postal and
telecommunication systems of Morocco shall be the same for Western Sahara. With
respect to all functions described in this subparagraph, Morocco may appoint
representatives to serve it in Western Sahara.
9. The authority of Morocco for the foreign relations of Western
Sahara shall be exercised in consultation with the Western Sahara Authority on
matters that directly affect the interests of Western Sahara. Morocco may
authorize representatives of the Authority to serve as members of the Kingdom's
diplomatic delegations in international meetings concerned with economic issues
and other issues of direct interest to Western Sahara.
10. The executive authority of the Western Sahara Authority shall be
exercised by a Chief Executive elected by the people of Western Sahara in
accordance with paragraphs 15 to 17 of the present plan. The Chief Executive may
appoint such administrators as may be necessary to exercise the powers reserved
to the Authority by the plan.
11. The legislative authority of the Western Sahara Authority shall
be exercised by a Legislative Assembly elected by the people of Western Sahara
in accordance with paragraphs 15 to 17 of the present plan. The Legislative
Assembly shall be responsible for the enactment of all laws applicable in
Western Sahara, with the exception of any relating to the authorities reserved
to Morocco under paragraph 8 (b) above.
12. The judicial authority in Western Sahara shall be vested in a
Supreme Court of Western Sahara and such other lower courts as may be
established by the Western Sahara Authority. Members of the Supreme Court and
lower courts shall be appointed by the Chief Executive, with the consent of the
Legislative Assembly. The Supreme Court (a) shall have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the compatibility of any law of Western Sahara with this plan (except
any relating to the authorities reserved to Morocco by paragraph 8 (b) above, in
which case the highest court of Morocco shall have that jurisdiction), and (b)
shall be the final authority in interpreting the law of Western Sahara. The
Supreme Court shall have the authority to declare null and void any law,
regulation or other act of the Western Sahara Authority that contravenes this
plan or exceeds the competence of the Authority, as provided in the plan.
13. All laws, regulations and acts of the Western Sahara Authority
shall be consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards
(including human rights standards in any treaties to which Morocco is a party).
In no event shall human rights in Western Sahara be protected to a lesser extent
than is provided for in the constitution and laws of Morocco.
14. All laws and regulations now in force in Western Sahara shall
continue in force until they are amended or repealed by action of the
Legislative Assembly and Chief Executive of the Western Sahara Authority, except
any relating to the authorities reserved to Morocco by paragraph 8 (b) above.
15. The election for the Legislative Assembly and Chief Executive of
the Western Sahara Authority shall be held within one year of the effective date
of this plan. Voters shall vote separately (in a single election) for the Chief
Executive and members of the Legislative Assembly, who shall hold office for a
period of four years or until governmental authority in Western Sahara is
changed pursuant to the final status referendum. Sole and exclusive authority
over all matters relating to any and all elections and referendums called for in
this plan, including their organization and conduct, shall be vested in the
United Nations.
16. Those eligible to vote in the election for the Legislative
Assembly and Chief Executive of the Western Sahara Authority are persons who are
at least 18 years of age and whose names appear either on the provisional voter
list of 30 December 1999 (without giving effect to any appeals or other
objections) or on the repatriation list drawn up by UNHCR as at 31 October 2000.
Those eligible to vote shall be determined by the United Nations, whose decision
shall be final and without appeal.
IV. Other matters
17. Campaigns for the election and referendum referred to in this
plan shall be conducted in a manner consistent with international human rights
standards and in keeping with the principles of the Code of Conduct agreed to by
Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO in 1997 (the Houston accords), except where to
do so would be inconsistent with this plan. In particular, the interested
parties agree not to hinder the ability of persons to campaign peacefully for or
against any person standing for election or any option or ballot question
offered to the voters in the referendum on final status.
18. Neither Morocco nor the Western Sahara Authority may
unilaterally change or abolish the status of Western Sahara, except for the
adoption of such laws as may be necessary to conform to the results of the
referendum on final status. No change to this plan may be made without the
agreement of the King of Morocco and the Chief Executive and the Legislative
Assembly of Western Sahara.
19. Immediately after the effective date of this plan, all political
prisoners and prisoners of war shall be released, and the obligation of each
party in this regard is not dependent upon performance by the other. The
interested parties agree that they shall continue their full cooperation with
relevant international bodies until the completion of the repatriation process.
20. Within 90 days after the effective date of this plan, the armed
forces of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO will be reduced, confined, contained
and thereafter maintained in all respects strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the 1997 Houston accords. This provision is without prejudice to
the deployment of Moroccan armed forces in purely defensive positions pursuant
to the responsibility of Morocco for external defence under paragraph 8 (b)
above or the creation and normal functioning of law enforcement personnel in
Western Sahara under the authority of the Western Sahara Authority.
21. The United Nations will assist the interested parties, in
particular the Western Sahara Authority, in fulfilling their responsibilities
under this plan. The Security Council undertakes to amend the name and mandate
of MINURSO to enable it to assist in the implementation of this plan, in
particular during the period between the plan's entry into force and the holding
of the election for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Assembly of the
Western Sahara Authority.
22. The Secretary-General will use his good offices to assist the
interested parties in the implementation of this plan. The interested parties
agree that the Secretary- General shall have the authority to interpret this
plan and that in the event of any disagreement about the meaning of the plan,
the Secretary-General's interpretation shall be binding on the interested
parties.
23. By signing the present document, the interested parties, the
neighbouring countries and the United Nations agree to the terms of the plan,
effective on the date on which all of them have signed the document.
Kingdom of Morocco
Frente POLISARIO
Democratic Republic of Algeria
Islamic Republic of Mauritania
United Nations
Annex III
Responses of the parties and the neighbouring States to the peace
plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara
Note verbale dated 10 March 2003 from the Permanent Mission of
Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Personal Envoy of the
Secretary-General for Western Sahara
Following the meeting of 14 January 2003 during which you presented
to His Majesty your new proposal on a political solution to the issue of Western
Sahara, and upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward to
you the enclosed document, in English and French, containing the observations of
the Kingdom of Morocco on the content of the above-mentioned proposal. I avail
myself of this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of my Government, to your
tireless and genuine efforts to assist all parties to achieve a mutually
acceptable solution to this dispute.
Observations of the Kingdom of Morocco on the new proposal of James
Baker entitled "peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara"
[Original: English and French]
On 14 January 2003, His Majesty King Mohammed VI received the
Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. James Baker, who
provided him with a document entitled, "Peace Plan for Self-determination of the
People of Western Sahara". Mr. Baker placed his action within the framework of
the mission conferred upon him by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1429
of 30 July 2002. In paragraph 1 of that resolution, the Council "continues to
support strongly the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to
find a political solution to this long-standing dispute, invites the Personal
Envoy to pursue these efforts taking into account the concerns expressed by the
parties and expresses its readiness to consider any approach which provides for
self-determination that may be proposed by the Secretary- General and the
Personal Envoy, consulting, as appropriate, others with relevant experience".
Mr. Baker expressed his hope that the Kingdom will study this
document and convey to him its views on its content, so that he may fully
satisfy the mission conferred upon him by the Security Council.
The Kingdom of Morocco has analysed the document provided to it in
great depth and in a constructive spirit. In consequence, it has drawn up the
following observations: It must be recalled, from the outset, that Morocco has
unceasingly sought a peaceful resolution of the dispute relating to Western
Sahara within the framework of international legality. Accordingly, co-operation
with MINURSO has been exemplary, and it has been provided with all the
facilities for and means of accomplishing its responsibilities in the best of
conditions. Since the cease-fire came into effect on 6 September 1991, peace has
been maintained in the region and its inhabitants go about their daily business
normally. Morocco recognises the value of the considerable efforts by MINURSO to
maintain peace in the Maghreb region.
However, the other aspect of the peace plan, the referendum
proposal, such as it was originally envisaged, has proven to be inapplicable as
the years pass and has thus been rendered lapsed. As early as the London meeting
of 14 May 2000, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy requested the parties "to
consider others ways of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of
their dispute" (paragraph 28 of Report S/2000/461, 22 May 2000). He went on to
emphasise the need for the parties to "depart from the winnertake- all
mentality" and "to discuss any possible political solutions in which each could
get some, but not all, of what it wanted and allow the other side to do the
same" (paragraph 30 of Report S/2002/178, 19 February 2002).
While calling on the parties to continue their direct talks, the
Security Council also requested them "to try to agree upon a mutually acceptable
political solution to their dispute over Western Sahara" (Resolution 1309, 26
July 2000).
During the following meeting organised between the parties in
Berlin, from 28 to 29 September 2000, the Kingdom of Morocco responded
positively to the request of the Personal Envoy and the recommendation of the
Security Council, by agreeing to commit itself in the search for a political
solution.
At that time, the Moroccan delegation insisted, for the sake of
clarity, on specifying the extent of its commitment to a "lasting and definitive
solution, that would take account of Morocco's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and the specifics of the region, in compliance with the democratic
and decentralization principles that Morocco wished to develop and apply,
beginning with the Sahara region" (paragraph 15 of Report S/2000/1029, 25
October 2000).
Morocco wishes to solemnly reaffirm its willingness to co-operate
with the Security Council, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in order
to progress towards a political solution. Of course, this requires a compromise
solution which diverges from the preceding approach set out in the Settlement
Plan, which envisaged a referendum presenting the sole options of integration or
independence, thus leaving, in the final analysis, a winner and a loser.
Whereas the Council required the Personal Envoy to propose a
political solution providing for self-determination, international practice
clearly shows that democratic consultation concerning the status of a territory,
as negotiated between the parties, is a valid means of allowing a population to
achieve self-determination. This practice is based on General Assembly
Resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15th, 1960 and on the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24th October 1970, which, states that the
options of independence, association or integration, as well as "the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes
of implementing the right of self-determination by that people".
Indeed, many disputes throughout the world, since the Aaland Island
case in 1920, under the League of Nations auspices (Report of the International
Committee of Jurists to the League of Nations Council, LNOJ Sp.Supp. no.3
[1920], 5 September 1920, at 286), have been resolved by the granting of
autonomous status within the existing State structure. Negotiation remains the
privileged means for the parties to adapt this autonomy to their aims and to
regional characteristics. The attainment of such self-determination would fall
squarely within the democratic, decentralised nature of the Moroccan State as a
whole. In addition, it is the best guaranty of respect for the fundamental human
rights recognised by the Moroccan Constitution and upheld by the international
commitments of the Kingdom.
It was in this context that, according to its final provisions, the
"Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara" proposed by the Personal
Envoy in June 2001 was to be submitted according to its final provision to
popular approval by referendum (Annex I to Report S/2001/613, 20 June 2001).
In accordance with its firm commitment to a political solution of
the dispute, Morocco had accepted this agreement as the basis for negotiations.
It should be recalled, however, that even before initiating the Framework
Agreement, the Personal Envoy expressed his belief that "substantial progress
has been made towards determining whether the Government of Morocco as the
administrative power in Western Sahara is prepared to offer or support some
devolution of authority for all inhabitants and former inhabitants of the
territory that is genuine, substantial and in keeping with international norms"
(paragraph 19 of Report S/2001/398, 24 April 2001).
It is in this spirit that the Council has taken into consideration
the Framework Agreement which "would provide for a substantial devolution of
authority, which does not foreclose self-determination, and which indeed
provides for it" (Resolution 1359, 29 June 2001).
The search for a political solution, or the so-called "third way",
was based, from the outset, on devolution by the Kingdom of Morocco of strictly
enumerated legal powers to a decentralised authority, thus allowing it to manage
its own local affairs.
The Kingdom appreciates the unceasing, and commendable efforts by
the Personal Envoy to satisfy the determination of the Security Council "to
assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political
solution, which would be of benefit to the Maghreb region" (Resolution 1429, 30
July 2002).
However, to ensure the success of these efforts, it would be
desirable to avoid any confusion between this political solution, or "third
way", and the Settlement Plan. Morocco made its position perfectly clear on this
subject during the discussions between the members of the Security Council
preceding the adoption of Resolution 1429 on 30 July 2002. Indeed, when an
amendment was presented requiring the political solution to be drawn from a
mixture of the Framework Agreement and the Settlement Plan, Morocco sent a
letter to the President of the Security Council pointing out that, "To the
extent that it sets out to amalgamate two irreconcilable options, this approach
is doomed to failure" (Letter S/2002/832, 25 July 2002). The Council did not
include this amendment when adopting the final formulation of Resolution 1429 of
30 July 2002. Morocco, which fully supports the efforts of the Personal Envoy,
insists however, on reestablishing the initial architecture of the political
solution: a viable alternative to the options set out in the Settlement Plan.
It is only on the basis of a sound and unambiguous understanding of
the political solution, as it emerges from United Nations practice, that the
success of the resolution of the dispute concerning the Sahara may be ensured.
For these reasons, its may be premature to proceed to a detailed
analysis of the Personnel Envoy's propositions as long as no agreement has been
reached on the exact nature of the political solution and the appropriate
procedure for its implementation. However, we deem it necessary to do so in
order to further the advent of a negotiated political solution.
In the light of these considerations concerning the global approach,
we will now review, successively, the provisions of the proposed document.
1- The title of the document, "Peace Plan for Self-determination of
the People of Western Sahara", is limited to only one element of the mandate set
out in Resolution 1429, while overlooking the search for the political solution
which gives sense to selfdetermination in the present case. As for the
expression "peace plan", it does not seem appropriate for the abovementioned
reasons. According to the document, its signature by Morocco, Polisario,
Algeria, Mauritania and the United Nations are the sufficient and necessary
condition for its entry into force. Nevertheless, given the nature, the scope
and the implications of this agreement, it would be preferable to stipulate that
it will only come into force after the fulfilment by the signatories of all
procedures required by their respective legal systems. The Kingdom of Morocco,
for its part, is bound to respect Article 31 of its Constitution, under which,
"Treaties likely to affect the provisions of the Constitution shall be approved
in accordance with the procedures prescribed for its modification ". This is
clearly the case for the proposed document, which involves substantial
modifications to the status of the country's Southern provinces.
It should also be noted that Algeria is described in the proposed
plan as a neighbouring country, although it was referred to as a party to the
dispute in the Secretary-General's Report of 20 June 2001 (S/2001/613) and the
annexed Framework Agreement.
2- If the aim of this plan is to achieve "a political solution which
provides for selfdetermination", it is surprising to find that priority is given
to the self-determination referendum, when it would have been logical to set out
the underlying political solution first.
3- At the outset, it is stated that the choices available for the
referendum will be those set out in the Settlement Plan, the parties being free
to add other options.
One may wonder about the interest of establishing a complex
political solution over some years only to find oneself, at the end of the day
(very close, 4 or 5 years), back in the setting of the Settlement Plan that led
to the current impasse. The dangers in such a scheme are clear. Indeed, the aim
of the political solution is to favour rapprochement and conciliation at a time
when the perspective of a confrontation, in a near future, over two completely
opposed choices, risks compromising the establishment of the proposed local
authority from the very start.
If the political solution consists, as we have reiterated, of
substantial delegation of powers to a local authority, it should have been left
to the partners (local and central authorities), at the very least, to
determine, at the appropriate time, the details of the democratic consultation
of the population.
In fact, once the parties are in agreement concerning such political
solution, the agreement could be immediately submitted to the population of the
territory for approval or rejection. Such approval would lead to direct
implementation of the status of the territory, with all the appropriate
international guaranties, whereas, the unlikely situation of rejection would
mean returning to the negotiation table.
4- It is envisaged that the referendum will be organised by the
United Nations and monitored by international observers accredited by the
Organization. Just as it has always agreed, Morocco is prepared to co-operate
closely with the United Nations for the success of the political solution.
However, the conditions for intervention by the World body should be more
clearly specified, including the relationship it would establish with the
Kingdom of Morocco.
5- According to the document, those eligible to vote in the
referendum will be composed of three categories:
a- persons identified by MINURSO and included in the provisional
voter list of 30 December 1999, without giving effect to any appeals or the need
to update the list for persons who now satisfy the criteria, but who were not
yet 18 years old in December 1999.
b- persons included in the repatriation list drawn up by the UNHCR
as at 31 October 2000. The Kingdom of Morocco wishes to note that it is
difficult to make any pronouncement concerning the contents of a list of which
it has received no official notification from the UNHCR.
According to unofficial sources, this list was established on the
basis of testimony by persons identified by MINURSO (provisional list of 1999)
about members of their families. If this were so, the list would not have
sufficient legal value to be used in determining the electorate, in the absence
of a census duly undertaken by the UNHCR, which the Kingdom of Morocco has been
requesting constantly for years. Moreover, as this system would provide an
updated MINURSO identification list for the children of those identified persons
who are in Tindouf, it would discriminate against the identified persons who are
in the Sahara.
c- Persons who have resided continuously in Western Sahara since 30
December 1999. The aim of this provision is to cover persons who were living in
the Sahara on 30 December 1999 and who have continued to do so since then.
Morocco considers that it is fair, just and in compliance with democratic
practice for all residents to have the right to participate in the proposed
consultation. It may, however, appear arbitrary to fix the list of residents at
30 December 1999.
Finally, it is proposed that the electoral list will be determined
by the United Nations finally and without appeal. While the Kingdom has
confidence in the World body, it does, however, wish to recall that the
conditions regulating the identification of voters must be clearly specified and
protected by all possible guarantees of impartiality.
6- Whereas the document does not require any verification of the
validity of the UNHCR repatriation list, which appears to have been established
very approximately, it provides that residents as at 30 December 1999 shall only
be allowed to vote if they are supported by testimony from at least three
credible persons and/or credible documentary evidence. It would be for the
United Nations to determine the credibility and legal sufficiency of such
evidence, when finalizing the electoral list. While Morocco reiterates its total
confidence in the World body, it remains unclear how the Organization intends to
make definitive decisions concerning the validity of official documentation
relating to resident status in the Southern provinces.
7- To the extent that the conditions for a democratic consultation
allowing the population to decide on the commonly agreed upon autonomous status
have been satisfied, Morocco will fully respect the results in accordance with
its traditions and convictions.
8- The provisions of the plan are intended to cover all government
authority in Western Sahara from the date of its entry into force until a new
"government" is formed in accordance with the results of the referendum. From a
purely technical viewpoint, one may wonder whether this does not create a legal
vacuum or lacuna, given that the election of the institutions of the local
authority must be achieved in the year following the effective date of the plan.
What would happen to the administration of the territory and the very complex
institutions which are in charge of it between the effective date of the plan
and the election of the assembly and executive?
Furthermore, as the election of these new institutions cannot take
place in a legal vacuum, a transitional period will be needed to ensure smooth
passage from one system to the other and avoid any discontinuation in the
operation of those public services which are essential to the daily life of the
population.
The document globally follows the power-sharing between the
Kingdom's central authorities and the local authority for Western Sahara
proposed in the Framework Agreement. However, some of the exceptions that have
been introduced could raise difficulties. In particular, as regards the
prohibition of secessionist activities, it is proposed to make an exception for
speeches and declarations during the election period. This means that Morocco
could be confronted with a propaganda campaign in favour of secession right from
the election of the territory's assembly and executive, without being able to
forbid activities susceptible to endanger State security and the maintenance of
order. The other exception, relating to the use of arms by the local authority
in law enforcement, would have to be carefully defined in order to avoid any
misuse endangering the security of the country.
9- Under the terms of the document, the power of the Kingdom of
Morocco in respect of "the foreign relations of Western Sahara" will be
exercised in consultation with the Western Sahara authority, for all questions
that directly affect that territory. It is also proposed that the Kingdom may
authorise representatives of the local authority to join diplomatic delegations
participating in international meetings relating to economic issues and other
issues of direct interest to Western Sahara. Indeed, the representatives of a
local authority may participate in such delegations, and consultations with the
local authority may be envisaged when the latter is directly concerned by a
particular area of the country's foreign relations. Nevertheless, the Kingdom
retains exclusive responsibility for those foreign relations and, accordingly,
the expression "foreign relations of Western Sahara" appearing in the document,
does not seem appropriate.
10- While the Framework Agreement provided for a collegiate
executive body, the proposed document confers executive power on a single person
chosen directly by the population, which is likely to raise some problems for
that person's relations with the assembly, the majority of which could be of an
opposing political persuasion. It is precisely in order to avoid this sort of
conflictual, paralysing situation that representative systems provide for the
executive to emanate from the majority in the assembly.
11- The "legislative" assembly, the number of members of and
electoral system for which are not specified, will be responsible for the
enactment of all laws applicable in Western Sahara, with the exception of laws
enacted under the powers reserved to the Kingdom according to paragraph 8B of
the plan. The document thus opts for a subsidiarity principle in favour of the
local authority (all powers that are not attributed to the Kingdom would be
exercised by this authority).
In so doing, the document inverts the entire logic underlying the
search for a political solution by the United Nations which, as noted above,
involved the Kingdom delegating some powers to the local authority.
Consequently, the political solution was based on the postulate that all powers
which were not attributed to the local authority remained within the competence
of the central authorities. Clearly the subsidiarity principle must take its
point of departure from the delegating entity, that is the Kingdom of Morocco,
which retains all powers that it has not conceded to a local delegated
authority. It should also be noted, in this respect, that the document does not
set out the relation between the head of the executive power and the territory's
"legislative" assembly, whether it be a question of their powers or their
responsibilities. Unfortunately, this flaw makes it impossible to understand the
exact mode of operation of the local authority.
12- The document places the judicial power in the context of an
advanced federal model. This certainly has advantages in countries with a
federal tradition, but it is difficult to apply in Morocco, a country whose
judicial system is unified and centralised. The document provides for a Supreme
Court of Western Sahara and lower courts, the judges of which are to be
appointed by the chief executive, with the consent of the assembly.
Yet the Moroccan legal system is under the hierarchical control of a
sole Supreme Court, which is the highest level for review of the uniform
application of the law by other courts. Furthermore, justice is meted out in the
name of His Majesty the King, as Protector of the rights and liberties of
citizens under Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution. He appoints judges, in
consultation with the Superior Council of Magistracy, the constitutional
guarantor of their independence.
Thus, the very existence of a Supreme Court of the local authority
is difficult to reconcile with the Moroccan judicial system.
Moreover, the document proposes that the Supreme Court be invested
with jurisdiction to adjudicate the compatibility of any "law of Western Sahara"
with the plan. Given that the judges sitting on this Court are to be designated
by the executive and legislative powers of the territory, one may question the
degree of independence the Court will have, in practice, to sanction any attempt
by the local authority to exceed its jurisdiction.
While it is true that the Supreme Court of the Kingdom plays the
same role with regard to the powers of the central authorities, this only
concerns sovereign prerogatives with respect to which there is not a great deal
of legislative activity. In reality, the competence to resolve conflicts
concerning power-sharing should be retained by the Supreme Court of the country,
as guarantor of the unified interpretation and application of Moroccan law.
Moreover, the system proposed in the document leaves aside the question of
jointly held powers (taxation, finance, security and the use of arms, for
example), for which one can not conceive that two Courts could have jurisdiction
to adjudicate these subjects. In sum, it is difficult to imagine introducing
such disparities into the administration of justice within the Kingdom.
13- According to the proposed document, all laws, regulations and
acts of the local authority must be consistent with internationally recognised
human rights standards, including those set out in treaties to which the Kingdom
is a party. The plan adds that the protection of human rights in Western Sahara
should not be inferior to the standards set out in the Constitution and laws of
Morocco.
While one can only rejoice at the introduction of such a precaution
in the document, to prevent any abuses by the local authority in the field of
fundamental human rights, it would have been preferable to include guarantees
and to grant full powers to the Kingdom's judicial system to ensure respect for
these rights.
14- It is entirely reasonable to provide for the country's existing
laws and regulations to remain in force until action is taken with respect to
them by the local authority, with the exception of the reserved powers of the
Kingdom. However, it must be noted, yet again, that such an approach places the
document in a logic of subsidiarity in favour of the local authority, which is
incompatible with both United Nations practice concerning political solutions
and the fundamental constitutional principles of the Kingdom, as explained
above.
15- The election of the assembly and the executive must take place
within one year of the effective date of the plan, which raises the question,
already discussed, of managing the transitional period and the establishment of
new institutions. Furthermore, it is proposed that the United Nations will have
sole and exclusive authority for the conduct of the elections and referendum.
Yet, of necessity, the Organization will have to rely on the Kingdom's
institutions, in order to fulfil this responsibility.
16- The election of the local authority's chief executive and
assembly are to be entrusted to a limited group of voters: those who are on the
provisional voter list of 30 December 1999 or the repatriation list drawn up by
the UNHCR as at 31 October 2000 (subject to the questions previously raised
concerning the latter list). In any case, a minority of the population is thus
to elect a local authority which will administer the majority. This would create
an anti-democratic situation in contradiction with the same fundamental human
rights that the document requires to be fully respected. Serious problems will
result from this, perhaps even leading to confrontation between two parts of the
population: those who have elected the executive and legislative bodies and
those who have been excluded from the electoral process.
Furthermore, the tribal structure and resulting solidarity of the
territory's population cannot be ignored. It is inconceivable, therefore, that
the chosen electoral system should result in the domination of one tribe by the
others, the exclusion of one of them, or even a fraction of a tribe.
17- By providing that the electoral campaign must be conducted in
compliance with international human rights standards, the document echoes the
requirements of the Moroccan Constitution. It would be desirable, however, for
judicial guarantees to be established, in particular by providing for recourse
to those Moroccan courts having jurisdiction over electoral conflicts.
18- The document provides that the status of the territory cannot be
changed unilaterally. However, it is hard to understand the proposed procedure
for change of that status, requiring an agreement between the King of Morocco,
the chief executive and the legislative assembly, as this places the country's
Sovereign on the same level as the local institutions.
19- The document calls for the release of all prisoners of war and
political prisoners immediately after the effective date of the plan. This
provision is contrary to international humanitarian law, which requires the
release of prisoners of war immediately after the cease-fire (i.e. since 1991).
In addition, in paragraph 5 of Resolution 1429 of the 30 July 2002, the Security
Council called upon Polisario to release without further delay all remaining
prisoners of war. International humanitarian law and United Nations practice
require the dissociation of the humanitarian aspects of a dispute or conflict
from its political solution. For all these reasons, the document should simply
recall the need to respect scrupulously, and at all times, the peremptory norms
of humanitarian law.
20- The document provides for the cantonment of all troops 90 days
after its entry into force, with the sole exception of the deployment of those
Moroccan armed forces necessary to ensure the external defence of the territory.
We wonder if it is not more appropriate to link such cantonment to the
establishment and operation of the local authorities so as to guarantee the
maintenance of order and security during the transitional period.
21- Morocco is prepared to co-operate with the United Nations for
the implementation of the political solution to be agreed, when the time comes.
22- The Kingdom considers that the offer of good offices by the
Secretary-General is most welcome to assist the parties in implementing the
plan. However, the document states that the Secretary-General would also have
binding authority to interpret the plan, finally and without appeal. The latter
provision raises difficulties both in principle and at the technical level.
Indeed, the Secretary-General, who will be a party to the agreement and involved
in its implementation, would also be called on to interpret it, which would
place him in the delicate, untenable position of being both judge and party. It
should also be noted that an interpretative role has been granted to the local
and central supreme courts, in charge of reviewing laws with respect to the
power-sharing proposed in the plan; this seems to be in contradiction with the
functions assumed by the Secretary-General in this matter.
In conclusion, the Kingdom of Morocco warmly appreciates the
laudable efforts by the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to assist the
parties in achieving a political solution, and wishes to express its gratitude
to both of them for all their efforts intended to bring the States of the
Maghreb region closer together, thus enhancing their stability and progress
towards unity.
The Kingdom reiterates its commitment to dialogue and negotiation,
as a means of finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the dispute concerning
the Sahara which fully respects the territorial integrity of the States of the
Maghreb region and complies with international legality.
Letter dated 8 March 2003 from the Secretary-General of the Frente
POLISARIO to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
[Original: French]
I had the honour to receive, on 16 January 2003, your Personal
Envoy, Mr. James Baker III, who transmitted to me a proposal for a solution
entitled "Peace Plan for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara",
with a view to putting an end to the decolonization conflict which, for more
than 27 years, has pitted the Saharan people against the Kingdom of Morocco.
The Frente POLISARIO, which expresses its appreciation to the United
Nations, its Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, has considered this
proposal carefully. I have entrusted Mr. Mhamed Khadad, the Saharan Coordinator
with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),
with the task of transmitting to you our reply to this proposal. I should be
grateful if you would bring the full contents of this reply to the attention of
the members of the Security Council at such time as you find convenient.
I wish to assure you of our determination to continue to cooperate
with you and your Personal Envoy for the culmination of your efforts to arrive
at a just and final solution to the conflict over Western Sahara.
(Signed) Mohamed Abdelaziz
Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO
On 16 January 2003, the Frente POLISARIO had the pleasure to receive
Mr. James Baker III, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who presented to it a settlement proposal entitled "Peace Plan for
selfdetermination for the people of Western Sahara", in which he requested a
reply from each of the two parties to the conflict over Western Sahara. The
present document contains the reaction of the Frente POLISARIO to this proposal.
The Frente POLISARIO wishes first of all to thank the Personal Envoy
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the patience and perseverance
he has shown in investing his personal credit and talent in the efforts to
arrive at a just and final settlement of the long and grievous conflict over
Western Sahara by the only legal and just path with regard to decolonization,
namely the Saharan people's exercise of its exclusive right to
self-determination through a free and properly conducted referendum organized
and monitored by the United Nations.
Similarly, the Frente POLISARIO wishes to give due credit to Mr.
James Baker III, recalling that his input and efforts made it possible, within
the framework of negotiations conducted with the two parties to the conflict at
Lisbon, London and Houston, in 1997, to resolve all pending issues for the
implementation of the United Nations Plan. The Houston agreements incorporated
all these final measures that were worked out and unreservedly accepted by the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. The detailed Implementation Plan,
finalized and submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the
Security Council on 13 November 1997, envisaging the holding of the referendum
on 7 December 1998, constitutes a further solemn confirmation of this, sealed
with the authority of the Security Council.
This gratitude expressed to the Personal Envoy and this
recapitulation indicate clearly the obstacles raised on the path towards a
settlement of the conflict over Western Sahara. They also show the
responsibility and duplicity of the Kingdom of Morocco. All that brings the fore
the continuing volte-face of the occupying Power in Western Sahara, conduct
which the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and then the United Nations, have
had to suffer constantly, to the detriment of international law and to the
detriment of their own credit.
OAU and the United Nations can also testify that Frente POLISARIO,
which speaks for martyrs, exiles and Saharans faced with unspeakable suffering
inside their occupied country and for a just cause, has unceasingly over the
decades made successive compromises with the aim of ensuring the exercise of a
fundamental right, the Saharan people's right to self-determination. These
compromises began with the acceptance of, and faithful respect for, the
ceasefire that came into force on 6 September 1991, in spite of the fact that
this halt to the fighting was an integral element of the Settlement Plan that
Morocco is constantly impeding and even challenging. What became of it? Morocco
itself gives the reply: Its invasion of Western Sahara in 1975, with a savagery
and barbarity unprecedented against an unarmed civilian population, its
obstinacy and illegality, its expansionism and its will to gain recognition for
the fait accompli of the occupation of Western Sahara. That is not a question of
polemics but of stands that have been taken by the Kingdom of Morocco and for
which it must be held accountable. It is Morocco that alleges that "the
international community has finally recognized its rights to the Sahara". It is
Morocco that maintains that "the referendum is null and void". It is Morocco
that, in short, states that it will not accept any solution to this
decolonization conflict "that does not respect its territorial integrity and
national sovereignty".
By recalling all this, the Frente POLISARIO is not indulging in
statements that might be perceived as inappropriate in response to a proposal
submitted to it with peace as the goal. It simply seeks to place that proposal
in its essential context: that of an illegal occupation inasmuch as Morocco,
which has never given its word on the subject except to retract it subsequently,
producing only obstacles and complications.
The Frente POLISARIO sees clearly that, since November 1999, the
United Nations has been trying to counter Moroccan duplicity with the search for
a "political solution", the ultimate step of which is still the referendum on
selfdetermination, while confirming the validity of the settlement plan and
acknowledging the difficulties still encompassing its implementation.
The Saharan people and the Frente POLISARIO, which speaks on its
behalf, believe that they are entitled to expect of the United Nations that the
necessary and adequate conditions and guarantees be provided to ensure that the
triumph of the right of peoples to self-determination is safeguarded, in Western
Sahara, against new Moroccan volte-face and that the return of the Saharan
people to its Territory to exercise its right to self-determination is not a
gathering to endorse, through its own participation, the integration of its
country in the occupying Power, or, even less, a return of its repression,
massacre and suffocation.
Taking all these factors into consideration, the Frente POLISARIO
has considered carefully the proposal of Mr. James Baker III based on Security
Council resolution 1429 (2002) of 30 July 2002. In the course of this careful
consideration, Frente POLISARIO has noted that the Personal Envoy has
endeavoured to take account of some of the "concerns expressed by the parties".
However, it has also sought to analyse the proposal in the light of the
volte-face and obstacles that the Kingdom of Morocco has already placed in the
way of previous plans and agreements after duly accepting them. Accordingly,
Frente POLISARIO wishes to make the following remarks and comments on Mr. James
Baker III's proposal entitled "Peace Plan for selfdetermination for the people
of Western Sahara".
1. It is provided (para. 15) that: "The election for the Legislative
Assembly and Chief Executive of WSA [Western Sahara Authority] shall be held
within one year of the effective date of this Plan". However, the concept of
this one-year period is encompassed with solemn and weighty silences, except for
some brief indications regarding the issues of prisoners, the troops of the two
parties and refugees (paras. 19, 20 and 21).
Need it be recalled that this period is supposed to see the return
of the Saharan refugees to the Territory? Need it be recalled also that the
United Nations is supposed to exercise its exclusive authority in the election
of WSA? Lastly, need it be recalled that the Settlement Plan, supplemented by
the Houston agreements and translated into detailed measures by the
Secretary-General on 13 November 1997, defines clearly and precisely the body of
provisions that should govern the transition period.
Accordingly, through these solemn silences regarding the one-year
period preceding the election of WSA, there is a risk that the proposal might
&emdash; quite contrary to the will of its author &emdash; set a real trap for
Saharan refugees on return to their illegally occupied country.
Without adequate guarantees and protection from the United Nations,
through, inter alia, the engagement of its own authority in the occupied
Territory, many previous experiences (such as Rwanda and Timor) confirm in
advance that the above-mentioned one-year period will be the occasion of a mass
repression of Saharans and a blemish on the name of the United Nations itself.
Moreover, the Moroccan repression to which Saharans in the occupied part of the
Territory continue to be subjected, in spite of the presence of MINURSO since
1991, is a further proof of the serious dangers ahead.
2. With regard to the release of political prisoners and prisoners
of war (para. 19), the proposal omits to raise the question of the
responsibility of either party should it evade its obligations. We are all aware
that Morocco persists in refusing to provide any information to the
International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the fate of the Saharans held
in its jails. Does that mean that the United Nations thereby intends to forget
those detainees and prisoners and to release the occupier from its serious
responsibilities in this regard?
3. With regard to the repatriation of refugees (para. 19), the
proposal restricts itself to stipulating that: "The interested parties agree
that they shall continue their full cooperation with relevant international
bodies until the completion of the repatriation process". However, by
undertaking to assume full responsibility for the referendum, the United Nations
undertakes to assume primary responsibility for the protection and security of,
and assistance to, refugees. That was formally agreed and specified in the
Settlement Plan, with the agreement of the two parties. The relevant provisions
were set forth in paragraphs 22 to 28 of the detailed Plan submitted by the
Secretary-General to the Security Council (report contained in document
S/1997/882). Renouncing those provisions or even ignoring them would mean
exposing the refugees to serious danger upon repatriation without protection and
during resettlement without security guaranteed by MINURSO and without the
anticipated assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
4. With regard to the provisions applicable to the troops of the two
parties (para. 20), the proposal provides that these would be the measures to
reduce, confine and contain them envisaged in the Settlement Plan, as
supplemented by the Houston agreements. This gives rise to some major questions,
including the following:
(a) Does this mean that the 65,000 Moroccan troops intended, under
the Settlement Plan, to be kept contained and monitored by MINURSO (for a period
of six months prior to the referendum) would henceforth be scheduled to remain
in Western Sahara for more than four years? Logic and fairness would demand that
almost all of these 65,000 men be withdrawn from Western Sahara in order to
remove a serious threat;
(b) Does this mean that the United Nations intends at the very least
to maintain the military unit of MINURSO in its entirety (almost 2,000 men) in
Western Sahara for almost four years so that it can ensure observance of the
containment and monitoring provisions already agreed on in the Settlement Plan
and accepted by the two parties?
In fact, the very logic of the proposal which (para. 8) provides for
the powers of WSA in the context of the exercise of "governmental authority",
must lead to the withdrawal of practically all of the Moroccan troops still in
Western Sahara upon the establishment of WSA.
5. With regard to MINURSO, paragraph 21 of the Plan provides for
amending its name and mandate "to enable it to assist in implementation of this
Plan, in particular during the period between the Plan's entry into force and
the holding of the election of WSA". This statement gives considerable cause for
concern, because it would appear to indicate the abdication by the United
Nations of its responsibilities in the Territory for a period of four years,
thus setting the stage for a potentially lethal confrontation between Western
Saharans and the Moroccan occupier.
It bears recalling at this point that, in accordance with its own
Charter, the United Nations remains committed to the non-self-governing
Territory of Western Sahara. Moreover, the mere fact that the proposal itself
outlines a process the final phase of which is a referendum exclusively
organized and monitored by the United Nations to determine the final status of
the Territory, should in all logic require the presence of the Special
Representative and MINURSO under the mandates given to them by the Settlement
Plan supplemented by the Houston agreements, mandates that provide not only for
the prevention of any escalation of the conflict and derailment of the plan, but
also, and more importantly, for the continuing protection of the population of
the Western Sahara until the implementation of the final result of the
referendum.
6. After the WSA election, the proposal provides for another period
of transition of no less than three and no longer than four years. The evidence
at hand raises a concern as to why the reasons for this inordinately long period
are not specified.
7. The arrangements envisaged for this three- or four-year period
are based on two legally inadmissible postulates. Indeed, Morocco is an
occupying Power in the Western Sahara and not an administering power. Its
sovereignty over the Territory is not recognized and the proposal itself
confirms this, since its aim is to hold elections on the final status of the
Territory. Consequently:
(a) Morocco cannot be responsible for the foreign relations of a
territory over which the international community has never recognized its
sovereignty;
(b) The occupying Power cannot conclude agreements or conventions
that are binding on the Western Sahara or involve its resources, as confirmed by
the Legal Counsel of the United Nations in his opinion of 29 January 2002;
(c) Nor can Morocco determine the international borders of the
Western Sahara established by treaties signed between Spain, the administering
Power in the Western Sahara, and France, then administering Power in Algeria,
Mauritania and Morocco, neighbouring countries of the Western Sahara, and
deposited with the United Nations.
8. The proposal intends to confer on WSA powers to exercise
governmental authority over the territory of the Western Sahara. It therefore
leads to the establishment, by the Western Sahara Authority, of an appropriate
administration. This therefore presupposes the dismantling of the occupying
administration in all areas that fall under the remit of WSA. This
dismantling/establishment exercise should proceed peacefully and in accordance
with the agreement that is supposed to have been signed.
It also follows that MINURSO and the Special Representative should
supervise the transition. Lastly, the foregoing also implies the transfer to WSA
of the power to issue titles and documents such as deeds for state ownership,
residence and settlement permits, civil-status documents and decisions.
9. The proposal also confers on WSA competence over taxation and
economic development, including mining and fisheries. This implies halting the
plunder by the Moroccan occupying Power of the natural resources (phosphates and
fisheries) of Western Sahara and ensuring that such resources belong exclusively
to the Territory and its people, yet the proposal does not make any specific
provision to that end.
10. Similarly, since WSA is considered to have competence over
education and culture, that should imply that it has the right to teach the
languages it wants, to guarantee the freedom of worship and to lay down
principles governing society and the institutions, including the right to do
justice on behalf of the people.
11. The proposal also confers on WSA competence over internal
security and the maintenance of law and order. In some cases, such as the fight
against transnational crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering or terrorism,
competence over internal security should lead to cooperation at the
international level between the WSA police and the police forces of other states
or bodies (such as Interpol). However, in this regard, the exclusive competence
over foreign relations that the proposal intends to confer on Morocco would be a
serious obstacle.
12. The proposal confers on Morocco, the occupier, jurisdiction that
is at times vague. Thus, at this stage, nothing prevents Morocco from claiming
the right to draft Saharans into the ranks of its army of occupation, a
situation whose ludicrousness is there for all to see.
13. The proposal intends to grant to Morocco the right to conserve
the trappings of its sovereignty over the Western Sahara, including the flag,
currency and stamps. Such a situation would have been conceivable within the
framework of specific autonomy agreed under a sovereign State. However, it is
inconceivable in non-autonomous, illegally occupied Western Sahara for which the
proposal itself suggests a solution aimed at deciding on the final status of the
Territory. Accepting the Moroccan flag, currency and stamps in the Western
Sahara is tantamount to giving in to the colonizer's claim that it has
sovereignty over the Territory.
14. By deeming it necessary to make Morocco responsible for customs
in the Western Sahara, the proposal would seriously call into question the
economic powers of WSA. Indeed, such situation would have an advance impact in
terms of restrictions on imports and exports and the diversion of customs
revenues and duties to the detriment of the Western Saharan economy.
15. By envisaging granting to Morocco (whose police practices are
well known) the administration of posts and telecommunications, the proposal
threatens respect for the universal principle of freedom and the privacy of
communications and correspondence. This would be tantamount to calling basic
human rights into question, to the detriment of Saharans.
16. The proposal has remained silent on the free movement of goods
and persons to and from the Western Sahara. This proposal calls into question
the universal principle of freedom of movement, which is also contained in the
Settlement Plan and the Houston agreements. Furthermore, the powers envisaged by
Morocco with regard to combating any secessionist attempts would undoubtedly
result in the people of Western Sahara being locked up in a ghetto of
oppression.
17. The proposal fails to stipulate the right of foreigners,
especially nongovernmental organizations and the media, to have free access to
the Western Sahara. Moreover, making the occupier, Morocco, responsible for the
Territory's external security would result in granting it the right to censure
the entry of foreigners into the Western Sahara. That is why the proposal should
have granted only to the services of the United Nations the power to issue entry
visas into the Territory.
18. The proposal intends to give Morocco exclusive competence over
"all matters relating to the production, sale, ownership, or use of weapons or
explosives". That is a "legal" basis which would be established in favour of the
occupying Power, which it could use to arm "death squads" with a view to
establishing a bloody chaos in the Western Sahara of which the designated victim
in advance would be the Saharan people. Let us also note that the proposal is
silent on a universal principle of law, namely, that any activity undertaken by
the police must necessarily be subject to monitoring by the magistrate with
jurisdiction over the Territory and therefore by the courts that are supposed to
be established in the Western Sahara.
19. It should be pointed out that the proposal's intention to confer
on Morocco the right to preserve the Territory against secessionist attempts is
a serious juridical shift and a blatant anomaly. It is indeed a grave legal
anomaly because any mention of "secession" carries an implication of
"territorial integrity". This, of course, is Morocco's colonialist argument;
however, such "territorial integrity" is not recognized by the international
community and the Saharan people, for its part, has challenged it through its
legitimate national liberation struggle. Furthermore, the proposal rejects
Morocco's territorial integrity in the Western Sahara, since it is supposed to
lead to a referendum on the final status of the Western Sahara.
Furthermore, it is also a blatant anomaly because the proposal in
its conception assumes that the Frente POLISARIO would have accepted the
arrangement put forward and that the Saharawi People's Liberation Army would be
reduced and contained under the supervision of MINURSO. That being the case,
where would any "secessionist attempts" come from?
Such a provision would be tantamount to suppressing for three or
four years the right of the Saharan people to foster peacefully and
democratically, and not only during electoral campaigns, their demand for
independence, for which they are still fighting, even while the option of
independence naturally still remains one of the options to be decided upon
following a free and fair referendum.
20. The proposal intends to establish a judicial authority appointed
by WSA in the Western Sahara. At the same time, it gives the highest court of
Morocco "jurisdiction to adjudicate the compatibility of any law reserved to the
Kingdom". This constitutes unprecedented dual judicial authority over a colonial
Territory, without even the arbitration of third party judges representing the
United Nations. Its initial effect would be to seriously weaken the powers
conferred on the WSA legislative assembly.
The second dangerous consequence of this approach in practice would
most probably be that Saharans detained for questioning by the Moroccan security
services for attempted secession would be subject to Morocco's special courts.
In a nutshell, the occupation and repression of Saharan nationalism would
continue, as under the current occupation; such repression would probably be
more savage and ferocious, especially with its "validation" by a United Nations
sponsored peace plan.
21. Concerning the final referendum on the final status of the
Western Sahara, and despite the begging of the question concerning its
monitoring by the United Nations (paras. 4 and 15),the process still remains, on
the issue of the electorate, marked by a certain unfairness towards the Saharan
people and by contradictions in terms of its approach; it is also a fresh source
of complications.
(a) Thus, the contents of paragraphs 5 and 6, describing the three
components of the electorate (namely, the Saharans already identified, Saharan
refugees and the Moroccan settlers) takes the entire process back to the
original and ongoing complications concerning the issue of those eligible to
vote in the referendum. Indeed, the United Nations itself admits that for 10
years the implementation of the settlement plan was hampered by the difficulty
in resolving the identification issue. However, by providing for the
identification of a new category of voters (the "residents") the United Nations
would be heading for a new controversy and a deadlock of the proposed process.
(b) Furthermore, the provisions concerning the counting of
"residents on the list of qualified voters" clearly contain some contradictions.
It is stated, on the one hand, that it is the United Nations, "whose decision
shall be final and without appeal", which will be responsible for this census.
On the other hand, it is indicated that the United Nations shall base its action
to that end on "testimony from at least three credible persons and/or credible
documentary evidence".
By proceeding thus, Morocco will have the exclusive privilege of
claiming the right to vote for its nationals, also providing witnesses and, of
course, providing documents. Thus, the proposal would embark the United Nations
on yet another open-ended process of identification with the introduction of
complications by Morocco, which is to blame for the ongoing deadlock of the
settlement plan, precisely with respect to the issue of identification.
It bears recalling at this point that the United Nations Peace Plan
accepted by the two parties and endorsed by the Security Council set forth in
1988, when it was initially drafted, and in April 1991 in its final version,
that the 74,000 Saharans counted by Spain, the administering Power, constituted
the electorate body for the referendum.
Let us also recall that the delaying tactics by Morocco have been as
consistent as public on the issue of identification as indicated by the
following:
&endash; Its submission to the United Nations as far back as July
1991 of two additional lists of 76,000 and 45,000 Saharans, respectively;
&endash; Its second "Green March" of 17 September 1991 (following
the entry into force of the ceasefire of 6 September 1991) getting 170,000
Moroccans to go to the identification commission in the Western Sahara;
&endash; Its third "Green March" of 12 January 1998 (following the
Houston agreements, which supported the eligibility criteria, and some weeks
after the adoption of the Secretary-General's detailed plan of 13 November 1997
for the holding of the 7 December 1998 referendum) that brought an initial
contingent of 50,000 Moroccans to the Western Sahara to be "identified";
&endash; Its lodging of 131,000 appeals in February 2000 (relating
to individuals already ruled out by the Identification Commission) to force the
United Nations to accept them as voters immediately following the publication of
the provisional list of the identification commission on 30 December 1991 and
despite Security Council resolutions 1238 (14 May 1999) and 1263 (13 September
1999) by which the Council had appealed to the two parties not to turn the
appeals process into a second round of identification.
Lastly, let us recall that in each of the above-mentioned instances
the United Nations caved in without succeeding in stopping Morocco's manoeuvres.
Thus:
&endash; The entry of 170,000 more Moroccans into the Western Sahara
in September 1991 was followed by a revision of the identification criteria that
had already been established;
&endash; The entry of 50,000 more Moroccans into the Western Sahara
in January 1998 resulted in the calling into question of the identification
modalities agreed upon and accepted under the Houston agreements and in the
drafting by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of five additional
protocols relating to appeals in May 1999;
&endash; Lastly, the publication by the United Nations in December
1999 of the list of identified voters (86,425 persons) was followed by the
submission by Morocco of 131,000 appeals concerning cases that had all been
already considered and rejected by the United Nations Identification Commission.
That resulted in a deadlock in the identification process and brought the
implementation of the Settlement Plan to a standstill.
(c) Lastly, the composition of the electorate envisaged under the
proposal is both unfair and fatal to the Saharan people:
&endash; It is unfair because the fate of the colonized Saharan
Territory would be determined through a referendum in which 86,425 Saharans and
(if we were to confine ourselves to the above-mentioned facts) Moroccan settlers
four to five times that number would participate;
&endash; It is fatal because the Saharan refugees would be returning
to the Western Sahara, to a situation fraught with uncertainty, to be trapped
there by the colonizer who would then block once again the process around the
"residents" issue and would embark on as brutal a repression as it did in 1975,
when it even used napalm against civilians fleeing from the occupation. Not even
the Nazis behaved that way when they invaded neighbouring countries of Germany.
22. Furthermore, the proposal does not contain any provisions banning any
fresh and massive movement of Moroccans to the Western Sahara. By failing to do
so, the four to five years between the entry into force of the proposed plan and
the final referendum, will provide ample opportunities for new "green marches",
a method used by Morocco to invade the Western Sahara and sustain its occupation
of the Territory over the years.
23. The proposal offers no guarantees as to the respect for the
results of the proposed referendum, should it lead to independence. It is
definitely not the commitment of the interested parties (para. 9) which could be
mistaken for an effective guarantee. Such undertakings were made by Morocco in
1988 and 1991 (under the Settlement Plan), then in September 1997 at Houston and
in November 1997 at the adoption of the detailed implementation Plan by the
Security Council. We all know what happened.
Moreover, it was the Secretary-General himself who stated in his
report of 19 February 2002 (para. 48) that "the United Nations might not be able
to hold a free and fair referendum whose results would be accepted by both
sides; and there would still be no mechanism to enforce the results of the
referendum". That should even have provided grounds for including in the
proposal sufficient guarantees including through the role of MINURSO and the
Special Representative and prior commitments by the Secretary-General and the
Security Council to ensure that the results of the referendum would be
respected.
24. The agreement contained in the Special Envoy's proposal breaks
new ground by introducing a novel idea in the field of agreements. The document
states (para. 1) that the Peace Plan "is an agreement by and between the Kingdom
of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO". In its articles 17 and 19, it refers once
again to the Frente POLISARIO for the purposes of settling the fate of the
Saharawi People's Liberation Army and reaffirming the Code of Conduct. The
proposal makes the Frente POLISARIO one of the five signatories to the
"Agreement". However, the Frente POLISARIO does not appear anywhere else in the
other 20 pages of the document (unlike Morocco, which is a subject or actor in
all phases of the proposed process). Does the foregoing mean that the Frente
POLISARIO would be restricted to the status of a signatory on behalf of the
Saharan people but without any further role to play in meeting the commitments
it will have undertaken or even as a petitioner for any violations of the
Agreement? Would it also mean that the Frente POLISARIO would be stripped of its
responsibility for waging a political and peaceful campaign for independence,
the very reason why it was appointed as a representative of the Saharan people
and for which it has been accepted for decades by the international community,
including the United Nations, as interlocutor?
The Frente POLISARIO is a democratic movement and would therefore
bear no grudges in seeing genuine Saharans setting up institutions and
especially deciding on the future of the Western Sahara. However, the Frente
POLISARIO is also a key partner when it comes to reaching agreement on the terms
of any just and final settlement to the conflict. It is therefore also a key
partner in the conclusion, implementation and observance of any settlement plan.
The proposal should have taken this fact into account and prevented a serious
omission. All the foregoing shows that the Frente POLISARIO is not using
delaying tactics nor engaging in evasive manoeuvres to stall the peace efforts
of the United Nations.
A just and lasting peace is what is sought by the Saharan people,
part of whose country is under occupation, a situation that has forced some of
them into a painful exile for 27 years.
The quest for peace through genuine self-determination for the
Saharan people is the reason for the many concessions that the Frente POLISARIO
has willingly made on behalf of the Saharans, from the unilateral cessation of
hostilities (1990) to the ceasefire (1991) and various successive agreements
already made with regard to identification criteria. Furthermore, the successive
liberation of prisoners of war (a vital component of the Settlement Plan) gives
further proof of the Frente POLISARIO's desire for peace.
As for the other party, the occupier Morocco, its only good point
has been to constantly proclaim openly, since 1975, that only a "confirmatory"
referendum would be held and that the only solution would be one that is "in
accordance with its territorial integrity and national sovereignty".
The comments made by the Frente POLISARIO on the Personal Envoy's
proposal are meant to bring out its inconsistencies, the serious obstacles it is
putting in the way of the efforts suggested by the United Nations and the grave
danger it poses to the security and legitimate and inalienable right of the
Saharan people to freely decide on its future and that of its own country. It is
in that same spirit and as proof of both the good will and desire of the Saharan
people to ensure that the United Nations efforts result in the satisfaction of
its own right to self-determination that the Frente POLISARIO is submitting to
the Special Envoy, and through him to the United Nations, a proposal which
represents a major sacrifice and a major concession.
The aim of this new proposal is to:
&endash; Resolve the long-standing issue of voter identification;
&endash; Reduce the time frame and costs of implementation of the
Settlement Plan;
&endash; Uphold the guarantees of impartiality already accepted by
the two parties without challenge;
&endash; And put in place guarantees that the results of the
referendum will be respected.
To that end, the Frente POLISARIO proposes:
(1) That in order to overcome the deadlock with regard to
identification, the United Nations should decide that the electorate should
consist of:
(a) The individuals whose names are on the provisional voter lists
established by the Identification Commission on 30 December 1999;
(b) The results produced by the Identification Commission following
the impartial, rigorous and transparent consideration of the appeals lodged,
nearly all of them by Morocco, and recorded by the Identification Commission;
such consideration would be conducted with or without the participation of the
"chioukh" and its decisions should be final and without appeal;
(c) Such identification, which would take some weeks to finalize,
should be completed before the transitional period begins.
(2) Once the identification has been completed, the Settlement Plan
supplemented by the Houston agreements would be implemented in accordance with
the detailed plan contained in the Secretary-General's report dated 13 November
1997 (S/1997/882).
(3) In order to guarantee respect for the results of the referendum,
the Secretary-General and the Security Council would make a commitment in
advance to ensuring respect for the outcome of the referendum organized and
monitored by the United Nations, the operational mechanism for that purpose
being the Special Representative and MINURSO.
The Frente POLISARIO hopes that this new proposal closes all
loopholes for delaying tactics: the issue of voter identification would be
decided by the United Nations on the basis of information (the appeals) already
in its possession. All the other provisions of the Settlement Plan supplemented
by the Houston agreements were not challenged by any of the parties. The Frente
POLISARIO hopes that the Personal Envoy and the United Nations will grasp the
scope and import of the proposal it is making, which is very consistent with
justifications for a peaceful solution acceptable to the two parties and
intended to guarantee self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. It is
because its very raison d'�tre is the quest for a just and lasting solution to
the conflict in Western Sahara that the Frente POLISARIO once again reaffirms
its willingness to continue cooperating with the Personal Envoy of the United
Nations Secretary-General.
Letter dated 26 February 2003 from the President of Algeria to the
Secretary-General
[Original: French]
I should like to thank you sincerely for your letter informing me of
the visit of your Personal Envoy, Mr. James Baker III, to Algeria and for the
interest you have consistently shown in the settlement of the question of
Western Sahara since your election to the post of Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Baker and learning of the new
proposal he had drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Security Council
resolution 1429 (2002) to ensure the self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara. As I promised, his proposal has been considered in depth in a
constructive and open manner.
Algeria has considered the proposal on the basis of the principles
that have always guided it in dealing with the question of Western Sahara,
namely the need to ensure the exercise of the legitimate right of the Saharan
people to selfdetermination, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, the position of the Organization with regard to decolonization, and the
obligations incumbent upon it in respect of colonial States and peoples.
The Personal Envoy submitted his proposal with his habitual
frankness and pointed out that the solution it offered was based on a compromise
which did not seek to fully satisfy either of the parties to the conflict in
Western Sahara and which was not open to negotiation.
Algeria has considered the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the
People of Western Sahara with a view to contributing to the establishment of
guarantees concerning each stage of the proposed process. These guarantees of
transparency, legality and security have already been defined by the United
Nations and accepted by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Polisario in the
context of the Settlement Plan and the Houston Accords.
They are designed to conclude the process of decolonization in
Western Sahara in a climate of freedom and legality, without administrative or
military constraints and under the sole authority of the United Nations, thereby
endorsing the credibility of the proposed solution and enhancing the reputation
and prestige of the Organization. Such was the spirit that prevailed during the
elaboration of Algeria's response to the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of
the People of Western Sahara, which is set out in the memorandum attached
hereto. I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the
members of the Security Council.
Lastly, I should like to reassure you of my full determination and
willingness to continue to cooperate both with you and with your Personal Envoy
to ensure the success of the long-standing efforts of the United Nations to find
a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara with a view to
bringing peace and stability to the subregion.
(Signed) Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Memorandum from Algeria concerning the new proposal from the
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "peace
plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara"
[Original: French]
On 15 January 2003, Algeria welcomed with pleasure and hope His
Excellency Mr. James Baker III, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. On that occasion, His Excellency Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, reassured him of
Algeria's appreciation for the tireless efforts he has been making since April
1997, with competence and devotion, to complete the process of a peaceful, just
and lasting settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara under the auspices of
the United Nations and through a referendum for the self-determination of the
people of Western Sahara. The President of the Republic also assured the
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General that Algeria would study, with all due
attention, the "Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western
Sahara", submitted to the two parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Frente Polisario, and to Algeria and Mauritania, as neighbouring
countries and interested parties. Algeria's interest in the new peace offer
submitted by the Personal Envoy is consistent with the support it has
continually given since 1966 to the completion of the decolonization of Western
Sahara in order to ensure that the right of peoples to self-determination, which
is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, is finally secured in the
Territory.
The exercise of this right has been the subject of many United
Nations resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and of
sustained practice, having been accepted as the ineluctable way for colonial
countries and peoples freely to choose their future. Similarly, the Charter and
practice of the United Nations have recognized and confirmed the prime
responsibility of the Organization towards colonial peoples and towards the
Non-Self-Governing Territories, two realities of the prevailing situation in
Western Sahara. The United Nations has effectively taken on this responsibility
for Western Sahara through the Settlement Plan and the Houston Agreements on the
holding of a referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara that is free, fair and transparent and free from administrative or
military constraints, organized and conducted by the United Nations. The
implementation of this Plan has regrettably been blocked by events for which the
responsibility has been clearly established. Fortunately, however, the United
Nations has neither become disheartened by this impasse, which has persisted
since 1991, nor relinquished its role in, and responsibility for, the situation
concerning Western Sahara. Security Council resolution 1429 (2002) of 30 July
2002 confirms this determination. By this resolution, the Security Council
declares that it "continues to support strongly the efforts of the
Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to find a political solution to this
long-standing dispute, invites the Personal Envoy to pursue these efforts taking
into account the concerns expressed by the parties and expresses its readiness
to consider any approach which provides for self-determination that may be
proposed by the Secretary-General and the Personal Envoy, consulting, as
appropriate, others with relevant experience".
The "Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western
Sahara", presented by the Personal Envoy as a non-negotiable offer, stems from
this Security Council resolution. Algeria has examined this plan very carefully,
in the hope of contributing to the success of the efforts of the Personal Envoy
of the Secretary-General and, through him, the entire United Nations system, for
just as it has always supported the right of the people of Western Sahara to
self-determination and rejected the fait accompli policy, it has also continued
to promote the maintenance of peace in the region and to affirm its attachment
to respect for international law, of which the Security Council is both the
embodiment and the guarantor.
Having studied the new proposal, Algeria would like to make the
following observations:
- First, on the preliminary period of one year before the election
of the Western Sahara Authority (WSA);
- Second, on the question of prisoners;
- Third, on the repatriation of refugees;
- Fourth, concerning the troops of the two parties;
- Fifth, on the period between the election of the WSA and the
holding of the referendum on the final status of the Territory;
- Sixth, on the referendum on the final status of the Territory;
- Lastly, on guarantees for the successful implementation of the
proposed Plan. All these observations take into account the progress made in
earlier negotiations between the parties under the chairmanship of the Personal
Envoy of the Secretary-General and, in particular, the provisions contained in
the Houston Agreements, signed by both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente
Polisario.
I. The preliminary period of one year before the election of the WSA
Paragraph 15 of the proposed Plan states that "the election for the
Legislative Assembly and Chief Executive of W.S.A. shall be held within one year
of the effective date of this Plan". Nevertheless, no indication is provided on
the organization and arrangements that will prevail during this crucial period
during which, as noted in other paragraphs of the Plan, important operations
such as the return of refugees, the enactment of provisions applicable to the
troops of the two parties and, in the last phase, the election of the Western
Sahara Authority will be carried out.
It is true that, in citing the provisions of the Houston Agreements
of 1997 for some of the operations to be carried out during that period
(including respect for the Code of Conduct mentioned in paragraph 17 and the
confinement of troops provided for in paragraph 20) and in referring to the role
to be played by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO), the Plan submitted by the Personal Envoy gives some indication of the
arrangements that may govern this preliminary phase. Nonetheless, Algeria feels
that the year preceding the election of the Western Sahara Authority will be a
critical one. It therefore considers that the wording of the applicable
arrangements should be made perfectly clear before the parties and neighbouring
countries affirm their acceptance by their signatures.
For its part, Algeria believes that there is an obvious similarity
between the problems and issues relating, on the one hand, to this preliminary
one-year period and, on the other, to the one-year transitional period provided
for in the Settlement Plan. Accordingly, Algeria considers that the management
of that period by the United Nations should include guarantees of security and
fairness similar to those that will apply to the transitional period envisioned
in the Settlement Plan, as consolidated by the Houston Agreements; these
guarantees, moreover, have not been objected to by either party to the conflict.
In addition, despite the differences in purpose -- a
self-determination referendum in one case and the election of the WSA in the
other -- the similarity of issues relating to the preliminary one-year period
and the transitional period stemming from the Settlement Plan is confirmed by
the very fact that the transitional period effectively began when the ceasefire
took effect on 6 September 1991. Lastly, and except for the assessment of the
material means and financial implications to be reevaluated, such relevant
measures and conditions have already been identified by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations in his report of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882).
Algeria therefore considers that, for the period between the entry
into force of the Plan submitted by the Personal Envoy and the election of the
Western Sahara Authority a year later, the United Nations should stipulate that:
(1) The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is
already in the Territory, shall exercise all his functions and powers, in other
words, exclusive authority over all issues related
to the preparation of the election of the Western Sahara Authority,
including measures to be taken concerning the troops of the two parties, the
return of refugees, the release of prisoners of war and political prisoners, the
supervision of the administration and police in the Territory, the guarantee of
freedom of speech during the electoral campaign and, lastly, the organization
and conduct of the election of the WSA , for which the exclusive responsibility
is vested in the United Nations. It should be noted that similar provisions are
set forth in paragraph 14 of the above-mentioned report of the
Secretary-General;
(2) To assist the Special Representative, the United Nations shall
proceed to deploy MINURSO civilian, military and police units in due course with
appropriate levels of staff. This issue is clearly addressed in paragraphs 38 to
46 of the report of the Secretary-General;
(3) The United Nations, through the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General and with the cooperation of MINURSO, shall supervise the
administration of the Territory, including the maintenance of law and order, as
stipulated in paragraph 15 of the report of the Secretary- General;
(4) An amnesty shall be proclaimed before the repatriation of
refugees begins, as provided for in paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's
report;
(5) The United Nations shall neutralize the paramilitary units in
the existing police forces and make arrangements for the maintenance of law and
order during the transitional period, as provided for in paragraph 24 of the
Secretary-General's report;
(6) The Special Representative shall ensure, among other things,
complete freedom of speech and assembly, and of the press, as well as freedom of
movement for personnel and property into, out of and within the Territory, thus
creating a climate of public tranquillity within which the election of the
Western Sahara Authority, free of all constraints, intimidation and harassment,
can be organized and conducted by the United Nations, as provided for in
paragraph 14 of the Secretary-General's report;
(7) The Special Representative of the Secretary General shall be
authorized to issue regulations prohibiting graft, fraud, intimidation and
harassment which could interfere with the organization and conduct of a free and
fair election under the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations, as
stipulated in paragraph 14 of the Secretary-General's report;
(8) Before the repatriation of refugees begins, the Special
Representative shall ensure that the authorities involved suspend any law or
measure which, in his judgement, could obstruct the conduct of a free and fair
election and would not otherwise be superseded by the regulations, rules and
instructions issued by him, as provided for in paragraph 21 of the
Secretary-General's report;
(9) To clear up any difficulty or problem that may arise during the
electoral campaign and during the election of the Western Sahara Authority, the
Special Representative may, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations
and with regard to the organization and conduct of the election, be assisted by
a commission in whose work the representatives of the two parties, the Kingdom
of Morocco and the Frente Polisario, will be associated as observers, as
stipulated in paragraph 33 of the Secretary-General's report;
(10) In order to ensure the promotion of a favourable climate for
conducting the election of the WSA, the Special Representative shall, while
respecting the right to freedom of movement, take steps to prevent any mass
movement of persons from Morocco to the Territory of Western Sahara. These
measures are all the more necessary in view of the occurrence of such movements
in 1975 and again in 1998, although the United Nations had already taken on
responsibility for Western Sahara as from the entry into force of the ceasefire
of 6 September 1991;
(11) Lastly, practical provisions shall be enacted to clarify the
field and scope of the exclusive authority of the United Nations with regard to
the organization and conduct of the election of the Western Sahara Authority and
to the proclamation and implementation of its results. Algeria considers the
above-mentioned measures crucial to the successful unfolding of the one-year
period between the entry into force of the Personal Envoy's Plan and the setting
up of the Western Sahara Authority. These measures will make it possible to
arrange for suitable conditions to prevent any unexpected event that could
destroy the confidence and tranquillity which this period aims to establish or
could even undermine the Peace Plan after the refugees have returned to the
Territory.
II. Release of political prisoners and prisoners of war
Algeria clearly understands the reason for the absence of
reciprocity between the two parties in the framework of their obligation to
proceed to the release of prisoners, as set forth in paragraph 19 of the
proposed Peace Plan. Nonetheless, it believes that in a case where either party
fails to comply with its obligations in this matter after the other party has
begun to release its prisoners, it should be the responsibility of the United
Nations, through its Special Representative, and, where appropriate, at a higher
level, to ensure respect for this important principle of humanitarian law, from
which no derogation should be tolerated by the international community.
III. Repatriation of refugees
Algeria notes that, under paragraph 19 of the proposed Plan, the
"interested parties agree that they shall continue their full cooperation with
relevant international bodies until the completion of the repatriation process".
This provision is a positive one, but it is nonetheless insufficient
to ensure in practice a well-organized and safe repatriation process for the
refugees and their resettlement in the territory in the required conditions of
protection and assistance. Algeria therefore considers that the modalities
defined in the Settlement Plan, which, moreover, have not been rejected or
questioned by either party, should be implemented in the framework of
repatriation envisaged by the new Plan. These measures are detailed in the
Secretary-General's report (S/1997/882) and relate to the following:
(1) The prior assurance, by MINURSO, that all necessary conditions
have been met for the safe return of refugees, including the reduction,
confinement and containment of Moroccan troops present in the Territory, the
designation by the Special Representative of crossing-points for refugees into
the Territory, arrangements by MINURSO to ensure security at these
crossingpoints, including mine clearing of repatriation routes and security at
the reception centres designated by the Special Representative. It should be
noted that identical provisions are set forth in paragraph 24 of the
Secretary-General's report (S/1997/882);
(2) Respect for the rights of refugees returning to the Territory
who wish to rejoin their relatives in the Territory or make other arrangements
as provided for in paragraph 25 of the Secretary- General's report;
(3) Assistance provided by UNHCR to repatriated refugees in
reception centres or places where they may assemble during the entire period
preceding the election of the Western Saharan Authority and, thereafter, with a
view to their resettlement in the Territory. Provisions to this effect are
contained in paragraph 28 of the Secretary-General's report.
IV. Concerning the troops of the two parties
In this regard, Algeria wishes to state its position on each of the
two elements of paragraph 20 of the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy. 1.
Firstly, this paragraph states that "Within [90] days after the effective date
of this Plan, the armed forces of Morocco and the Frente Polisario will be
reduced, confined, contained, and thereafter maintained in all respects strictly
in accordance with the provisions of the 1997 Houston Agreements".
This satisfactory provision should be interpreted as representing
strict respect by the troops of the two parties for "the provisions of the
Settlement Plan as complemented by the Houston Agreements". It is useful to
recall, in this respect, that the merit of the Houston Agreements was, on the
one hand, to confirm the relevant provisions of the Settlement Plan applicable
to the armed forces of the Kingdom of Morocco and, on the other, to spell out
the applicable measures for the confinement of the Frente Polisario troops which
are not specified in the Settlement Plan.
In fact, the measures applicable to the Moroccan forces in the
Territory are set forth in paragraph 20 of the Secretary-General's report
(S1997/882), which indicates that it is complemented by paragraph 56 of the
report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/21360 and Corr. 1.
Algeria therefore wishes to set forth its understanding of the commitments
already agreed between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, which were confirmed in the framework of the Houston Agreements,
to the effect that:
(a) "Morocco was prepared to reduce its troops in the Territory to a
level not exceeding 65,000 all ranks, within a period of 11 weeks from the start
of the transitional period. The then Secretary- General accepted this as an
appropriate, substantial and phased reduction in accordance with the settlement
proposals. Accordingly, the reduction of Moroccan forces in the Territory is
expected to be completed by 22 August 1998 and all those remaining, with the
exceptions mentioned in the plan (S/21360, para. 56), would be confined by that
date, with due account taken of the modalities and time required for the
repatriation phase described in the present report" (para.. 20 of the report of
the Secretary-General of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882));
(b) "The Moroccan troops remaining in the Territory will, with the
exceptions mentioned in this paragraph, consist only of troops deployed in
static or defensive positions along the sand wall constructed by Morocco close
to the eastern and southern frontiers of the Territory. All intervention forces
and artillery units will have been withdrawn, as will all Moroccan air force
units previously used for interdiction and offensive operations. The only
exceptions to these arrangements will be:
- Certain logistic and support units required to support the
Moroccan troops deployed along the sand wall, and not exceeding a level
acceptable to the Secretary-General, will remain deployed at their present
locations at Laayoune, Dakhla and Smara; they will not, however, carry weapons
in the towns or circulate there in uniform, whether on or off duty;
- The Moroccan air force will continue to provide meteorological
services, air traffic control and radio communications within the Territory but
will retain only those aircraft that are essential for the logistic support of
the Moroccan troops remaining in the Territory;
- The Moroccan navy will continue to perform such tasks as coastal
patrolling.
- All the above activities will be closely monitored by the Military
Unit of MINURSO" (para. 56 of the report of the Secretary-General contained in
document S/21360 and Corr. 1). Since the Houston Agreements provide for the
confinement of some of the Frente Polisario troops in its territory, Algeria,
which hereby confirms its commitment to making the relevant contribution as
agreed in the framework of the Houston Agreements, considers that the Frente
Polisario should be the interlocutor in dealing with the United Nations, the
Special Representative and the authorities of the countries concerned in respect
of any issue related to the above-mentioned confinement until its completion, in
other words, until the holding of the referendum on the final status of the
Territory.
2. Secondly, paragraph 20 of the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy
specifies that the abovementioned provision "is without prejudice to the
deployment of Moroccan armed forces in purely defensive positions pursuant to
the responsibility of the Kingdom for external defense under paragraph 8B of
this Plan or the creation and normal functioning of law enforcement personnel in
Western Sahara under the authority of W.S.A.". In this connection, Algeria
wishes first of all to express its concern that this provision concerning the
Moroccan armed forces would rework the terms of an Agreement concluded within
the framework of the Settlement Plan and confirmed within the framework of the
1997 Houston Agreements. This concern is well-founded because the Plan proposed
by the Personal Envoy envisages, in paragraph 23, the signature of this document
by Algeria and by Mauritania, which would thus accept the Plan and be obliged to
cooperate in its success as neighbouring countries of Western Sahara. In other
words, the provision contained in paragraph 20 of the new Plan would introduce
an element of mistrust between the two parties and the neighbouring countries,
although the latter are expected to promote in good faith the implementation of
the Agreement which they will have signed.
It is perfectly clear that the above-mentioned deployment of armed
forces of Morocco carries with it serious risks of tension and unfortunate
incidents, at the very time when the comprehensive, impartial and faithful
implementation of the proposed Plan should normally foster understanding and
hope for all the peoples of the region. This Plan, which pursues the goal of
peace in the region, could thus paradoxically lead to situations of conflict
between Morocco and Algeria, which we have all avoided so far. Algeria wishes to
stress that, since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Western Sahara in 1975,
neither Algeria in its own territory nor Morocco in the territory of Western
Sahara has ever deployed armed forces on the internationally recognized frontier
between Algeria and Western Sahara. The Moroccan armed forces are deployed along
the sand wall located some ten kilometres from the international frontier
between Algeria and Western Sahara. As envisaged by the Settlement Plan and by
the Houston Agreements, the maintenance of these positions by the Moroccan armed
forces is appropriate and quite sufficient both in order to monitor the frontier
of Western Sahara "pursuant to the responsibility of the Kingdom for external
defense" and in order to avoid any risk of incidents caused by the new
configuration proposed, which Algeria considers as a threat to its own national
security.
Algeria therefore makes the following suggestions:
(1) Parallel to the internationally recognized frontier between the
territory of Algeria and the territory of Western Sahara, Moroccan armed forces
should be deployed along the sand wall in purely defensive positions as
envisaged by the Personal Envoy's Plan, following the arrangements described in
the first subparagraph of the above-mentioned paragraph 56 of the
Secretary-General's report in document S/21360 and Corr.1;
(2) MINURSO military observers should be deployed in sufficient
numbers to monitor the Moroccan forces thus deployed, as specified in the last
subparagraph of paragraph 56 mentioned above;
(3) Under the "responsibility of the Kingdom for external defense"
envisaged in the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy, the United Nations
Security Council and the Secretary-General should clearly specify ahead of time
that any incident claimed by the Moroccan party on the frontier between Algeria
and Western Sahara could in no case provoke action or unilateral reaction by
Moroccan armed forces but should be reported to the Special Representative, who
would verify it through MINURSO and, if necessary, notify the Secretary-General
so that the United Nations could adopt any measure or decision that it deemed
appropriate. In making these requests that it considers to be legitimate,
Algeria in no way intends to block the United Nations initiative and efforts to
achieve a peaceful and final settlement of the Western Sahara conflict.
Quite the contrary &endash; by so doing, Algeria is demonstrating
its concern that the Personal Envoy's Plan should be implemented with the calm
required for its success.
V. Period between the election of the Western Sahara Authority and
the holding of the referendum on the final status of the Territory
Algeria wishes to express its appreciation for the approach and
arrangements in the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy for the election of the
Western Sahara Authority and in particular for definition of the electorate body
and United Nations assumption of total and exclusive responsibility for the
actual election.
The period between the election of the Western Sahara Authority and
the holding of the referendum on the final status of the Territory is a
transitional period. In addition, this period was certainly envisaged in the
proposed Plan for the purpose of promoting confidence and calm at the prospect
of the final referendum. It is thus a period during which the United Nations
will retain important responsibilities, in particular for guaranteeing respect
for the spirit and letter of the provisions of the proposed Plan. Clearly the
Personal Envoy has not lost sight of this issue, since the Plan which he
proposes indicates, firstly, in paragraph 21 that "The United Nations will
assist the interested parties, in particular W.S.A., in fulfilling their
responsibilities under this Plan" and, secondly, in paragraph 22 that the
Secretary- General of the United Nations will offer his good offices to assist
the interested parties in the implementation of the Plan, that he will have the
authority to interpret the Plan and that "in the event of any disagreement about
the meaning of the Plan, the Secretary-General's interpretation shall be binding
on the interested parties".
Algeria considers that these clauses are encouraging; it believes,
however, that other provisions and mechanisms should also be specified in order
to prevent any possible serious incident affecting persons who returned to the
Territory under United Nations protection and also, in general, to ensure
respect for the spirit and the letter of the Plan. In this context, Algeria
believes that, during the period between the election of the WSA and the holding
of the referendum on the final status of the Territory:
(1) The Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General should remain in the Territory so that, while respecting the
powers entrusted both to the WSA and to Morocco, he can on behalf of the
Secretary-General provide advice, authority and arbitration to help the parties
to respect their commitments;
(2) MINURSO should remain in the Territory, with the staff
considered appropriate, particularly as regards its military and police
components, so that it can, without prejudice to the powers of the WSA , prevent
any mishaps and any threat to the security of persons and particularly of
refugees who have returned to the Territory under United Nations protection;
(3) The powers entrusted to the Western Sahara Authority should
result, after its election, in the transfer of the authority given to it and
should also give it the sovereign right to establish the administrations within
its area of competence, which presupposes the dismantling of existing similar
administrations. Moreover, in order to guarantee respect for the Plan and to
avoid misunderstandings, this transfer and these changes should be effected
under the auspices and with the assistance of the Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-General;
(4) In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
should help the WSA to prevent any mass population movement from Moroccan
territory to the Territory of Western Sahara during the period preceding the
holding of the referendum;
(5) With regard to the powers entrusted to Morocco for the
"preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts" and in
accordance with universal human rights principles and rules, any criminal
investigation under the prerogatives conferred on the Kingdom of Morocco by
paragraph 8B of the proposed Plan that is conducted by the representatives of
Morocco should be supervised by the territorially competent court in Western
Sahara established by the WSA in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Plan; in
any case, any such investigation should be reported to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General.
VI. Referendum on the final status of the Territory
Algeria appreciates the fact that "The referendum shall be organized
and conducted by the United Nations and monitored by international observers
accredited by the United Nations" (paragraph 4 of the proposed Plan) and that
"Sole and exclusive authority over all matters relating to any and all elections
and referenda called for in this Plan, including their organization and conduct,
shall be vested in the United Nations" (paragraph 15). In fact, by such
commitments, the United Nations is quite clearly confirming that it intends to
assume its legal, moral and political responsibilities in the completion of the
decolonization process in Western Sahara.
In all fairness, it must be said that the United Nations has not
failed in this duty, derived from its Charter, since 1966 when the question was
included on the agenda of the General Assembly. Indeed, since he was requested
to do so by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985, the Secretary- General
has constantly worked for the success of the decolonization process in Western
Sahara. The various phases of formulation and consolidation of the Settlement
Plan confirm this and the various reports submitted to the Security Council bear
witness to the difficulties encountered. Among these difficulties, the question
of the identification of voters was the subject of successive reports and then
an obstacle to implementation of the Settlement Plan. The identification of
voters commenced in August 1994, as can be seen from paragraph 30 of the
Secretary-General's report of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882), which followed up
the Houston Agreements and contains the detailed plan for the organization of
the referendum of 7 December 1998. Unfortunately, the "Compromise Agreement on
Outstanding Identification Issues" reached by the two parties in London in July
1997 under the auspices of the Personal Envoy did not suffice to resolve the
situation. Nor did the Additional Protocols concerning identification, prepared
by the Secretary- General in April 1997 and accepted in writing by both parties,
allow any further progress. The Secretary-General therefore rightly noted in
paragraph 21 of his report S/2001/613 of 20 June 2001 that "The establishment of
the electorate body for the referendum in Western Sahara has been, and remains
to date, the most contentious issue and one of the main reasons for the
successive deadlocks in the work of MINURSO".
By this recapitulation, Algeria wishes to emphasize that, until the
electorate body that is to take part in the referendum on the final status of
the Territory has been identified, implementation of the Plan proposed by the
Personal Envoy will be seriously threatened. Past experience proves that it was
not for lack of specific provisions, solemn and repeated acceptances by both
parties and even confirmation by the Security Council that identification within
the framework of the Settlement Plan could not be completed.
Today, it is impossible to rule out with certainty a recurrence of
the same situation. In such a case, however, the new aggravating factor would be
that the Saharan refugees who in 1975 were forced into exile to flee repression
would then be taken hostage inside the Territory. The resulting crisis would
have even more dangerous repercussions than the unfortunate status quo
established on the way to the application of the Settlement Plan, although it
had begun to be implemented on 6 September 1991, with the entry into force of
the ceasefire in Western Sahara. In paragraph 5, the Plan proposed by the
Secretary-General's Personal Envoy clearly defined the categories of persons
over 18 years of age who were qualified to vote in the referendum: electors
already identified by the MINURSO Commission as of 30 December 1999; those on
the list drawn up by UNHCR as of 31 October 2000 (in both cases with no
possibility of recourse or appeal); and, lastly, persons who had resided
continuously in Western Sahara since 30 December 1999.
Similarly, in paragraph 6 the Plan codifies the arrangements for
identifying persons "who have resided continuously in Western Sahara since 30
December 1999" and entrusts this task to the United Nations, whose
determinations "shall be final and without appeal". This shows that the United
Nations already possesses the list of persons who may participate in the
referendum because they were already identified by the MINURSO Identification
Commission (subject to the addition of any descendants who will have reached the
age of 18 by the date of the referendum), as well as the list of those who may
participate because they were counted as refugees by UNHCR as of 31 October 2000
(subject also to the addition of any descendants who will have reached the age
of 18 by the date of the referendum). On the other hand, the list of persons who
are to participate in the referendum because they have "resided continuously in
Western Sahara since 30 December 1999" still remains to be drawn up at a date
left open in the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy. For the timely removal of
this threat to the success of the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the
People of Western Sahara, Algeria considers that the persons entitled to
participate in the referendum because they have "resided continuously in Western
Sahara since 30 December 1999" should be identified promptly by the United
Nations in the manner specified in paragraph 6 of the Plan proposed by the
Personal Envoy, as soon as the Peace Plan comes into force and in any case
before the return of the refugees, in optimal conditions of rigor, objectivity
and impartiality.
By proceeding in this way, the United Nations will also have in its
possession the matrix of names in the electorate body for the referendum on the
final status of the Territory of persons who have "resided continuously in
Western Sahara since 30 December 1999" and will still have the leeway and the
competence needed to update it, when the time comes, simply by verifying that
the residence of those concerned is still permanent and by adding descendants
who will have reached the age of 18. This approach would not pose any problems
for the United Nations. It would also not impose any constraints on either of
the two parties, because each of them would have endorsed the Plan sincerely in
the intention of promoting its success. Lastly, this measure would avoid a
potential risk of another roadblock in the way of United Nations peace efforts.
VII. Guarantees for the successful implementation of the proposed
Plan
Algeria takes note of the fact that the proposed Plan already
envisages that:
- "Sole and exclusive authority over all matters relating to any and
all elections and referenda called for in this Plan, including their
organization and conduct, shall be vested in the United Nations".
- The Code of Conduct accepted and signed by the two parties in
Houston on 16 September 1997 will ensure that the referendum campaign and the
referendum are held in optimal conditions of fairness and impartiality.
- "The interested parties agree that the Secretary-General shall
have the authority to interpret this Plan, and that, in the event of any
disagreement about the meaning of the Plan, the Secretary-General's
interpretation shall be binding on the interested parties".
- "By signing this document, the interested parties, the
neighbouring countries and the United Nations agree to the terms of the Plan".
While these guarantees are pertinent, they are based solely on the good faith of
the parties to the Western Sahara conflict. In fact, this conflict has amply
demonstrated the stakes involved and the concerns existing both as regards the
two parties and as regards concerned neighbouring countries. Because of these
stakes and concerns, similar guarantees obtained by the United Nations or
assumed by it under the Settlement Plan have ultimately proved insufficient.
In this connection, it is useful to recall that, despite a
Settlement Plan accepted by the two parties and approved by the Security Council
and despite additional arrangements to which both parties agreed, as was the
case in Houston in 1997 and in New York in 1999, there were obstacles to the
organization of the referendum for the self-determination of the people of
Western Sahara. It is also useful to recall that, although the Settlement Plan
accepted by both parties entrusted to the United Nations the organization and
monitoring of the referendum, the proclamation of its results and the authority
to supervise, through MINURSO, the adoption of final measures reflecting either
outcome of the referendum, the United Nations Secretary-General felt it
necessary, in paragraph 48 of his report S/2002/178 of 19 February 2002, to note
that "the United Nations might not be able to hold a free and fair referendum
whose results would be accepted by both sides; and there would still be no
mechanism to enforce the results of the referendum".
For this reason, Algeria believes that implementation of the Plan
proposed by the Personal Envoy must, from the outset, be accompanied by real
guarantees. It believes that this would reassure not only the neighbouring
countries which are required to sign and commit themselves but also, above all,
the people of Western Sahara who are invited to accept a historic compromise in
favour of peace but are entitled to live in guaranteed security and under
effective United Nations protection. Lastly, Algeria believes that these same
guarantees will only enhance the credibility of the United Nations, as the
Organization of last resort for all the nations of the world, whose authority
has sometimes been severely undermined.
Accordingly, in our opinion, the Personal Envoy's Plan should
include the following guarantees: (1) A local United Nations presence of
appropriate size, with a specific mandate to deal with the complexity of the
task entrusted to it and to prevent on the spot any mishap from the beginning of
the process until the implementation of the result of the referendum on the
final status of the Territory. In this regard, Algeria believes that the
alterations to be made to the composition and mandate of MINURSO provide a
timely opportunity to deal with this issue and considers that it is not
absolutely necessary to change the name of MINURSO, since in the end the task
will be "to organize a referendum in Western Sahara";
(2) The Secretary-General and the Security Council should, in unison
and in advance, undertake if appropriate to adopt any necessary measures to
prevent and promptly correct any deviation in the implementation of the Plan,
which &endash; it should be recalled &endash; will cover a total period of four
or five years after its entry into force;
(3) The Secretary-General and the Security Council should also, in
unison and in advance, promise the concerned parties, the neighbouring countries
and the international community that the results of the election of the Western
Sahara Authority and the results of the referendum on final status will be
respected and enforced, including if necessary by the adoption of appropriate
measures. In adopting this position, Algeria is demonstrating its support for
the fair and final settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara and the
importance which it attaches to the promotion of relations of
good-neighbourliness and cooperation with all its neighbours in the region, in a
context of peace finally restored and stability recreated.
** *
Algeria considers that the Plan submitted by the Personal Envoy of
the United Nations Secretary-General represents a gamble for peace in the
Maghreb &endash; a gamble which should be taken by all concerned with
determination and sincerity.
The comments made and positions adopted by Algeria in this
memorandum on the subject of the Plan proposed by the Personal Envoy are not
intended to question the spirit and letter of this new proposal or still less to
undermine its provisions or structure. These comments and positions are based,
first and foremost, on the reaffirmation of relevant commitments already made,
in unison and without opposition, by the two parties and by the United Nations
with a view to the implementation of the Settlement Plan. They are designed
also, and above all, to protect this new plan from the disappointments and
frustrations provoked by the paralysis which was the sad fate that events
reserved for the Settlement Plan and for which the reasons and responsibilities
are well known. Algeria pays a tribute to His Excellency Mr. James Baker III,
the Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, for the
perseverance, talent and dedication with which he has promoted the peaceful and
final resolution of this conflict through the self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara, under the exclusive guarantee and responsibility of the
United Nations. It hopes that all necessary conditions will be created for the
entry into force and implementation of this peace plan, with strengthened trust
among all the concerned and interested parties, with protection for the
legitimate rights and security of the people of Western Sahara and, lastly, with
progress towards the final peace so long awaited by the Maghreb as well as by
Africa and the entire international community. It is in this spirit that Algeria
reiterates to the United Nations Secretary-General and to his Personal Envoy
that it is fully available to continue to give them its loyal cooperation for
the final settlement of the Western Sahara conflict.
Note verbale dated 17 March 2003 from the Permanent Mission of
Mauritania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original: French]
The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to the
United Nations in New York presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations and has the honour to transmit to him herewith a copy of
letter No. 9/MAEC of 17 March 2003 from His Excellency the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation concerning the comments of the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania on the peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara proposed by His Excellency Mr. James Baker.
Letter dated 17 March 2003 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation of Mauritania addressed to the Personal Envoy of the
Secretary-General for Western Sahara
[Original: French]
In the framework of the excellent climate of cooperation and
coordination that has always marked our relations with the United Nations, and
following the visit that you made to Nouakchott on 16 January 2003 to present
and explain your proposals concerning the peace plan for self-determination of
the people of Western Sahara, I have the honour to inform you that we have
considered the various aspects of this plan with great interest and particular
attention. On the basis of this consideration, we are now able to make the
following comments:
(i) Mauritania greatly appreciates the consistent efforts made by
the United Nations to find a just and lasting solution to the dispute on Western
Sahara, which constitutes a major concern for the States and peoples of the
region;
(ii) It reiterates its total confidence in your ongoing commitment
over close on six years to the search for a solution to the dispute on Western
Sahara and pays a tribute to your personal qualities of patience, wisdom and
openmindedness;
(iii) It notes that your new proposals represent an in-depth
reflection of persevering efforts and a genuine will to find a solution to this
dispute, which has lasted for more than a quarter of a century;
(iv) The Islamic Republic of Mauritania reiterates its full
readiness to lend its backing to any political solution that meets with the
support of the parties, with a view to a final settlement of the dispute on
Western Sahara;
(v) It reaffirms its commitment to continuing to give its full
support to United Nations efforts to find a solution to this dispute and to
making any contribution requested of it in this context, in accordance with the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mohamed Ould Tolba
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