[ Series of lectures from May 26 to
June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association
for the Study of the War of Resistance Against
Japan.]
1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of
the great War of Resistance Against Japan. Rallying in
unity, persevering in resistance and persevering in the
united front, the forces of the whole nation have been
valiantly fighting the enemy for almost a year. The
people of the whole world are attentively following
this war, which has no precedent in the history of the
East, and which will go down as a great war in world
history too. Every Chinese suffering from the disasters
of the war and fighting for the survival of his nation
daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the
course of the war? Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many
people are talking about a protracted war, but why is
it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war?
Many people are talking about Final victory, but why
will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for
final victory?
Not everyone has found answers to these questions;
in fact, to this day most people have not done so.
Therefore the defeatist exponents of the theory of
national subjugation have come forward to tell people
that China will be subjugated, that final victory will
not be China's. On the other hand, some impetuous
friends have come forward to tell people that China
will win very quickly without having to exert any great
effort. But are these views correct? We have said all
along they are not.
However, most people have not yet grasped what we
have been saying. This is partly because we did not do
enough propaganda and explanatory work, and partly
because the development of objective events had not yet
fully and clearly revealed their inherent nature and
their features to the people, who were thus not in a
position to foresee the over-all trend and the outcome
and hence to decide on a complete set of policies and
tactics. Now things are better, the experience of ten
months of war has been quite sufficient to explode the
utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to
dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of
quick victory.
In these circumstances many people are asking for a
comprehensive explanation. All the more so with regard
to protracted war, not only because of the opposing
theories of national subjugation and quick victory but
also because of the shallow understanding of its
nature. "Our four hundred million people have been
making a concerted effort since the Lukouchiao
Incident, and the final victory will belong to China."
This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct
formula but needs to be given more content.
Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the
united front has been possible because of many factors.
Internally, they comprise all the political parties in
the country from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang,
all the people from the workers and peasants to the
bourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the regular
forces to the guerrillas; internationally, they range
from the land of socialism to justice-loving people in
all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range
from those people in Japan who are against the war to
those Japanese soldiers at the front who are against
the war. In short, all these forces have contributed in
varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every man
with a conscience should salute them.
We Communists, together with all the other
ant-Japanese political parties and the whole people,
have no other course than to strive to unite all forces
for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.
July 1 this year will be the 17th
anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of
China. A serious study of protracted war is necessary
in order to enable every Communist to play a better and
greater part in the War of Resistance. Therefore my
lectures will be devoted to such a study. I shall try
to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted
war, but I cannot possibly go into everything in one
series of lectures.
2. All the experience of the ten months of war
proves the error both of the theory of China's
inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's
quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to
compromise and the latter to the tendency to
underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem
are subjective and one-sided, or, in a word,
unscientific.
3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great
deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said,
"China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in a
war." Others said, "If China offers armed resistance,
she is sure to become another Abyssinia." Since the
beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation
has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it
too, still continues. For instance, from time to time
an atmosphere of compromise arises and the advocates of
compromise argue that "the continuance of the war
spells subjugation".[1] In a letter from Hunan a student has
written:
In the countryside everything seems
difficult. Doing propaganda work on my own, I have to
talk to people when and where I find them. The people I
have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all
have some understanding of what is going on and are
very interested in what I have to say. But when I run
into my own relatives, they always say: "China cannot
win; she is doomed." They make one sick ! Fortunately,
they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise
things would really be bad. The peasants would
naturally put more stock in what they say.
Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable
subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to
compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China,
and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to
crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and
will probably remain with us right until the end of the
war. Now that Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is in
danger, it will not be unprofitable, I think, to knock
the bottom out of the theory of national
subjugation.
4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views
which are indicative of impetuosity have also appeared.
For instance, at the outset of the war many people were
groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even
believing that the Japanese could not get as far as
Shansi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla
warfare in the War of Resistance and doubted the
proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare
is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with
regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and
mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the
Eighth Route Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is
basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under
favourable conditions", which they regarded as a
"mechanical" approach.[2]
During the battle of Shanghai some people said: "If
we can fight for just three months, the international
situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound
to send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned
their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance
chiefly on foreign aid.[3]
After the Taierhchuang victory,[4] some people maintained that
the Hsuchow campaign should be fought as a
"quasi-decisive campaign" and that the policy of
protracted war should be changed. They said such things
as, "This campaign marks the last desperate struggle of
the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanese warlords will
be demoralized and able only to await their Day of
Judgement."[5]
The victory at Pinghsingkuan turned some people's
heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned
more people's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether
the enemy will attack Wuhan. Many people think
"probably not", and many others "definitely not". Such
doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is
our anti-Japanese strength already sufficient? Some
people may answer affirmatively, for our present
strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's
advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the
slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese
National United Front" still correct? Some people may
answer negatively, for the united front in its present
state is already strong enough to repulse the enemy, so
why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should
our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda
be intensified? Here again the answer may be in the
negative.
Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to
reform the army system and the system of government,
develop the mass movement, enforce education for
national defence, suppress traitors and Trotskyites,
develop war industries and improve the people's
livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling
for the defence of Wuhan, of Canton and of the
Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla
warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers
might all be in the negative. There are even some
people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn
occurs in the war situation, are prepared to intensify
the "friction" between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party, diverting attention from external to internal
matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a
comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance
comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed
political and military short-sightedness. Such talk,
however plausible, is actually specious and groundless.
To sweep away such verbiage should help the victorious
prosecution of the War of Resistance.
5. The question now is: Will China be
subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be
subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win
quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and
the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.
6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated
the main arguments on these questions. On July 16,
1936, five months before the Sian Incident and twelve
months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in an interview
with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made
a general estimate of the situation with regard to war
between China and Japan and advanced various principles
for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve
as a reminder:
Question: Under what
conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy
the forces of Japan?
Answer: Three conditions are
required: first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese
united front in China; second, the formation of an
international anti-Japanese united front; third, the
rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in
Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint
of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China
is the most important of the three conditions.
Question: How long do you
think such a war would last?
Answer: That depends on the
strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many
other conditioning factors involving China and Japan.
That is to say, apart from China's own strength, which
is the main thing, international help to China and the
help rendered by the revolution in Japan are also
important. If China's anti-Japanese united front is
greatly expanded and effectively organized horizontally
and vertically, if the necessary help is given to China
by those governments and peoples which recognize the
Japanese imperialist menace to their own interests and
if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will
speedily be brought to an end and China will speedily
win victory. If these conditions are not realized
quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end,
just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and
China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices
will be great and there will be a very painful
period.
Question: What is your
opinion of the probable course of development of such a
war, politically and militarily?
Answer: Japan's continental
policy is already fixed, and those who think they can
halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with
Japan at the expense of more Chinese territory and
sovereign rights are indulging in mere fantasy. We
definitely know that the lower Yangtse valley and our
southern seaports are already included in the
continental programme of Japanese imperialism.
Moreover, Japan wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam,
Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East
Indies in order to cut off other countries from China
and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is
Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will
undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But
the majority of the Chinese people believe that such
difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big
port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of
losing their property.
Many people think it would be
impossible for China to continue the war, once her
coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To
refute them we need only cite the war history of the
Red Army. In the present War of Resistance Against
Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the
Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and
even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section of
China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we
would still be far from defeated. We would still have
ample strength to fight against Japan, while the
Japanese would have to fight defensive battles in their
rear throughout the war. The heterogeneity and uneven
development of China's economy are rather advantageous
in the war of resistance. For example, to sever
Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be
as disastrous to China as would be the severance of New
York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan
blockades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for
her to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest and West.
Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the
unity of the entire Chinese people and the building up
of a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This is what we
have long been advocating.
Question: If the war drags on
for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated,
would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of a
peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern
China?
Answer: No. Like the people
of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will
not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese
territory.
Question: What, in your
opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be
followed in this "war of liberation"?
Answer: Our strategy should
be to employ our main forces to operate over an
extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the
Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high
degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making
swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations
and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile
warfare, and not positional warfare depending
exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high
fortresses and successive rows of defensive
positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all
the vital strategic points, which should be defended by
positional warfare as long as profitable. But the
pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare.
Positional warfare is also necessary,
but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary.
Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that
it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most
effectively. In the face of the vigorous actions of our
forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its
war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited
efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow
front for a defensive war of attrition, we would be
throwing away the advantages of our geography and
economic organization and repeating the mistake of
Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must
avoid any major decisive battles, and must first employ
mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat
effectiveness of the enemy troops.
Besides employing trained armies to
carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers
of guerrilla units among the peasants. One should know
that the anti-Japanese volunteer units in the three
northeastern provinces are only a minor demonstration
of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized
from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese
peasants have very great latent power; properly
organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese army
busy twenty-four hours a day and worry it to death. It
must be remembered that the war will be fought in
China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be
entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it
will be forced to move in all its provisions and guard
them, it must use large numbers of troops to protect
its lines of communications and constantly guard
against attacks and it needs large forces to garrison
Manchuria and Japan as well.
In the course of the war, China will
be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize
many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself;
at the same time China will win foreign aid to
reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually.
Therefore China will be able to conduct positional
warfare in the latter period of the war and make
positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus
Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's
long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces
will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On
the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of
resistance will be constantly brought into play and
large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring
into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The
combination of all these and other factors will enable
us to make the final and decisive attacks on the
fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas
and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of
China.
The above views have been proved correct in the
light of the experience of the ten months of war and
will also be borne out in the future.
7. As far back as August 25, 1937, less than two
months after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly
pointed out in its "Resolution on the Present Situation
and the Tasks of the Party":
The military provocation by the
Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their occupation
of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of
their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great
Wall. They have already begun their national
mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have
"no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a
smokescreen for further attacks.
The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7
marked the starting point of China's national War of
Resistance.
Thus a new stage has opened in China's
political situation, the stage of actual resistance.
The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the
present stage the central task is to mobilize all the
nation's forces for victory in the War of
Resistance.
The key to victory in the war now lies
in developing the resistance that has already begun
into a war of total resistance by the whole nation.
Only through such a war of total resistance can final
victory be won.
The existence of serious weaknesses in
the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks,
retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and
partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore
it should be realized that the war will be an arduous
and protracted war. But we are confident that, through
the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the
resistance already started will sweep aside all
obstacles and continue to advance and develop.
The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in
the light of the experience of the ten months of war
and will also be borne out in the future.
8. Epistemologically speaking, the source of all
erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic
tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies
are subjective and one-sided in their approach to
problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely
subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon a single
aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with
similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem. But
there are two categories of erroneous views, one
comprising fundamental, and therefore consistent,
errors which are hard to correct, and the other
comprising accidental, and therefore temporary, errors
which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong, both
need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing
idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an
objective and all-sided view in making a study of war
can we draw correct conclusions on the question of
war.
The Basis of the
Problem
9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a
protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's?
What is the basis for these statements?
The war between China and Japan is not just any war,
it is specifically a war of life and death between
semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist
Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the
basis of the whole problem. The two sides in the war
have many contrasting features, which will be
considered in turn below.
10. The Japanese side. First, Japan is a
powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the
East in military, economic and political-organizational
power, and is one of the five or six foremost
imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic
factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability
of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for
China are due to Japan's imperialist system and her
great military, economic and political-organizational
power. Secondly, however, the imperialist character of
Japan's social economy determines the imperialist
character of her war, a war that is retrogressive and
barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, the internal and
external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have
driven her not only to embark on an adventurist war
unparalleled in scale but also to approach her final
collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no
longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the
prosperity sought by her ruling classes but to the very
reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.
This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of
Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled
with the military-feudal character of Japanese
imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity
of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost
the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism
between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the
antagonism between Japan and most other countries of
the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of
Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her
inevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on
the basis of her great military, economic and
political-organizational power, but at the same time it
rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's
military, economic and political-organizational power
is great but quantitatively inadequate.
Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in
manpower and in military, financial and material
resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan's
rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty
through war, but again they will get the very reverse
of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have
launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually
aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original
resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get
international support from the fascist countries, the
international opposition she is bound to encounter will
be greater than her international support. This
opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only
cancel out the support but even bear down upon Japan
herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds
meagre support, and such is the consequence of the very
nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage
lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her
disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous
nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower
and material resources, and in her meagre international
support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese
side.
11. The Chinese side. First, we are a
semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War,
[6] the
Taiping Revolution, [7] the Reform Movement of 1898,
[8] the
Revolution of 1911 [9] and the Northern Expedition
[10]--the
revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at
extricating China from her semi-colonial and
semi-feudal state--all met with serious setbacks, and
China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.
We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to
the enemy in military, economic and
political-organizational power. Here again one can find
the basis for the inevitability of the war and the
impossibility of quick victory for China. Secondly,
however, China's liberation movement, with its
cumulative development over the last hundred years, is
now different from that of any previous period.
Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it
have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they
have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today
is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically,
politically and culturally, yet there are factors in
China more progressive than in any other period of her
history. The Communist Party of China and the army
under its leadership represent these progressive
factors. It is on the basis of this progress that
China's present war of liberation can be protracted and
can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese
imperialism, which is declining, China is a country
rising like the morning sun. China's war is
progressive, hence its just character.
Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing
the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the
people in Japan and of winning the support of most
countries in the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast
with Japan, China is a very big country with vast
territory, rich resources, a large population and
plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long
war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international
support for China stemming from the progressive and
just character of her war, which is again exactly the
reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause.
To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her military
weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive and
just character of her war, her great size and her
abundant international support. These are China's
characteristics.
12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great
military, economic and political-organizational power,
but that her war is reactionary and barbarous, her
manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she
is in an unfavourable position internationally. China,
on the contrary, has less military, economic and
political-organizational power, but she is in her era
of progress, her war is progressive and just, she is
moreover a big country, a factor which enables her to
sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by
most countries. The above are the basic, mutually
contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war.
They have determined and are determining all the
political policies and military strategies and tactics
of the two sides; they have determined and are
determining the protracted character of the war and its
outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to
China and not to Japan.
The war is a contest between these characteristics.
They will change in the course of the war, each
according to its own nature; and from this everything
else will follow. These characteristics exist
objectively and are not invented to deceive people;
they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and
are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major
and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the
war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If
anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the
Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even
though some of his ideas win credence for a time and
may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by
the course of the war. On the basis of these
characteristics we shall now proceed to explain the
problems to be dealt with.
Refutation of the Theory
of National Subjugation
13. The theorists of national subjugation, who see
nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength
and our weakness, used to say, "Resistance will mean
subjugation," and now they are saying, "The continuance
of the war spells subjugation." We shall not be able to
convince them merely by stating that Japan, though
strong; is small, while China, though weak, is large.
They can adduce historical instances, such as the
destruction of the Sung Dynasty by the Yuan and the
destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Ching, to prove
that small but strong country can vanquish a large but
weak one and, moreover, that a backward country can
vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events
occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can
cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a
small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a
large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have
to produce other grounds before we can silence and
convince all the subjugationists, and supply everyone
engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to
persuade those who are still confused or irresolute and
so strengthen their faith in the War of Resistance.
14. What then are the grounds we should advance? The
characteristics of the epoch. These characteristics are
concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and
paucity of support and in China's progress and
abundance of support.
15. Our war is not just any war, it is specifically
a war between China and Japan fought in the Nineteen
Thirties. Our enemy, Japan, is first of all a moribund
imperialist power; she is already in her era of decline
and is not only different from Britain at the time of
the subjugation of India, when British capitalism was
still in the era of its ascendancy, but also different
from what she herself was at the time of World War I
twenty years ago. The present war was launched on the
eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and,
above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very
reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war,
which is in the nature of a last desperate struggle.
Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will
not be China but the ruling circles of Japanese
imperialism which will be destroyed as a result of the
war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time
when many countries have been or are about to be
embroiled in war, when we are all fighting or preparing
to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's
fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries
and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the
opposition Japan has aroused and will increasingly
arouse among those countries and peoples.
16. What about China? The China of today cannot be
compared with the China of any other historical period.
She is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society, and she
is consequently considered a weak country. But at the
same time, China is historically in her era of
progress; this is the primary reason for her ability to
defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance
Against Japan is progressive we do not mean progressive
in the ordinary or general sense, nor do we mean
progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war
against Italy, or the Taiping Revolution or the
Revolution of 1911 were progressive, we mean
progressive in the sense that China is progressive
today.
In what way is the China of today progressive? She
is progressive because she is no longer a completely
feudal country and because we already have some
capitalism in China, we have a bourgeoisie and a
proletariat, we have vast numbers of people who have
awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party,
we have a politically progressive army--the Chinese Red
Army led by the Communist Party--and we have the
tradition and the experience of many decades of
revolution, and especially the experience of the
seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese
Communist Party. This experience has schooled the
people and the political parties of China and forms the
very basis for the present unity against Japan. If it
is said that without the experience of 1905 the victory
of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we
can also say that without the experience of the last
seventeen years it would be impossible to win our War
of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.
In the existing international situation, China is
not isolated in the war, and this fact too is without
precedent in history. In the past, China's wars, and
India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only
today that we meet with world-wide popular movements,
extraordinary in breadth and depth, which have arisen
or are arising and which are supporting China. The
Russian Revolution of 1917 also received international
support, and thus the Russian workers and peasants won;
but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in
nature as ours today. The popular movements in the
world today are developing on a scale and with a depth
that are unprecedented. The existence of the Soviet
Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day
international politics, and the Soviet Union will
certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm;
there was nothing like this twenty years ago. All these
factors have created and are creating important
conditions indispensable to China's final victory.
Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and
will come only in the future, but China is progressive
and is a big country, and these are the factors
enabling her to protract the war and to promote as well
as await international help.
17. There is the additional factor that while Japan
is a small country with a small territory, few
resources, a small population and a limited number of
soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory,
rich resources, a large population and plenty of
soldiers, so that, besides the contrast between
strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a
small country, retrogression and meagre support and a
big country, progress and abundant support. This is the
reason why China will never be subjugated. It follows
from the contrast between strength and weakness that
Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time
and to a certain extent, that China must unavoidably
travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of
Resistance will be a protracted war and not a war of
quick decision; nevertheless, it follows from the other
contrast--a small country, retrogression and meagre
support versus a big country, progress and abundant
support--that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China
indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while
China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final
victory.
18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, she was not
only weak but also small. Second, she was not as
progressive as China; she was an old country passing
from the slave to the serf system, a country without
any capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let
alone a Communist Party, and with no army such as the
Chinese army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army.
Third, she was unable to hold out and wait for
international assistance and had to fight her war in
isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there
were mistakes in the direction of her war against
Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated. But there is
still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia,
which, if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to
recover their country when the world situation
changes.
19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the
failure of liberation movements in modern China to
prove their assertions first that "resistance will mean
subjugation", and then that "the continuance of the war
spells subjugation", here again our answer is, "Times
are different." China herself, the internal situation
in Japan and the international environment are all
different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is
stronger than before while China in her unchanged
semi-colonial and semi-feudal position is still fairly
weak. It is also a fact that for the time being Japan
can still control her people at home and exploit
international contradictions in order to invade China.
But during a long war, these things are bound to change
in the opposite direction. Such changes are not yet
accomplished facts, but they will become so in future.
The subjugationists dismiss this point. As for China,
we already have new people, a new political party, a
new army and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a
situation very different from that of over a decade
ago, and what is more, all these will inevitably make
further progress. It is true that historically the
liberation movements met with repeated setbacks with
the result that China could not accumulate greater
strength for the present War of Resistance--this is a
very painful historical lesson, and never again should
we destroy any of our revolutionary forces.
Yet even on the present basis, by exerting great
efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually and
increase the strength of our resistance. All such
efforts should converge on the great Anti-Japanese
National United Front. As for international support,
though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in
sight, it is in the making, the international situation
being fundamentally different from before. The
countless failures in the liberation movement of modern
China had their subjective and objective causes, but
the situation today is entirely different. Today,
although there are many difficulties which make the War
of Resistance arduous--such as the enemy's strength and
our weakness, and the fact that his difficulties are
just starting, while our own progress is far from
sufficient--nevertheless many favourable conditions
exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our
subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome
the difficulties and win through to victory. These are
favourable conditions such as never existed before in
any period of our history, and that is why the War of
Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation
movements of the past, will not end in failure.
Compromise or
Resistance? Corruption or Progress?
20. It has been fully explained above that the
theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there
are many people who do not subscribe to this theory;
they are honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply
worried about the present situation. Two things are
worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japan and
doubts about the possibility of political progress.
These two vexing questions are being widely discussed
and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now
examine them.
21. As previously explained, the question of
compromise has its social roots, and as long as these
roots exist the question is bound to arise. But
compromise will not avail. To prove the point, again we
need only look for substantiation to Japan, China, and
the international situation. First take Japan. At the
very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated
that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive
to compromise would arise, in other words, that after
occupying northern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan
would probably resort to the scheme of inducing China
to capitulate. True enough, she did resort to the
scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being
that the enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy
and practiced naked plunder. Had China capitulated,
every Chinese would have become a slave without a
country. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of
subjugating China, has two aspects, the material and
the spiritual, both of which are being applied
universally to all Chinese, not only to the people of
the lower strata but also to members of the upper
strata; of course the latter are treated a little more
politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not
of principle.
In the main the enemy is transplanting into the
interior of China the same old measures he adopted in
the three northeastern provinces. Materially, he is
robbing the common people even of their food and
clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; he is
plundering the means of production, thus ruining and
enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he
is working to destroy the national consciousness of the
Chinese people. Under the flag of the "Rising Sun" all
Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts of
burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese
national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be
carried deeper into the interior of China. Japan with
her voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As
was inevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese
cabinet's statement of January 16, 1938 [11] is still being
obstinately carried out, which has enraged all strata
of the Chinese people.
This rage is engendered by the reactionary and
barbarous character of Japan's war--"there is no escape
from fate", and hence an absolute hostility has
crystallized. It is to be expected that on some future
occasion the enemy will once again resort to the scheme
of inducing China to capitulate and that certain
subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably
collude with certain foreign elements (to be found in
Britain, the United States and France, and specially
among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in
crime. But the general trend of events will not permit
capitulation; the obstinate and peculiarly barbarous
character of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the
question.
22. Second, let us take China. There are three
factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War
of Resistance. In the first place the Communist Party,
which is the reliable force leading the people to
resist Japan. Next, the Kuomintang, which depends on
Britain and the United States and hence will not
capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally,
the other political parties and groups, most of which
oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance.
With unity among these three, whoever compromises will
be standing with the traitors, and anybody will have
the right to punish him. All those unwilling to be
traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the
War of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can
hardly succeed.
23. Third, take the international aspect. Except for
Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata
of other capitalist countries, the whole world is in
favour of resistance, and not of compromise by China.
This factor reinforces China's hopes. Today the people
throughout the country cherish the hope that
international forces will gradually give China
increasing help. It is not a vain hope; the existence
of the Soviet Union in particular encourages China in
her War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now
strong as never before, has always shared China's joys
and sorrows. In direct contrast to all the members of
the upper strata in the capitalist countries who seek
nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its
duty to help all weak nations and all revolutionary
wars. That China is not fighting her war in isolation
has its basis not only in international support in
general but in Soviet support in particular. China and
the Soviet Union are in close geographical proximity,
which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's
War of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan
increases the difficulties of China's resistance.
Proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a
favourable condition for the War of Resistance.
24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of
compromise exists but can be overcome. Even if the
enemy can modify his policy to some extent, he cannot
alter it fundamentally. In China the social roots of
compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise
are in the majority. Internationally, also, some forces
favour compromise but the main forces favour
resistance. The combination of these three factors
makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise
and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.
25. Let us now answer the second question. Political
progress at home and perseverance in the War of
Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political
progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the
more we persevere in the war, the greater the political
progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our
perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy
phenomena in various herds under the Kuomintang regime
are very serious, and the accumulation of these
undesirable factors over the years has caused great
anxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our
patriots. But there is no ground for pessimism, since
experience in the War of Resistance has already proved
that the Chinese people have made as much progress in
the last ten months as in many years in the past.
Although the cumulative effects of long years of
corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the
people's strength to resist Japan, thus reducing the
extent of our victories and causing us losses in the
war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and
in the world is such that the Chinese people cannot but
make progress. This progress will be slow because of
the factor of corruption, which impedes progress.
Progress and the slow pace of progress are two
characteristics of the present situation, and the
second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war,
which is a source of great concern to patriots. But we
are in the midst of a revolutionary war, and
revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only
eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our
own filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed
with tremendous power, which can transform many things
or clear the way for their transformation.
The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and
Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of
Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will
surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old
China into a new China, and people and everything else
in both China and Japan will be transformed during and
after the war. It is proper for us to regard the
anti-Japanese war and our national reconstruction as
interconnected. To say that Japan can also be
transformed is to say that the war of aggression by her
rulers will end in defeat and may lead to a revolution
by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the
Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is
transformed. All this is closely linked with China's
War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into
account.
The Theory of National
Subjugation is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory is
Likewise Wrong
26. In our comparative study of the enemy and
ourselves with respect to the basic contradictory
characteristics, such as relative strength, relative
size, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of
support, we have already refuted the theory of national
subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is
unlikely and why political progress is possible. The
subjugationists stress the contradiction between
strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomes
the basis of their whole argument on the question,
neglecting all the other contradictions. Their
preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows their
one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side
of the matter into the whole shows their subjectivism.
Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be
seen that they have no ground to stand on and are
wrong.
As for those who are neither subjugationists nor
confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic
frame of mind for the moment simply because they are
confused by the disparity between our strength and that
of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or
by the corruption in the country, we should point out
to them that their approach also tends to be one-sided
and subjective. But in their case correction is
relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will
understand, for they are patriots and their error s
only momentary.
27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise
wrong. Either they completely forget the contradiction
between strength and weakness, remembering only the
other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's
advantages beyond all semblance of reality and beyond
recognition, or they presumptuously take the balance of
forces at one time and place for the whole situation,
as in the old saying, "A leaf before the eye shuts out
Mount Tail" In a word, they lack the courage to admit
that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often
deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the
truth. Nor do they have the courage to admit the
limitations of our advantages, and thus they deny
another aspect of the truth. The result is that they
make mistakes, big and small, and here again it is
subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the
mischief. These friends have their hearts in the right
place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the
gentlemen aspirations are indeed lofty", their views
are wrong, and to act according to them would certainly
be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not
conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective;
and to act notwithstanding would mean the army's defeat
and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would
be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory
of quick victory will not do either.
28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation?
No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two
possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that
the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve
liberation and to avert subjugation. The conditions for
liberation are China's progress, which is basic, the
enemy's difficulties, and international support. We
differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective
and all-sided view, we recognize the two possibilities
of national subjugation and liberation, stress that
liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the
conditions for its achievement, and strive to secure
them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a
subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one
possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the
possibility of liberation, and still less point out the
conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure
them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency to
compromise and the corruption, we see other tendencies
and phenomena which, we indicate, will gradually
prevail and are already in violent conflict with the
former; in addition, we point out the conditions
necessary for the healthy tendencies and phenomena to
prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency to
compromise and to change the state of corruption.
Therefore, contrary to the pessimists, we are not at
all down-hearted.
29. Not that we would not like a quick victory;
everybody would be in favour of driving the "devils"
out overnight. But we point out that, in the absence of
certain definite conditions, quick victory is something
that exists only in one's mind and not in objective
reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false
theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and
comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances
concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out
that the only way to final victory is the strategy of
protracted war, and we reject the groundless theory of
quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to
secure all the conditions indispensable to final
victory, and the more fully and the earlier these
conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of
victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe
that only in this way can the course of the war be
shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory,
which is just idle talk and an effort to get things on
the cheap.
Why a
Protracted War?
30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted
war. A correct answer to the question "Why a protracted
war?" can be arrived at only on the basis of all the
fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For
instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong
imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and
semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling into
the theory of national subjugation. For neither in
theory nor in practice can a struggle become protracted
by simply pitting the weak against the strong. Nor can
it become protracted by simply pitting the big against
the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or
abundant support against meagre support.
The annexation of a small country by a big one or of
a big country by a small one is a common occurrence. It
often happens that a progressive country which is not
strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, and
the same holds for everything that is progressive but
not strong. Abundant or meagre support is an important
but a subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect
depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides.
Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance
Against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is
derived from the interrelations of all the factors at
work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are
weak, and the danger of subjugation is there. But in
other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have
advantages. The enemy's advantage can be reduced and
his shortcomings aggravated by our efforts. On the
other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our
shortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win
final victory and avert subjugation, while the enemy
will ultimately be defeated and will be unable to avert
the collapse of his whole imperialist system.
31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one
respect but shortcomings in all others and we have
shortcomings in only one respect but advantages in all
others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on
the contrary, a superior position for him and an
inferior position for us at the present time? Quite
clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a
formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the
enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the
enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the
time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to
offset his strength, while our advantages have not
developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a
degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness.
Therefore there can as yet be no balance, only
imbalance.
32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War
of Resistance and the united front have somewhat
changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against
our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no
basic change. Hence during a certain stage of the war,
to a certain degree the enemy will be victorious and we
shall suffer defeat. But why is it that in this stage
the enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely
restricted in degree and cannot be transcended by
complete victory or complete defeat?
The reason is that, first, from the very beginning
the enemy's strength and our weakness have been
relative and not absolute, and that, second, our
efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in
the united front have further accentuated this
relativeness. In comparison with the original
situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavourable
factors have reduced his strength, although not yet to
a degree sufficient to destroy his superiority, and
similarly we are still weak, but favourable factors
have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to
a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus
it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we
are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively
superior and we are in a relatively inferior position.
On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and
inferiority, have never been absolute, and besides, our
efforts in persevering in resistance to Japan and in
the united front during the war have brought about
further changes in the original balance of forces
between us and the enemy. Therefore, in this stage the
enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely
restricted in degree, and hence the war becomes
protracted.
33. But circumstances are continually changing. In
the course of the war, provided we employ correct
military and political tactics, make no mistakes of
principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's
disadvantages and China's advantages will both grow as
the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result that
there will be a continual change in the difference in
comparative strength and hence in the relative position
of the two sides. When a new stage is reached, a great
change will take place in the balance of forces,
resulting in the enemies defeat and our victory.
34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit
his strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet
fundamentally weakened him. The insufficiency in his
manpower and material resources is not yet such as to
prevent his offensive; on the contrary, they can still
sustain his offensive to a certain extent. The
reactionary and barbarous nature of his war, a factor
which intensifies both class antagonisms within Japan
and the resistance of the Chinese nation, has not yet
brought about a situation which radically impedes his
advance.
The enemy's international isolation is increasing
but is not yet complete. In many countries which have
indicated they will help us, the capitalists dealing in
munitions and war materials and bent solely on profit
are still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war
supplies, [12] and their governments [13] are still reluctant
to join the Soviet Union in practical sanctions against
Japan. From all this it follows that our War of
Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a
protracted war.
As for China, although there has been some
improvement with regard to her weakness in the
military, economic, political and cultural spheres in
the ten months of resistance, it is still a long way
from what is required to prevent the enemy's offensive
and prepare our counteroffensive. Moreover,
quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain
losses. Although all the factors favourable to us are
having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to
halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our
counter-offensive unless we make an immense effort.
Neither the abolition of corruption and the
acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of
the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the
anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished
facts. From all this it follows that our war cannot be
won quickly but can only be a protracted war.
The Three Stages of the
Protracted War
35. Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one
and final victory will belong to China, it can
reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will
pass through three stages. The first stage covers the
period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our
strategic defensive. The second stage will be the
period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our
preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage
will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive
and the enemy's strategic retreat.
It is impossible to predict the concrete situation
in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war
may be pointed out in the light of present conditions.
The objective course of events will be exceedingly rich
and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can
cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war;
nevertheless it is necessary for the strategic
direction of the war to make a rough sketch of its
trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord
with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them,
it is still necessary to make it in order to give firm
and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted
war.
36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's
design is to occupy Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and link
up these three points. To accomplish this aim the enemy
will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one
and a half million men, spend from one and a half to
two years, and expend more than ten thousand million
yen. In penetrating so deeply, he will encounter
immense difficulties, with consequences disastrous
beyond imagination.
As for attempting to occupy the entire length of the
Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-Lanchow Railway, he
will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not
fully accomplish his design. But in drawing up our
operational plan we should base ourselves on the
assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points
and even certain additional areas, as well as link them
up, and we should make dispositions for a protracted
war, so that even if he does so, we shall be able to
cope with him. In this stage the form of fighting we
should adopt is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented
by guerrilla and positional warfare.
Through the subjective errors of the Kuomintang
military authorities, positional warfare was assigned
the primary role in the first phase of this stage, but
it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view
of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has
already built up a broad united front and achieved
unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and
will continue to use base and shameless means to induce
China to capitulate in the attempt to realize his plan
for a quick decision and to conquer the whole country
without much effort, he has failed so far, nor is he
likely to succeed in the future. In this stage, in
spite of considerable losses, China will make
considerable progress, which will become the main basis
for her continued resistance in the second stage. In
the present stage the Soviet Union has already given
substantial aid to China.
On the enemy side, there are already signs of
flagging morale, and his army's momentum of attack is
less in the middle phase of this stage than it was in
the initial phase, and it will diminish still further
in the concluding phase. Signs of exhaustion are
beginning to appear in his finances and economy;
war-weariness is beginning to set in among his people
and troops and within the clique at the helm of the
war, "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest
themselves and pessimism about the prospects of the war
is growing.
37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic
stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the
enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to
his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops
and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will
stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of
safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage,
the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas
and to make them his own by the fraudulent method of
setting up puppet governments, while plundering the
Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be
confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking
advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is
unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop
extensively in the first stage, and many base areas
will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's
consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the
second stage there will still be widespread fighting.
In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily
guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare.
China will still retain a large regular army, but
she will find it difficult to launch the strategic
counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand,
the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position
in the big cities and along the main lines of
communication under his occupation and, on the other
hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped
technically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal
defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched
in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively
dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all
the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and
co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces,
they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare
against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the
move as far as possible in order to destroy him in
mobile warfare, as is now being done in Shansi
Province. The fighting in the second stage will be
ruthless, and the country will suffer serious
devastation.
But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if
it is well conducted the enemy may be able to retain
only about one-third of his occupied territory, with
the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will
constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great
victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory
as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the
enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla
warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by
both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on
the degree of change in the balance of forces between
us and the enemy and on the changes in the
international situation; generally speaking, we should
be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long
time and to weather its hardships. It will be a very
painful period for China; the two big problems will be
economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of
the traitors.
The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united
front, and the traitor organizations in all the
occupied areas will merge into a so-called "unified
government". Owing to the loss of big cities and the
hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks
will clamour for compromise, and pessimism will grow to
a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize
the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the
war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and
consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism
and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard
struggle and apply new wartime policies, and so to
weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will
have to call upon the whole country resolutely to
maintain a united government, we will have to oppose
splits and systematically improve fighting techniques,
reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and
prepare for the counter-offensive.
The international situation will become still more
unfavourable to Japan and the main international forces
will incline towards giving more help to China, even
though there may be talk of "realism" of the
Chamberlain type which accommodates itself to faits
accomplis. Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and
Siberia will become greater, and there may even be
another war. As regards Japan, scores of her divisions
will be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread
guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese
movement will wear down this big Japanese force,
greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale
by stimulating the growth of homesickness,
war-weariness and even anti-war sentiment.
Though it would be wrong to say that Japan will
achieve no results at all in her plunder of China, yet,
being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla
warfare, she cannot possibly achieve rapid or
substantial results. This second stage will be the
transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the
most trying period but also the pivotal one. Whether
China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a
colony will be determined not by the retention or loss
of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent
to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second.
If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the
united front and in the protracted war, China will in
that stage gain the power to change from weakness to
strength. It will be the second act in the three-act
drama of China's War of Resistance. And through the
efforts of the entire cast it will become possible to
perform a most brilliant last act.
38. The third stage will be the stage of the
counter-offensive to recover our lost territories.
Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength
which China has built up in the preceding stage and
which will continue to grow in the third stage. But
China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we
shall also have to rely on the support of international
forces and on the changes that will take place inside
Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this
adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and
diplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer
be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a
strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in
strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought
on strategically interior lines, but will shift
gradually to strategically exterior lines.
Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can
this war be considered over. The third stage will be
the last in the protracted war, and when we talk of
persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all
the way through this stage. Our primary form of
fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional
warfare will rise to importance. While positional
defence cannot be regarded as important in the first
stage because of the prevailing circumstances,
positional attack will become quite important in the
third stage because of the changed conditions and the
requirements of the task. In the third stage guerrilla
warfare will again provide strategic support by
supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it
will not be the primary form as in the second
stage.
39. It is thus obvious that the war is protracted
and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not
be able to gobble up the whole of China but will be
able to occupy many places for a considerable time.
China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly,
but the greater part of her territory will remain in
her hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will
win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to
travel.
40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the
course of this long and ruthless war. The political
parties taking part in the war will also be steeled and
tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by
persevering in the united front can we persevere in the
war; and only by persevering in the united front and in
the war can we win final victory. Only thus can all
difficulties be overcome. After travelling the hard
stretch of road we shall reach the highway to victory.
This is the natural logic of the war.
41. In the three stages the changes in relative
strength will proceed along the following lines. In the
first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior
in strength. With regard to our inferiority we must
reckon on changes of two different kinds from the eve
of the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The
first kind is a change for the worse. China's original
inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely,
decreases in territory, population, economic strength,
military strength and cultural institutions. Towards
the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably
be considerable, especially on the economic side. This
point will be exploited by some people as a basis for
their theories of national subjugation and of
compromise. But the second kind of change, the change
for the better, must also be noted. It includes the
experience gained in the war, the progress made by the
armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization
of the people, the development of culture in a new
direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the
increase in international support, etc. What is on the
downgrade in the first stage is the old quantity and
the old quality, the manifestations being mainly
quantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new
quantity and the new quality, the manifestations being
mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change
that provides a basis for our ability to fight a
protracted war and win final victory.
42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are
also occurring on the enemies side. The first kind is a
change for the worse and manifests itself in hundreds
of thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and
ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, popular
discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure
of over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world
opinion, etc. This trend also provides a basis for our
ability to fight a protracted war and win final
victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second
kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the
better, that is, his expansion in territory, population
and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted
nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility
of quick victory, but at the same time certain people
will use it as a basis for their theories of national
subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take
into account the transitory and partial character of
this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan
is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and her
occupation of China's territory is temporary. The
vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will
restrict her actual occupation to narrow zones.
Moreover, her occupation of Chinese territory has
created and intensified contradictions between Japan
and other foreign countries. Besides, generally
speaking, such occupation involves a considerable
period in which Japan will make capital outlays without
drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in
the three northeastern provinces. All of which again
gives us a basis for demolishing the theories of
national subjugation and of compromise and for
establishing the theories of protracted war and of
final victory.
43. In the second stage, the above changes on both
sides will continue to develop. While the situation
cannot be predicted in detail, on the whole Japan will
continue on the downgrade and China on the
upgrade.[14]
For example, Japan's military and financial resources
will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare,
popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of
her troops will deteriorate further, and she will
become more isolated internationally. As for China, she
will make further progress in the political, military
and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the
people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there
will be some new economic growth on the basis of the
small industries and the widespread agriculture in the
interior; international support will gradually
increase; and the whole picture will be quite different
from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a
long time, during which there will be a great reversal
in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising
and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from
her inferior position, and Japan will lose her superior
position; first the two countries will become evenly
matched, and then their relative positions will be
reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have
completed her preparations for the strategic
counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the
counter-offensive and the expulsion of the enemy. It
should be reiterated that the change from inferiority
to superiority and the completion of preparations for
the counter-offensive will involve three things,
namely, an increase in China's own strength, an
increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in
international support; it is the combination of all
these forces that will bring about China's superiority
and the completion of her preparations for the
counter-offensive.
44. Because of the unevenness in China's political
and economic development, the strategic
counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a
uniform and even picture throughout the country in its
initial phase but will be regional in character, rising
here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy
will not relax his divisive tricks to break China's
united front, hence the task of maintaining internal
unity in China will become still more important, and we
shall have to ensure that the strategic
counter-offensive does not collapse halfway through
internal dissension. In this period the international
situation will become very favourable to China. China's
task will be to take advantage of it in order to attain
complete liberation and establish an independent
democratic state, which at the same time will mean
helping the world anti-fascist movement.
45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then
to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity
and then to inferiority; China moving from the
defensive to stalemate and then to the
counter-offensive, Japan moving from the offensive to
the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat--such
will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its
inevitable trend.
46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as
follows: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No,
she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory.
Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot
win quickly, and the war must be a protracted one. Are
these conclusions correct? I think they are.
47. At this point, the exponents of national
subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and
say, "To move from inferiority to parity China needs a
military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to
move from parity to superiority she will need a
military and economic power greater than Japan's. But
this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not
correct."
48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons
decide everything",[15] which constitutes a mechanical
approach to the question of war and a subjective and
one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not
only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important
factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is
people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of
strength is not only a contest of military and economic
power, but also a contest of human power and morale.
Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by
people. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the
Japanese and of the people of other countries are on
the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how
can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it
is by a small minority through coercion, count as
superiority? And if not, then does not China, though
wielding relatively inferior military and economic
power, become the superior?
There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in
military and economic power, provided she perseveres in
the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for
our enemy, weakened as he will be by the long war and
by internal and external contradictions, his military
and economic power is bound to change in the reverse
direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason
why China cannot become the superior? And that is not
all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and
economic power of other countries as being openly and
to any great extent on our side, is there any reason
why we will not be able to do so in the future? If
Japan's enemy is not just China, if in future one or
more other countries make open use of their
considerable military and economic power defensively or
offensively against Japan and openly help us, then will
not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small
country, her war is reactionary and barbarous, and she
will become more and more isolated internationally;
China is a large country, her war is progressive and
just, and she will enjoy more and more support
internationally. Is there any reason why the long-term
development of these factors should not definitely
change the relative position between the enemy and
ourselves?
49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not
realize that war is a contest of strength, and that
before a certain change has taken place in the relative
strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for
trying to fight strategically decisive battles and
shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be
put into practice, we should inevitably run our heads
into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for
their own pleasure without really intending to put
their ideas into practice. In the end Mr. Reality will
come and pour a bucket of cold water over these
chatterers, showing them up as mere windbags who want
to get things on the cheap, to have gains without
pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before and
we have it now, though not very much so far; but there
may be more as the war develops into the stage of
stalemate and then of counter-offensive. But in the
meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are
fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long,
the theories of national subjugation and of compromise
will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be
directed mainly against them and only secondarily
against the idle chatter about quick victory.
50. That the war will be protracted is certain, but
nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it
will last, as this depends entirely upon the degree of
the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish
to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard
to increase our own strength and reduce that of the
enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive to win
more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop
guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to
a minimum, consolidate and expand the united front to
rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new
armies and develop new war industries, promote
political, economic and cultural progress, mobilize the
workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals and other
sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces
and win over their soldiers, carry on international
propaganda to secure foreign support, and win the
support of the Japanese people and other oppressed
peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the
duration of the war. There is no magic short-cut.
A War of Jig Saw
Pattern
51. We can say with certainty that the protracted
War of Resistance Against Japan will write a splendid
page unique in the war history of mankind. One of the
special features of this war is the interlocking
"jig-saw" pattern which arises from such contradictory
factors as the barbarity of Japan and her shortage of
troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of
China and the extensiveness of her territory on the
other. There have been other wars of jig-saw pattern in
history, the three years' civil war in Russia after the
October Revolution being a case in point. But what
distinguishes this war in China is its especially
protracted and extensive character, which will set a
record in history. Its jig-saw pattern manifests itself
as follows.
52. Interior and exterior lines. The
anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on
interior lines; but as far as the relation between the
main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the
former are on the interior lines while the latter are
on the exterior lines, presenting a remarkable
spectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be
said of the relationship between the various guerrilla
areas. From its own viewpoint each guerrilla area is on
interior lines and the other areas are on exterior
lines; together they form many battle fronts, which
hold the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the
war, the regular army operating strategically on
interior lines is withdrawing but the guerrilla units
operating strategically on exterior lines will advance
with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the
enemy-- they will advance even more fiercely in the
second stage--thereby presenting a remarkable picture
of both withdrawal and advance.
53. Possession and non-possession of a rear
area. The main forces, which extend the front
lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied
areas, are operating from the rear area of the country
as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the
battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from
the rear area of the country as a whole. But each
guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, upon which
it relies to establish its fluid battle lines. The case
is different with the guerrilla detachments which are
dispatched by a guerrilla area for short-term
operations in the rear of the enemy in the same area;
such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a
battle line. "Operating without a rear area" is a
special feature of revolutionary war in the new era,
wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an
advanced political party and army are to be found;
there is nothing to fear but much to gain from it, and
far from having doubts about it we should promote
it.
54. Encirclement and counter-encirclement.
Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we
are strategically encircled by the enemy because he is
on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior
lines while we are on the strategic defensive and
operating on interior lines. This is the first form of
enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or
more of the enemy columns advancing on us along
separate routes, because we apply the policy of
fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior
lines by using numerically preponderant forces against
these enemy columns advancing on us from strategically
exterior lines. This is the first form of our
counter-encirclement of the enemy.
Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the
enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by
the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai Mountains, or on
three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is
the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one
considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in
their relation to the positions of the regular forces,
one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy
forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have
surrounded the Tatung-puchow Railway on three sides
(the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the
city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many
similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This
is the second form of our counter-encirclement of the
enemy.
Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the
enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our
own--rather like a game of weichi.
[16]Campaigns
and battles fought by the two sides resemble the
capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment
of enemy strongholds (such as Talyuan) and our
guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains)
resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. If the
game of weichi is extended to include the
world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as
between us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation
between the front of aggression and the front of peace.
The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France and
Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we
counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our
front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of
Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements
lying athwart the Universe, and the modern Sun Wu-kungs
[17]--the
fascist aggressors--will finally be buried underneath
it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the
international plane we can create an anti-Japanese
front in the Pacific region, with China as one
strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other
countries which may join it as other strategic units,
and with the Japanese people's movement as still
another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net
from which the fascist Sun Wu-kungs can find no escape,
then that will be our enemy's day of doom. Indeed, the
day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly
be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese
imperialism. We are not jesting; this is the inevitable
trend of the war.
55. Big areas and little areas. There is a
possibility that the enemy will occupy the greater part
of Chinese territory south of the Great Wall, and only
the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one
aspect of the situation. But within this greater part,
which does not include the three northeastern
provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big
cities, the main lines of communication and some of the
plains--which may rank first in importance, but will
probably constitute only the smaller part of the
occupied territory in size and population, while the
greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas
that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of
the situation.
If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great
Wall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and
Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the
greater part of China's territory, and the
enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even
with the three northeastern provinces. That is yet
another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact
is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great
efforts to developing it, not only politically,
militarily and economically but, what is also
important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our
former cultural centres into culturally backward areas,
and we on our part must transform the former culturally
backward areas into cultural centres. At the same time,
the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind
the enemy lines is also extremely important, and we
should attend to every aspect of this work, including
the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China's
territory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed
into regions of progress and light, while the small
pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas and especially
the big cities, will temporarily become regions of
backwardness and darkness.
56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and
far-flung War of Resistance Against Japan is a war of a
jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically
and culturally. It is a marvellous spectacle in the
annals of war, a heroic undertaking by the Chinese
nation, a magnificent and earth-shaking feat. This war
will not only affect China and Japan, strongly
impelling both to advance, but will also affect the
whole world, impelling all nations, especially the
oppressed nations such as India, to march forward.
Every Chinese should consciously throw himself into
this war of a jig-saw pattern, for this is the form of
war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself,
the special form of war of liberation waged by a big
semi-colonial country in the Nineteen Thirties and the
Nineteen Forties.
Fighting for Perpetual
Peace
57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese
war is inseparably connected with the fight for
perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never has
there been a historical period such as the present in
which war is so close to perpetual peace. For several
thousand years since the emergence of classes, the life
of mankind has been full of wars; each nation has
fought countless wars, either internally or with other
nations. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist
society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive
scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great
imperialist war of twenty years ago was the first of
its kind in history, but not the last. Only the war
which has now begun comes close to being the final war,
that is, comes close to the perpetual peace of mankind.
By now one-third of the world's population has entered
the war. Look ! Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then
Spain, then China. The population of the countries at
war now amounts to almost 600 million, or nearly a
third of the total population of the world.
The characteristics of the present war are its
uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetual peace.
Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia,
Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan
attacked China. What will come next? Undoubtedly Hitler
will fight the great powers. "Fascism is war"
[18]--this is
perfectly true. There will be no interruption in the
development of the present war into a world war;
mankind will not be able to avoid the calamity of war.
Why then do we say the present war is near to perpetual
peace? The present war is the result of the development
of the general crisis of world capitalism which began
with World War I; this general crisis is driving the
capitalist countries into a new war and, above all,
driving the fascist countries into new war adventures.
This war, we can foresee, will not save capitalism, but
will hasten its collapse. It will be greater in scale
and more ruthless than the war of twenty years ago, all
nations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on
for a very long time, and mankind will suffer
greatly.
But, owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and
the growing political consciousness of the people of
the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly
emerge from this war to oppose all
counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the
character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if
later there should be another period of war, perpetual
world peace will not be far off. Once man has
eliminated capitalism, he will attain the era of
perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for
war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military
aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed.
Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again
know war. The revolutionary wars which have already
begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war
between China and Japan, two countries which have a
combined population of over 500 million, will take an
important place in this war for perpetual peace, and
out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese
nation. The liberated new China of the future will be
inseparable from the liberated new world of the future.
Hence our War of Resistance Against Japan takes on the
character of a struggle for perpetual peace.
58. History shows that wars are divided into two
kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive
are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust.
We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede
progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars.
Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars, we
actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World
War I is an instance in which both sides fought for
imperialist interests; therefore the Communists of the
whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose
a war of this kind is to do everything possible to
prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks
out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with
just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust
war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the
world, including the Japanese people, should oppose it
and are opposing it.
In our country the people and the government, the
Communist Party and the Kuomintang, have all raised the
banner of righteousness in the national revolutionary
war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just, it
is progressive and its aim is peace. The aim is peace
not just in one country but throughout the world, not
just temporary but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim
we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for
any sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop
short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and
however long the time needed to attain it, a new world
of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly
before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon
the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and
brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and
imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put
an end to it in the not too distant future.
The great majority of mankind should exert their
utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people
of China constitute one quarter of the world's
population, and if by their concerted efforts they
overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China
of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be
making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for
perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for the
whole world is approaching this point in the course of
its social and economic development, and provided that
the majority of mankind work together, our goal will
surely be attained in several decades.
Man's Dynamic Role in
War
59.We have so far explained why the war is a
protracted war and why the final victory will be
China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war
is and what it is not. Now we shall turn to the
question of what to do and what not to do. How to
conduct protracted war and how to win the final
victory? These are the questions answered below. We
shall therefore successively discuss the following
problems: man's dynamic role in war, war and politics,
political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the
object of war, offence within defence, quick decisions
within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior
lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile
warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of
annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of
exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of
decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, and the
army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let
us start with the problem of man's dynamic role.
60. When we say we are opposed to a subjective
approach to problems, we mean that we must oppose ideas
which are not based upon or do not correspond to
objective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and
fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on. But
whatever is done has to be done by human beings;
protracted war and final victory will not come about
without human action. For such action to be effective
there must be people who derive ideas, principles or
views from the objective facts, and put forward plans,
directives, policies, strategies and tactics. Ideas,
etc. are subjective, while deeds or actions are the
subjective translated into the objective, but both
represent the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We
term this kind of dynamic role "man's conscious dynamic
role", and it is a characteristic that distinguishes
man from all other beings. All ideas based upon and
corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and
all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are
correct actions. We must give full scope to these ideas
and actions, to this dynamic role. The anti-Japanese
war is being waged to drive out imperialism and
transform the old China into a new China; this can be
achieved only when the whole Chinese people are
mobilized and full scope is given to their conscious
dynamic role in resisting Japan. If we just sit by and
take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there
will be neither protracted war nor final victory.
61. It is a human characteristic to exercise a
conscious dynamic role. Man strongly displays this
characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat in war
is decided by the military, political, economic and
geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of
the war each side is waging and the international
support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these
alone; in themselves, all these provide only the
possibility of victory or defeat but do not decide the
issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be
added, namely, the directing and waging of war, man's
conscious dynamic role in war.
62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war
cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the
objective conditions; within these limitations,
however, they can and must play a dynamic role in
striving for victory. The stage of action for
commanders in a war must be built upon objective
possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the
performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour,
power and grandeur. Given the objective material
foundations, the commanders in the anti-Japanese war
should display their prowess and marshal all their
forces to crush the national enemy, transform the
present situation in which our country and society are
suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a
new China of freedom and equality; here is where our
subjective faculties for directing war can and must be
exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the
war to detach himself from the objective conditions and
become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want
every commander to become a general who is both bold
and sagacious. Our commanders should have not only the
boldness to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability to
remain masters of the situation throughout the changes
and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the
ocean of war, they must not flounder but make sure of
reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes.
Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing war,
constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.
War and
Politics
63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this
sense war is politics and war itself is a political
action; since ancient times there has never been a war
that did not have a political character. The
anti-Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the
whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the
political aim of the war--to drive out Japanese
imperialism and build a new China of freedom and
equality--inseparable from the general policy of
persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united
front, from the mobilization of the entire people, and
from the political principles of the unity between
officers and men, the unity between army and people and
the disintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable
from the effective application of united front policy,
from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the
efforts to win international support and the support of
the people inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a
single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency
among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle
politics by isolating war from it and advocating the
idea of war as an absolute is wrong and should be
corrected.
64. But war has its own particular characteristics
and in this sense it cannot be equated with politics in
general. "War is the continuation of politics by other
. . . means." [19] When politics develops to a certain
stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual
means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the
way. For instance, the semi-independent status of China
is an obstacle to the political growth of Japanese
imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of
aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about
China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle
to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many
wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to
sweep it away. Japan is now using war for the purpose
of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance
of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is
compelled to wage the War of Resistance in her
determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the
obstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained
and the war concluded. But if the obstacle is not
completely swept away, the war will have to continue
till the aim is fully accomplished. Thus anyone who
seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese
war is fulfilled is bound to fail, because even if a
compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the
war would break out again, since the broad masses of
the people would certainly not submit but would
continue the war until its political objective was
achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war
without bloodshed while war is politics with
bloodshed.
65. From the particular characteristics of war there
arise a particular set of organizations, a particular
series of methods and a particular kind of process. The
organizations are the armed forces and everything that
goes with them. The methods are the strategy and
tactics for directing war. The process is the
particular form of social activity in which the
opposing armed forces attack each other or defend
themselves against one another, employing strategy and
tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to
the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of
experience. All who take part in war must rid
themselves of their customary ways and accustom
themselves to war before they can win victory.
Political Mobilisation
for the War of Resistance
66. A national revolutionary war as great as ours
cannot be won without extensive and thoroughgoing
political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war
there was no political mobilization for resistance to
Japan, and this was a great drawback, as a result of
which China has already lost a move to the enemy. After
the war began, political mobilization was very far from
extensive, let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's
gunfire and the bombs dropped by enemy airplanes that
brought news of the war to the great majority of the
people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it
was done for us by the enemy, we did not do it
ourselves. Even now the people in the remoter regions
beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as
usual. This situation must change, or otherwise we
cannot win in our life-and-death struggle.
We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the
contrary, we must make full use of this move, political
mobilization, to get the better of him. This move is
crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our
inferiority in weapons and other things is only
secondary. The mobilization of the common people
throughout the country will create a vast sea in which
to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will
make up for our inferiority m arms and other things,
and create the prerequisites for overcoming every
difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must
persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front
and in the protracted war. But all these are
inseparable from the mobilization of the common people.
To wish for victory and yet neglect political
mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving
the chariot north", and the result would inevitably be
to forfeit victory.
67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it
means telling the army and the people about the
political aim of the war. It is necessary for every
soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought
and how it concerns him. The political aim of the war
is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new
China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this
aim to everybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before
we can create an anti-Japanese upsurge and unite
hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their all
to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to
explain the aim to them; the steps and policies for its
attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a
political programme. We already have the Ten-Point
Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and
also the Programme of Armed Resistance and National
Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in
the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to
carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political
programme it is impossible to mobilize all the armed
forces and the whole people to carry the war against
Japan through to the end. Thirdly, how should we
mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and
bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through
plays and films, through schools, through the mass
organizations and through our cadres. What has been
done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in
the ocean, and moreover it has been done in a manner
ill-suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit
uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed.
Fourthly, to mobilize once is not enough; political
mobilization for the War of Resistance must be
continuous. Our job is not to recite our political
programme to the people, for nobody will listen to such
recitations; we must link the political mobilization
for the war with developments in the war and with the
life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a
continuous movement. This is a matter of immense
importance on which our victory in the war primarily
depends.
The Object of
War
68. Here we are not dealing with the political aim
of war; the political aim of the War of Resistance
Against Japan has been defined above as "to drive out
Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom
and equality". Here we are dealing with the elementary
object of war, war as "politics with bloodshed", as
mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war
is specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the
enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or
"deprive him of the power to resist", and does not mean
to destroy every member of his forces physically). In
ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used,
the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the
shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present
day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear
and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun, the
long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the
spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet,
the concrete fortification and the gas mask are
developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon
combining the functions of both spear and shield.
Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but
defence cannot be dispensed with.
In attack the immediate object is to destroy the
enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation,
because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be
destroyed. In defence the immediate object is to
preserve yourself, but at the same time defence is a
means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over
to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defence
and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a
continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that
destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war
and self-preservation the secondary, because only by
destroying the enemy in large numbers can one
effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the
chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while
defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy
and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In
actual warfare the chief role is played by defence much
of the time and by attack for the rest of the time, but
if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.
69. How do we justify the encouragement of heroic
sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict
"self-preservation"? No, it does not; sacrifice and
self-preservation are both opposite and complementary
to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and
exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price.
Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is
incurred for the sake of general and permanent
preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack,
which is basically a means of destroying the enemy,
also has the function of self-preservation. It is also
the reason why defence must be accompanied by attack
and should not be defence pure and simple.
70. The object of war, namely, the preservation of
oneself and the destruction of the enemy, is the
essence of war and the basis of all war activities, an
essence which pervades all war activities, from the
technical to the strategic. The object of war is the
underlying principle of war, and no technical,
tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in
any way depart from it. What for instance is meant by
the principle of "taking cover and making full use of
fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is
self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the
enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as
making use of the terrain and its features, advancing
in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation.
The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as
clearing the field of fire and organizing a fire-net.
As for the assault force, the containing force and the
reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for
annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving
oneself, and the third is for either purpose according
to circumstances--either for annihilating the enemy (in
which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as
a pursuit force), or for self-preservation (in which
case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a
covering force). Thus, no technical, tactical, or
strategical principles or operations can in any way
depart from the object of war, and this object pervades
the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning
to end.
71. In directing the anti-Japanese war, leaders at
the various levels must lose sight neither of the
contrast between the fundamental factors on each side
nor of the object of this war. In the course of
military operations these contrasting fundamental
factors unfold themselves in the struggle by each side
to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we
strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or
small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and destroy a
part of his men and materiel. We must
accumulate the results of these partial destructions of
the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve
the final political aim of expelling the enemy,
protecting the motherland and building a new China.
Offence within Defence,
Quick Decisions within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines
within Interior Lines
72. Now let us examine the specific strategy of the
War of Resistance Against Japan. We have already said
that our strategy for resisting Japan is that of
protracted war, and indeed this is perfectly right. But
this strategy is general, not specific. Specifically,
how should the protracted war be conducted? We shall
now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows. In
the first and second stages of the war, i.e.,
in the stages of the enemy's offensive and preservation
of his gains, we should conduct tactical offensives
within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles
of quick decision within the strategically protracted
war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within
strategically interior lines. In the third stage, we
should launch the strategic counter-offensive.
73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we
are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, she
has adopted the policy of the strategic offensive while
we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to
execute the strategy of a war of quick decision; we
should consciously execute the strategy of protracted
war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly
high combat effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and
part of her navy to encircle and blockade China from
both land and sea, and is using her air force to bomb
China. Her army has already established a long front
stretching from Paotow to Hangchow and her navy has
reached Fukien and Kwangtung; thus exterior-line
operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the
other hand, we are in the position of operating on
interior lines. All this is due to the fact that the
enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect
of the situation.
74. But there is another and exactly opposite
aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough
soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a
large population and plenty of soldiers. Two important
consequences follow. First, the enemy, employing his
small forces against a vast country, can only occupy
some big cities and main lines of communication and
part of the plains. Thus there are extensive areas in
the territory under his occupation which he has had to
leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for
our guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if
the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Canton,
Wuhan and Lanchow and its adjacent areas, he can hardly
seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a
general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the
protracted war to final victory. Secondly, in pitting
his small forces against large forces, the enemy is
encircled by our large forces.
The enemy is attacking us along several routes,
strategically he is on exterior lines while we are on
interior lines, strategically he is on the offensive
while we are on the defensive; all this looks very much
to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our
two advantages, namely, our vast territory and large
forces, and, instead of stubborn positional warfare,
carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several
divisions against one enemy division, several tens of
thousands of our men against ten thousand of his,
several columns against one of his columns, and
suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from
the exterior lines of the battlefield. In this way,
while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the
offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to
fight on interior lines and on the defensive in
campaigns and battles.
And for us, interior lines and the defensive in
strategic operations will be transformed into exterior
lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This
is the way to deal with one or indeed with any
advancing enemy column. Both the consequences discussed
above follow from the fact that the enemy is small
while we are big. Moreover, the enemy forces, though
small, are strong (in arms and in training) while our
forces, though large, are weak (in arms and in training
but not in morale), and in campaigns and battles,
therefore, we should not only employ large forces
against small and operate from exterior against
interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking
quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision,
we should attack a moving and not a stationary enemy.
We should concentrate a big force under cover
beforehand alongside the route which the enemy is sure
to take, and while he is on the move, advance suddenly
to encircle and attack him before he knows what is
happening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we
fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy force or
the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do
not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy
casualties. This applies to any and every one of our
battles. If each month we could win one sizable victory
like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to
speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy,
stimulate the morale of our own forces and evoke
international support. Thus our strategically
protracted war is translated in the field into battles
of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick
decision is bound to change into protracted war after
he is defeated in many campaigns and battles.
75. In a word, the above operational principle for
fighting campaigns and battles is one of
"quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines".
It is the opposite of our strategic principle of
"protracted defensive warfare on interior lines", and
yet it is the indispensable principle for carrying out
this strategy. If we should use "protracted defensive
warfare on interior lines" as the principle for
campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning
of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited
to the circumstances in which the enemy is small while
we are big and the enemy is strong while we are weak;
in that case we could never achieve our strategic
objective of a protracted war and we would be defeated
by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the
organization of the forces of the entire country into a
number of large field armies, each counterposed to one
of the enemy's field armies but having two, three or
four times its strength, and so keeping the enemy
engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with
the principle outlined above. This principle of
"quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines"
can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in
regular warfare. It is applicable not only to any one
stage of the war but to its entire course. In the stage
of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better
equipped technically and are no longer in the position
of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be able to
capture prisoners and booty on a large scale all the
more effectively if we continue to employ superior
numbers in quick-decision offensive battles from
exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, three
or four mechanized divisions against one mechanized
enemy division, we can be all the more certain of
destroying it. It is common sense that several hefty
fellows can easily beat one.
76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive
warfare on exterior lines" on a battlefield, we shall
not only change the balance of forces on that
battlefield, but also gradually change the general
situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the
offensive and the enemy on the defensive, we shall be
employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the
enemy inferior numbers on interior lines, and we shall
seek quick decisions, while the enemy, try as he may,
will not be able to protract the fighting in the
expectation of reinforcements; for all these reasons,
the enemy's position will change from strong to weak,
from superior to inferior, while that of our forces
will change from weak to strong, from inferior to
superior. After many such battles have been
victoriously fought, the general situation between us
and the enemy will change. That is to say, through the
accumulation of victories on many battlefields by
quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, we
shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the
enemy, which will necessarily affect the general
balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When
that happens, these changes, together with other
factors on our side and together with the changes
inside the enemy camp and a favourable international
situation, will turn the over-all situation between us
and the enemy first into one of parity and then into
one of superiority for us. That will be the time for us
to launch the counter-offensive and drive the enemy out
of the country.
77. War is a contest of strength, but the original
pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here
the decisive factor is subjective effort--winning more
victories and committing fewer errors. The objective
factors provide the possibility for such change, but in
order to turn this possibility into actuality both
correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It
is then that the subjective plays the decisive
role.
Initiative, Flexibility
and Planning
78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and
battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the
crucial point is the "offensive"; "exterior lines"
refers to the sphere of the offensive and
"quick-decision" to its duration. Hence the name
"quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines".
It is the best principle for waging a protracted war
and it is also the principle for what is known as
mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect
without initiative, flexibility and planning. Let us
now study these three questions.
79. We have already discussed man's conscious
dynamic role, so why do we talk about the initiative
again? By conscious dynamic role we mean conscious
action and effort, a characteristic distinguishing man
from other beings, and this human characteristic
manifests itself most strongly in war; all this has
been discussed already. The initiative here means an
army's freedom of action as distinguished from an
enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very
life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close
to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is
the result of his losing freedom of action through
being forced into a passive position. The same is true
of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in
war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid
passivity. It may be said that the quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate
and the flexibility and planning necessary for its
execution are designed to gain the initiative and thus
force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the
object of preserving ourselves and destroying the
enemy. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from
superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war.
Consequently it is also inseparable from the
correctness or incorrectness of the subjective
direction of war. In addition, there is the question of
exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and
unpreparedness in order to gain the initiative and
force the enemy into passivity. These points are
analysed below.
80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in
capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable
from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such
superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of
initiative or passivity. It is natural that the
strategic initiative can be better maintained and
exercised through a strategic offensive, but to
maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is,
to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when
there is absolute superiority matched against absolute
inferiority. When a strong, healthy man wrestles with
an invalid, he has the absolute initiative. If Japan
were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for
instance, she could throw in a huge force of several
million or ten million men all at once, if her
financial resources were several times what they are,
if she had no opposition from her own people or from
other countries, and if she did not pursue the
barbarous policies which arouse the desperate
resistance of the Chinese people, then she would be
able to maintain absolute superiority and have the
absolute initiative always and everywhere.
In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears
in the early stages of a war or a campaign but is to be
found towards its end. For instance, on the eve of
Germany's capitulation in World War I, the Entente
countries became absolutely superior and Germany
absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated and
the Entente countries were victorious; this is an
example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards
the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinese
victory at Taierhchuang, the isolated Japanese forces
there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute
inferiority while our forces achieved absolute
superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were
victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority
and inferiority towards the end of a campaign. A war or
campaign may also end in a situation of relative
superiority or of parity, in which case there is
compromise in the war or stalemate in the campaign. But
in most cases it is absolute superiority and
inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this
holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for
the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war, it
can be predicted, will be that Japan will become
absolutely inferior and be defeated and that China will
become absolutely superior and gain victory.
But at present superiority or inferiority is not
absolute on either side, but is relative. With the
advantages of her military, economic and
political-organizational power, Japan enjoys
superiority over us with our military, economic and
political-organizational weakness, which creates the
basis for her initiative. But since quantitatively her
military and other power is not great and she has many
other disadvantages, her superiority is reduced by her
own contradictions. Upon her invasion of China, her
superiority has been reduced still further because she
has come up against our vast territory, large
population, great numbers of troops and resolute
nation-wide resistance.
Hence, Japan's general position has become one of
only relative superiority, and her ability to exercise
and maintain the initiative, which is thereby
restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China,
though placed in a somewhat passive position
strategically because of her inferior strength, she is
nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory,
population and troops, and also superior in the morale
of her people and army and their patriotic hatred of
the enemy; this superiority, together with other
advantages, reduces the extent of her inferiority in
military, economic and other power, and changes it into
a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the
degree of China's passivity so that her strategic
position is one of only relative passivity. Any
passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must
strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do
so is resolutely to wage quick-decision offensive
warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare
in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming
local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of
mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local
superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we
can gradually create strategic superiority and
strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from
strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the
interrelation between initiative and passivity, between
superiority and inferiority.
81. From this we can also understand the
relationship between initiative or passivity and the
subjective directing of war. As already explained, it
is possible to escape from our position of relative
strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is
to create local superiority and initiative in many
campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority
and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and
passivity. These local successes will add up to
strategic superiority and initiative for us and
strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. Such
a change depends upon correct subjective direction.
Why? Because while we seek superiority and the
initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle,
war is a contest in subjective ability between the
commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for
superiority and for the initiative on the basis of
material conditions such as military forces and
financial resources. Out of the contest there emerge a
victor and a vanquished; leaving aside the contrast in
objective material conditions, the victor will
necessarily owe his success to correct subjective
direction and the vanquished his defeat to wrong
subjective direction.
We admit that the phenomenon of war is more elusive
and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any
other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is
more a matter of "probability". Yet war is in no way
supernatural, but a mundane process governed by
necessity. That is why Sun Wu Tzu's axiom, "Know the
enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred
battles with no danger of defeat", [20] remains a scientific truth.
Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about
ourselves, and moreover the peculiar nature of war
makes it impossible in many cases to have full
knowledge about both sides; hence the uncertainty about
military conditions and operations, and hence mistakes
and defeats. But whatever the situation and the moves
in a war, one can know their general aspects and
essential points. It is possible for a commander to
reduce errors and give generally correct direction,
first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then
through intelligent inference and judgement. Armed with
the weapon of "generally correct direction", we can win
more battles and transform our inferiority into
superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is
how initiative or passivity is related to the correct
or incorrect subjective direction of a war.
82. The thesis that incorrect subjective direction
can change superiority and initiative into inferiority
and passivity, and that correct subjective direction
can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more
convincing when we look at the record of defeats
suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories
won by small and weak armies. There are many such
instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in
China are the Battle of Chengpu between the states of
Tsin and Chu, [21] the Battle of Chengkao between the
states of Chu and Han, [22] the Battle in which Han Hsin
defeated the Chao armies, [23] the Battle of Kunyang between the
states of Hsin and Han, [24] the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan
Shao and Tsao Tsao, [25] the Battle of Chihpi between the
states of Wu and Wei, [26] the Battle of Yiling between the
states of Wu and Shu, [27] the Battle of Feishui between the
states of Chin and Tsin, [28] etc. Among examples to be found
abroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns and the civil
war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution.
In all these instances, victory was won by small forces
over big and by inferior over superior forces.
In every case, the weaker force, pitting local
superiority and initiative against the enemy's local
inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp
defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of his
forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming
the over-all situation into one of superiority and
initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy who
originally had superiority and held the initiative;
owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions,
it sometimes happened that he completely lost an
excellent or fairly good position in which he enjoyed
superiority and initiative, and became a general
without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it
can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in
the capacity to wage war is the objective basis
determining initiative or passivity, it is not in
itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only
through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actual
initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle,
correct subjective direction can transform inferiority
into superiority and passivity into initiative, and
incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The
fact that every ruling dynasty was defeated by
revolutionary armies shows that mere superiority in
certain respects does not guarantee the initiative,
much less the final victory. The inferior side can
wrest the initiative and victory from the superior side
by securing certain conditions through active
subjective endeavour in accordance with the actual
circumstances.
83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares
may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence,
deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and
then springing surprise attacks upon him are two
ways--indeed two important means--of achieving
superiority and seizing the initiative. What are
misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount
Pakung as an enemy soldier" [29] is an example of misconception. And
"making a feint to the east but attacking in the west"
is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy.
When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the
leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses
to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong
judgements and actions so that he loses his superiority
and the initiative. The saying, "There can never be too
much deception in war", means precisely this. What does
"being caught unawares" mean? It means being
unprepared. Without preparedness superiority is not
real superiority and there can be no initiative either.
Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior
but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by
surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to
attack precisely because he is then off guard, that is,
unprepared. These two points--creating misconceptions
among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him--
mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy
while securing the greatest possible certainty for
ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the
initiative and victory.
Excellent organization of the masses is the
prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is
extremely important to arouse all the people who are
opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last
man, make widespread raids on the enemy and also
prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for
our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in
the dark about where and when our forces will attack,
and an objective basis will be created for
misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was
largely owing to the organized, armed masses of the
people that the weak and small force of the Chinese Red
Army was able to win many battles in the period of the
Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war
should win broader mass support than an agrarian
revolutionary war; however, as a result of past
mistakes [30]
the people are in an unorganized state, cannot be
promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes
even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of
the people on a broad scale is the only way to secure
inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of
the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part
in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by
misleading him and catching him unawares. We are not
Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinine
ethics.[31]
In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible
make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and
ears and drive his commanders to distraction by
creating confusion in their minds. The above concerns
the way in which the initiative or passivity is related
to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective
direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.
84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in
the stage of her offensive by reason of her military
power and her exploitation of our subjective errors,
past and present. But her initiative is beginning to
wane to some extent because of her many inherent
disadvantages and of the subjective errors she too has
committed in the course of the war (of which more
later) and also because of our many advantages. The
enemy's defeat at Taierhchuang and his predicament in
Shansi prove this clearly. The widespread development
of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed his
garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive
position. Although he is still on the offensive
strategically and still holds the initiative, his
initiative will end when his strategic offensive ends.
The first reason why the enemy will not be able to
maintain the initiative is that his shortage of troops
renders it impossible for him to carry on the offensive
indefinitely. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and
our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together
with other factors, constitute the second reason why he
will have to cease his offensive at a certain limit and
will not be able to keep his initiative. The existence
of the Soviet Union and changes in the international
situation constitute the third reason. Thus it can be
seen that the enemy's initiative is limited and can be
shattered. If, in military operations, China can keep
up offensive warfare by her main forces in campaigns
and battles, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare in
the enemy's rear and mobilize the people on a broad
scale politically, we can gradually build up a position
of strategic initiative.
85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is
flexibility? It is the concrete realization of the
initiative in military operations; it is the flexible
employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of
armed forces is the central task in directing a war, a
task most difficult to perform well. In addition to
organizing and educating the army and the people, the
business of war consists in the employment of troops in
combat, and all these things are done to win the fight.
Of course it is difficult to organize an army, etc.,
but it is even more difficult to employ it,
particularly when the weak are fighting the strong. To
do so requires subjective ability of a very high order
and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity
and uncertainty peculiar to war and the discovery of
order, clarity and certainty in it; only thus can
flexibility in command be realized.
86. The basic principle of field operations for the
War of Resistance Against Japan is quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various
tactics or methods for giving effect to this principle,
such as dispersion and concentration of forces,
diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive
and the defensive, assault and containment,
encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It
is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all
easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three
crucial links are the time, the place and the
troops.
No victory can be won unless the time, the place and
the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking
an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we
expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to
prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemy may have
encamped and concentrated his forces, presenting us
with a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the
time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank
which actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point,
victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank
and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the
question of the place. If a particular unit of our
forces is employed for a particular task, victory may
be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same
task, it may be hard to achieve results.
This is the question of the troops. We should know
not only how to employ tactics but how to vary them.
For flexibility of command the important task is to
make changes such as from the offensive to the
defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from
advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from
containment to assault or from assault to containment,
from encirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to
encirclement, and to make such changes properly and in
good time according to the circumstances of the troops
and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in
campaigns and strategic command as well as of command
in battles.
87. The ancients said: "Ingenuity in varying tactics
depends on mother wit"; this "ingenuity", which is what
we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the
intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean
recklessness; recklessness must be rejected.
Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander's
ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the
basis of objective conditions after "judging the hour
and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" includes
the enemy's situation, our situation and the terrain),
and this flexibility is "ingenuity in varying tactics".
On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more
victories in quick-decision offensive warfare on
exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our
favour, gain the initiative over the enemy, and
overwhelm and crush him so that the final victory will
be ours.
88. Let us now discuss the question of planning.
Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much
more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than
is the case with other activities. Yet, since
"preparedness ensures success and unpreparedness spells
failure", there can be no victory in war without
advance planning and preparations. There is no absolute
certainty in war, and yet it is not without some degree
of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain
about our own situation. We are very uncertain about
the enemy's, but here too there are signs for us to
read, clues to follow and sequences of phenomena to
ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative
certainty, which provides an objective basis for
planning in war. Modern technical developments
(telegraphy, radio, airplanes, motor vehicles,
railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the
possibilities of planning in war.
However, complete or stable planning is difficult
because there is only very limited and transient
certainty in war; such planning must change with the
movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in degree
according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such
as plans for attack or defence by small formations or
units, often have to be changed several times a day. A
plan of campaign, that is, of action by large
formations, can generally stand till the conclusion of
the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is
often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A
strategic plan based on the over-all situation of both
belligerents is still more stable, but it too is
applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to
be changed when the war moves towards a new stage. The
making and changing of tactical, campaign and strategic
plans in accordance with scope and circumstance is a
key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete
expression of flexibility in war, in other words, it is
also ingenuity in varying one's tactics. Commanders at
all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take
note.
89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people
categorically deny that war plans or policies can be
relatively stable, describing such plans or policies as
"mechanical". This view is wrong. In the preceding
section we fully recognized that, because the
circumstances of war are only relatively certain and
the flow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war
plans or policies can be only relatively stable and
have to be changed or revised in good time in
accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of
the war; otherwise we would become mechanists. But one
must not deny the need for war plans or policies that
are relatively stable over given periods; to negate
this is to negate everything, including the war itself
as well as the negator himself. As both military
conditions and operations are relatively stable, we
must grant the relative stability of the war plans and
policies resulting from them. For example, since both
the circumstances of the war in northern China and the
dispersed nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations
are relatively stable for a particular stage, it is
absolutely necessary during this stage to acknowledge
the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's
strategic principle of operation, namely "Guerrilla
warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare
under favourable conditions." The period of validity of
a plan for a campaign is shorter than that of a
strategic plan, and for a tactical plan it is shorter
still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone
denying this point would have no way of handling
warfare and would become a relativist in war with no
settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or
just as right as another. No one denies that even a
plan valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one
plan would never be abandoned in favour of another. But
it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of
the various war operations undertaken for carrying it
out, but not fluid as to its essence; in other words it
is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within
such a given period of time, this essence is definitely
not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability
within a given period. In the great river of absolute
fluidity throughout the war there is relative stability
at each particular stretch--such is our fundamental
view regarding war plans or policies.
90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare
on interior lines in strategy and with quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and
battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility and
planning, we can now sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese
war must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete
application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible
so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the
war. We should always seek to transform our inferiority
into superiority and our passivity into the initiative
so as to change the situation as between the enemy and
ourselves. All these find expression in quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and
battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior
lines in strategy.
Mobile Warfare,
Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare
91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when
its content is quick-decision offensive warfare on
exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the
framework of the strategy of interior lines, protracted
war and defence. Mobile warfare is the form in which
regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns
and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts
and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it
includes "mobile defence", which is conducted when
necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also
includes positional attack and positional defence in a
supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular
armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles,
the offensive, and fluidity.
92. China has a vast territory and an immense number
of soldiers, but her troops are inadequately equipped
and trained; the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are
inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained.
In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt
offensive mobile warfare as our primary form of
warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating
them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only
retreat, never advance", which is flightism, and at the
same time oppose "only advance, never retreat" which is
desperate recklessness.
93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is
fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field
army to advance and to withdraw in great strides.
However, it has nothing in common with flightism of the
Han Fu-chu brand.[32] The primary requirement of war is
to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is
self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is
to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in
turn the most effective means of self-preservation.
Hence mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people
like Han Pu-chu and can never mean moving only
backward, and never forward; that kind of "moving"
which negates the basic offensive character of mobile
warfare would, in practice, "move" China out of
existence despite her vastness.
94. However, the other view, which we call the
desperate recklessness of "only advance, never
retreat", is also wrong. The mobile warfare we
advocate, the content of which is quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and
battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary
role, "mobile defence" and retreat, without all of
which mobile warfare cannot be fully carried out.
Desperate recklessness is military short-sightedness,
originating often from fear of losing territory. A man
who acts with desperate recklessness does not know that
one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which
not only permits but requires a field army to advance
and to withdraw in great strides. On the positive side,
in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to
him but favourable to us, it is usually necessary that
he should be on the move and that we should have a
number of advantages, such as favourable terrain, a
vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent
the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and
unpreparedness.
This requires that the enemy should advance, and we
should not grudge a temporary loss of part of our
territory. For the temporary loss of part of our
territory is the price we pay for the permanent
preservation of all our territory, including the
recovery of lost territory. On the negative side,
whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position
which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our
forces, we should have the courage to retreat, so as to
preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new
opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this
principle, the advocates of desperate action will
contest a city or a piece of ground even when the
position is obviously and definitely unfavourable; as a
result, they not only lose the city or ground but fail
to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the
policy of "luring the enemy in deep", precisely because
it is the most effective military policy for a weak
army strategically on the defensive to employ against a
strong army.
95. Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese
war mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare
second. When we say that in the entire war mobile
warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary,
we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on
regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and
that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main
responsibility in deciding the outcome. It does not
follow, however, that the role of guerrilla warfare is
unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the
strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that
of mobile warfare, for without its support we cannot
defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind
the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into
mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not remain the
same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise
to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus
the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to
support regular warfare and to transform itself into
regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent
and duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of
Resistance, it is all the more important not to
underestimate its strategic role.
Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only
its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems.
I have already discussed this in "Problems of Strategy
in Guerrilla War Against Japan". As indicated above,
the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of
the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first
stage mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and
positional warfare are supplementary. In the second
stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place
and will be supplemented by mobile and positional
warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again
become the primary form and will be supplemented by
positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile
warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken
solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly
quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces
which were originally guerrillas but which will have
progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare.
From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's
War of Resistance Against Japan, guerrilla warfare is
definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war will
present a great drama unparalleled in the annals of
war. For this reason, out of the millions of China's
regular troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at
least several hundred thousand to disperse through all
enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm
themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in co-ordination
with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should
shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they
should not think their status lowered because they
fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not
appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong.
Guerrilla warfare does not bring as quick results or as
great renown as regular warfare, but "a long road tests
a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's
heart", and in the course of this long and cruel war
guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power;
it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover, such
regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when
dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the
Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principle of the
Eighth Route Army is, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but
lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable
conditions." This principle is perfectly correct; the
views of its opponents are wrong.
96. At China's present technical level, positional
warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally
impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests
itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the
vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified
positions. Hence positiona1 warfare cannot be an
important, still less the principal, means for us. But
in the first and second stages of the war, it is
possible and essential, within the scope of mobile
warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a
supplementary role in campaigns. Semi-positional
"mobile defence" is a still more essential part of
mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting
the enemy at every step, thereby depleting his forces
and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase
her supplies of modern weapons so that she can fully
carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage
of the strategic counter-offensive.
In this third stage positional warfare will
undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy
will be holding fast to his positions, and we shall not
be able to recover our lost territory unless we launch
powerful positional attacks in support of mobile
warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too, we must
exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the
primary form of warfare. For the art of directing war
and the active role of man are largely nullified in
positional warfare such as that fought in Western
Europe in the second half of World War I. It is only
natural that the war should be taken "out of the
trenches", since the war is being fought in the vast
expanses of China and since our side will remain poorly
equipped technically for quite a long time. Even during
the third stage, when China's technical position will
be better, she will hardly surpass her enemy in that
respect, and so will have to concentrate on highly
mobile warfare, without which she cannot achieve final
victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance China
will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the
primary or important forms are mobile warfare and
guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will
afford full play to the art of directing war and to the
active role of man-- what a piece of good fortune out
of our misfortune!
War of Attrition and
War of Annihilation
97. As we have said before, the essence, or the
object, of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the
enemy. Since there are three forms of warfare, mobile,
positional and guerrilla, for achieving this object,
and since they differ in degrees of effectiveness,
there arises the broad distinction between war of
attrition and war of annihilation.
98. To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese
war is at once a war of attrition and a war of
annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still
exploiting his strength and retains strategic
superiority and strategic initiative, and therefore,
unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation,
we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength
and break his superiority and initiative. We still have
our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of
strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless
we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we
cannot win time to improve our internal and
international situation and alter our unfavourable
position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means
of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In
this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It
is chiefly by using the method of attrition through
annihilation that China can wage protracted war.
99. But the objective of strategic attrition may
also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally
speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of
annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of
attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both
simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thus
distinguished from one another. In this sense war of
annihilation is different from war of attrition.
Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary
in protracted war.
100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's
needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of
greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in her
defensive stage should not only exploit the function of
annihilation, which is fulfilled primarily by mobile
warfare and partially by guerrilla warfare, but also
exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled
primarily by positional warfare (which itself is
supplementary) and partially by guerrilla warfare. In
the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit
the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled
by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale
depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at
protracting the war, gradually changing the general
balance of forces and preparing the conditions for our
counter-offensive. During the strategic
counter-offensive, we should continue to employ the
method of attrition through annihilation so as finally
to expel the enemy.
101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience
in the last ten months that many or even most of the
mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition,
and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its
proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The
positive aspect is that at least we depleted the
enemy's forces, which is important both for the
protracted warfare and for our final victory, and did
not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are
first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy,
and second, that we were unable to avoid rather heavy
losses and captured little war booty. Although we
should recognize the objective cause of this situation,
namely, the disparity between us and the enemy in
technical equipment and in the training of troops, in
any case it is necessary, both theoretically and
practically, to urge that our main forces should fight
vigorous battles of annihilation whenever circumstances
are favourable. And although our guerrilla units have
to wage battles of pure attrition in performing
specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is
necessary to advocate and vigorously carry out
campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever
circumstances are favourable, so as greatly to deplete
the enemy's forces and greatly replenish our own.
102. The "exterior lines", the "quick-decision" and
the "offensive" in quick-decision offensive warfare on
exterior lines and the "mobility" in mobile warfare
find their main operational expression in the use of
encircling and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity
for concentrating superior forces. Therefore
concentration of forces and the use of encircling and
outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile
warfare, that is, for quick-decision offensive warfare
on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating
the enemy forces.
103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only
in its weapons but also in the training of its officers
and men--its degree of organization, its
self-confidence arising from never having been
defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in
supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contempt for
the Chinese people and other such characteristics, all
of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the
Japanese warlords and from the Japanese national
tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken
very few prisoners, although we have killed and wounded
a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been
underestimated by many people in the past. To destroy
these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The
first thing to do is to give the matter serious
attention, and then patiently and systematically to
work at it in the political field and in the fields of
international propaganda and the Japanese people's
movement; in the military sphere war of annihilation is
of course one of the means. In these enemy
characteristics pessimists may find a basis for the
theory of national subjugation, and passively minded
military men a basis for opposition to war of
annihilation.
We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong
points of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that
their destruction has already begun. The chief method
of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldiers
politically. We should understand, rather than hurt,
their pride and channel it in the proper direction and,
by treating prisoners of war leniently, lead the
Japanese soldiers to see the anti-popular character of
the aggression committed by the Japanese rulers. On the
other hand, we should demonstrate to the Japanese
soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic,
stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the
Chinese people, that is, we should deal them blows in
battles of annihilation. Our experience in the last ten
months of military operations shows that it is possible
to annihilate enemy forces--witness the Pinghsingkuan
and Taierhchuang campaigns. The Japanese army's morale
is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the
aim of the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies
and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far
less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all
these are objective factors favourable to waging
battles of annihilation, and they will, moreover,
steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From
the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening
arrogance through battles of annihilation, such battles
are one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and
accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers
and the Japanese people. Cats make friends with cats,
and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with
mice.
104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for
the present we are inferior to the enemy in technical
equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it is often
difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such
as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy
force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this
connection the excessive demands of the theorists of
quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our
forces in the anti-Japanese war is that they should
fight battles of annihilation as far as possible. In
favourable circumstances, we should concentrate
superior forces in every battle and employ encircling
and outflanking tactics--encircle part if not all of
the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the
encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part
of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. In
circumstances which are unfavourable for battles of
annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In
favourable circumstances, we should employ the
principle of concentration of forces, and in
unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As
for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should
apply the principle of centralized command in the
former and that of decentralized command in the latter.
These are the basic principles of field operations for
the War of Resistance Against Japan.
The Possibilities of
Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes
105. The enemy command itself provides a basis for
the possibility of defeating Japan. History has never
known an infallible general and the enemy makes
mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making
them; hence, the possibility exists of exploiting the
enemy's errors. In the ten months of his war of
aggression the enemy has already made many mistakes in
strategy and tactics. There are five major ones.
First, piecemeal reinforcement. This
is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also
to his shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked
down on us. After grabbing the four northeastern
provinces at small cost, he occupied eastern Hopei and
northern Chahar, all by way of strategic
reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was
that the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus,
thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, he
mapped out a plan of "quick decision", attempting with
very small forces to send us scampering in panic. He
did not expect to find such great unity and such
immense powers of resistance as China has shown during
the past ten months, forgetting as he did that China is
already in an era of progress and already has an
advanced political party, an advanced army and an
advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then
increased his forces piecemeal from about a dozen to
thirty divisions. If he wants to advance, he will have
to augment his forces still further. But because of
Japan's antagonism with the Soviet Union and her
inherent shortage of manpower and finances, there are
inevitable limits to the maximum number of men she can
throw in and to the furthest extent of her advance.
Second, absence of a main direction
of attack. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, the enemy
had divided his forces more or less evenly between
northern and central China and had again divided them
inside each of these areas. In northern China, for
instance, he divided his forces among the
Tientsin-pukow, the Peiping-Hankow and the
Tatung-Puchow Railways, and along each of these lines
he suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in
the places occupied, after which he lacked the forces
for further advances. After the Taierhchuang defeat,
from which he learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated
his main forces in the direction of Hsuchow, and so
temporarily corrected this mistake.
Third, lack of strategic
co-ordination. On the whole coordination exists within
the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in
central China, but there is glaring lack of
coordination between the two. When his forces on the
southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway attacked
Hsiaopengpu, those on the northern section made no
move, and when his forces on the northern section
attacked Taierhchuang, those on the southern section
made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both
places, the Japanese minister of war arrived on an
inspection tour and the chief of general staff turned
up to take charge, and for the moment, it seemed, there
was co-ordination. The landlord class, the bourgeoisie
and the warlords of Japan have very serious internal
contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of
military co-ordination is one of the concrete
manifestations of this fact.
Fourth, failure to grasp strategic
opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in
the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking and
Taiyuan, chiefly because of his shortage of troops and
his lack of a strategic pursuit force.
Fifth, encirclement of large, but
annihilation of small, numbers. Before the Taierhchuang
campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking,
Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankow, Hsinkou and Linfen, many
Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner,
which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.
These five errors--piecemeal reinforcement, absence
of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic
co-ordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and
encirclement of large, but annihilation of small,
numbers--were all points of incompetence in the
Japanese command before the Taierhchuang campaign.
Although the enemy has since made some improvements, he
cannot possibly avoid repeating his errors because of
his shortage of troops, his internal contradictions and
other factors. In addition, what he gains at one point
he loses at another. For instance, when he concentrated
his forces in northern China on Hsuchow, he left a
great vacuum in the occupied areas in northern China,
which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla
warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making
and not induced by us.
On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy
commit errors, that is, we can mislead him and
manoeuvre him into the desired position by ingenious
and effective moves with the help of a well-organized
local population, for example, by "making a feint to
the east but attacking in the west". This possibility
has already been discussed. All the above shows that in
the enemy's command, too, we can find some basis for
victory. Of course, we should not take it as an
important basis for our strategic planning; on the
contrary, the only reliable course is to base our
planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few
mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes
just as we can exploit his. It is the duty of our
command to allow him the minimum of opportunities for
doing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed
errors, will again commit errors in the future, and can
be made to do so through our endeavours. All these
errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our
generals in the War of Resistance to do their utmost to
seize upon them. However, although much of the enemy's
strategic and campaign command is incompetent, there
are quite a few excellent points in his battle command,
that is, in his unit and small formation tactics, and
here we should learn from him.
The Question of
Decisive Engagements in the Anti Japanese War
106. The question of decisive engagements in the
anti-Japanese war should be approached from three
aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisive
engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are
sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement
in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of
victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically
decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole
nation is staked. The characteristics differentiating
our War of Resistance Against Japan from many other
wars are also revealed in this question of decisive
engagements. In the first and second stages of the war,
which are marked by the enemy's strength and our
weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us
concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement.
Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to
choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate
superior forces and fight decisive campaigns or battles
only when we are sure of victory, as in the battles at
Pinghsingkuan, Taierhchuang and other places; we want
to avoid decisive engagements under unfavourable
conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being
the policy we adopted in the Changteh and other
campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive
engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is
staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recent
withdrawal from Hsuchow. The enemy's plan for a "quick
decision" was thus foiled, and now he cannot help
fighting a protracted war with us. These principles are
impracticable in a country with a small territory, and
hardly practicable in a country that is very backward
politically.
They are practicable in China because she is a big
country and is in an era of progress. If strategically
decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the
green mountains are there, one need not worry about
firewood", for even though some of our territory may be
lost, we shall still have plenty of room for manoeuvre
and thus be able to promote and await domestic
progress, international support and the internal
disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy
for us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the
arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an
early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory
clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the
moment the situation takes a slightly favourable turn.
To do what they want would be to inflict incalculable
damage on the entire war, spell finis to the protracted
war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually,
it would be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to
avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon
territory, and we must have the courage to do so when
(and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At
such times we should not feel the slightest regret, for
this policy of trading space for time is correct.
History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat
to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated
Napoleon, the terror of his age. Today China should do
likewise.
107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as
"non-resisters"? No, we are not. Not to fight at all
but to compromise with the enemy -- that is
non-resistance, which should not only be denounced but
must never be tolerated. We must resolutely fight the
War of Resistance, but in order to avoid the enemy's
deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we should
not allow our main forces to be finished off at one
blow, which would make it difficult to continue the War
of Resistance--in brief, it is absolutely necessary to
avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this
point is to be shortsighted on the question of the war
and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the
subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate
recklessness of "only advance, never retreat" precisely
because, if it became the fashion, this doctrine would
make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance
and would lead to the danger of ultimate national
subjugation.
108. We are for decisive engagements whenever
circumstances are favourable, whether in battles or in
major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we should
never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive
engagements can we achieve the objective of
annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and every
soldier in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play
his part. For this purpose considerable partial
sacrifices are necessary; to avoid any sacrifice
whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those
afflicted by the fear of Japan and must be firmly
opposed. The execution of Li Fu-ying, Han Fu-chu and
other Rightists was justified. Within the scope of
correct war planning, encouraging the spirit and
practice of heroic self-sacrifice and dauntless advance
in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable from
the waging of protracted war and the achievement of
final victory. We have strongly condemned the flightism
of "only retreat, never advance" and have supported the
strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only
through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a
correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy;
flightism, on the contrary, gives direct support to the
theory of national subjugation.
109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight
heroically first and then abandon territory? Will not
our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That
is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat
and then to empty your bowels--is this not to eat in
vain? To sleep and then to get up--is this not to sleep
in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would
suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to
keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu
River without a stop--these are subjectivist and
formalist illusions, not realities of life.
As everybody knows, although in fighting and
shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare
the counter-offensive we have had to abandon some
territory, in fact we have gained time, we have
achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting
enemy forces we have acquired experience in fighting,
we have aroused hitherto inactive people and improved
our international standing. Has our blood been shed in
vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in
order to preserve our military forces and indeed to
preserve territory, because if we do not abandon part
of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but
blindly fight decisive engagements without the least
assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces
and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our
territory; to say nothing of recovering territory
already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his
business, and if he loses it all he is no longer a
capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake,
and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck
fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events have their
twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and
war is no exception; only formalists are unable to
comprehend this truth.
100. I think the same will also hold true for the
decisive engagements in the stage of strategic
counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy will be
in the inferior and we in the superior position, the
principle of "fighting profitable decisive engagements
and avoiding unprofitable ones" will still apply and
will continue to apply until we have fought our way to
the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain
our initiative from beginning to end, and as for the
enemy's "challenges" and other people's "taunts", we
should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them.
In the War of Resistance only those generals who show
this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and
wise. This is beyond the ken of those who "jump
whenever touched". Even though we are in a more or less
passive position strategically in this first stage of
the war, we should have the initiative in every
campaign; and of course we should have the initiative
throughout the later stages. We are for protracted war
and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk
everything on a single throw.
The Army and the People
are the Foundation of Victory
111. Japanese imperialism will never relax in its
aggression against and repression of revolutionary
China; this is determined by its imperialist nature. If
China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all
China without firing a single shot, as she did the four
northeastern provinces. Since China is resisting, it is
an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this
resistance until the force of her repression is
exceeded by the force of China's resistance. The
Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very
ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast
Asia and north to Siberia, they have adopted the policy
of breaking through in the centre by first attacking
China. Those who think that Japan will know where to
stop and be content with the occupation of northern
China and of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces completely
fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has
developed to a new stage and is approaching extinction,
differs from the Japan of the past.
When we say that there is a definite limit both to
the number of men Japan can throw in and to the extent
of her advance, we mean that with her available
strength, Japan can only commit part of her forces
against China and only penetrate China as far as their
capacity allows, for she also wants to attack in other
directions and has to defend herself against other
enemies; at the same time China has given proof of
progress and capacity for stubborn resistance, and it
is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by
Japan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan
cannot occupy the whole of China, but she will spare no
effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas
she can reach, and will not stop until internal and
external developments push Japanese imperialism to the
brink of the grave. There are only two possible
outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either
the downfall of her entire ruling class occurs rapidly,
political power passes to the people and war thus comes
to an end, which is impossible at the moment; or her
landlord class and bourgeoisie become more and more
fascist and maintain the war until the day of their
downfall, which is the very road Japan is now
travelling.
There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that
the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come
forward and stop the war are only harbouring illusions.
The reality of Japanese politics for many years has
been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen
captive to the landlords and the financial magnates.
Now that Japan has launched war against China, so long
as she does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese
resistance and still retains sufficient strength, she
is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even
both. She will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in
their wishful calculations' the rulers of Japan have it
worked out on a grandiose scale. Of course, it is
possible that Japan will have to drop her original plan
of invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive
attitude towards the Soviet Union on account of Soviet
strength and of the serious extent to which Japan
herself has been weakened by her war against China. But
in that case, so far from relaxing her aggression
against China she will intensify it, because then the
only way left to her will be to gobble up the weak.
China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance,
the united front and the protracted war will then
become all the more weighty, and it will be all the
more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the
slightest.
112. Under the circumstances the main prerequisites
for China's victory over Japan are nation-wide unity
and all-round progress on a scale ten or even a hundred
times greater than in the past. China is already in an
era of progress and has achieved a splendid unity, but
her progress and unity are still far from adequate.
That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due
not only to her strength but also to China's weakness;
this weakness is entirely the cumulative effect of the
various historical errors of the last hundred years,
and especially of the last ten years, which have
confined progress to its present bounds. It is
impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without
making an extensive and long-term effort. There are
many things we have to exert ourselves to do; here I
will deal only with two fundamental aspects, the
progress of the army and the progress of the
people.
113. The reform of our military system requires its
modernization and improved technical equipment, without
which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu
River. In our employment of troops we need progressive,
flexible strategy and tactics, without which we
likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are
the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with
a progressive political spirit, and unless such a
spirit is fostered through progressive political work,
it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between
officers and men, impossible to arouse their enthusiasm
for the War of Resistance to the full, and impossible
to provide a sound basis for the most effective use of
all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say
that Japan will finally be defeated despite her
technical superiority, we mean that the blows we
deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from
inflicting losses, will eventually shake the morale of
the enemy army whose weapons are not in the hands of
politically conscious soldiers. With us, on the
contrary, officers and men are at one on the political
aim of the War of Resistance. This gives us the
foundation for political work among all the
anti-Japanese forces. A proper measure of democracy
should be put into effect in the army, chiefly by
abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating
and by having officers and men share weal and woe. Once
this is done, unity will be achieved between officers
and men, the combat effectiveness of the army will be
greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our
ability to sustain the long, cruel war.
114. The richest source of power to wage war lies in
the masses of the people. It is mainly because of the
unorganized state of the Chinese masses that Japan
dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then
the Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a
ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of
millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound
of their voices will strike terror into him, and he
will be burned to death. China's armies must have an
uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the abuses of
press-ganging and of buying substitutes,[33] which now exist at
the lower levels, must immediately be banned and
replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political
mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist
millions of men. We now have great difficulties in
raising money for the war, but once the people are
mobilized, finances too will cease to be a problem. Why
should a country as large and populous as China suffer
from lack of funds? The army must become one with the
people so that they see it as their own army. Such an
army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like
Japan will be no match for it.
115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that
make for strained relations between officers and men
and between the army and the people, but I always tell
them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic
principle), of having respect for the soldiers and the
people. It is from this attitude that the various
policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from
this attitude, then the policies, methods and forms
will certainly be wrong, and the relations between
officers and men and between the army and the people
are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major
principles for the army's political work are, first,
unity between officers and men; second, unity between
the army and the people; and third, the disintegration
of the enemy forces. To apply these principles
effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of
respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect
for the human dignity of prisoners of war once they
have laid down their arms. Those who take all this as a
technical matter and not one of basic attitude are
indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.
116. At this moment when the defence of Wuhan and
other places has become urgent, it is a task of the
utmost importance to arouse the initiative and
enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to
the full in support of the war. There is no doubt that
the task of defending Wuhan and other places must be
seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we
can be certain of holding them depends not on our
subjective desires but on concrete conditions. Among
the most important of these conditions is the political
mobilization of the whole army and people for the
struggle. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure
all the necessary conditions, indeed even if one of
these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of
Nanking and other places are bound to be repeated.
China will have her Madrids in places where the
conditions are present. So far China has not had a
Madrid, and from now on we should work hard to create
several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most
fundamental of these is extensive political
mobilization of the whole army and people.
117. In all our work we must persevere in the
Anti-Japanese National United Front as the general
policy. For only with this policy can we persevere in
the War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring
about a widespread and profound improvement in the
relations between officers and men and between the army
and the people, arouse to the full the initiative and
enthusiasm of the entire army and the entire people in
the fight for the defence of all the territory still in
our hands and for the recovery of what we have lost,
and so win final victory.
118. This question of the political mobilization of
the army and the people is indeed of the greatest
importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of
repetition precisely because victory is impossible
without it. There are, of course, many other conditions
indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is
the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United
Front is a united front of the whole army and the whole
people, it is certainly not a united front merely of
the headquarters and members of a few political
parties; our basic objective in initiating the
Anti-Japanese National United Front is to mobilize the
whole army and the whole people to participate in
it.
Conclusions
119. What are our conclusions? They are:
"Under what conditions do you think China can defeat
and destroy the forces of Japan?"
"Three conditions are required first, the
establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China
second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese
united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary
movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese
colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people,
the unity of the people of China is the most important
of the three conditions."
"How long do you think such a war would last?"
"That depends on the strength of China's
anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning
factors involving China and Japan."
"If these conditions are not realized quickly, the
war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same,
Japan will certainly be defeated and China will
certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be
great and there will be a very painful period."
"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to
operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve
success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare
with a high degree of mobility on extensive
battlefields."
"Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile
warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla
units among the peasants."
"In the course of the war, China will be able to . .
. reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually.
Therefore China will be able to conduct positional
warfare in the latter period of the war and make
positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus
Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's
long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces
will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On
the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of
resistance will be constantly brought into play and
large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring
into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The
combination of all these and other factors will enable
us to make the final and decisive attacks on the
fortifications and bases in the Japanese occupied areas
and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of
China." (From an interview with Edgar Snow in July
1936.)
"Thus a new stage has opened in China's political
situation.... In the present stage the central task is
to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the
War of Resistance."
"The key to victory in the war now lies in
developing the resistance that has already begun into a
war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only
through such a war of total resistance can final
victory be won."
"The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of
Resistance may lead to setbacks, retreats, internal
splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises
and other such reverses. Therefore it should be
realized that the war will be arduous and protracted.
But we are confident that, through the efforts of our
Party and the whole people, the resistance already
started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to
advance and develop." ("Resolution on the Present
Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
August 1937.)
These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the
subjugationists the enemy are supermen and we Chinese
are worthless, while in the eyes of the theorists of
quick victory we Chinese are supermen and the enemy are
worthless. Both are wrong. We take a different view;
the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted
war, and the final victory will be China's. These are
our conclusions.
120. My lectures end here. The great War of
Resistance Against Japan is unfolding, and many people
are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate
the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed
is simply the general experience of the past ten
months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind of summary.
The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention
and discussion; what I have given is only an outline,
which I hope you will examine and discuss, amend and
amplify.
Notes
1. This theory of national subjugation was the
view held by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was
unwilling to resist Japan and fought Japan only under
compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7,
1937), the Chiang Kai-shek clique reluctantly took
part in the War of Resistance, while the Wang
Ching-wei clique became the representatives of the
theory of national subjugation, was ready to
capitulate to Japan and in fact subsequently did so.
However, the idea of national subjugation not only
existed in the Kuomintang, but also affected certain
sections of the middle strata of society and even
certain backward elements among the labouring people.
As the corrupt and impotent Kuomintang government
lost one battle after another and the Japanese troops
advanced unchecked to the vicinity of Wuhan in the
first year of the War of Resistance, some backward
people became profoundly pessimistic.
2. These views were to be found within the
Communist Party. During the first six months of the
War of Resistance, there was a tendency to take the
enemy lightly among some members of the Party, who
held the view that Japan could be defeated at a
single blow. It was not that they felt our own forces
to be so strong, since they well knew that the troops
and the organized people's forces led by the
Communist Party were still small, but that the
Kuomintang had begun to resist Japan. In their
opinion, the Kuomintang was quite powerful, and, in
co-ordination with the Communist Party, could deal
Japan telling blows. They made this erroneous
appraisal because they saw only one aspect of the
Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan, but
overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary
and corrupt.
3. Such was the view of Chiang Kai-shek and
company. Though they were compelled to resist Japan,
Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang pinned their hopes
solely on prompt foreign aid and had no confidence in
their own strength, much less in the strength of the
people.
4. Taierhchuang is a town in southern Shantung
where the Chinese army fought a battle in March 1938
against the Japanese invaders. By pitting 400,000 men
against Japan's 70,000 to 80,000, the Chinese army
defeated the Japanese.
5. This view was put forward in an editorial in
the Ta King Pao, then the organ of the
Political Science Group in the Kuomintang. Indulging
in wishful thinking, this clique hoped that a few
more victories of the Taierhchuang type would stop
Japan's advance and that there would be no need to
mobilize the people for a protracted war which would
threaten the security of its own class. This wishful
thinking then pervaded the Kuomintang as a
whole.
6. For many decades, beginning with the end of the
18th century, Britain exported an increasing quantity
of opium to China. This traffic not only subjected
the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered
China of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in
China. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its
trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression
against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu
put up resistance, and the people in Canton
spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British
Corps", which dealt serious blows to the British
forces of aggression. In 1842, however, the corrupt
Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with
Britain. This treaty provided for the payment of
indemnities and the cession of Hongkong to Britain,
and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo
and Canton were to be opened to British trade and
that tariff rates for British goods imported into
China were to be jointly fixed by China and
Britain.
7. The Taiping Revolution, or the Movement of the
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, was the mid-19th century
revolutionary peasant movement against the feudal
rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In
January 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and
other leaders launched an uprising in Chintien
Village in Kueiping County, Kwangsi Province, and
proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly
Kingdom. Proceeding northward from Kwangsi, their
peasant army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hupoh in
1852. In 1853 it marched through Kiangsi and Anhwei
and captured Nanking. A section of the forces then
continued the drive north and pushed on to the
vicinity of Tientsin. However, the Taiping army
failed to build stable base areas in the places it
occupied; moreover, after establishing its capital in
Nanking, its leading group committed many political
and military errors. Therefore it was unable to
withstand the combined onslaughts of the
counter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government
and the British, U.S. and French aggressors, and was
finally defeated in 1864.
8. The Reform Movement of 1898, whose leading
spirits were Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and Tan
Szu-tung, represented the interests of the liberal
bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. The
movement was favoured and supported by Emperor Kuang
Hsu, but had no mass basis. Yuan Shih-kai, who had an
army behind him, betrayed the reformers to Empress
Dowager Tzu Hsi, the leader of the die-hards, who
seized power again and had Emperor Kuang Hsu
imprisoned and Tan Szu-tung and five others beheaded.
Thus the movement ended in tragic defeat.
9. The Revolution of 1911 was the bourgeois
revolution which overthrew the autocratic regime of
the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a
section of the Ching Dynasty's New Army who were
under revolutionary influence staged an uprising in
Wuchang, Hupeh Province. The existing bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois revolutionary societies and the broad
masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers
responded enthusiastically, and very soon the rule of
the Ching Dynasty crumbled. In January 1912, the
Provisional Government of the Republic of China was
set up in Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as the
Provisional President. Thus China's feudal monarchic
system which had lasted for more than two thousand
years was brought to an end. The idea of a democratic
republic had entered deep in the hearts of the
people. But the bourgeoisie which led the revolution
was strongly conciliationist in nature. It did not
mobilize the peasant masses on an extensive scale to
crush the feudal rule of the landlord class in the
countryside, but instead handed state power over to
the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai under imperialist
and feudal pressure. As a result, the revolution
ended in defeat.
10. The Northern Expedition was the punitive war
against the Northern warlords launched by the
revolutionary army which marched north from Kwangtung
Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary
Army, with the Communist Party of China taking part
in its leadership and under the Party's influence
(the political work in the army was at that time
mostly under the charge of Communist Party members),
gained the warm support of the broad masses of
workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and
the first half of 1927 it occupied most of the
provinces along the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers and
defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 this
revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by
the reactionary clique under Chiang Kai-shek within
the revolutionary army.
11. On January 16, 1938, the Japanese cabinet
declared in a policy statement that Japan would
subjugate China by force. At the same time it tried
by threats and blandishments to make the Kuomintang
government capitulate, declaring that if the
Kuomintang government "continued to plan resistance",
the Japanese government would foster a new puppet
regime in China and no longer accept the Kuomintang
as "the other party" in negotiations.
12. The capitalists referred to here are chiefly
those of the United States.
13. By "their governments" Comrade Mao Tse-tung is
here referring to the governments of the imperialist
countries--Britain, the United States and
France.
14. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that there
would be an upswing in China during the stage of
stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan was
completely confirmed in the case of the Liberated
Areas under the leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party. But there was actually a decline instead of an
upswing in the Kuomintang areas, because the ruling
clique headed by ChiangKai-shek was passive in
resisting Japan and active in opposing the Communist
Party and the people. This roused opposition among
the broad masses of the people and raised their
political consciousness
15. According to the theory that "weapons decide
everything", China which was inferior to Japan in
regard to arms was bound to be defeated in the war.
This view was current among all the leaders of the
Kuomintang reaction, Chiang Kai-shek
included.
16. See "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War
Against Japan", Note 9, p. 112 of this
volume.
17. Sun Wu-kung is the monkey king in the Chinese
novel Hsi Yu Chi (Pilgrimage to the
West), written in the 16th century. He could
cover 108,000 li by turning a somersault.
Yet once in the palm of the Buddha, he could not
escape from it, however many somersaults he turned.
With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his
fingers into the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements,
and buried Sun Wu-kung.
18. "Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and
predatory war," said Comrade Georgi Dimitrov in
his report to the Seventh World Congress of the
Communist International in August 1935, entitled "The
Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International" (see Selected Articles and
Speeches, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart
London, 1951, p. 44). In July 1937, Comrade Dimitrov
published an article entitled Fascism Is
War.
19. V. I. Lenin, Socialism and War, Eng.
ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1950, p. 19.
20. Sun Tzu, Chapter 3, "The Strategy of
Attack".
21. Chengpu, situated in the southwest of the
present Chuancheng County in Shantung Province, was
the scene of a great battle between the states of
Tsin and Chu in 632 BC. At the beginning of the
battle the Chu troops got the upper hand. The Tsin
troops, after making a retreat of 90 li,
chose the right and left flanks of the Chu troops,
their weak spots, and inflicted heavy defeats on
them.
22. The ancient town of Chengkeo, in the northwest
of the present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was
of great military importance. It was the scene of
battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King of
Han, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu
captured Hsingyang and Chengkao and Liu Pang's troops
were almost routed. Liu Pang waited until the
opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in
midstream crossing the Szeshui River, and then
crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.
23. In 204 B.C., Han Hsin, a general of the state
of Han, led his men in a big battle with Chao Hsieh
at Chinghsing. Chao Hsieh's army, said to be 200,000
strong, was several times that of Han. Deploying his
troops with their backs to a river, Han Hsin led them
in valiant combat, and at the same time dispatched
some units to attack and occupy the enemy's weakly
garrisoned rear. Caught in a pincer, Chao Hsieh's
troops were utterly defeated.
24. The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of
the present Yehhsien County, Honan Province, was the
place where Liu Hsiu, founder of the Eastern Han
Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of
the Hsin Dynasty, in A.D. 23. There was a huge
numerical disparity between the two sides, Liu Hsiu's
forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against Wang
Mang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the
negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Hsun and
Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with
only three thousand picked troops put Wang Mang's
main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by
crushing the rest of the enemy troops.
25. Kuantu was in the northeast of the present
Chungmou County, Honan Province, and the scene of the
battle between the armies of Tsao Tsao and Yuan Shao
in A D 200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while
Tsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of
supplies. Taking advantage of the lack of vigilance
on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled the
enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers
to spring a surprise attack on them and set their
supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown into
confusion and its main force wiped out.
26. The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the
state of Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the
south bank of the Yangtse River, to the northeast of
Chisyu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsao led an
army of over 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be
800,000 strong, to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The
latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao's antagonist Liu
Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao
Tsao's army was plagued by epidemics and was
unaccustomed to action afloat, the allied forces of
Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet
and crushed his army.
27. Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang,
Hupeh Province, was the place where Lu Sun, a general
of the state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Pei,
ruler of Shu, in A D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored
successive victories at the beginning of the war and
penetrated five or six hundred li into the
territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Sun, who was
defending Yiling, avoided battle for over seven
months until Liu Pei "was at his wits' end and his
troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he
crushed Liu Pei's troops by taking advantage of a
favourable wind to set fire to their
tents.
28. Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty,
defeated Fu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in AD
383 at the Feishui River in Anhwei Province. Fu Chien
had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalry
force of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than
30,000, while the land and river forces of Eastern
Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies lined up
on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan,
taking advantage of the overconfidence and conceit of
the enemy troops, requested Fu Chien to move his
troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin
troops to cross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien
complied, but when he ordered withdrawal, his troops
got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing
the opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the
river, launched an offensive and crushed the
enemy.
29. In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state
of Chin, belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked
them. The Tsin troops defeated the enemy's advance
units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province,
and pushed forward by land and water. Ascending the
city wall of Shonyang, Fu Chien observed the
excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistaking
the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy
soldiers, was frightened by the enemy's apparent
strength.
30. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the
fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having
betrayed the first national democratic united front
of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927,
launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus
made it impossible for the Chinese people to be
organized on a large scale. For this the Kuomintang
reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held
responsible.
31. Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and
Autumn Era. In 638 BC, the state of Sung fought with
the powerful state of Chu. The Sung forces were
already deployed in battle positions when the Chu
troops were crossing the river. One of the Sung
officers suggested that, as the Chu troops were
numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack.
But the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never
attack one who is unprepared." When the Chu troops
had crossed the river but had not yet completed their
battle alignment, the officer again proposed an
immediate aback, and once again the Duke said, "No, a
gentleman should never attack an army which has not
yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave
the order for attack on after the Chu troops were
fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with
disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was
wounded.
32. Han Pu-chu, a Kuomintang warlord, was for
several years governor of Shantun. When the Japanese
invaders thrust southward to Shantung along the
Tientsin-Pukow Railway after occupying Peiping and
Tientsin in 1937, Han Fu-chu fled all the was from
Shantung to Honan without fighting a single
battle.
33. The Kuomintang expanded its army by
press-ganging. Its military and police seized people
everywhere, roping them up and treating them like
convicts. Those who had money would bribe the
Kuomintang officials or pay for
substitutes.
"... The enemy is strong and we are
weak, and the danger of subjugation is there.
But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and
we have advantages.... China's war is progressive,
hence its just character. Because it is a just war,
it is capable of arousing the nation to unity...
Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody
would be in favour of driving the "devils" out
overnight. But we point out that, in the absence of
certain definite conditions, quick victory is something
that exists only in one's mind and not in objective
reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false
theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and
comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances
concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out
that the only way to final victory is the strategy of
protracted war, and we reject the groundless theory of
quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to
secure all the conditions indispensable to final
victory, and the more fully and the earlier these
conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of
victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe
that only in this way can the course of the war be
shortened, and we reject the theory of quick
victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get
things on the cheap. ..."