Norwegian Peace Initiative
Sri Lanka Peace Process: Role of the International Community
Jayantha Dhanapala,
Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process
& Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka Caucus: US Congressional Briefing, 8 September 2005
"A Sri Lanka caucus was formed in the House of
Representatives in 1998. The caucus seems to be a cheerleader for the
Sri Lankan government, and it periodically issues statements praising
the government and condemning the LTTE. These statements, which often
bear little resemblance to reality in the country, appear in the
headlines of Colombo’s newspapers the next day..."
Miriam Young, Executive director of
the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace and the coordinator of the
U.S. NGO Forum on Sri Lanka, 2000
Comment by tamilnation.org: "Mr.Dhanapala's
wide ranging Briefing to the US Congress Sri Lanka Caucus merits attention
notwithstanding Miriam Young's characterisation of the Caucus as a 'cheer
leader for the Sri Lankan government'. The briefing merits attention for
more reasons than one. For one thing, Mr.Dhanapala's appointment as
Secretary General of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat was welcomed by the
opposition United National Party and had its support. For another, the
briefing is of interest not only for that which Mr.Dhanapala said but also
for that which he did not say. It is not without significance that in a
Briefing on 'Sri Lanka Peace Process: Role of the International
Community' Mr.Dhanapala (unlike Ms. Teresita
Schaffer) makes no explicit reference to
India.
Thank you for the privilege of addressing this Congressional
gathering.
It is a pleasure to be back in Washington, DC - a city I first visited as an
18 year old and where later I served six and a half years as a professional
diplomat including a term as Ambassador of Sri Lanka.
I am here today at a sad and sombre time for both our countries. I would
like to express my deep sympathy and sincere solidarity with the people of
the United States and especially with those in Louisiana, Alabama and
Mississippi, who have experienced death and destruction due to hurricane
Katrina. In my own country, the
Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26th last
year took over thirty thousand lives, displaced one million people and
caused enormous destruction to infrastructure, property and livelihoods.
Sri Lanka is yet recovering from this natural disaster
of unprecedented magnitude, but the task of recovery and reconstruction has
been made easier by the assistance so generously provided by the
international community, including the government and people of the USA.
In
our own modest way Sri Lanka has made a donation to the victims of Katrina
as a gesture symbolizing a spontaneous bonding between peoples in
humanitarian crises as well as the close and traditional ties between two
democracies.
I am here to speak to you on the “Sri Lanka Peace Process and the Role of
the International Community”, at a crucial moment in Sri Lanka’s peace
process, less than a month after the premeditated and diabolically planned
assassination of Sri Lanka’s former Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar,
which on the basis of the investigations carried so far, unmistakably points
to the culpability of the LTTE.
Evidence so far gathered shows that days
prior to the assassination LTTE cadres were apprehended carrying out
surveillance on the Minister’s private residence, the accomplices of the
assassins were carefully cultivated at different layers of the organization,
duress had been used to force them to cooperate and that in May 2005 they
had travelled to Kilinochchi and met the LTTE hierarchy including one
Charles - an intelligence chief of the LTTE responsible for operations in
the south of Sri Lanka.
Let me begin with the Government of Sri Lanka’s (GOSL’s) policy in relation
to the peace process and its engagement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) before the assassination of Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar. That
policy has had elements of continuity through the two decades of conflict,
spanning changes of government through democratic elections. More recently,
a firm commitment to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002 with its
Nordic-staffed monitoring mission; the objective of a politically negotiated
solution; the retention of the Royal Norwegian Government as the
facilitator; adherence to the principles of the Oslo Decision of 2 December
2002, where the GOSL and the LTTE signed an agreement to explore a solution
based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka; the Tokyo
Declaration; and the infrastructural support of the Peace Secretariat, were
the elements of continuity between the previous United National Front
Government and the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government elected in
April 2004.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala's assertion about
'elements of continuity' between the previous United
National Front Government and the United People’s
Freedom Alliance Government elected in April 2004
appears to fly in the face of the facts.
On 1 March 2002,
in a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, President Kumaratunga
complained that she was not properly consulted before Wickremesinghe committed the Colombo government to a ceasefire
with the LTTE. Additionally she criticised the powers given to Norway through a
monitoring mission to demarcate "lines of
control" within Sri Lanka that would separate
government-held areas and rebel-held areas - and this
was a matter that went to the root of the Cease Fire
Agreement.
Again,
On 1 November 2003, the European Union welcomed the
ISGA proposals (submitted by the LTTE) as "an important step forward in the
peace process".
The US Embassy in Colombo declared that it " has taken
note of the LTTE's delivery of counterproposals made in
response to the Sri Lankan Government's interim
administration proposal for the North and East" and urged
"both parties to build on this step by resuming
negotiations in a timely manner..."
But, President Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)
rejected the
ISGA proposals and on 4 November 2003, within days
of the LTTE proposal, the
President in the exercise of powers
vested in her under the 1978
constitution took over from the UNF
government which enjoyed a majority in
Parliament, the Ministries of Defense,
Interior and Media, which were directly
linked to the peace process, and
assigned the portfolios either to
herself or to nominees from within her
party. The actions of President
Kumaratunga resulted in
the facilitator, the Norwegian
Government suspending its role in
November 2003, in view of the lack of
clarity in regard to who was responsible
for the peace process.
By using the felicitous phrase 'elements
of continuity', Mr. Dhanapala seeks to gloss over the
fundamental issue that has confronted conflict resolution in the island
of Sri Lanka for the past several decades - an issue which
Professor Marshall Singer pointed out ten years ago to the
US Congress Committee on International Relations
-
"...One of the essential elements that
must
be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is that,
since 1958 at least, every time Tamil politicians negotiated some sort of
power-sharing deal with a Sinhalese government - regardless of which party
was in power - the opposition Sinhalese party always claimed that the party
in power had negotiated away too much. In almost every case - sometimes
within days - the party in power backed down on the agreement..."
It is a view reiterated by
Professor Neil Devotta,
ten years later in
From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict:
the institutional bases for Sri Lanka's separatist war -
"...Beginning in the mid-1950s Sri Lanka's politicians from the majority
Sinhalese community resorted to
ethnic outbidding as a means to
attain power and in doing so
systematically marginalised the
country's minority Tamils...parties in power seek to promote
dubious conflict resolution only to be checkmated by the respective opposition
which typically claims that the proposed solutions are bound to eventually
dismember the island.."
At the same time engagement with the LTTE was based on the
expectation that this militant group would abandon the terrorism and
violence of the past and would gradually move into the democratic mainstream
in the same way as other groups including minority Tamil rebel groups had
done in Sri Lanka and other groups elsewhere in the world, have done.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala obfuscates when he fails to
draw a distinction between violence and terrorism. The
war on Iraq was a violent act but (whatever its
legitimacy) it was not by itself an act of terror.
Admittedly, a resort to arms must be truly a last
resort. The question is when is enough, enough? After
the Sinhala
pogrom against the Tamils in 1958, Tarzie Vittachi,
a distinguished Sinhala journalist with an international
reputation asked: "What are we left with? A nation in ruins, some grim lessons which we
cannot afford to forget and a momentous question: Have the Sinhalese and Tamils reached
the parting of ways?" Forty seven years later, Mr.Dhanapala and the Government he represents
may also want to consider the conclusion reached by Paul Sieghart
Q.C. in his Report of a Mission to Sri Lanka on
behalf of the International Commission of Jurists in March1984
- ".. Communal riots in which Tamils
are killed, maimed, robbed and rendered homeless are no longer isolated episodes; they are
beginning to become a pernicious habit." [see
1958,
1961,
1974,
1977 and
1983]
Here the views expressed
by
UNESCO International Conference of Experts, Barcelona
in
1998 may also be helpful -
"...In all regions of the world conflicts turn violent over the desire for full
control by state governments, on the one hand, and claims to
self-determination (in a broad sense) by peoples, minorities or other communities, on the other.
Where governments recognise and respect the right to self-determination, a
people can effectuate it in a peaceful manner. Where governments
choose to use
force to crush or prevent the movement, or where they attempt to
impose
assimilationist policies against the wishes of a people, this polarises
demands and generally
results in armed conflict. The Tamils, for example, were not
seeking independence and were not using violence in the 1970s. The government
response to further deny the Tamil people equal expression of their distinct
identity led to armed confrontation and a war of secession..."
Mr.Dhanapala's glib reference to the
'democratic mainstream' raises questions which any person truly
concerned with progressing the peace process will need
to confront - and not simply paper over. What is the
'democratic mainstream' towards which the LTTE should
'gradually move'? Rule by a permanent ethnic majority within the confines of an
unitary state is no 'democratic' mainstream.
The fifty year record
in Sri Lanka shows the consequences of that 'democratic' rule. Mr.Dhanapala and the Government he seeks to serve
with distinction may want to
meaningfully address
the
concerns expressed by
Professor Margaret
Moore in 2001:
"...One of the most pressing problems in
societies with severe divisions and this may be true of ethnic,
linguistic, religious, national or ideological divisions is the problems that they pose for normal
electoral (democratic) politics...In this situation, the basic conditions for
responsible democracy are not met. ... in a wellfunctioning democracy, the outvoted minority will respect the
majority decision in the expectation that, at some later time, they will be
part of a winning coalition and will require minority compliance. ... (and)
a majority will tend to refrain from upsetting the minority because they
anticipate that they will be in need of majority self-restraint when they are
converted to minority status .. This dynamic does
not occur in a state in which
different national communities consistently vote
for nationally aligned parties - there is no outlet for minority
disaffection; there is no moderating influence on minority demands; and no
mechanisms, at least internal to the democratic system, to prevent the
majority from oppressing the minority..."
Consequently confidence building measures were unilaterally pursued by the GOSL without demanding any reciprocal gestures. Interaction with foreign
governments by the LTTE was encouraged in the hope that this exposure would
broaden the thinking of a group wedded to a weapon-based culture.
Comment: Here, it appears
that Mr.Dhanapala chooses to be economical with the truth. The
CFA did provide
reciprocal steps in confidence building at each
progressive step in time. The failure of Sri Lanka to
implement that which was agreed, remains a bone of
contention between the signatories to the CFA. Again the international community
is well aware that the
LTTE
interaction with foreign governments took place not with Sri Lanka's
'encouragement' but with its reluctant acquiescence.
The Kadirgamar assassination is the worst of a series of ceasefire
violations. It is the most high profile assassination since the ceasefire
came into force and is no doubt an outrage and a grave setback to the peace
process.
Comment: What is high
profile and what is 'most high profile' will ofcourse remain a matter of
opinion. Mr.Dhanapala's remarks may have had a more balanced
ring if he had referred to the UN Secretary General's condemnation of
the killing of E.Kaushalyan, who played a role no less
important for the people living in the NorthEast than that of Lakshman Kadirgamar for those
in the Sinhala South.
"The
UN Secretary-General condemns the killings of Mr. E. Kaushalyan, (8
February 2005) a senior political leader of the LTTE Eastern Province Division,
and several colleagues travelling with him, when their vehicle came under
attack yesterday evening. He extends his sincere condolences and deepest
sympathies to the families of all the victims of these callous killings. The
Secretary-General urges all parties to exercise calm and restraint so as to
avoid actions that could disrupt the Cease-fire Agreement of February 2002
or the long-term interest of peace in Sri Lanka."
Not much may be gained at the present
time by considering whether the murder of E.Kaushalyan was 'an outrage
and a grave set back to the peace process'. However, the fact that the LTTE continued with
the ceasefire despite that killing may be of some significance.
It is also one of hundreds of killings carried out by the LTTE
after the CFA was signed, as part of its unabated policy to eliminate all
political dissent.
Comment: Mr.Dhanapala allegation
of 'hundreds' of killings does not appear to be founded on
evidence of any kind. The use of hyperbole does not advance reason. Be that as it may, it may be helpful if Mr.Dhanapala had commented on the views widely held in Sri Lanka that
its intelligence agencies (with the help of India's RAW, amongst others)
have sought to secure intelligence of LTTE activities with a view to
undermining the armed strength of the LTTE -
an armed strength which led to the ceasefire and
which also serves to underpin the
peace process. Here, we have in mind the matters
stated in யாழ்ப்பாணத்தில் 'றோ'வின் கண்கள்
and the remarks of S.Sivakumaran in
Pigs are Flying in Batticaloa! -
"....
the entire puppet show is being run by the
Indians (UNP, SLFP, JVP- on the Sinhalese side; Karuna,
Anandasangaree and other Tamil paramilitaries, on the Tamil side).
This is an open secret to all in Sri Lanka. So, now the only game in
town is LTTE (Eelam Tamils) vs Indian tentacles, namely - the
RAW.
Now, RAW has access to any place or any facility in Sri Lanka,
except in LTTE-controlled areas. Karuna cannot be (need not be) in Sri Lanka. He is only
a faceless phantom figure used by the Indians (and Sinhalese) to break-
up the Tamil solidarity, mainly the North and East bond and linkage. .."
Democratic Tamil leaders such as Mr. A. Amirthalingam
former leader of the TULF and Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, TULF M.P., and Human
Rights Activist, who were seen by the LTTE as traitors or opponents of their
cause were eliminated. While the LTTE is internationally notorious for their
signature style of political killings - the suicide bomber - it is not their
only modus operandi for carrying out assassinations. Pistol gangs and
snipers are also part of their tactical repertoire.
Comment: That Mr.Dhanapala should seek
to explain away the uncomfortable fact that a suicide bomber was not
involved in the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar is understandable -
understandable in the context of his desire to implicate the LTTE. But
Mr.Dhanapala would know that pistol gangs and snipers are
part of the political culture of
Democracy, Sri Lanka Style
in the South.
"...The progressive destruction of the political process in Sri Lanka has
led to both domestic and international tolerance of an enormous amount
of violence by the government (regardless of party affiliation) against
its citizens. Increasingly, it seems that the government of Sri Lanka
is accountable to no one - not its citizens, and not its foreign
counterparts who rubber-stamped the recent parliamentary elections. In
Sri Lanka's current political climate, power seems to be determined by
the number of thugs a given politician has at his/her disposal..."
Sri
Lanka's Elections 2000: Fear and Intimidation Rule the Day - An Observer's
Report - Laura Gross
Investigations into the
assassination of Mr. Kadirgamar so far have clearly established a direct
link to the LTTE. The GOSL will act expeditiously to conclude
investigations, apprehend those responsible and bring them to justice.
Comment: Again, Mr.Dhanapala's anxiety to
condemn is understandable. But by so doing, he denies due process and
the rule of law to those who may be accused. This is more so because the
record shows that the Sri Lanka judiciary has been singularly
amenable to bowing to political pressure.
Despite this dastardly act, the GOSL will continue to adhere to and respect
the CFA. As a responsible democratic government committed to the rule of law
and human rights, the GOSL does not want to plunge the country back into
armed conflict.
 Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala's statement about Sri Lanka's commitment
'to the rule of law and human rights' is ofcourse
welcome. More so, because
the record
shows the gross and consistent violation of the rights of the Tamil people, by the Sri Lankan government and its
agencies during the past several decades, including grave breaches of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Genocide Convention, and the
Geneva Conventions relating to the
humanitarian law of armed conflict. The whole is a chilling chronology of
discrimination,
arbitrary arrest and detention,
torture,
extra judicial killings and massacres,
mass graves,
indiscriminate
aerial bombardment and artillery shelling,
wanton rape,
impunity,
and genocide.
The CFA has saved countless lives and prevented the wanton
destruction of property. It has facilitated the movement of people, goods
and services from the North and the East to the South and vice versa.
Despite reports to the contrary, it has brought about a peace dividend for
people particularly in the North and the East. But after the Kadirgamar
assassination it cannot be business as usual.
Comment: For more than 15 months
before the Kadirgamar assassination, the Sri Lanka government failed
to implement the provisions of the CFA. That was business as usual.
Again, though the
Government of
Sri Lanka and LTTE signed Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)
Agreement on 24 June 2005, within a couple of weeks President
Kumaratunge requested that Article 7 of the
signed agreement dealing
with the Regional Fund be amended.
The agreement provided for the government and the LTTE to
appoint a suitable
multilateral agency to be the custodian of the Regional Fund.
However, the President wanted that the Sri Lanka Treasury be
nominated as
the custodian of the Regional Fund. A few days after the
President's request,
the
Supreme Court obliged by staying the implementation of the clause
which the President had wanted amended.
We are therefore engaged in a
policy review, which we would like to share with the international community
and seek cooperation in its implementation.
Comment: Many will take the view
that Sri Lanka seeks a policy review because it has been thwarted in its
efforts to use the CFA as a cover to infiltrate and undermine the armed
strength of the LTTE.
Here, the views expressed by
D.Sivaram in 2000 are not irrelevant:
"Sri Lanka is easily the only country in the world to fight its
insurgency with the undivided support of the international
community, the backing of all the important nations across the
global political spectrum. It is the most advantageous external
environment that any country may have ever had in fighting an
insurgency.
And yet something is obviously going wrong. There are three reasons
that may be attributed to the apparent failure of western counter
insurgency - CI - methods in Sri Lanka....Firstly, the LTTE has developed
over the years a fairly sophisticated counter-counter insurgency
system. Secondly, it has consistently focused its resources on
building a conventional force and on preserving the minimum required
territory to sustain such a force. And thirdly it never lets itself
be inveigled or coerced into the political space that is so
necessary for diluting and mystifying the basic cause fuelling the
insurgency..."
The areas in which we think policy review is necessary are:
The more effective functioning of the CFA
Ensuring the practice of democratic freedoms by all Tamils and Muslims
in the LTTE dominated areas of the North and the East
A serious effort to stop child recruitment by the LTTE
The urgent need to address human rights issues involved in ceasefire
violations
The continuation of development and humanitarian assistance to the
people of the North and the East
The urgent need for sanctions by the international community for
persistent violations of the CFA
In all of these areas, we seek the understanding and active
co-operation of the international community in general and the USA in
particular.
(a) Reviewing the CFA
There is, first of all, a need to review the functioning of the CFA that is
now far more urgent than before. In the aftermath of the assassination, the
President of Sri Lanka wrote to the Prime Minister of Norway, requesting “an
urgent meeting between the government and the LTTE…. to review the practical
functioning of the ceasefire with a view to preventing further killings and
other violations".
The GOSL has been calling for a review of the
implementation of the CFA for quite sometime, a request endorsed by the SLMM
but steadfastly resisted by the LTTE until they found it expedient to divert
the recent outrage and opprobrium expressed by the international community
in the aftermath of the Kadirgamar assassination by agreeing to these talks.
The GOSL expectation is that these talks will be technical level discussions
between representatives of the armed forces of the government on the one
part and the LTTE on the other on the practical functioning of the CFA with
a view to preventing further killings. I have just been informed that the
LTTE has rejected a Norwegian proposal that the talks be held at the
Bandaranaike International Airport, which the government had accepted.
Comment:
"We consider the Sri Lankan government's insistence on holding
future peace talks in Sri Lanka and not abroad is with a view to sever
the rapport the LTTE has built up with the international community," Mr.Thamilchelvan
- An embodiment of
antimony - Thamilchelvan on Kumaratunga's
speeches in New York
(b) Democratic freedoms
The GOSL also recognizes that in the long run a mere review of the CFA may
not be sufficient to halt violations of the CFA. According to statistics
maintained by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which monitors the CFA, up
to August 2005 the LTTE has a record of 3113 violations of the CFA as
against 141 by the Government, which represents a ratio of 22 to 1.
Comment:
Here D.Sivaram's remarks in
War Remains an
Option Three Years After Cease-fire may be helpful.
"Trying to score points over each other
at this juncture with SLMM statistics is an absolutely futile exercise.
The number of violations has nothing to do with the stability of the
ceasefire because there is a conventional fighting force on either side
of the line of control as defined by the CFA. When and why these two
forces would go to war is a strictly centralized decision of their
respective leaderships and has nothing to do with the manner in which
the CFA is violated. SLMM's ceasefire statistics do not tell us anything
about war and peace. If the army says the LTTE has committed greater
violations, then Tigers would say that the military has not fulfilled
its pledges to vacate all public buildings, homes etc., and disarm
paramilitaries." And Mr.Dhanapala may have usefully addressed
the matters raised by the LTTE with Head of the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) on 15 July 2005 -
".. the CFA contains
within it time frames stipulating moving away of the military from occupied
positions in places of worship, schools and densely populated habitats and
public buildings paving a way for restoration of normalcy. (Time frames
which have not been kept by Sri Lanka) It is relevant to
remind the Secretary General (of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat) that it is on the acknowledgement of the ground
reality of two power positions and territories being administered under
their respective control, that the CFA has been formulated..."
I would
like to highlight for you the qualitative nature of these violations. Political killings are merely a symptom of LTTE’s
intolerance of dissent. The basic right to express one’s opinion, to
associate, to engage in political activity, to vote freely - are the
foundations of a democracy. More than three years after the CFA it does not
appear that the LTTE is able to change and accept the imperative for
democratization and the fact that it is not the ‘sole representative of the
Tamil people’.
Similarly, more than three years after the CFA, Tamil
people, or the representatives of the Tamil political parties, who express
independent opinions or engage in political activity outside the framework
laid down by the LTTE are still on a death sentence. In contrast, the CFA in
Art. 1.13 allows LTTE cadres to engage in political work in GOSL controlled
areas and the GOSL has also recognized LTTE’s right to set up political
offices in these areas. International pressure on the LTTE is needed to allow other parties to
conduct political activities in LTTE controlled areas.
Comment: The
real question that may need to be explored carefully is whether Sri
Lanka's intelligence agencies have been operating under cover of the
ceasefire and whether the LTTE was right when
it pointed out in August 2005 that "five Tamil paramilitary
armed groups, including the Karuna group, are being paid and provided with logistic support by the Sri
Lanka security forces in a covert military campaign" to destabilise the
Eastern province and to paralyse the LTTE’s political engagement in
the region." If this be the case, the so called 'political killings' may
not be a 'symptom of LTTE’s intolerance of
dissent' but its intolerance of Sri Lanka funded
intelligence operatives. There may be a need for the
evidence to be sifted and examined in an objective
manner.
Mr.Dhanapala may also want to pay attention to the
statement of the co chairs to the peace process (US, Japan and the EU)
on 19 July 2005 -
“The Sri Lankan government, in
accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement, must ensure that all paramilitary
groups are disarmed and prevented from any activity that might lead to acts
of violence. The government must also guarantee the security of unarmed LTTE
cadres in government controlled areas”
(c) Child Combatants
A majority of CFA violations (54%) relate to child recruitment, in blatant
disregard of the undertaking the LTTE has given to the United Nations in
1998 and the UNICEF Action Program of mid 2003.
On the question of child recruitment, the Sri Lankan government welcomes the
UN Security Council Resolution 1612(2005), which establishes a monitoring
and reporting mechanism on the use of child soldiers, and will work closely
with UNICEF to give effect to this resolution.
Comment: Here, the
comments of the
International Red Cross in its Introduction to the
Geneva Conventions Optional Protocol (which requires that armed groups may
not recruit persons under the age of 18
years) are not without relevance -
"..The ICRC welcomes the fact that the issue of
non-state actors has been included in the Optional
Protocol, but regrets that the provision imposes a
moral, as opposed to a legal obligation. Although
Article 4 also provides for criminal prosecution
under domestic law, this is likely to be of limited
effect, because those who take up arms against the
lawful Government of a country already expose
themselves to the most severe penalties of domestic
law, and because the capacity of a Government to
enforce its laws is often very limited in situations
of non-international armed conflicts. Third, it
is uncertain whether non-state actors will feel
bound by a norm which is different from that imposed
on States, and thus whether it will be respected..."
There is a further complicating factor. The
LTTE is not simply an armed group. It also administers civil institutions in
a de facto state in control of a demarcated area recognised by the CFA. Ms.Virginia Judge MP from Australia stated recently -
"... I observed that in a remarkable
three year period the Tamils developed a virtual state within the north
and north-east of Sri Lanka.I visited their judiciary and court, school of law, police station, police
academy, medical
and technical colleges and small industries, a community bank plus a children's
home
housing 278 children left orphaned by the war and the recent tsunami. The
Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) runs a variety of development, relief and
reconstruction
projects as well as
assisting several non-government organisations with their
projects. All
this is a tribute to the spirit and resilience of the Tamil people..."
A question that may have to be examined
is whether recruitment of those under 18 by the LTTE is for its armed
forces or whether those under 18 are employed in the various
institutions of the de facto state such as the judiciary and court,
school of law, police station, police academy, medical and technical
colleges and small industries.
(d) Human Rights
These violations, whether they are political killings or child recruitment,
are carried out with impunity even in the face of international condemnation
as there are no sanctions against such violations. The SLMM as conceived in
the CFA has a ‘naming and shaming’ role. Furthermore, given that a majority
of CFA violations fall into the category of violations of a human rights
nature, rather than of a military nature, the SLMM is inadequately equipped
to deal with such violations, as they are mainly staffed by personnel with a
military/police background.
There is also now a consensus emerging among civil society in Sri Lanka that
a separate human rights agreement may be necessary to stem the tide of human
rights violations by the LTTE. Human rights missions in El Salvador and
Guatemala demonstrate the crucial role of promoting and protecting human
rights in rebuilding trust and fostering a climate of reconciliation after
an armed conflict. In Guatemala the human rights verification mission
(MINUGUA) was deployed in 1994, two years in advance of the final peace
agreement signed by the Government and the Opposition. The National Peace
Accord was signed in South Africa September 1991, long before agreement was
reached on a new constitution for SA.
 Comment:
Many Tamils will be heartened by Mr.Dhanapala's
concern about impunity. Heartened because of the
impunity enjoyed by Sri Lanka's security forces
during the past several years despite condemnation
by innumerable human rights organisations - and despite
persistent 'naming and shaming'.
As recently as
October 2004,
Amnesty International called on the Sri Lankan Government to
prosecute security forces responsible for disappearances in Sri
Lanka. The situation has not changed since
Amnesty 'named and shamed' in 1996 - "The People's Alliance (PA) government has repeatedly proclaimed its commitment to
human rights since it came to power in August 1994 and has introduced a number of
safeguards to prevent torture and 'disappearances'.
However, the Amnesty
International delegation found that these grave violations of human rights are
continuing... Amnesty International is concerned that the government is not
living up to its stated commitment to human rights. Despite lobbying by local and
international human rights organizations, including the Human Rights Committee and the
United Nations (UN) Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the
government refuses to amend provisions in several laws which fall far short of
international standards and continue to facilitate torture, death in custody,
"disappearances" and extrajudicial executions... "
Clearly human rights is of vital importance and it
appears that it was in
recognition of that importance that the
Northeast Secretariat of Human Rights
was established
in August 1984 to monitor
human rights violations and implement actions to strengthen human rights in the NorthEast.
Mr.Dhanapala's failure to inform the Congress Sri Lanka
Caucus of the work of NESHOR accords with the general
tenor of his address.
In Sri Lanka, it was understood that the process of negotiations for a
solution to the armed conflict will be a long one, before ultimate human
rights commitments are agreed upon and included as part of constitutional
arrangements. But the need to address human rights issues in the interim was
recognized by both parties during the fourth and fifth rounds of the peace
talks. Accordingly, the two parties agreed to invite Mr. Ian Martin to act
as an international human rights advisor and to draw up a road map on human
rights issues relating to the peace process, which could form an agreement
between the two parties.
However, with the unilateral suspension of the peace talks in April 2003, it
has not been able to make any progress on the road map.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala is yet again economical with truth.
Sometimes to be silent is also to lie. Mr.Dhanapala
omits to mention that the LTTE submitted its ISGA
proposal in November 2003 and that it was
the actions of President
Kumaratunga that resulted in
the facilitator, the Norwegian
Government suspending its role in
November 2003.
The Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister declared on 14
November 2003 " Peace talks
could have started tomorrow, provided there was clarity
about who is holding political authority and responsibility
on behalf of the Government to ensure the continuation of
the ceasefire agreement and the resumption of peace
negotiations. Until last week there was such clarity.
Today
there is no such clarity. Until such clarity is
re-established, there is no space for further efforts by the
Norwegian government to assist the parties."
Mr. Ian Martin is
expected to visit Sri Lanka again this year, and it is our hope that we will
be able to recommence the discussion relating to addressing human rights as
a matter of priority as the continuation of these violations will seriously
jeopardize the future of our peace process.
The GOSL has also commenced a dialogue with the UN on the issue of
addressing human rights within the peace process. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi,
Special Advisor to the SG was in Sri Lanka just before my departure to the
US to discuss a possible UN role in this regard.
This discussion on the CFA and its limitations has, I believe, already
highlighted the considerable role played by the international community in
the peace process in Sri Lanka and the potential for other actors. The Royal
Norwegian Government, which facilitated the CFA in 2001, continues to act as
the facilitator and the CFA is monitored by the Nordic staffed SLMM. Other
international actors have also supported Sri Lanka’s peace process through
economic assistance and a variety of diplomatic tools.
Comment: Mr.Dhanapala refers to
'the considerable role played by the international community in the
peace process in Sri Lanka and the potential for other actors'
though he does not name these 'other actors'. Who are these 'other
actors' i.e. other than the so called 'international community'?
In a statement on
21 August 2005, the leader of the JVP, Mr.Somawansa Amarasinghe emphasised
that by "International Community" he means 'western
powers' and not India - and it is to this
"International Community" that he appeals, when he urges that 'the
international community must support us in (our) legitimate self-
defence'. Whether Mr.Dhanapala subscribes to this usage is not
altogether clear. The report
in the Hindustan Times on 25 August 2005 may be helpful in
this regard -
"According to sources, the Indian leaders expressed
concern about the "over internationalisation" of the Sri Lankan peace
process. ... New Delhi is said to be unhappy with the performance of the
"co-chair" of the June 2003 Tokyo Aid Lanka conference. The co-chair (US,
EU, Japan and Norway) have arrogated to themselves a role not assigned to
them. They style themselves as the "international community" and strut about
as the "co-chair of the Sri Lankan peace process". India feels that they
have been pampering the LTTE a bit too much and have been ineffective..."
(e) Development and Humanitarian Assistance
The international community has provided enormous support to the peace
process in Sri Lanka through economic assistance to rebuild the North and
the East affected by the armed conflict. Since the CFA was signed,
international donor conferences were held in Oslo and Tokyo, as well as a
preparatory meeting in Washington to mobilize political and economic support
for the peace process. At the Tokyo Donor Conference held in June 2003, the
international community pledged $4.5 billion to support the GOSL's efforts
to address the immediate and long-term needs of the conflict-affected North
and the East. The US, EU, Norway and Japan, which were named Co-Chairs to
the Tokyo Donor Conference, have continued to meet to monitor progress in
Sri Lanka’s peace process.
The Government through the Ministry of RRR has been delivering this
international humanitarian and development assistance to the affected people
of the North and the East, including those in the uncleared areas of
Mullaitivu and Killinochchi. I am happy to say that this work has been done
with the cooperation of the LTTE, and as I mentioned earlier, people in the
North and the East have therefore benefited from the ceasefire, through a
peace dividend. Let me now identify some of the very specific programmes
being undertaken in the North and the East, since the ceasefire was signed.
The RRR Ministry with donor assistance is at present implementing an
impressive number of projects, which include resettlement of internally
displaced persons and assistance to host communities, rehabilitation of
basic physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation programmes, power,
and communication facilities as well as rebuilding of social and communal
services such as health, education, sanitation and judicial services. The
CFA has also enabled the return of a large number of refugees mainly from
India.
The demining efforts undertaken by the Government together with NGO’s have
facilitated this resettlement of IDP’s as well as reconstruction and
rehabilitation work in the North and the East. Consequent to the ceasefire
agreement, a comprehensive programme for demining is being coordinated and
implemented by the GOSL during the last 2 years. We are particularly
appreciative of the role of the U.S. in this programme.
Perhaps as a direct result of these efforts, GDP in the Northern and the
Eastern Provinces has shown remarkable growth. According to research done by
the Economic Affairs Division of my office, the highest GDP growth rates
during the post-CFA period are in the Northern Province (12.6% per annum)
and in the Eastern Province (10.1% per annum.), in contrast to other
provinces in Sri Lanka. The engine of growth in the North and the East
during the post-CFA has been the agricultural sector with the industrial and
service sectors also making useful contributions; rice production in the
North and the East has reached pre-conflict levels and recorded a surplus
during the last harvest. The North has the lowest rate of unemployment -
5.8% as against 8.9% for the national average.
Furthermore, GOSL is looking at investment promotion strategies specific to
the conflict-affected areas and exploring ways of improving the investment
climate in general in the North and the East. Attracting private-sector
investment in troubled areas is not easy and at present the government is
negotiating a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) facility to
promote investment in the North and the East. MIGA is the political risk
insurance arm of the World Bank, which promotes foreign direct investment in
developing countries by insuring against political risk and by providing
technical assistance.
While the international community also showed a keen
interest to support the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure
(P-TOMS), which was agreed upon by the GOSL and the LTTE for equitable
allocation of donor funds, the implementation of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) has been delayed due to a stay order on some provisions
of the MOU by the Supreme Court, relating to the Regional Committee and the
Regional Fund set up under the MOU. The Government has filed its written
objections to the case and will also vigorously argue that the MOU does
neither violate provisions of the Constitution nor governmental regulations,
when the case is taken up on the 12th of September.
Comment: In the event, (contrary to Mr.Dhanapala's statement) the Supreme
Court did not hear the case on 12 September 2005 and his
promise that the Government will 'vigorously argue that
the MOU does neither violate provisions of the
Constitution nor governmental regulations' remains a
promise. Meanwhile the P-TOMS is a dead letter and the
people in the NorthEast continue to suffer the ravages
of the
Tsunami.
Despite the delay in implementing the MOU on P-TOMS, foreign economic
assistance obtained for post tsunami reconstruction work is being disbursed
through the Ministry of RRR and other line Ministries in order to bring
relief to the tsunami affected people in the North and the East. The role of
the UN agencies and the local and international NGOs remain significant in
these areas. I must also emphasize that the GOSL will continue its humanitarian and
development work in the North and the East as a matter of priority,
irrespective of the progress made in the peace process, as the people of the
North and the East cannot be penalized for the faults of the LTTE.
Comment: Here, the US Congress may have found
Mr.Lakshman Kadirgamar remarks on BBC Hard Talk, 22 March 2005
of some interest: "BBC: What is the government's
response to the accusation that aid is being withheld from Tamil
Tiger areas?
Kadirgamar. Totally and horribly false - this is being
put about by mischief makers and propagandists.. Take the
food situation in the first two months. Earlier on there were
accusations that people in the Tamil areas were starving and had
no water - that was a load of rubbish.."
BBC: It is not only Tamil Tigers who are saying
this. Local NGOs are saying it. Western Aid organisations..
Let me tell you what John Charly from Refugees International
said - he says that the Government when faced with the choice of
spending foreign aid in Galle in the south or in Tamil
areas in the North and East, the government would give it in
Galle where its Sinhala constituencies are based
Kadirgamar: That is a wholly
unsubstantiated allegation.
BBC:
This is not a Tiger rebel saying it, is it
Kadirgamar: I do not know who he is
BBC: He is a western NGO. He is one of
many NGOs who is saying that this government is withholding aid
to Tamil Tiger areas
Kadirgamar:
I am sorry - that does not impress me in the slightest...."
(f) Sanctions and Pressures
With the exception of the USA, UK, Australia and India, which has banned the
LTTE as a terrorist outfit, a number of international governments have
followed a policy of constructive engagement with both parties to the
conflict in Sri Lanka.
Comment: India has not banned
the LTTE as a 'terrorist outfit' and Mr.Dhanapala's statement is factually
incorrect.
India banned the
LTTE on the ground that 'LTTE's objective for a homeland for all
Tamils disrupts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India'.
In the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, the Indian Supreme Court
acquitted the accused of the 'terrorism' charge,
Sri Lanka de proscribed the LTTE on 4 September 2002
and Peace Talks commenced thereafter. Whatever may have been the
position before such de proscription, it will be strange (and opportunistic)
if after itself de proscribing the LTTE and seeking to engage in talks with
it, Sri Lanka should now be concerned that 'a number of international
governments have followed a policy of constructive engagement' with both
parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka.'
Constructive engagement with the LTTE has meant
direct interaction with the LTTE in Kilinochchi, on issues relevant to the
peace process, reconstruction and rehabilitating activities and hosting LTTE
delegations in their own countries. Since the CFA, the LTTE has made several
tours to Europe. The last tour also included a visit to South Africa.
In the
past, the GOSL has encouraged these visits, in the belief that it is a
useful exercise for the LTTE to learn about democracy, concepts of
governance, power sharing, federalism etc., to broaden their horizons and
that it will assist in their transformation from a terrorist outfit to a
democratic institution.
Foreign governments have also sought to make public, their stance on issues
related to the Sri Lanka peace process through policy statements or
statements of encouragement/condemnation thereby influencing the actors and
stakeholders in the conflict in Sri Lanka. These diplomatic tools have
however, made little or no impact on the LTTE to either desist from
violations of the CFA or return to the negotiating table, which they left in
April 2003.
Direct peace negotiations between the GOSL and the LTTE that are critical in
any peace process have been stalled since April 2003. The six (6) rounds of
peace talks yielded a number of significant decisions such as the
establishment of a Committee for De-escalation and Normalization, a Gender
Committee, a Sub Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs, and the Oslo Decision signed by the two sides in December 2002, in
which both parties agreed “to explore a solution founded on the principle of
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil
speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka”.
None of these committees are now functioning and the Oslo decision also
remains a dead letter with the LTTE steadfastly refusing to reiterate it
publicly.
The stalemate over the reopening of negotiations has revolved around whether
the ISGA proposal by the LTTE alone should be the only subject of the agenda
as the LTTE has demanded or whether all proposals for an interim authority
should be discussed as a prelude to a final settlement within the framework
of the Oslo decision, as the Government has proposed.
Comment: The record shows that the
stalemate over the reopening of negotiations had everything to do with the
divisions amongst Sinhala political parties in the South and very little to
do with agreeing on the wording of the proposed agenda.
"The representatives of three of the four co-chairs of the
Tokyo Donors Conference (Japan, EU and US) called on Her Excellency
President Kumaratunga on December 14. The co-chair representatives
.. expressed deep concern about the ongoing JVP-led actions against the
peace process in Sri Lanka and the Government of Norway's efforts as
facilitator of that process.
The representatives expressed bewilderment that a member party of the UPFA could engage in such a campaign in absolute contradiction of the
clearly stated position of the President and the Government that they
endorse and support the Norwegian role. "
Address
the JVP problem - Tokyo co-chairs urge President, 14 December 2004
"The responsibility of
resurrecting the stalled peace process is entirely with the government in
ensuring that its coalition partners reflect the thinking of the president,
if she is in fact really sincere, and her military refrains from coercive
and provocative actions", Mr. S. P. Thamilchelvan, Head of the Political
Wing of the LTTE told the Norwegian facilitators Wednesday (15 December
2004) in Kilinochchi. "Norwegian delegation was unable to give assurance
that Sri Lanka Government will take any constructive steps to take the peace
process forward" Thamilchelvan told the Press after the meeting. "
GoSL entirely responsible for resuming talks - LTTE, 15 December 2004
This dispute over the
agenda probably conceals other factors.
Comment: It may well be correct that
the dispute over the agenda conceals other factors. Mr.Dhanapala may have
helped the Sri Lanka Caucus to draw its own conclusion as to what those
factors were, if he had brought to the notice of the Caucus the views
expressed in Securing Peace: An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka
- A Report Prepared by Princeton
University
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2004
"..In our view,
resolution of the Sinhalese political party struggle is the top
priority. This
conflict—whatever the merits of the arguments—is selfish in the short-term
and self defeating
in the long-term. The country is ready for peace. The LTTE is ready to
continue negotiations. The world cannot understand why Sri Lanka does not
move ahead
to peace. All parties need to seize this moment, honor their constituents’
faith in them,
and settle their dispute immediately. The critical next steps we explore in
this report will
go unaddressed if this issue is not resolved immediately."...
Since March 2004 a dramatic split in
the ranks of the LTTE has resulted in a murky internecine war between the Karuna faction, a break away group of the LTTE, and the Kilinochchi based
LTTE.
Comment: The timing of the Karuna
'break away' after nominations were submitted for the General Elections and
before the actual vote in April 2004, the help provided by a Sri Lanka Member of
Parliament (albeit from the United National Party) for Karuna to escape to
Colombo, the provision of a 'safe house' in Colombo for Karuna's associates
by the Sri Lanka intelligence services, show the need for an examination of
Sri Lanka's 'murky' role in the Karuna 'break away'.
The SLMM has strongly urged the government to take meaningful and
effective action to curb the activities of paramilitary groups
including that of Karuna faction and the EPDP'', Major General (retd)
Trond Furuhovde, Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission told LTTE Head
of Political Wing, S.P.Thamilchelvan"
Curb
activities of paramilitaries, SLMM urges SL Government,
22 July 2004
In many ways, the international community has been indulgent of the LTTE,
subordinating democracy and
human rights to keep the peace process alive,
rewarding the LTTE with various incentives, in the hope that dialogue and
engagement will slowly democratize the organization. This however is no
longer a tenable policy.
The recent Kadirgamar assassination has thrown up hard questions about the
role of the international community in Sri Lanka’s peace process. Both the
Royal Norwegian Government and the SLMM has had to perform a difficult task
under extremely difficult circumstances and the GOSL is extremely grateful
to them for the work they are doing to support peace in Sri Lanka. Despite
media criticism and widespread speculation, I must emphasize here that the GOSL does not intend to replace Norway as facilitator.
Comment: "...There is widespread
questioning of the Norwegian role in Sri Lanka, and senior government
officials have been publicly critical of Norway. I believe Norway has
handled itself with skill and professionalism. Nonetheless, no negotiator is
perfect, and after a frustrating two years the Sri Lankan government and the
LTTE may want to reassess what they seek from the international community.
If there is to be a change, both parties need to be involved..."
International Community and Sri
Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better - Teresita C. Schaffer
The GOSL, however,
believes that the international community has an important role to play in
supplementing the role of Norway as facilitator by applying pressure on the
LTTE.
This may be an opportune moment to undertake a fundamental review or
‘redesign’ of the peace process in Sri Lanka. GOSL’s discussions with
representatives of the international community in Colombo reveal that there
is broad agreement that we have to take a fresh look at the peace process.
The route of appeasement or the ‘carrot and more carrots’ approach, have not
worked with the LTTE. Immediately after the Kadirgamar assassination, the
GOSL called for concerted international action that is immediate and
tangible against the LTTE, to include not only those that have a bearing on
the LTTE, but also its numerous front organizations in many countries
through which it continues its reign of terror in Sri Lanka.
In the globalized world of today, the trajectory of internal conflicts are
often influenced by international developments and pressures. Analysts of
internal conflicts have concluded that international involvement in internal
conflicts is eventually inevitable as a passive as well as an active factor.
The question is how to ensure such pressure is positive rather than
negative.
Comment: Here, it may have been
helpful if in relation to the 'globalized world of today', Mr.Dhanapala had expressed his views on the question whether
there may be a difference in the end goals that US and India may have in the
emerging multi lateral world, and whether for that reason, the policies of the United States and
New Delhi in relation to Sri Lanka and the LTTE
may not always
be congruent - and, examined the extent to which this impacts on
the Sri Lanka Peace Process.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in a recent address to the nation pointed
out that, “Terrorism has become today, the single most dominant global
phenomenon. From New York to London, the western world has begun to
experience terrorism, which we have for long suffered in Sri Lanka.
Terrorism has been condemned globally while its true nature is recognized
and rejected. The community of nations represented by the United Nations
Organization and its Security Council has now united to oppose terrorism
practically and effectively”.
The United States as a close friend of Sri Lanka, and as a member of the
Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference, has consistently supported a
sanctions based approach to the LTTE, and maintained that the US listing of
the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization will remain in effect until it
renounces terrorism in word and deed.
Comment: At the time that
Mr.Dhanapala made his presentation, he may or may not have had access to
Teresita C. Schaffer's Briefing Paper on International Community and
Sri Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better
-
"U.S. terrorism policies have effectively prevented the United States from
developing any real leverage on the LTTE. U.S. laws on
terrorism would have made it impossible for the United
States to contribute to post-Tsunami relief through the
P-TOMS mechanism; a different approach might have made it
easier for that mechanism to survive. This is not the time
for a major shift in those policies. However, should the
talks on revitalizing the ceasefire get somewhere, I believe
the Administration and the Congress should consider giving
the Administration some flexibility in this area. We cannot
put pressure on the LTTE if we have no means of engagement
with them."
International Community and Sri Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better - Teresita C. Schaffer
Indeed it is the international safety net provided by such a sanctions based
approach that has allowed the GOSL to continue to negotiate with the LTTE to
find a peaceful solution to the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. In order for
the GOSL to be able to talk to the LTTE without further alienating the peace
constituency in Sri Lanka, the international community must take a tough
stand against them. This will help move the peace process forward.
I would like to conclude by saying that the impact of the international
community has been mixed in Sri Lanka’s peace process. On the one hand it
has had a positive impact on the sustainability of the peace process through
sustained interest and economic support. It has however, not been
particularly effective in stemming the tide of grave ceasefire violations,
insisting on a resumption of talks or transforming the LTTE into a
democratic institution.
The next meeting of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference is scheduled
for the 19th of September in New York. It is an opportunity for the U.S. to
continue to show leadership at that meeting to ensure that acts of terrorism
like the Kadirgamar assassination would not go unpunished and that
conditions for human rights and
democracy to flourish in all parts of Sri
Lanka would be created.
As Sri Lanka enters a
democratic process of electing a new President, the
LTTE must be under no illusion that they can get away by assassinating
political leaders and resorting to electoral malpractices in the areas
controlled by them as they have done on previous occasions.
Comment: At the end of
Mr.Dhanapala's Briefing the question remains as to the way forward. Here,
the Tamil Guardian editorial of 12
September 2005, on 'Main Stream Extremism' merits the attention of
all who are genuinely concerned with securing a just peace in the island of Sri Lanka
-
"The stark polarisation amongst Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities is
undoubtedly set to deepen further. The Sinhala right wing coalition that
emerged this week behind Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse’s Presidential
candidacy is not just a marriage of political convenience but an
assertive statement of their shared vision of a future Sri Lanka – one
in which the Sinhala-Buddhism is the prevailing order and the minorities
know their place. Mr. Rajapakse is going to sign an agreement with the
Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP), the third force in the Sinhala politics
and another with the small, but important monks’ party, the Jeyatha Hela
Urumaya. The text of the JVP deal makes grim reading for those concerned
with promoting a peaceful solution to Sri Lanka’s protracted ethnic
conflict. It is a comprehensive attack on the very foundations of the
Norwegian peace process. Every concept around which dialogue has been
proposed – joint aid mechanism, interim administration, etc – has been
rejected. The ceasefire is criticised. Even Oslo’s invaluable role in
stopping the bloodshed is denounced. The most important aspect of these
attitudes, as far as the Tamils are concerned, is that they are mainstream
values in the south...
 ...Those
still optimistic about a liberal peace in a united Sri Lanka need to
seriously reconsider the viability of their vision. Three decades of
violence have not dulled
Sinhala nationalist
aspirations, nor have four years of peace and increasing enmeshment in
the threads of globalisation. On the other hand, these - and a half-century
of increasing Sinhala oppression - have
concretised a Tamil national
consciousness. It is these polarised sentiments that are playing out in the
political developments today..."
We may all gain by revisiting the words of
Professor Margaret Moore in
Nations & Nationalism in 2001 -
""...The problem in nationally divided societies is that the different groups
have different political identities, and, in cases where the identities
are mutually exclusive (not nested), these groups see themselves as forming
distinct political communities. In this situation, the options available to
represent these distinct identities are very limited, because any solution at
the state level is inclined to be biased in favour of one kind of identity
over another. That is to say, if the minority group seeks to be
self-governing, or to secede from the larger state, increased representation
at the centre will not be satisfactory. The problem in this case is that the
group does not identify with the centre, or want to be part of that political
community...One conclusion that can be drawn is that, in some cases,
secession/partition of the two communities, where that option is available,
is the best outcome overall. .."
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