Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
- Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C 

Aceh - Indonesia Peace Process

"In 1989, over one hundred Libyan-trained GAM guerrillas returned to Aceh with rudimentary military training to try and give the then moribund rebellion a new lease on life. After they mounted a series of attacks on military and police posts, culminating in one raid on a police post in May 1990 that netted ammunition and dozens of automatic weapons, the Soeharto government declared Aceh an area of military operations (daerah operasi militer or DOM) and mounted one of the heaviest counterinsurgency campaigns seen since the 1960s. Well over one thousand Acehnese civilians were killed in the first three years of operations, the worst phase of DOM. The most conservative accounting of victims, prepared by the provincial government in late 1998, documented 871 people killed outright by the army, and 387 missing who later turned up dead. More than 500 others were listed as “disappeared” and never found.11 Most estimates by NGOs were at least twice as high. In addition, tens of thousands of Acehnese were imprisoned and tortured in military camps, and rape was reportedly widespread, with 102 cases documented by the local government team. So many people were affected that, today, virtually every Acehnese in the hardest-hit areas can cite a family member who was the direct target of a human rights violation – and who had no link to GAM at the time. Abuses continued through the end of DOM in August 1998, although at a lower level of intensity than in the 1990-93 period. The resignation of Soeharto created expectations across Aceh that, at last, the truth would come out, justice would be done, and victims would be compensated. From late May 1998 onward, it was as though the lid had been suddenly blown off a pressure cooker of information. Every news broadcast on Indonesian television seemed to carry new revelations of abuses in Aceh, from testimonies of rape victims to discoveries of mass graves. New fact-finding missions were conducted, victim solidarity organizations formed, forensic training conducted. With newfound freedom of expression, assembly, and association, many more people were mobilized, not by GAM, but by student and NGO organizations, to demand justice for their relatives and establish links with each other. "

"...When GAM refused to compromise on its demand for independence, the Indonesian military began to undermine the agreement by encouraging demonstrations against the international monitors and making preparations for a renewed military campaign. Then the Indonesian government presented an ultimatum that GAM rejected at a final meeting in Tokyo on May 18, 2003. At midnight the government declared a military emergency in Aceh and military operations commenced soon after. ..

The Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, signed a peace agreement today in Helsinki that brings to a close nearly thirty years of armed conflict on the island. Under the deal, GAM will disarm and be allowed to form a recognized political party. However, that party will not be allowed to seek a referendum on Acehnese independence from Indonesia.

Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement: Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Acheh Movement, 10 May 2002

Preamble

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Acheh Movement (GAM) have been engaged in a process of dialogue since January 2000 and concur that the priority in Acheh is the security and welfare of the people and therefore agree on the need for finding an immediate peaceful solution to the conflict in Acheh. On 10 May 2002, the GOI and GAM issued a Joint Statement set out below:

On the basis of the acceptance of the NAD Law as a starting point, as discussed on 2-3 February 2002, to a democratic all-inclusive dialogue involving all elements of Achehnese society that will be facilitated by HDC in Acheh. This process will seek to review elements of the NAD Law through the expression of the views of the Achehnese people in a free and safe manner. This will lead to the election of a democratic government in Acheh, Indonesia.

To enable this process to take place both parties agree to work with all speed on an agreement on cessation of hostilities with an adequate mechanism for accountability of the parties to such an agreement. This will also provide the opportunity and environment for much needed socio-economic and humanitarian assistance to the people of Acheh.

The GOI and GAM share the common objective to meet the aspirations of the people of Acheh to live in security with dignity, peace, prosperity, and justice. In order to meet the aspirations of the people of Acheh and permit them to administer themselves freely and democratically, the GOI and GAM agree to a process which leads to an election in 2004 and the subsequent establishment of a democratically elected government in Acheh, Indonesia, in accordance with the review of the NAD Law, as provided for in point 1 of the 10 May 2002 Joint Statement.

To this end, the GOI will ensure and GAM will support the development of a free and fair electoral process in Acheh, which will be designed to ensure the broadest participation of all elements of Achehnese society.

In light of the delicate nature of the confidence building process, the GOI and GAM further appeal for the support of all elements of society and request that no party undertake any action which is inconsistent with this Agreement and may jeopardize the future security and welfare of the people of Acheh.

The immediate requirement is to ensure the cessation of hostilities and all acts of violence, including, intimidation, destruction of property and any offensive and criminal action. Offensive and criminal action is deemed to include violent actions such as attacking, shooting, engaging in torture, killing, abducting bombing, burning, robbing, extorting, threatening, terrorising, harassing, illegally arresting people, raping, and conducting illegal searches.

Throughout the peace process the maintenance of law and order in Acheh will continue to be the responsibility of the Indonesian Police (Polri). In this context, the mandate and mission of Brimob will be reformulated to strictly conform to regular police activities and as such will no longer initiate offensive actions against members of GAM not in contravention of the Agreement.

The JSC will be the point of reference for all complaints regarding police functions and action that are deemed to be in contravention of the spirit and letter of the Cessation of Hostilities (COH) Agreement. As such, the JSC will be responsible for defining, identifying and investigating when and if the police have breached their mandate.

With this general understanding, and to bring the peace process forward to the next phase, both parties hereby agree on the following:

Article 1: Objectives of the Cessation of Hostilities and All Acts of Violence

a) Since both sides have thus agreed that, from now on, enmity between them should be considered a thing of the past, the peace process, which is continued by an agreement on this phase, will proceed by building further confidence and both sides will prove to each other that they are serious about achieving this ultimate common objective.

b) The objectives of the cessation of hostilities and all acts of violence between both parties are (i) to proceed to the next phase of the peace process, as mutually agreed on 10 May 2002 in Switzerland; (ii) to continue the confidence building process with a view to eliminating all suspicions and creating a positive and cooperative atmosphere which will bring the conflict in Acheh to a peaceful conclusion; and, (iii) to enable, provided hostilities and all acts of violence cease, for the peace process to proceed to the next phases, i.e. the delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

Article 2: Commitment by Both Sides to Cease Hostilities and All Acts of Violence

a) Both sides explicitly express their commitment to meet the terms of this Agreement to cease hostilities and all forms of violence toward each other and toward the people in Acheh, by implementing the steps stipulated in this Agreement. In expressing such commitment, both sides guarantee that they are in full control of, respectively, TNI/Polri and GAM forces on the ground. GOI and GAM commit to control those groups that do not share their objectives but claim to be part of their forces.

b) Both sides further commit themselves to immediately after the signing of this Agreement to thoroughly inform their respective forces on the ground of theterms of this Agreement, and to instruct them to cease hostilities immediately.

c) Both sides agree that, should there be other parties taking advantage of the situation and disturbing the peaceful atmosphere, they will endeavour to take joint action against them to restore the peace.

d) During this confidence-building period, both sides agree that they will not increase their military strength, which includes re-deployment of forces, increase in military personnel or military equipment into Acheh.

e) HDC is requested to strictly facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.

f) Both parties will allow civil society to express without hindrance their democratic rights.

Article 3: Joint Security Committee (JSC)

a) The senior leadership in charge of security from each side will meet, in order to establish the initial contact and understanding between both sides. They should also (i) reactivate the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which was established during the implementation of the Humanitarian Pause, and (ii) commence discussion, in order to reach agreement expeditiously, on a plan of action for the JSC in discharging its duties.

b) The functions of JSC are: (i) to formulate the process of implementation of this Agreement; (ii) to monitor the security situation in Acheh; (iii) to undertake full investigation of any security violations; (iv) in such cases, to take appropriate action to restore the security situation and to agree beforehand on the sanctions to be applied, should any party violate this Agreement; (v) to publish weekly reports on the security situation in Acheh; (vi) to ensure that no new paramilitary force is created to assume previous functions of Brimob, and (vii) to design and implement a mutually agreed upon process of demilitarisation. Regarding this last task, the JSC will designate what will be called Peace Zones (see Art. 4(a)). After peace zones have been identified, the GAM will designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of the COH and as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its weapons, arms and ordinance in the designated sites. The JSC will also decide on a simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a defensive force. The GOI has the right to request HDC to undertake no-notice verification of the designated sites. With the growth in confidence of both parties in the process the phased placement of GAM weapons will be completed within a period of five months (see attached note).

c) The composition of JSC will be senior officials appointed as representatives of the GOI and the GAM and a senior third party personality of high standing agreed upon by both sides, Each senior official from the three parties are to be accompanied by up to four persons as members. The heads of delegations from both sides have to be senior and have the authority to be able to take decisions on the spot.

The third party (HDC) personality needs to be able to command the respect and high regard of both sides in order to be able to assist in resolving problems, as they arise.

d) In order to perform these functions, the JSC is to be assisted by a monitoring team or monitoring teams, which would be provided security guarantees by both sides in monitoring the security situation and in investigating any violation.

e) The composition of each of the monitoring teams are appointed officials as representatives of the High Command of the security forces of the GOI and the High Command of the forces of the GAM in Acheh and a senior third party military officer agreed upon by both sides reporting to the senior third party personality of high standing in the JSC.

f) JSC and the monitoring team(s) would be provided with the necessary technical and administrative staff and logistical support. The HDC is requested to facilitate the establishment of these bodies by providing the necessary funds, logistical and administrative facilities.

g) It is agreed upon that the JSC and the monitoring team(s) will be established and be operational within one month of the signing of this Agreement. Civil society has the right to provide inputs to the JSC.

Article 4: Establishment of "Peace Zones"

a) Following the signing of the COH Agreement, the JSC, with the direct participation of the senior leadership for security from both sides, will immediately identify and prepare locations of conflict to be designated as "Peace Zones". This would facilitate, considerably the work of the JSC since it could focus its attention on these areas in establishing and maintaining security, and these zones, provided peace could be established, will be the focus of the initial humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

b) For the first two months after the signing, both parties will relocate to defensive positions as agreed upon by the JSC. Adjustments to these locations could be made by the JSC in order to separate the forces of both parties with sufficient distance to avoid contact or confrontation. Forces of both parties will refrain from operations, movements, activities or any provocative acts that could lead to contact or confrontation with each other.

c) In order to build trust and confidence during these crucial months, these zones and surroundings will be monitored by the tripartite monitoring teams. The JSC will be informed by both parties of any significant movements or activities in these areas.

d) POLRI will be able to investigate criminal activities in these areas in consultation with the JSC.

e) The designation of identified areas of demilitarised zones such as schools, mosques, health institutions and public places, bazaars, Achehnese meunasahs, market-places, foodstalls, communication centres including bus-terminals, taxi-stations, ferry-terminals, public roads, river transportation services, and fishing ports.

Article 5: Time Frames

a) Both sides agree that hostilities and all acts of violence by both sides should cease forever in Acheh.

b) Both sides also agree that hostilities and all acts of violence during the first three months from the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational are very crucial as indicator of the seriousness of the commitment from both sides. If indeed hostilities and all acts of violence could decrease dramatically, or even cease altogether, during this first three month period, the Achehnese and other Indonesian people, and the international community, would consider that the peace process would most likely succeed.

c) During the period between the signing of this Agreement and the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational, both signatories to this Agreement commit themselves to exercise the utmost restraint by not making any public statement that would inflame the feeling and sentiment of the other side, including the people, and by ensuring that their forces will not initiate any hostile act toward the other.

Article 6: All-Inclusive Dialogue

The parties agree to support the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue in Acheh as provided for in the Joint Statement of 10 May 2002. The parties agree to ensure, through this Agreement, the necessary security and freedom of movement for all participants in the All-Inclusive Dialogue to enable the process to be conducted in a safe and fair manner, reflecting the views of all elements of Achehnese society. The parties reconfirm their agreement that the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue be facilitated by HDC.

Article 7: Public Information and Communications

a) To ensure national and international support for the peace process in Acheh, the Agreement of 10 May 2002, and this Agreement and its implementation have to be publicised as widely as possible within one month of the signing of this Agreement. The process of implementation has to be as transparent as possible and the people have to be regularly informed of the progress made and difficulties encountered.

b) Communications to the public will be given priority, especially through the print and electronic media. Television and radio programmes have to be devised to enable obtaining inputs from the general public provided that they are conducted in a fair and balanced manner. The JSC remains the final reference on this matter.

c) Other media, such as community meetings, seminars, flyers, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and others could also be considered, as appropriate.

d) The HDC is requested to look for sources of funding these public information and communication activities.

Article 8: Joint Council

A Joint Council will be established, composed of the most senior representatives of the GOI and the GAM, and of the third party (HDC). The function of this Joint Council will be to resolve all issues or disputes arising out of the implementation of this Agreement, which cannot be resolved by other Committees or Structures established under this Agreement. The Joint Council may amend the articles and provisions of this Agreement.

Article 9: Amendment or Termination

This Agreement may only be amended by agreement between the two parties in the Joint Council. Should either party wish to unilaterally terminate the Agreement then they are obligated to first bring the issue to the Joint Council and engage in and support all efforts by the Joint Council to resolve the problem within a sufficient period of time (no less than 30 days). If the Joint Council is unable to resolve the matter, then either party has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the Agreement.

For the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia
Amb. Mr. S. Wiryono

For the Leadership
of the Free Acheh Movement
Dr. Zaini Abdullah

Witnessed by
Henry Dunant Centre
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)
Mr. Martin Griffiths

The Aceh Peace Process:Why it Failed - Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, East West Centre, 2003

Executive Summary

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the history and dynamics of Aceh’s abortive peace process. We survey the origins and progress of the negotiations, the roles played by the main players, the problems encountered along the way, and the achievements that were registered. Above all, our concern is to understand the reasons for the failure of the process in the hope that the lessons learned may be of relevance to policymakers, analysts, and others with an interest in the long-term resolution of the Aceh conflict as well as other internal disputes in the region and beyond.

The failure of the final round of talks between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in May 2003 ended a process that had its roots in the collapse of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in May 1998 and the subsequent election of Abdurrahman Wahid to the Indonesian presidency in October 1999. These events opened the way for dialogue between President Abdurrahman’s government and GAM’s leadership-in-exile in Sweden.

In May 2000, a cease-fire agreement of sorts was reached but it soon broke down. Contact between the two sides was not entirely severed, however, and following Abdurrahman’s replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001, a new round of talks opened and eventually resulted in a “cessation of hostilities” agreement in December 2002.

This agreement was welcomed with much enthusiasm not only in Aceh but internationally, although all parties knew it was just one step toward the overall resolution of the conflict. The pact provided for internationally monitored demilitarization of the territory to be followed by a dialogue “reflecting the views of all elements” of Acehnese society and finally “a free and fair electoral process.” Although the agreement led to a sharp decline in armed conflict, the peace process did not proceed smoothly.

When GAM refused to compromise on its demand for independence, the Indonesian military began to undermine the agreement by encouraging demonstrations against the international monitors and making preparations for a renewed military campaign.

Then the Indonesian government presented an ultimatum that GAM rejected at a final meeting in Tokyo on May 18, 2003. At midnight the government declared a military emergency in Aceh and military operations commenced soon after.

There seems to be little prospect of an early renewal of talks. The peace process broke down because the two parties were unable to agree on the fundamental issue dividing them: whether Aceh would become an independent nation or remain an integral part of the Indonesian state. Leaders in Jakarta were determined to maintain Indonesia’s territorial integrity and prevent “national disintegration.”

But GAM leaders were equally adamant that Aceh had an incontrovertible right to independence. The strategy of the peace process, as conceived by its Geneva-based mediator, was to bridge the gap between the two sides by shifting the focus away from incompatible goals toward more immediate concerns such as reduction in hostilities, disarmament, reconstruction, and the like.

It was hoped that the two sides would be able to develop greater confidence in one another and perhaps eventually come up with unexpected and creative means to resolve the underlying political difference. In other words: the idea was to develop a political framework for resolving the conflict by peaceful rather than violent means.

Reality proved to be very different. Not only were the two sides rarely able to put aside their differences over first principles, but neither evinced an unreserved commitment to the peace process as the primary means for resolving the conflict.

Although the peace process was initiated by the Indonesian government, significant Indonesian groups were either profoundly ambivalent or openly hostile whereas GAM leaders never lost sight of their ultimate goal of independence.

Both sides viewed the process primarily in tactical terms—as a means to undermine their opponents, force their surrender, or gain some other short-term advantage. Far from building trust, the process served ultimately to entrench the positions of the two sides and deepen the division between them.

 Even so, we conclude that the Indonesian government’s current resort to a military solution is unlikely to resolve the conflict and may ultimately prove counterproductive. Moreover, “special autonomy” is unlikely to satisfy Acehnese aspirations unless accompanied by major economic and political reforms. Eventually a return to negotiations—not necessarily with GAM alone—will be necessary.

In drawing lessons from the achievements and failings of the 2000–2003 peace process, we draw particular attention to the unrealistic expectations for rapid progress toward a “final” solution.

Rather than seek an immediate resolution it might have been better to concentrate, as proposed by the mediator, on preserving the “cessation of hostilities” and maintaining peaceful conditions.

A “delayed settlement” approach may have been preferable—postponing substantive discussions about the ultimate political status of Aceh while offering GAM incentives to abandon its armed struggle and participate in conventional political activities. Such a delay would also have given the central government time to improve its own image among Acehnese. To achieve such an outcome in the future, however, both sides will need to recognize that their military options are truly exhausted

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.

The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed.

The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust. This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) details the agreement and the principles that will guide the transformation process.

To this end the GoI and GAM have agreed on the following:

1 Governing of Aceh

1.1 Law on the Governing of Aceh

1.1.1 A new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006.

1.1.2 The new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be based on the following principles:

a) Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.

b) International agreements entered into by the Government of Indonesia which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

c) Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic of Indonesia will be taken in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

d) Administrative measures undertaken by the Government of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration.

1.1.3 The name of Aceh and the titles of senior elected officials will be determined by the legislature of Aceh after the next elections.

1.1.4 The borders of Aceh correspond to the borders as of 1 July 1956.

1.1.5 Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn.

1.1.6 Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions and customs of the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal requirements of Aceh.

1.1.7 The institution of Wali Nanggroe with all its ceremonial attributes and entitlements will be established.

1.2 Political participation

1.2.1 As soon as possible and not later than one year from the signing of this MoU, GoI agrees to and will facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties that meet national criteria. Understanding the aspirations of Acehnese people for local political parties, GoI will create, within one year or at the latest 18 months from the signing of this MoU, the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament. The timely implementation of this MoU will contribute positively to this end.

1.2.2 Upon the signature of this MoU, the people of Aceh will have the right to nominate candidates for the positions of all elected officials to contest the elections in Aceh in April 2006 and thereafter.

1.2.3 Free and fair local elections will be organised under the new Law on the Governing of Aceh to elect the head of the Aceh administration and other elected officials in April 2006 as well as the legislature of Aceh in 2009.

1.2.4 Until 2009 the legislature of Aceh will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of the Aceh administration.

1.2.5 All Acehnese residents will be issued new conventional identity cards prior to the elections of April 2006.

1.2.6 Full participation of all Acehnese people in local and national elections will be guaranteed in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

1.2.7 Outside monitors will be invited to monitor the elections in Aceh. Local elections may be undertaken with outside technical assistance.

1.2.8 There will be full transparency in campaign funds.

1.3 Economy

1.3.1 Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. Aceh has the right to set interest rates beyond that set by the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.

1.3.2 Aceh has the right to set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities. Aceh has the right to conduct trade and business internally and internationally and to seek foreign direct investment and tourism to Aceh.

1.3.3 Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh.

1.3.4 Aceh is entitled to retain seventy (70) per cent of the revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh as well as in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh.

1.3.5 Aceh conducts the development and administration of all seaports and airports within the territory of Aceh.

1.3.6 Aceh will enjoy free trade with all other parts of the Republic of Indonesia unhindered by taxes, tariffs or other restrictions.

1.3.7 Aceh will enjoy direct and unhindered access to foreign countries, by sea and air.

1.3.8 GoI commits to the transparency of the collection and allocation of revenues between the Central Government and Aceh by agreeing to outside auditors to verify this activity and to communicate the results to the head of the Aceh administration.

1.3.9 GAM will nominate representatives to participate fully at all levels in the commission established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR).

1.4 Rule of law

1.4.1 The separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary will be recognised.

1.4.2 The legislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code for Aceh on the basis of the universal principles of human rights as provided for in the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

1.4.3 An independent and impartial court system, including a court of appeals, will be established for Aceh within the judicial system of the Republic of Indonesia.

1.4.4 The appointment of the Chief of the organic police forces and the prosecutors shall be approved by the head of the Aceh administration. The recruitment and training of organic police forces and prosecutors will take place in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration in compliance with the applicable national standards.

1.4.5 All civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh will be tried in civil courts in Aceh.

2 Human rights

2.1 GoI will adhere to the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

2.2 A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh.

2.3 A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating and determining reconciliation measures.

3 Amnesty and reintegration into society

3.1 Amnesty

3.1.1 GoI will, in accordance with constitutional procedures, grant amnesty to all persons who have participated in GAM activities as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU.

3.1.2 Political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict will be released unconditionally as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU.

3.1.3 The Head of the Monitoring Mission will decide on disputed cases based on advice from the legal advisor of the Monitoring Mission.

3.1.4 Use of weapons by GAM personnel after the signature of this MoU will be regarded as a violation of the MoU and will disqualify the person from amnesty.

3.2 Reintegration into society

3.2.1 As citizens of the Republic of Indonesia, all persons having been granted amnesty or released from prison or detention will have all political, economic and social rights as well as the right to participate freely in the political process both in Aceh and on the national level.

3.2.2 Persons who during the conflict have renounced their citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia will have the right to regain it.

3.2.3 GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under the administration of the authorities of Aceh will be established.

3.2.4 GoI will allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict to be administered by the authorities of Aceh.

3.2.5 GoI will allocate suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities of Aceh for the purpose of facilitating the reintegration to society of the former combatants and the compensation for political prisoners and affected civilians. The authorities of Aceh will use the land and funds as follows:

a) All former combatants will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.

b) All pardoned political prisoners will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.

c) All civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.

3.2.6 The authorities of Aceh and GoI will establish a joint Claims Settlement Commission to deal with unmet claims.

3.2.7 GAM combatants will have the right to seek employment in the organic police and organic military forces in Aceh without discrimination and in conformity with national standards.

4 Security arrangements

4.1 All acts of violence between the parties will end latest at the time of the signing of this MoU.

4.2 GAM undertakes to demobilise all of its 3000 military troops. GAM members will not wear uniforms or display military insignia or symbols after the signing of this MoU.

4.3 GAM undertakes the decommissioning of all arms, ammunition and explosives held by the participants in GAM activities with the assistance of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). GAM commits to hand over 840 arms.

4.4 The decommissioning of GAM armaments will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages and concluded by 31 December 2005.

4.5 GoI will withdraw all elements of non-organic military and non-organic police forces from Aceh.

4.6 The relocation of non-organic military and non-organic police forces will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages in parallel with the GAM decommissioning immediately after each stage has been verified by the AMM, and concluded by 31 December 2005.

4.7 The number of organic military forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation is 14700. The number of organic police forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation is 9100.

4.8 There will be no major movements of military forces after the signing of this MoU. All movements more than a platoon size will require prior notification to the Head of the Monitoring Mission.

4.9 GoI undertakes the decommissioning of all illegal arms, ammunition and explosives held by any possible illegal groups and parties.

4.10 Organic police forces will be responsible for upholding internal law and order in Aceh.

4.11 Military forces will be responsible for upholding external defence of Aceh. In normal peacetime circumstances, only organic military forces will be present in Aceh.

4.12 Members of the Aceh organic police force will receive special training in Aceh and overseas with emphasis on respect for human rights.

5 Establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission

5.1 An Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) will be established by the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the commitments taken by the parties in this Memorandum of Understanding.

5.2 The tasks of the AMM are to:

a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments,

b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,

c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members,

d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field,

e) monitor the process of legislation change,

f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,

g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU,

h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

5.3 A Status of Mission Agreement (SoMA) between GoI and the European Union will be signed after this MoU has been signed. The SoMA defines the status, privileges and immunities of the AMM and its members. ASEAN contributing countries which have been invited by GoI will confirm in writing their acceptance of and compliance with the SoMA.

5.4 GoI will give all its support for the carrying out of the mandate of the AMM. To this end, GoI will write a letter to the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries expressing its commitment and support to the AMM.

5.5 GAM will give all its support for the carrying out of the mandate of the AMM. To this end, GAM will write a letter to the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries expressing its commitment and support to the AMM.

5.6 The parties commit themselves to provide AMM with secure, safe and stable working conditions and pledge their full cooperation with the AMM.

5.7 Monitors will have unrestricted freedom of movement in Aceh. Only those tasks which are within the provisions of the MoU will be accepted by the AMM. Parties do not have a veto over the actions or control of the AMM operations.

5.8 GoI is responsible for the security of all AMM personnel in Indonesia. The mission personnel do not carry arms. The Head of Monitoring Mission may however decide on an exceptional basis that a patrol will not be escorted by GoI security forces. In that case, GoI will be informed and the GoI will not assume responsibility for the security of this patrol.

5.9 GoI will provide weapons collection points and support mobile weapons collection teams in collaboration with GAM.

5.10 Immediate destruction will be carried out after the collection of weapons and ammunitions. This process will be fully documented and publicised as appropriate.

5.11 AMM reports to the Head of Monitoring Mission who will provide regular reports to the parties and to others as required, as well as to a designated person or office in the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries.

5.12 Upon signature of this MoU each party will appoint a senior representative to deal with all matters related to the implementation of this MoU with the Head of Monitoring Mission.

5.13 The parties commit themselves to a notification responsibility procedure to the AMM, including military and reconstruction issues.

5.14 GoI will authorise appropriate measures regarding emergency medical service and hospitalisation for AMM personnel.

5.15 In order to facilitate transparency, GoI will allow full access for the representatives of national and international media to Aceh.

6 Dispute settlement

6.1 In the event of disputes regarding the implementation of this MoU, these will be resolved promptly as follows:

a) As a rule, eventual disputes concerning the implementation of this MoU will be resolved by the Head of Monitoring Mission, in dialogue with the parties, with all parties providing required information immediately. The Head of Monitoring Mission will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.

b) If the Head of Monitoring Mission concludes that a dispute cannot be resolved by the means described above, the dispute will be discussed together by the Head of Monitoring Mission with the senior representative of each party. Following this, the Head of Monitoring Mission will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.

c) In cases where disputes cannot be resolved by either of the means described above, the Head of Monitoring Mission will report directly to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the political leadership of GAM and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative, with the EU Political and Security Committee informed. After consultation with the parties, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.

GoI and GAM will not undertake any action inconsistent with the letter or spirit of this Memorandum of Understanding.

Signed in triplicate in Helsinki, Finland on the 15 of August in the year 2005.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia,

Hamid Awaludin Minister of Law and Human Rights Leadership

Malik Mahmud

On behalf of the Free Aceh Movement

As witnessed by Martti Ahtisaari Former President of Finland

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative Facilitator of the negotiation process