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Nagaland -
Lessons of the Past
by Ram Narayan Kumar
Himal, September, 2001
http://www.meadev.nic.in/opn/2002dec/27pio1.htm
The ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and
the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), announced by prime
minister IK Gujral on 24 July 1997, is more than four years old. The
agreement promised to bring about a lasting political solution to this
long-drawn-out conflict through unconditional dialogue at the highest
political level to be conducted in a neutral country. A set of ground rules
and modalities to implement them, finalised on 12 December 1997 and further
revised on 13 January 2001, aimed to facilitate the negotiations on
politically substantive issues that underlie the five decades� long war.
A number of basic questions occur even as we try to evaluate the agreement at
the end of its four tumultuous years: What progress has the promise of
dialogue made in this period? Is there sufficient transparency in the
process? Have both the sides been observing the ground rules, in letter and
spirit? Has the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, set up to supervise adherence to
these ground rules and to investigate complaints of their violations, been
functioning effectively? Has the ceasefire brought respite from the violence
and unremitting harassments, that has been the Nagas� lot over the past 50
years? Do they feel sufficiently relieved to acquire a stake in its
continuance?
A central problem of the ceasefire agreement was that it did not include
revocation of draconian laws, such as the Assam Maintenance of Public Order
Act, 1953, Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962, Armed Forces (Special Powers)
Act, 1958, and Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955, which allow the security
forces to violate fundamental rights with impunity on the pretext of
countering insurgency. With such laws still in force the role of the army
and the paramilitary during the operation of the ceasefire was never really
clarified. Given that there was a civil administration functioning under
normal constitutional law and a security administration operating under
special laws, the subordination of the military to civil authority and the
legal demarcation of respective roles was a precondition for the success of
the ceasefire. This issue itself arose from the related question of the
state government�s role in a ceasefire agreement between the Union of India
and an insurgent group in the state. How do its agencies go about their law
and order functions without jeopardising the special terms of the
agreement?
There were two other aspects of the situation crucial to the efficacy of the
ceasefire. For one, the attitude of the other insurgent groups and factions
involved in the long war with India, who have not been included in the
agreement, is vital to the maintenance of peace. And to what extent are
civil society organisations uncontaminated by the violence, involved in the
process of finding a just peace? If the 1997 ceasefire was in limbo, it was
precisely because the modalities of the agreement failed to address these
fundamental issues.
But there were also other specific grievances. In the four years since the
peace process formally began, dialogue made no progress because the NSCN(IM)
insisted on universal coverage of the ceasefire, which the Union Government
had been unable to enforce after initially promising it. General Atem and P.
Shimrang in Dimapur, two main representatives of the NSCN(IM) in the region,
made it clear during discussions that unless the government of India kept
its pledge there was no point in continuing with the ceasefire. On 8 May
2001, the Ministry of Home Affairs confirmed receiving an ultimatum from
Isak Chishi Swu, chairman of the NSCN(IM) and Thuingaleng Muivah, its
general secretary, threatening to withdraw from the peace-process if the
government of India failed to honour its commitment to extend the cease-fire
to �all the Naga areas�. Seemingly, this threat had an effect.
On 20 May 2001, The Indian Express reported that the prime minister�s
representative was leaving for Bangkok for talks with the leaders of the
NSCN(IM). The report also indicated that the chief ministers of Manipur,
Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the other states affected by the Naga question,
had agreed to include the Naga-populated areas of their states within the
ceasefire zone. One day before their scheduled meeting in Bangkok, the
People�s Front government in Manipur collapsed after being defeated in a
confidence motion tabled by chief minister Radhabinod Koijam. Koijam
belonged to the Samata Party, a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led
National Democratic Alliance running the Union Government. The state then
came under President�s rule. An editorial comment in The Statesman on 28 May
2001, indicated that the fall had been engineered to facilitate the
extension of the Naga ceasefire to the Manipur areas since Koijam�s
government was vociferously opposing it.
The negotiations in Bangkok yielded results. On 14 June 2001, the Union Home
Secretary, Kamal Pande, announced that it has been agreed to extend the
ceasefire for one more year without territorial limits. In response, a large
number of Manipuri political groups including the Samata Party, Manipur
People�s Party, All Manipur United Clubs Organisation (AMUCO) and All
Manipur Students� Union (AMSU) said that they were against the extension and
would oppose it. The Congress chief minister of Assam also voiced the same
sentiment. The ostensible concern was the territorial integrity of other
Northeastern states since the NSCN(IM) was laying claim to the
Naga-inhabited hill areas.
The Bangkok agreement was a belated recognition of the argument that the peace
process, in order to be meaningful, had to be comprehensive, that its
objectives could not be accomplished if the antagonists seek an accord in
one state while remaining belligerent in other areas. The extension also
suggested total abjuration of violence by both the sides and the restoration
of a rational process to resolve political differences. It presupposed
accountability, the end of impunity, and the repeal of �black laws� such as
the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. In this sense, the June extension of
the ceasefire opened the way to a just peace for all the people in the
Northeast. But the violent agitation for its repeal in the other states has
added a new twist to the process.
AMUCO and AMSU called for a three-day strike in Manipur to protest against the
extension of the ceasefire. The popular agitation, although limited to the
valley of Imphal, became extremely violent. On the third day of the strike,
mobs stormed the government buildings and torched the State Assembly
building after assaulting several legislators and former ministers. The
police had to open fire to stop the unruly crowds from invading the house of
Radhabinod Koijam, the outgoing chief minister of the state. This resulted
in several deaths. Despite the imposition of curfew, violent protests
continued.
Naga organisations showed sensitivity to the emerging situation. The All Naga
Students� Association of Manipur (ANSAM), the Naga Women�s Union of Manipur
(NWUM) and the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights mourned the deaths in
the police firing. They issued a statement appealing to all �Meitei
brethren� and the Naga population in the state to �maintain communal harmony
at this critical juncture�. �The need of the hour is peace and dialogue
among ourselves,� the statement emphasised. Thuingaleng Muivah clarified
that the agreement to a universal ceasefire with the Government of India
�deals only with the ceasefire, nothing beyond that. The declaration of a
ceasefire is not against anyone and it does not deal with territorial
limits.�
He further explained, �We have agreed not to fight in any
part of India or Asia or anywhere. There is no reason for anyone else to
interpret it more that that.� The Naga HoHo, the apex body of all Naga
tribal councils, convened a special meeting to consider the situation. Its
statement pointed out that the violent protests in Imphal Valley �revealed
the extremely complicated and sensitive challenges the Nagas face to evolve
a workable solution with our neighbours. Ultimately, we need a settlement
that will ensure security, stability and peace for ourselves and for our
neighbours.
Our actions will decide whether we develop and survive
together in a changing world or drag one another down to a common hell of
perpetual animosity and violence, which can only be destructive to all.� The
statement called on the Nagas not to �ignore or treat lightly the intensity
and depth of our neighbours� insecurity about their future�, and went on to
suggest that the leaders of both the communities should sit together and
find a common approach to deal with the controversy.
These statements from the Naga organisations, however, did not mollify the
protesters and the violent agitation continued. Thousands of Nagas fled
Imphal Valley to the safety of the hills. On 27 July, the Home Minister of
India told reporters that the government had decided to rescind the Bangkok
agreement and to once again limit the ceasefire to the state of Nagaland.
According to him, the leaders of NSCN(IM) were agreeable to the decision.
The crowds in Imphal celebrated the announcement.
V.S. Atem, the seniormost leader of the NSCN(IM) in the region, issued a stern
warning that his organisation �cannot be a party to any ceasefire that is
restricted only to the State of Nagaland�. He denied the home minister�s
claim that his organisation had endorsed the annulment of the extension. In
a separate statement faxed to the Press Trust of India from Amsterdam, Swu
and Muivah said that they have not agreed to the government�s decision to
rescind the 14 June Bangkok agreement. The statement said: �Of course, both
sides believed that better understanding could certainly be arrived at in
the course of talks... Therefore, any announcement, declaration or statement
given by the Home Ministry are unfounded. They are in no sense acceptable to
the Nagas.�
Does the lay reader, who daily scans through newspapers and probably also
watches television, understand why this trend of events is not favourable
for the prospects of peace in the region? Does he or she sufficiently
emphathise with our forebodings that history may repeat its vicious cycle
unless civil society develops an informed aversion to its inveteracy and
forges a collective will to break free? One needs to become aware of the
content of Naga history because there is no other way of understanding the
mechanisms and compulsions which, again and again, drive people back into
blunder. History tells us of the evils of doctrinaire intransigence, and so
too of the dangers inherent in compromises that are born of fear and greed,
or foisted on unsuspecting people by stealth and deception. If repetition of
our past tragedies is to be avoided, it is necessary to not only expose the
falsehoods of the victors, but also puncture the myths of innocence that the
vanquished all too easily develop to conceal their failings.
For the sake of learning from the past, let us briefly recount an episode from
the 1960s. In May 1964, New Delhi constituted a Peace-Mission consisting of
Jayaprakash Narayan, B.P. Chaliah, then chief minister of Assam, and Michael
Scott, an English pastor sympathetic to the Nagas, and it worked out a
ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the Naga
underground. The agreement was a prelude to political negotiations to
peacefully resolve the conflict. While endorsing the principle of
self-determination of all subject people, the Peace Mission suggested that
the Naga underground could �on their own volition, decide to be a
participant in the Union of India and mutually settle the terms and
conditions for that purpose�. The Mission asked Government of India �to
consider to what extent the pattern and structure of the relationship
between Nagaland and the Government of India should be adapted and recast,
so as to satisfy the political aspirations of all sections of Naga
opinion...� Both the sides rejected the proposal. Members of Indian
Parliament demanded Jayaprakash Narayan�s arrest for suggesting that it was
more important to have friendly Nagas �on our frontiers closely associated
with us in some new constitutional manner rather than unfriendly and
discontented Nagas kept forcibly within the Indian Union.�
Jayaprakash Narayan resigned from the Peace Mission in February 1966 after the
Naga underground expressed lack of confidence in his impartiality. The
ceasefire agreement between the two recalcitrant parties was made to last
till September 1972 because the logic of �peaceful� attrition had taken
over. Minoo R. Masani, the leader of a parliamentary delegation to Nagaland
in February 1965, said: �As the weeks and months pass, peace brings with it
a relaxation of tensions. This involves, insofar as the village population
is concerned, a freer expression of opinion and a greater assertiveness
against the demands and exactions of the (underground) �Naga Federal
Government�. Now that the Indian army no longer operates, the villages are
turning to the state administration and the Indian army for protection
against the underground. Fear is diminishing. People do not wish to pay
taxes endlessly to the �Naga Federal Government�� So far as the underground
is concerned, a long period of peace must involve a measure of
disintegration. The men from the jungles are going home to the villages to
eat and sleep with their families. They taste the joys and comforts of
domestic life. This is something that Mao Tsetung�s rules of guerrilla
warfare do not permit of. Those who have talked to small groups of Naga
underground men find, in private conversation, that they are already
becoming more reasonable and there is no desire to go back to the jungles��
Even as the ceasefire agreement declared on 25 July 1997 is already four years
old, and no substantive progress has been made in negotiations, these words
of complacency are being heard all over again. No doubt, the Naga people
want peace and the men languishing in the jungles long for simple domestic
pleasures.
However, if we do not reach the source of their discontent which brought them
to the path of war with India, their political recalcitrance may soon
reassert itself. As for the Naga warriors and their leaders, they will
hopefully recognise what their movement at all its twists and turns, has
been doing to their people. Those who waste themselves in the pursuit of
utopias can probably contribute no more to history than others who
apathetically resign themselves to a self-perpetuating status quo.
Bertrand Russell, the English philosopher and a well wisher of the Nagas who
indirectly contributed to the formation of the Peace-Mission in 1964 by
recommending it to Jawaharlal Nehru, introduced the concept of
�compossibility� while discussing the idea of existence in the writings of
Leibniz, famous seventeenth century German philosopher. Shorn of
complications, Russell�s concept suggests that every predicate, necessary or
contingent, past, present, or future is already implicit in the notion of
the subject that carries it. So, ultimately, the existence of these
predicates is not affected by our capacity and incapacity to observe them,
nor by their being manifest or latent, nor by their contradicting or not
contradicting each other. Applied to the history of the Indo-Naga conflict,
which so far has largely remained a chronicle of lost opportunities,
Russell�s idea of �compossible� may point in the right direction. Instead of
bemoaning all the possibilities and opportunities that were not seized, it
is necessary to realise that the lost opportunities are not, and indeed
cannot be, lost for good.
Then and only then will history cease to be the dead-weight it has been until
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