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Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together

Overview report of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding



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Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together

Overview report of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding

Dan Smith

PRIO – International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

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the Evaluation Department of

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conducted with the Evaluation Departments of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Department for International Development.

Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the consultant. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Dan Smith

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CA	Conflict analysis (or assessment)
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool(s) (UK)
CPS	Civil Peace Service (Germany)
CRE	Conflict Resolution Evaluation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DDR	Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (of ex-combatants)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FriEnt	Working Group on Development and Peace (Germany)
GMV	Good governance, human rights and peacebuilding (Dutch) – referring to policies and/or recipient countries
HMA	Humanitarian mine action
HR	Human rights
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IFIs	International financial institutions
IGO	Inter-governmental organisation
INCORE	International Conflict Research, University of Ulster
LTTE	Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PCIA	Peace and conflict impact assessment
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice project
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SAF	Stability Assessment Framework
SSR	Security sector reform
U4	Four <i>Utstein</i> governments – Germany, Netherlands, Norway, the UK
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Preface

The Joint *Utstein* Peacebuilding study was developed by the Evaluation Departments of the respective foreign and development cooperation ministries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK), with Norway taking the lead, to carry out a survey of peacebuilding experience. The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) assisted in conceptualizing the study, and was then chosen as the lead consultant to manage the research. The research framework relied on each of the four departments to find research assistants to carry out the four surveys according to PRIO's instructions. It was then agreed that the research teams should also independently write country papers outlining and reviewing key pol-

icy issues, drawing on the material unearthed in the surveys and supplemented by interviews.

This report draws on the four independent national studies, to identify key findings for analysis and comparison. The overall findings of this report centre on the challenges presented in defining policy terms, articulating goals, key concepts and vocabulary in peacebuilding. A key finding is that a major strategic deficit exists between the articulation of policy and efforts to translate this policy into practice.

The international comparison and the scale of the survey of activities combine to form a unique basis for this report.

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

The thrust of the agenda established by the development ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK at their meeting in Utstein in 1999 was not new policy but better implementation of existing policy. Improved implementation is also the goal of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding. The empirical basis of the joint study is an illustrative survey of 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by the four original *Utstein* governments (U4). As well as the survey, studies were prepared of each country's peacebuilding policy and activities. Together with the wider literature on conflict and peacebuilding, that material forms the basis of this report.

The term *peacebuilding* entered the international vocabulary in 1992 through the UN *Agenda for Peace*. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the conditions, attitudes and behaviour that foster and sustain social and economic development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous. To this end, it uses a wide range of policy instruments. Some are activities undertaken as projects – discreet, chronologically limited activities, implemented by partner organisations; other policy instruments include diplomatic initiatives and military operations.

Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to ending or avoiding armed conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or to prevent a conflict from escalating violently. The activities fall under four main headings:

- to provide security,
- to establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace,
- to establish the political framework of long-term peace,
- to generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war and justice.

This adds up to a varied palette of activities and projects, which can be combined – like mixing paints – to maximise impact.

The U4 cover the full range of peacebuilding activities but concentrate more on work on the political framework, which accounted for one-third of projects in the survey, and the socio-economic foundations of peace, which accounts for a marginally smaller proportion, than on the reconciliation and security dimensions. There are, however, considerable variations in emphasis between the U4. The national studies reveal considerable strengths in the projects of the U4 and growing professionalism.

Peacebuilding must be responsive to context and able to adapt to new conditions and requirements as the context changes. It must also be sustainable: following bitter conflicts, sustainable peace is only available on the basis of sustained effort lasting a decade or more. This does not mean that all peacebuilding projects have to be sustained for so long, but that the overall strategy sees the process through.

Multi-dimensional policies are required to take on the complex task of encouraging war-torn and war-threatened societies to develop peaceful relations. This emphasis on a broad range of activities is supported by the conclusions of academic research into conflict causation. This approach to policy makes necessary multi-level cooperation between ministries and departments with different institutional cultures.

The study identifies a major strategic deficit in the peacebuilding efforts of the U4. Evidence outside the survey and national studies shows that the U4 are not alone in this strategic deficiency. The problem is visible in the fact that more than 55 per cent of the projects do not show any link to a broader strategy for the country in which they are implemented. Some projects are not linked to a broader strategy because there is no strategy for them to be linked to. In other cases, the broader strategy

exists but projects show no connection to it. Various security and socio-economic projects seem “strategy resistant” as if they need no strategic justification because their worth is self-evident. Planning is based on relatively little analysis, and there are important conceptual confusions and uncertainties. There are problems about the timing of financial flows. The influx of resources has unwanted effects in war-torn countries. There is no known way of reliably assessing the impact of peacebuilding projects.

Important lessons learned by the U4 include the multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding, the inter-dependence of its different parts, and the wide range of different activities that are possible. It has been learned that peacebuilding must be responsive to context and need and must be sustained for the long term. There is recognition of a major need for coordination within and between governments and with IGOs and NGOs. The knowledge of key personnel about peacebuilding issues is improving with experience. The U4 have started to address strategic problems.

Recommendations to correct the strategic deficit fall under three headings – policy, evaluation, and research. Each heading indicates the audience to whom the recommendations are made. It is hoped they will be of interest not only to the U4, but also to Canada and Sweden who are now also members of the group and to other donor governments and peacebuilding actors.

Policy Recommendations

Establishing strategic frameworks

There is a need to adopt two strategic frameworks:

One to assist in formulating peacebuilding intervention strategies in specific countries and regions when need arises;

The other to assist in formulating a general peacebuilding strategy for donor governments.

These provide the means for correcting the strategic deficit. This work could be initiated

jointly by the *Utstein* group. If other governments are interested in joining the work, that would be in tune with the general *Utstein* approach of refusing to be an exclusive grouping and of forming issue-specific coalitions.

The frameworks outlined below draw on general principles of strategic planning. They do not go into the substance of either an intervention strategy or a general strategy but simply outline the elements and the linkages between them that are required in strategic planning for peacebuilding.

A general peacebuilding strategy for donor governments can set the general context of principle and policy for each peacebuilding intervention that is undertaken, can indicate the basis of deciding whether to undertake an intervention, and can outline how the governments looks after its peacebuilding capabilities. What a general peacebuilding strategy cannot do is specify the purpose and shape of each intervention except in the most general terms. An intervention strategy in a given instance works in the policy context set by the general strategy but cannot be directly derived from the general strategy. Each case requires its own strategy. Moreover, as the intervention proceeds, the strategy needs to be revisited, assessed and possibly modified. An intervention strategy is not a piece of paper but a process.

In order to emphasise the importance of the case-specific emphasis, we turn first to a framework for intervention strategy, and then to a framework for general strategy.

Intervention strategy

In institutional terms, an intervention strategy has to be owned by those who implement it. In many cases, this means country desks in ministries of development cooperation and of foreign affairs. Many conflicts are shaped not only by internal national issues but also by the regional context and this dimension must also be present in strategic analysis and planning, even when it is driven by country desks. Key parts of the analysis and planning can be carried out with local partners. The expertise

required to put substance into the strategic framework includes country and regional knowledge, as well as capacity for conflict assessment, knowledge of the peacebuilding palette and especially those parts in which the donor specialises, and familiarity with the donor's general peacebuilding strategy.

The components of a specific peacebuilding intervention strategy should be:

Establish a strategic planning mechanism:

- a. Contact other potential donors to assess initial interest in cooperation on this case;
- b. Agree a strategic planning group.

Undertake conflict analysis using an agreed framework:

- c. As to conflict causes, the framework has to encompass four components;
 - i. the structural and background causes of war, whether actual or threatened, including regional dimensions;
 - ii. the objectives and likely behaviour of the main conflict actors of all sides and of those political actors who genuinely favour accommodation rather than continued confrontation, including regional political influences;
 - iii. the potential triggers for conflict escalation;
 - iv. the factors that influence how armed conflict is fought out (ranging from terrain and climate to culture of war and the balance of military forces);
- d. As to the history of the conflict, the framework needs to direct assessment towards;

- i. analysis of the political and military strengths and weaknesses of the conflict parties;
- ii. the parties' positions on peace-related issues, especially their attitudes towards outside intervention;
- iii. any previously attempted external interventions;

- e. The analysis must also include the regional context, focusing on aims and capacities of neighbouring states and important non-state groups located in those countries.

Intervention assessment: based on the conflict analysis, and reflecting available information on population – needs, casualties, demographics, refugees – and on the economic resources of the country, including available data on the country's likely absorptive capacity, work up;

- f. Needs assessment
- g. Feasibility assessment.

Derived from the above, and reflecting the basic principles and values in the general peacebuilding strategy, establish the goals of an intervention.

Initiate discussion with relevant IGOs and NGOs to establish cooperative relationships for implementing peacebuilding strategy.

Assess available means compared to goals and to target country's absorptive capacity.

Agree approximate phasing of goals and expected outcomes.

Consider how to address cross-cutting priorities in relation to the strategic phases.

Establish division of labour with other donor governments, on the basis of each one's assessment of its peacebuilding strengths. Identify any gaps and means to fill them.

Establish criteria for selection of activities and projects.

Establish mechanism of monitoring, evaluation and assessment.

General peacebuilding strategy

A general peacebuilding strategy for a donor country should cover the following:

Basic principles and goals and the challenges to the achievement of those goals – a simple statement of political principles and worldview.

The government's understanding of the concept of peacebuilding and its purpose – a summary of the government's analysis, with emphasis on cooperation.

The conditions in which the government will consider whether to launch or participate in a peacebuilding intervention – a statement of criteria that presumably highlights humanitarian and global or regional security concerns and the views of potential partners among other donor governments.

The importance of tailoring each intervention to the requirements of the case – there is no one-size-fits-all version of peacebuilding.

The basic questions that have to be asked and answered in order for an intervention strategy to be developed – the basis on which to tailor peacebuilding to fit the specific case is a needs assessment and a feasibility assessment, building on the conflict analysis.

The main techniques used by the government and its agencies and NGOs it frequently supports and preferences for the mode of intervention – within the peacebuilding palette, the activities in which the government sees its particular peacebuilding strengths.

The government's approach to strengthening its own capacities for peacebuilding interventions – how it organises its own learning from experience, with emphasis on cooperation with other donors.

Standing arrangements

The evidence is that there are many opportunities for donor governments that are so minded to work together on various components of peacebuilding. Standing arrangements could be a way to take up some of these opportunities. These would build on current dialogues and cooperation among donor governments and make it quicker and easier to work out joint peacebuilding intervention strategies for specific countries when the need arises. Through standing arrangements come closer understandings and quicker cooperation based on established routines, than are available from *ad hoc* cooperation, even if the latter is frequently repeated and working relationships between the officials are good.

These standing arrangements should involve a degree of institutionalisation, but not very much. It is in part to keep the institutionalisation light that the proposal is for standing arrangements in the plural, and not just one single cooperative arrangement. However, the details of the degree of institutionalisation are less important than the substance of cooperation that can be covered. Four areas recommend themselves:

Coordination: A standing committee that is activated as needed to coordinate the initial steps in the peacebuilding intervention strategy; it would be the basis for identifying who would staff the planning group;

Conflict analysis: A study team focusing on the analysis of conflicts in countries in which peacebuilding interventions might unfold in the near future – a continuing research group;

Intervention assessment: A mechanism for quickly recruiting a study team when needed to develop an intervention assessment – a reservoir of regional experts;

Strategic evaluation: A centre for strategic monitoring, evaluation and assessment, consisting of teams devoted to specific peacebuilding operations – the most institutional of the four components.

Evaluation Recommendations

Strategic impact assessment

The first challenge for the evaluation community is to recognise that impact assessment at the project level is not proving to be viable and to shift it to the strategic level. The next is to communicate the findings of strategic impact assessment to policy-makers on a useful timescale for strategies to be amended if necessary. How to meet these challenges has not been part of the remit of the joint study, so no detailed recommendations are offered here. The study has, however, given the basis on which some indications can be offered.

The recommendation to shift impact assessment to the strategic level necessitates a clear distinction between project outputs and impacts. Output can be evaluated and often measured (numbers of mines removed and hectares returned to farm use, for example, or numbers of people engaged in dialogue activities and evidence of shifts in attitudes). Whether these project outputs have an impact that helps promote peace is less easy to establish; there are very many other factors at work, so their effects are hard to distinguish, and in any case, what seems *a priori* like a positive impact may generate a negative and violent backlash. Output should continue to be evaluated as part of project evaluations to ensure that best practice is respected, projects are properly managed, and lessons are drawn from both the strengths and the weaknesses of projects. Impact assessment, however, should be removed from project evaluation and explored instead at the strategic level, asking whether the intervention strategy as a whole is working.

What is here called strategic impact assessment is closely related to the policy assessment/evaluation approach that is increasingly in focus already for the international evaluation community. It can be understood as the continuation of the conflict analysis that is the basis of strategic planning, as recommended above. The same analytical framework can be used as the tool to identify key changes and to relate them to different components of the intervention strategy.

One of the main issues to sort out may be the variegated timetable of peacebuilding. For example, achieving an acceptable level of security can usually be done more quickly than achieving political legitimacy, which may often be initially available more quickly than economic improvement. Political legitimacy is likely to lapse quickly if economic improvement is not forthcoming, but may become sustainable political stability on the basis of an economic recovery. Such changes may take up to a decade, while a thoroughgoing change in attitudes where conflict was on ethno-national lines will take even longer. Strategic impact assessment must also pay attention to the fluctuation of expectation and disappointment among the recipient country's population and leaders.

There are also worthwhile procedural questions to explore. There will need to be consideration of the intervals at which assessments should be offered, or whether in fact they should be offered all the time. This implies consideration of whether impact assessment should be thought of in terms of voluminous reports, after the manner of project and programme evaluations, or whether they should be much briefer, and perhaps even primarily communicated orally or in brief e-mails, backed up by a longer documentation that would be available on request. Likewise, there will need to be consideration of how criteria for impact should be spelled out, and of the need for those conducting the impact assessment to be fully familiar with details of the peacebuilding intervention strategy from its outset. It seems likely that there will be great advantage in a cradle-to-grave approach, so that strategic impact assessment is integrated in intervention strategy from the very outset.

The body of experience

The national surveys showed that project documentation is poorly stored. A further challenge for the evaluation community is to take responsibility as the guardian of the body of peacebuilding experience, for without reference to a body of experience there is little chance of learning from experience. This implies among other things that the evaluation community

should get involved in discussions about organising and coding of project archives, and equally that it has an interest in the adoption of formal strategic frameworks along the lines of those proposed above.

Joint evaluations

With the aim of promoting strategic coordination and a general sharing of knowledge between donor governments and other major actors in peacebuilding, increased emphasis can usefully be placed on joint evaluations by a group of donors. The focus of joint evaluations could be specific conflicts, countries, regions, or themes within peacebuilding such as security sector reform, return of IDPs, dialogue activities, or democratic capacity building. Thematic evaluations might provide the greatest potential for looking at experience comparatively and drawing out broadly based lessons, while multi-donor evaluations of specific conflicts, countries or regions might offer the greatest potential for assessing strategic consistency, coordination and strategic impact.

Research Recommendations

The major conclusion of this study is that there is a strategic deficit in peacebuilding. The study has identified it in the U4 but there are strong indications that not only the U4 face the problem. The task for research is to find out what needs to be known in order to correct the strategic deficit.

Theoretical research

There are several specific theoretical challenges for the research community. The first is to take further the work that has already been done on countries' capacity to absorb aid usefully and to see if there could be a methodology for calculating the absorptive capacity. It is important to know that absorptive capacity will peak in years four to seven or eight of peacebuilding effort, but it would be even more useful if there were a way of calculating its highs and lows. Even a rough approximation would be better than the current state of knowledge.

The second challenge is to look again at the issue of project impact assessment. Taking as the starting point that we currently do not know how to assess the impact of individual projects, we can admit failure and put an end to short-term demands to know. The task can now be taken out of the realm of studies that are supposed to report in a few months or at most a year or two, and put into the slower channels of genuine theoretical academic research. Two theoretical fields that ought to be explored here are those of game theory and chaos theory. Both may offer a different perspective from the normal cause-and-effect chain of logic that underpins most attempts so far to solve the problem of impact assessment.

It is likely that this research will need to take forward theoretical understanding of social change, especially to take it into the realm of peace and conflict, and to explore the ways in which external influences work. If such research produced a result it would be tested and, if still found viable, implemented. Though the evaluation literature offers no answers now, that is not to say that looking hard and long will not find an answer in the end. It is a challenge worth taking up.

A third task would be to ask why there is a strategic deficit. Three angles of approach recommend themselves here. First, the problem of conflict and social change could be taken on. It could be asked whether peacebuilding is actually a form of social engineering that faces inherent and perhaps insuperable difficulties. It might be that the complexities of conflict dynamics and the process of a society changing so that its own conflict management capacity increases are beyond the capacity of human organisations to drive and manage. Secondly, the emphasis of research could be placed not on the problem but on the institutions that attempt to solve it. This angle of approach would call on theory of organisations, bureaucracy and management to ask whether current institutions are optimal for the tasks assigned to them. Thirdly, research could be focused towards the intellectual research agenda in donor countries, to see whether the general

approach to peace and conflict and to development issues is generating the sort of knowledge that is needed for peacebuilding. If it is, the question would be how to make best use of it; if it is not, the task would be to propose modifications in national research agendas on these key issues.

This third possible line of enquiry about the sources of the strategic deficit relates to a fourth general task for research, which is to explore the theoretical relationship between development cooperation and peacebuilding. Only in recent years have theoretical frameworks been developed that offer firm foundations for explaining the linkages between development and internal armed conflict. It would be valuable to turn from the negative linkages to a new look not only at the positive linkages, but at the challenges that arise in the linkages between the social, economic, political and cultural transitions that are implied both by development and by peacebuilding.

Applied studies and methodology

Outside of the realms of theory, two further research tasks are needed in order for the framework for the peacebuilding intervention strategy to be worked out in full.

One task is to look into existing frameworks of conflict assessment and of peace and conflict impact assessment, and assess them both against academic theory and against experience. The next step would be to combine their strengths and, where necessary, address and remedy their weaknesses.

A second task is to explore the meaning of local ownership. This has become a point of principle in development cooperation and receives great emphasis in the policy discourse on peacebuilding. However, this report argues that in the context of violent conflict, local ownership becomes a more complex concept and needs to be handled with care. Local ownership can unintentionally come to mean ownership by conflict parties, or by the most powerful sectors of society. To take this discussion further and ultimately to provide nuanced guidelines for

emphasising local ownership in conflict contexts, a comparative study of experience in promoting local ownership would be the best starting point.

Structure of the Report

Chapter 1 sets the background to the study in terms of recent conflict patterns, the agenda of the *Utstein* group, the objectives of the study and the definition of peacebuilding. Chapter 2 outlines how the joint study was implemented, introducing its different components – the national surveys, national studies and this report.

Chapter 3 draws on other studies and established research conclusions to establish a context in which chapter 4 summarises key findings from the national surveys and studies. These brief sections by no means attempt to reflect the full analysis presented in these studies, but merely to highlight points that are especially relevant for the argument in this report. The second part of chapter 4 draws on these findings to outline the problem of the strategic deficit in peacebuilding.

Chapter 5 looks at issues that have arisen through the national studies and are exemplified in the project summaries in the national surveys to identify some of the key project and programme issues in the peacebuilding experience of the four donor countries.

Chapter 6 outlines strategic lessons learned, while chapter 7 focuses on the main conclusion of the report – the strategic deficit in peacebuilding and how to address it.

This overview report was discussed at an international seminar held in Asker, Norway, in December 2003. Annex 1 contains brief notes on some of the views expressed during the seminar. Annexes 2–5 provide background information on the joint study.


1 Introduction

1.1 A Decade of Peacebuilding

The term *peacebuilding* entered the international vocabulary in 1992 through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's report to the Security Council, *Agenda for Peace*. In the decade-plus since, experience has accrued in peacebuilding, involving activities to strengthen social capacities for ending and avoiding violent conflict and for peaceful conflict management.

The decade of peacebuilding has also been a decade of unremitting armed conflict. Datasets differ; this author's tally puts the number of armed conflicts from the start of 1990 until the end of 2002 at 126, causing 7–8 million deaths, 75 % of them non-combatants. Chart 1 shows the annual incidence of war since the end of the Cold War. Ninety per cent of these armed conflicts are internal wars and wars of independence. They are concentrated among the poorer developing countries.¹ Many are long-lasting and intractable.

Chart 1: Wars Since the end of the Cold War



In the new political epoch that opened as the Cold War ended, there was an increase in the frequency of international efforts to reduce conflicts and promote peace. A simple indicator of this is exponential increase in the number of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs): by 1990, the UN Security Council had authorised 15 PKOs in four decades – it authorised the same number in the next four years.

Not only did the number of PKOs increase, but the tasks that were undertaken through the interventions and the goals that were set became far more demanding. With the exception of the 1960–64 UN operation in Congo, the blue helmeted PKO forces used to monitor ceasefires and respect for peace agreements (so-called “classical peacekeeping”). In the 1990s tasks such as protecting civilians, preparing for elections and reintegrating ex-combatants into

1) Further data in *The Atlas of War and Peace* (London, Earthscan; New York, Penguin – 2003).

society were added. It was this expanded roster of tasks that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali placed under the rubric of peacebuilding. By 1999, with the UN missions in Kosovo and East Timor, the tasks had expanded to administering a country and setting up the institutions and systems that would eventually supplant interim UN administration.

About 50 per cent of peace agreements to end civil wars collapse within five years of signature.² In other words, peace is not easy to achieve. Moreover, there is significant confusion and uncertainty about what peacebuilding entails. A reflection on the policy-oriented academic literature is a salient summary of the state of knowledge in the policy world too: “There is a general consensus... that international attention and resources are necessary for successful implementation of peace agreements. Beyond that, however, there is little agreement about what outside actors actually do to assist implementation.”³ Neither the uncertainties and lack of knowledge, nor the fifty-fifty prospects of failure make it possible to turn away from the problem of trying to end wars and build peace. The reason is not only the basic humanitarian impulse but also the recognition of, as *The Economist* neatly put it, “The global menace of local strife.”⁴ Rather than turn away, we just have to do better.

1.2 The *Utstein* group

The urge to do better is what brought together the development ministers of Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the UK at *Utstein* Abbey, near Stavanger in south western Norway in July 1999. The content of the press release from that meeting is activist: “Making a difference in development is the ambition of

these four development ministers,” it declares.⁵ They set out eleven action points and the tone is straightforward and brisk. In an expression borrowed for the title of this report, they indicate four areas in which “the donors particularly need to get their act together” – coordination, untying aid, closing the gap between humanitarian assistance and long term development cooperation, and greater coherence of all policies that affect developing countries. Three areas need “more resources and the setting of new priorities” – debt relief, the multilateral system of the UN and international financial institutions, and a reinvigoration of development financing. Finally, in four areas, “the developing countries need to put their act together: combating corruption, strengthening democracy and good governance, preventing conflicts and implementing policies to reduce poverty. On conflict, they state, “Development efforts should be used strategically not just to prevent and settle conflicts but also to consolidate peace when settlement has been reached.”

Characterising these eleven points as the *Utstein* agenda, the statement closes by promising continued collaboration between the four ministers. A further meeting in The Hague in May 2000 led to a joint action plan for combating corruption⁶ and the establishment of a virtual resource centre on anti-corruption.⁷ Thereafter, the Ministers agreed on the “*Utstein* principles” setting out their shared view of the international agenda for development reform. This statement presents the group as a means of promoting coalitions among donor governments on specific issues and cases. It leads off with two points:

“Coherence: The *Utstein* Group strongly promotes coherence of international policy at large (e.g. conflict management), trade

2) Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–93”, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 3, 1995, pp 681–90.

3) Stephen John Stedman, “Introduction”, in *idem*, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars* (Boulder, Co & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

4) 24 May 2003.

5) “Four development ministers on a common course,” press statement 26 July 1999, available at <http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=38>.

6) “*Utstein* Anti-Corruption Action Plan,” available at <http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=21>

7) “The *Utstein* Group partnership,” available at <http://www.u4.no/about/u4partnership.cfm>.

policy and other relevant areas with development objectives.”

“Co-ordination: The *Utstein* Group is prepared to lower the individual flags in order to improve effectiveness through e.g. harmonising procedures and indicators and fostering ownership of the recipient country.”⁸

More recently, Sweden and Canada have joined the *Utstein* group.

This emphasis on policy coherence and donor coordination is by no means unique to the *Utstein* group, and the group is far from the only forum in which its members pursue these priorities. The group may, however, be regarded as an appropriate forum for some initiatives. Its members’ record in development and their willingness and capacity to form wider coalitions mean the *Utstein* group can have considerable weight in development issues it takes up. Based on the group’s statement of principles, coherence, coordination and conflict management are key issues in its development perspective.

1.3 The Joint Study of Peacebuilding

The thrust of the *Utstein* agenda as stated in 1999 was not new policy but better implementation through better coordination, better instruments, and better use of existing instruments. That is the spirit that imbues this joint study. Its motive force, as befits its institutional launchpad in the Evaluation Departments of the four *Utstein* governments who initiated it (U4), is to see what guide experience offers. The term “peacebuilding” entered our vocabulary about a decade ago; it seems time to find out what is being done and, as far as possible, how well, so as to be in a position to base conclusions and recommendations on experience. This led to the decision to conduct a survey of peacebuilding projects; the emphasis on projects as dis-

tinct from policies has both advantages and disadvantages, discussed below (section 2.3).

The survey was conducted by research teams contracted by each *Utstein* Evaluation Department. Each team wrote up a national policy analysis and the findings from their national survey. The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) designed the survey and has produced this report.

1.4 What is Peacebuilding?

It is necessary to preface the presentation of the study with a definitional discussion. To assess peacebuilding experience, we need to know what peacebuilding is.

It is best to begin with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali who offered a continuum of peace intervention: preventive deployment (or, later, diplomacy) attempted to stop conflict escalating into violence; peace enforcement used force if necessary to end the fighting; peacekeeping monitored compliance with agreements; and peacebuilding laid the foundation for a future without war.⁹ Peacebuilding, then, was the term for *post-war* activity. It was preferable to “reconstruction” for several reasons. The latter term emphasises physical and economic reconstruction at the expense of activities like reconciliation, and the idea of “reconstruction” is to put things back together again the way they were, which might mean reconstructing the conditions that led to war. Conceptually, the term “peacebuilding” offered the opportunity to make a new start and not simply return to a dangerous *status quo ante*.

Boutros-Ghali’s more or less chronological continuum shaped the discussion for much of the 1990s. The Brahimi Report in 2000 likewise uses “peacebuilding” for “activities undertaken *on the far side of conflict* to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for

8) “*Utstein* principles,” available at <http://www.u4.no/document/Utsteinprinciples.cfm>.

9) *An Agenda for Peace* (New York, United Nations, 1992).

building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”¹⁰ The neat chronological shape of the continuum within which peacebuilding fitted, however, was already being criticised as too neatly chronological.¹¹ Since half of all peace agreements fail within five years (and others fail after the five-year mark), the aftermath of one war might be the prelude to the next. The post-war was also potentially the pre-war and peacebuilding, therefore, should also be preventive. In February 2001, the UN Security Council threw the chronological element aside and recognised that peacebuilding “is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict.”¹² This concept of peacebuilding shapes this study.¹³

The Boutros-Ghali, Brahimi and UNSC 2001 definitions all emphasise the long-term goals of peacebuilding. This is also the keynote of NATO’s, which again leaves the chronological issue out of it. In NATO terminology, peacebuilding is “A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and – when necessary – military means to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.”¹⁴

From this decade-long discussion, we can come to a conclusion that is close to the chronological conceptualisation in both UNSC 2001 and the

NATO definition (though leaving military operations out of it because this dimension does not fall within the joint study’s remit), and still connected to the seminal concept of Boutros-Ghali and Brahimi’s variation. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development. Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to ending or avoiding armed conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting. As conceptualised in the joint *Utstein* study, peacebuilding activities fall under four main headings:

- to provide security,
- to establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace,
- likewise to establish the political framework of long-term peace,
- and to generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war and justice.

10) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, August 2000 – available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/ para 13, emphasis added.

11) E.g., Laurie Nathan, “A South African Policy Framework on Peace Initiatives in Africa”, *South African Political & Economic Monthly*, vol. 11, no. 3, 1998, pp.25–30.

12) S/PRST/2001/5 of 20 February 2001.

13) See Annex 1 – terms of reference.

14) NATO *Glossary* – AAP-6 (2003).

2 Implementing the Joint Study

2.1 The Survey

The empirical basis of this joint study is a survey of peacebuilding projects implemented by the U4. There was no intention of conducting this survey to be scientifically representative, because there existed no knowledge about the internal shape of the “population” of projects to be sampled. The aim was, instead, to have enough of a database that some worthwhile generalisations could be made. In fact, the survey showed that the organisation and content of the project archives in the four countries rule out scientific statistical comparisons. A particular shortcoming, which means many worthwhile questions cannot be answered, concerns expenditure; while the Dutch and British surveys could produce financial totals for peacebuilding activities, neither the German nor Norwegian surveys could.

The first task for the survey was to decide how to recognise a peacebuilding project. This is a separate activity from defining peacebuilding (see section 1.4 above). The survey’s definition of a peacebuilding project is based not on the activity alone but on the context and purpose. To decide if an activity is peacebuilding by reference only to the activity itself is misleading and technocratic, focusing on what is done rather than why. Much of what is done for peacebuilding may elsewhere be done for other reasons. For example, not only war-torn countries require investment in the health and education. Likewise, good governance projects

have been implemented in transitional countries in central and eastern Europe where there has not been civil war, as well as in the western Balkans where there has been war. Accordingly, projects were included in the survey only if their documentation showed a peacebuilding intent.

Decisions on how many projects in what period and country should be surveyed were taken pragmatically, based on what seemed viable and fruitful. Each research team was allocated nine recipient countries, between them offering a mixture of different phases of conflict (see Table 1 and Figure 1), and asked to provide summaries of about ten projects with a mix of different categories and financial scale. In the event, problems in accessing and processing project archives meant the research teams came up with four surveys of varying scale. The period 1997–2001 was chosen because it was appropriate for seeing what sort of response had unfolded to the introduction of the peacebuilding policy concept. A variation from the 1997–2001 framework was made for the case of Afghanistan so as to include new projects initiated in 2002 after the overthrow of the Taliban. In all, 13 countries were covered – two in Latin America, one in Europe, seven in Africa and three in Asia. Five recipient countries were covered in all four surveys. The British survey also included a significant proportion of projects not specific to any one recipient country.

Table 1: Number of Projects in the U4 Peacebuilding Survey

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	GERMANY	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	UK	TOTAL
Afghanistan	11	9	15	2	37
Angola			12		12
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10	10	12	2	34
Cambodia	10	10	11	5	36
Colombia	10				10
DR Congo				5	5
Guatemala	10		20		30
Kenya	10	10			20
Mozambique	10		14	1	25
Rwanda	6	10	11	6	33
Sierra Leone				6	6
Sri Lanka	12	7	17	6	42
Sudan		10	10	4	24
Africa Regional				7	7
Not country specific		1		14	15
TOTAL	89	67	122	58	336

Figure 1: Conflict Phases in the Survey Countries

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not at war in survey period (1997–01) 	Kenya
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term post-war peacebuilding • starting before 1997 	Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term post-war peacebuilding • starting during or after survey period (1997–2001) 	Angola, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term peacebuilding • starting before 1997 • low level-conflict continuing 	Rwanda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term peacebuilding • starting during or after survey period (1997–2001) • low level-conflict continuing 	Afghanistan, DR Congo
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At war throughout survey period 	Colombia, Sudan

The instructions for the survey are presented in Annex 3. Given the context- and purpose-based definition of a peacebuilding project, the research teams paid attention not only to what was done in the projects, but also to how it was explained in project documentation and evaluation if any. Under the four main headings of security, socio-economic framework, political framework, and reconciliation and healing, the 17 categories in the survey were based on

knowledge of the field before the survey was conducted. Further refinement of the list of peacebuilding project categories has been possible on the basis of the survey. Two additional project categories have emerged out from under the convenient heading of “other” that the survey used, and are included in Figure 2, which presents the components of peacebuilding (see section 3.4 below). The survey eventually encompassed 336 peacebuilding projects in

19 categories by four donor countries in 13 recipient countries, one region and a non-specific locus, from 1997 to 2001 and, for projects in Afghanistan, in 2002 as well.

It may be asked whether project *documentation* is the only or best empirical basis for the surveys. There are important limitations in the documentation, some of which reflect substantive problems, others being due to archiving inconsistencies. As source material, documentation – including evaluation reports where available – has therefore been supplemented by interviews even though these can also be unreliable as source material.

2.2 The National Studies

Beyond the surveys of the projects, the four research teams were also asked to write studies of their country's peacebuilding policy and activities, as reflected in the projects, supplemented by interviews and discussions with relevant officials and other individuals. Since the U4 countries lack single official statements of their approach to peacebuilding – having, rather, a plethora of statements about aspects of their policy approaches – the research teams used the studies to explore and identify their countries' peacebuilding policies as well as lessons learned and conclusions to be drawn. These studies are able to stand alone, each as an assessment of one donor country's approach and experience. The summaries below of national policies and experience (section 4.1.1 through 4.1.4) are not intended to be full reflections of the national studies and, given the available space, could not possibly do them justice. Rather the summaries pick out items and issues that are of particular relevance to the themes and orientation of this report. Titles and authors of the national studies are listed in Annex 5.

2.3 The Overview Report

The project survey and the four national studies combine with interviews and other policy and academic literature to form the basis of this report. Through comparing and contrasting the

national components in the survey and national policy analyses, the synthesis report aims for conclusions about experience in peacebuilding, including lessons learned, and guidelines for the future. However, the report does not offer a compendium of lessons learned from peacebuilding. The specific issue here, as a result of the survey and the national studies, is the question of strategy – whether and how the activities reflected in the survey are the expression in practice of a donor country's peacebuilding policy and strategy either in general or in relation to each specific recipient country.

It can legitimately be asked whether the focus on projects in this study is the most helpful starting point for a study of peacebuilding experience. In some meetings with practitioners it has been objected that a focus on the detailed activities in the projects risks missing the bigger picture. We can offer three responses to this question and objection. First, the projects were one door into the world of peacebuilding. Beginning with policies and the bigger picture offers a different way into the same world. It might be asked about a study that focused on policies at the expense of projects whether it did not risk concentrating on the generalities and the goals at the expense of the specifics and the untidy realities of implementation. Second, though the survey focuses on projects and the details of activities, the national studies encompass policies and the bigger picture. Third, if the bigger picture has any reality it should be reflected in the detailed activities of the projects. If it is not, there is a problem – a disconnection between policy and practice that ought to be filled by strategy. It is clear from the survey that exactly that disconnection exists.

These three responses may perhaps raise a further challenge: is the disconnection between policy and projects real, or is it only apparent, and simply the result of entering the peacebuilding world through the project “door”? To this the response is that it may indeed be that the disconnection is more visible when one looks first at projects and tries to work out what their role and purpose are. In principle, however, the disconnection would be equally evi-

dent if one started with the policies and attempted to work out how they are interpreted in practice. The disadvantage of starting at the project end of the spectrum may be that it is harder to grasp the big picture. The advantage, however, may be that it is easier to grasp the

on-the-ground realities. The evolution of the joint study from a project focus to a strategic focus represents an attempt to grasp the connection between the big picture and ground level, and finding that the connection is sometimes tenuous.

3 Working in and on Conflict

Within the field of development cooperation, the options have been identified of working *around* conflict, *in* conflict and *on* conflict.¹⁵ Peacebuilding always means working on conflict (i.e., targeting and attempting to remove the causes of armed conflict), and sometimes means working in conflict (i.e., implementing assistance programmes amidst conditions of armed conflict).

3.1 Assessing the Context

How does the context of war – looming, current or recent – affect the development activities carried out for peacebuilding? A World Bank study sees civil war as “development in reverse.”¹⁶ Does this mean that peacebuilding is simply development going forward? Yes, but with this defining difference – the context of crisis and war.

The differences the context makes are many and fundamental, starting with the stakes and risks both for the beneficiaries and the personnel of peacebuilding. The aim of peacebuilding interventions is to save life, but interventions into crisis situations can and do also cost lives, often because aid ends up in the wrong hands. Even when this does not directly cost lives, it may hamper the work of peacebuilding. The diversion of funds by conflict parties – and the basic fact that, since conflict is about control of resources, the injection of resources into a conflict country inevitably means involvement in the conflict – was already highlighted in 1997 by the OECD DAC guidelines.¹⁷ Even when misappropriation of funds is not part of the problem, peacebuilding assistance must be worked out in the knowledge that some of the standard operating procedures of development cooperation

are inappropriate. The World Bank study argues that post-war development assistance needs to be calibrated differently from normal circumstances – “social policy is relatively more important and macroeconomic policy is relatively less important in post conflict situations”.¹⁸ Equally, it can be questioned whether it is right or possible to carry out programmes for private sector investment when there is no stable peace, which means instability in the operating environment and arbitrariness in the legal framework.

Thus, to say that peacebuilding is development in a war-defined context does not mean it is the same old development routine with marginal variations. The difference is fundamental and the logic of peacebuilding differs in important respects from the logic of development assistance.

3.2 The Complexity of Peacebuilding

Commenting on peacebuilding in Kosovo and East Timor, the most demanding peace operations the UN had ever taken on, the Brahimi report says,

“These operations face challenges and responsibilities that are unique among United Nations field operations. No other operation must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage – in a war-damaged society, using voluntary con-

15) Jonathan Goodhand, *Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty*, CPRC Working Paper 6 (Manchester, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, May 2001) pp 5 and 30–3.

16) Paul Collier, VL Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marte Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC, World Bank & Oxford University Press, 2003).

17) “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997,” *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris, OECD, 2001) p.109.

18) Collier et al, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, pp 154–5.

tributions, because the assessed mission budget, even for such “transitional administration” missions, does not fund local administration itself. In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep.”¹⁹

It is not clear that all those involved in peace-building projects always share this nuanced understanding of the demanding complexity of their tasks. Many international field staff are out of their depth, especially those on short-term secondments to IGOs. With six-month assignments, they may have only a brief period of effective work shortly before they leave. The experience for locals is often disillusioning and demoralising. There are, of course, many exceptions both in IGOs and NGOs – people who know more to begin with and stay for longer – but often their task is made more difficult by others who are less knowledgeable and leave quicker.

Another part of the problem is a failure to confront mentally the realities of the context. Consider the implications of the hypothesis put forward in an NGO publication: “Good peacebuilding is about being good human beings and embodying and reflecting personal and organizational integrity. The focus should be kept on one’s own and others’ humanity and the partnerships, relationships and trust that are central to this work.”²⁰ Perhaps if the statement were more qualified (“One focus,” for example, rather than “The focus”) it would work better. It is a good thought about good peacebuilding yet somehow ignores elements such as greed, rapacity, deceit and hunger for power, which are part of the contextual reality and part the reason that a peacebuilding intervention is necessary.

The problem seems to be an approach that is shaped by the idea of serving beneficiaries,

focusing on those who have suffered, and assuming that those who have suffered are both needy and deserving. These concerns have to be balanced by recognising that some people perpetrated the violence from which others suffered, that they are still around, may not reveal themselves, and may try to get their hands on some of the aid – and that some who suffered were also perpetrators and likely to be part of the problem, not the solution.

3.3 Local Ownership

In similar vein, Jan Egeland, former State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway, warns of the need for hard-headedness among peacemakers and peacebuilders:

“A third party should not naively believe the stated intentions of the leaders involved. In the ten conflict resolution efforts in which I have been involved, *all* the leaders at all times claimed their goal was “to end the suffering of our peoples.” In reality, there were always influential political, military, or economic warlords who had their personal and professional interests tied to continued conflict.”²¹

This must place some question marks around local ownership, which is now an axiomatic goal in development cooperation, including among the *Utstein* group as reflected in its statement of principles. A failure to recognise the reality of the conflict context might make a simple commitment to local ownership almost fatal to hopes of successful peacebuilding. This is true not only of the governments of partner countries, which are likely themselves to be conflict parties, but also of local project partners. There needs to be very careful research about the identity and background of project partners, and recognition that it will be best to attempt to increase the degree of local ownership slowly and carefully as experience offers a growing

19) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para 77.

20) Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren, eds, *Towards better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict* (Utrecht, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002) p.23.

21) Jan Egeland, “The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel,” in CA Crocker, FO Hampson and P Aall, eds, *Herding cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, DC, United States Institute for Peace, 1999) p.544.

basis of trust. Otherwise, local ownership risks being a code for working with the most powerful and most opportunistic sectors of society.

The lines of division that led to conflict escalation normally survive the peace process: if war is continuation of politics by other means, peace is generally the resumption of the same politics, often by the same pre-war means. Groups with the capacity to own projects are usually connected to those political divisions or active parts of them. For donors, in short, devotion to local ownership needs to be nuanced by attention to local realities.

3.4 The Peacebuilding Palette

To help develop the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and prosperous social and economic development (see section 1.4 above), peacebuilding uses a wide range of policy instruments. Some of these instruments are activities undertaken as projects – discreet, chronologically limited activities, implemented by partner organisations; there are other policy instruments, including diplomatic initiatives and military operations.


The survey looked at project activities under four headings – security, establishing the socio-

economic foundations, establishing the political framework, and generating reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war and justice. Figure 2 sets out the types of activities of peacebuilding under these four general headings.²²

It is common to refer to these policy instruments as “tools” and to the full range of them as a “toolbox.”²³ The point of this terminology is to emphasise that the policy actor makes a selection of which policy instruments to use and how to use them – just as if fixing a car. For those who understand internal combustion, the metaphor emphasises the inter-linkages and inter-dependence between the different elements in the process – the importance of the harmonious working of the different components in the machine. The interplay between the different elements of peacebuilding, however, both goes beyond the purely mechanical and is harder to predict than the toolbox metaphor implies. Moreover, the possibilities for optimising and multiplying the effect by combining different kinds of activities are richer and more varied. Accordingly, the term “palette” is preferred here, because one of the interesting things about peacebuilding “tools” is that they can be combined together in ways that are specific to the country, region and conflict in question, for greater effect – like mixing paints.

22) As a result of the research in the project surveys, the number of activity categories in Figure 2 is higher than in the survey instructions in Annex 3.

23) Influential in setting this fashion was Michael S Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC, United States Institute for Peace, 1996).

Figure 2: The Peacebuilding Palette

4 The Peacebuilding Experience of the *Utstein* Countries

As indicated above (section 2.2), the national summaries in section 4.1 below are drawn from the national surveys and studies conducted as part of this joint study. The summaries are not intended to offer a full reflection of the analyses in those studies and cannot report all the evidence and conclusions in them. For a more in-depth appreciation of each of the U4's peacebuilding experience, the reader is referred directly to the studies (see Annex 4 for details).

4.1 Policies, Strategies and Experience

4.1.1 Germany

German peacebuilding policy evolved in the mid-1990s; the 1998 election of the current government is seen as a key moment in the evolution. In 1999, budgetary allocations for UN PKOs and other peace initiatives were increased and in 2000 the government launched a basic policy document – “Comprehensive Concept of the Federal Government on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building.” This tripartite but unified concept takes a wide definition of security, leading to a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding using multiple instruments and methodologies and the involvement of a wide range of actors both in government and outside it. This is seen as a means of guaranteeing strategic coherence. Acting together with international partners is also stressed. Against this background, the goal of German development policy is to help lay the foundations for avoiding violent conflict both by reducing structural causes of violence and by promoting in society and government the means of peaceful management and resolution of conflict. Poverty alleviation is key. This means that for the Federal government, development policy is part of its broad security policy.

Currently, a National Action Plan on Crisis Prevention is being drafted, intended to give further substance to the Comprehensive

Concept of 2000. This new action plan focuses on the civilian side of crisis prevention and will cover all relevant ministries and departments. Other current developments are the preparation of a cross-sectoral concept on crisis prevention and peacebuilding, intended to be the guiding concept for development policy and cooperation, and further work on the conflict early warning mechanism of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The German research team notes evidence of growing professionalism in the handling of peace and conflict issues since the mid-1990s, with a further strengthening since 2000. There are new fields of action, such as trauma healing, reconciliation, and work with youth, and there are also new instruments. The Civil Peace Service has been built up since 1999 so that appropriately trained and qualified experts can be deployed to assist groups, communities and governments in conflict to develop their capacities to handle conflicts non-violently. High standards are expected of the individuals, based on intensive training for some months. If the CPS permits a flexible targeting of appropriately qualified personnel towards crisis situations, the financial equivalent is to be found in the innovation of National Peace Funds that are established to support micro-projects. Networking between the main German actors in peacebuilding has been institutionalised through the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), established in 2001, to pursue the government's goal of strategic coherence.

Alongside strengths, the German study notes some deficiencies. The study divides its sample of recipient countries into three groups, identifying strategic consistency in German development cooperation with one group (Colombia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka), an absence of overall peacebuilding strategy despite peacebuilding content in many project activities in a second group (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kenya and Rwanda), and peacebuilding activities but no system or defined strategy in a third group

(Afghanistan and Mozambique) (pp19–21). Cross-referencing from these three groups to the cursory outline of conflict phases in Figure 1 (section 2.1 above), it can be noted that there is no systematic relationship. The conflict situations of Colombia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka, for which Germany has well-articulated peacebuilding strategies, are as different from each other as are the conflict situations of Afghanistan and Mozambique, towards which Germany had no defined peacebuilding strategy. The reasons for the variations in the degree of strategic planning, then, are not to be found in conditions in the recipient country. Subject to further enquiry, it seems the reasons lie in the internal realities of the German government and its relations with other donors and with recipients. One view is that the reasons lie in decisions by the country desks, which chose peacebuilding as a focal area for development assistance in Colombia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka but not in other countries, where the focus was rather on goals such as promoting the private sector. The German study concludes that the strengths of German peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka indicate the benefits of a “strategically guided and well coordinated” approach (p58).


A further finding of the German study (p25) is that, “No common understanding of peacebuilding as a method, concept or approach could be identified among the German (development cooperation) institutions or individual actors in the survey countries.” The study traces three broad approaches: issue-oriented, placing peacebuilding at the same level as good governance or specific activities such as demobilisa-

tion; cross-sectoral, identifying peacebuilding as a theme with its own methods and aiming to integrate it into the design of projects and portfolios; and context-oriented, meaning that all development cooperation could be regarded as peacebuilding if it is undertaken in a conflict-related context. The study also indicates that in many cases, the three different approaches co-exist. The Germany study links conceptual clarity to strategic clarity, as in the case of German peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka, and identifies an unfolding process of improvement at both conceptual and strategic levels during the survey period, especially in the last part of it.

The Germany survey covered 89 projects in nine countries (Table 2). There were severe data constraints, because there is no overall project database. Exact project expenditures in a recipient country could not be identified since disbursement and planning procedures vary widely among the government agencies and NGOs. If the survey is, nonetheless, adequately illustrative, we can conclude that German peacebuilding focuses on the traditional development category of socio-economic assistance (including, in this survey, return of refugees and IDPs) and support for the political framework, which is a well-established part of assistance to countries in transition. The broad categories of security and reconciliation receive less emphasis. As the German study notes, the process of adapting country portfolios to reflect new priorities after the comprehensive concept was laid out is not yet completed.

Table 2: Project Survey Overview: Germany

	Security	Socio-Economic	Political Framework	Reconciliation, Justice & Healing	Total
Afghanistan	–	7	3	1	11
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	4	3	3	10
Cambodia	2	3	5	–	10
Colombia	–	4	6	–	10
Guatemala	–	4	5	1	10
Kenya	1	5	2	2	10
Mozambique	2	4	4	–	10
Rwanda	–	1	2	3	6
Sri Lanka	–	6	2	4	12
TOTAL	5	38	32	14	89

Chart 2: Surveyed German Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors (governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)

The survey also indicates that the German government's commitment to international cooperation is not fully reflected at the project level (Chart 2). Less than a third of German peacebuilding projects are reported as involving cooperation with other major players – significantly less than each of the other three U4 countries.

4.1.2 The Netherlands

The Dutch study notes that, like most other donors, the Netherlands lacks a singular and well-defined framework on peacebuilding. Because “hardly any policy document has been

devoted to the topic of peacebuilding in an exclusive, comprehensive and complete manner”, the policy must be “reconstructed from fragments scattered over a multitude of different sources.” (1. p7)²⁴. The ongoing practice of the Dutch MFA also forms a source from which policy can be construed (1. p25).

The 1991 White Paper *A World of Difference* set the requirement for a new framework for Dutch development cooperation policy following the end of the Cold War. Conflict was not a major topic in the White Paper; by contrast, the 1993 policy document *A World in Dispute* elaborated

24) The Dutch national study is reported in two papers, one on policy and one on the project survey (see Annex 4). When referring here to specific points or quoting, the in-text reference indicates “1” for the policy study and “2” for the survey findings.

on the development/peace connection and offered an analysis of conflict patterns and trends on a global scale. The analytical focus included ethnic, resource and political conflicts and the disintegration of states. The conclusion was that new patterns of international relations raised the need for coordination between development cooperation policy and other dimensions of foreign policy. With clear connections to wider concepts of security and to the concept of “human security” then emerging from the UNDP, there was a call for integration of the policy fields of development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1993 and still today, this is referred to as the need for *decompartmentalisation*.

Policy evolution accelerated with the change of government in 1998, though in peacebuilding there was no dramatic change in direction. In development cooperation policy as a whole, the number of recipients of bilateral structural assistance was reduced to increase efficiency and impact. Recipient countries were selected on the basis of three criteria – the level of poverty, the quality of their macro-economic policies and their degree of good governance. Other countries could be assisted specifically in the fields of good governance, HR and peacebuilding (grouped as GMV countries). The main criterion for selection as a GMV country was the prospect of successful cooperation between the Dutch government and the recipient government. In this context, peacebuilding is defined as the entire spectrum of development cooperation activities aimed at helping to prevent or resolve armed conflicts. In addition, there was willingness to fund peacebuilding in countries where inter-governmental cooperation was not an option, working via NGOs.

An internal policy paper in 1999 and White Papers in 2001 on HR policies and on conflict prevention express these changes but leave room for interpretation and flexibility. The HR White Paper seeks mainstreaming in foreign policy and integrates HR principles in policy on both development and conflict. The 2001 White Paper on conflict prevention aims for a well-

coordinated international approach, and seeks a Dutch role within that, rather than specifically Dutch policies. Conceptually, the White Paper draws on the distinction between “structural long-term prevention” and “operational short-term prevention” that the Carnegie Commission put forward four years previously.²⁵ These overall policy approaches were expressed in regional strategy papers on Africa (1999), Southeast Asia (1999 – though not very specific about conflict), the Great Lakes (2001) and the western Balkans (2001 and 2002).

A further White Paper followed in 2002 on post-conflict reconstruction. It draws on experience to address issues in physical reconstruction and economic, socio-cultural and political development after violent conflict. It emphasises the importance of political stability and the consolidation of a secure peace, which require international support, although it equally emphasises that ownership of the peace process must be local. It supports a long-term and multilateral, cooperative approach by the international community, stressing the importance of coherence and coordination.

To help in the development and management of strategies for implementing the policy, the Netherlands MFA has recently developed a Stability Assessment Framework (SAF). The SAF combines analytical functions, setting strategic goals and process management. Goals, policy gaps and plans are identified in workshop sessions involving embassies and local partners. Since mid-2002 it has been tested in Mozambique, Rwanda and Kenya and three such exercises will be undertaken annually from now on, together with updating sessions in countries where SAF is already in use.

As policy evolved, financial allocations changed. From 1996, the explanatory notes in the national budgets showed increasing attention to conflict management and peacebuilding. In the nine countries originally selected for the Dutch survey (the seven in Table 3 plus Guatemala and Mozambique),²⁶ 213 peacebuilding projects

25) *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York, Carnegie Commission, 1997) chapters 3 and 4.

were identified at a combined total expenditure of 235.2 million Euros. This amounted to about 20 per cent of Dutch development cooperation expenditure in those countries in the survey period and about 12 per cent of project activities.


As the Dutch analysis notes (2. p.14), this means that peacebuilding projects are on aver-

age financially larger than normal development assistance projects. With variations from one recipient country to another, the overall average cost of a Dutch development assistance project in the nine countries originally chosen for the survey was 600,000 Euros, while the average for peacebuilding projects was 1.1 million.

Table 3: Project Survey Overview: The Netherlands

	Security	Socio-Economic	Political Framework	Reconciliation, Justice & Healing	Other	Total
Afghanistan	2	3	3	1		9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	2	5	2		10
Cambodia	5	1	4	–		10
Kenya	–	–	9	1		10
Rwanda	3	–	4	3		10
Sri Lanka	1	1	5	–		7
Sudan	1	1	2	6		10
Not country-specific	–	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL	13	8	32	13	1	67

Chart 3: Surveyed Dutch Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors (governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)



Project activities have reflected the evolving priorities. The Dutch survey reports that the emphasis of peacebuilding activities both in numbers of projects and scale of expenditure falls on the political dimension (Table 3). This is not the pattern for Dutch development cooperation as a whole, where the emphasis falls on the socio-economic aspects. The average costs of Dutch peacebuilding projects are highest for those in the socio-economic sector (1.7 million Euros), followed by those that fall under the broad headings of security (1.1 million), reconciliation (640,000) and political framework (520,000).

The emphasis on cooperation in the 2001 White Paper on conflict prevention and the 2002 White Paper on reconstruction was already reflected in on-the-ground cooperation with other major actors: Chart 3 shows almost 75 % of Dutch peacebuilding projects are collaborative – the highest proportion among the U4.

4.1.3 Norway

Norway's 1995 development cooperation White Paper *A Changing World* noted that, by then, development aid was being more frequently applied to peace and democratization issues than had previously been the case. The overall goal of Norwegian development cooperation policy was to help improve social, economic and political conditions in developing countries, including contributing to peace, which required an effort to deal with the long-term causes of violent conflict. This document formalised a broad national consensus, beneath which there are disputes both about the best means of implementation and about the balance between traditional foreign policy and Norway's support for peace processes as in Guatemala (from 1990), Israel/Palestine (1993) and Sri Lanka (especially since 2001), and less high profile cases such as Mali, South Ossetia, Sudan and Colombia.

A peacebuilding strategy paper was drafted in 2002 but a year later had not been given official status. This paper focuses more on the sub-goals and broad means of implementation of

Norwegian policy than on the overall goals. The central thrust of the paper is on the need to deal with the long-term causes of armed conflict, which it identifies in a variety of factors as follows: high speed political and economic changes; increasing socio-economic inequalities and marginalization of vulnerable groups and regions; weak institutions, corruption, and a lack of human rights and democracy; overlapping ethnic, religious, cultural and social cleavages, often leading to demands for autonomy; competition for scarce natural resources such as freshwater and arable land; environmental degradation and disasters; competition for easily tradable resources (diamonds, oil, minerals etc) that can contribute to financing long-lasting conflict; a historical tradition of violence and easy current access to arms. The analysis reflects current academic theory on conflict causation and leads to the case for directing development cooperation policy in practice towards addressing these causal factors systematically. The strategy paper also emphasizes the need to find a common international platform for peacebuilding, both in the sense that peacebuilding in a country must be sensitive to the regional context, and in the sense that donor countries should develop a division of labour that utilises each one's comparative advantages. The paper can be seen as following up several points in the *Utstein* agenda, particularly in the emphasis on policy coherence and donor coordination.

The Norwegian study draws attention to the introduction in 2002 of a budget line for transitional assistance, bridging the gap between traditional categories of long-term development aid and short-term humanitarian assistance – another point in the *Utstein* agenda. This flexible financing arrangement was first used in relation to peacebuilding in Afghanistan after the Taliban regime was ousted. A further development in 2002 was the establishment of a unit for Peace and Reconciliation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intended to identify lessons learned from involvement in peace processes; at present, two of the staff work on Sri Lanka with two more working on peace processes in

general. The development cooperation agency NORAD has also recently established a peacebuilding desk.

Financing for peacebuilding projects comes from two sources – the MFA and NORAD. Of the countries in the survey, during the period 1997 – 2001, the MFA financed the majority of projects in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sudan, whereas NORAD financed the majority in Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique and Sri Lanka. Cross-referencing to the brief outline of conflict phases in the survey countries in Figure 1 suggests a pattern in which, on the one hand, projects in long-term development partnerships are funded through NORAD, while some particularly difficult and bitter conflicts (Rwanda and Sudan) and cases with high political profiles (Bosnia and Afghanistan) are funded through the MFA.

In 2003, a reorganisation of the institutions of Norwegian development cooperation policy was initiated, with the aim of a greater integration of policy implementation. The general direction of the reorganisation seems likely to lead to a major change in the role of NORAD. At the time of writing, however, key aspects as

well as organisational details were still under discussion.

Norway thus has a stable policy, an active debate on strategy and institutional foundations, and recent innovations in implementation. The survey indicates that the Norwegian portfolio of peacebuilding projects emphasises the socio-economic category, which is traditional in development cooperation, and projects in the now well established political dimension (Table 4). If the survey sample is acceptably illustrative, projects in the field of reconciliation, justice and healing make up one sixth of the whole, and the security category even less.

Though access to much project information was relatively straightforward, financial information was an exception. There are enough financial data, however, to indicate that security and socio-economic projects tend to be considerably larger than projects in the political and reconciliation categories. The security projects, therefore, are more important in the Norwegian peacebuilding portfolio than their number indicates, while socio-economic projects predominate both in project numbers and in expenditure.


Table 4: Project Survey Overview: Norway

	Security	Socio-Economic	Political Framework	Reconciliation, Justice & Healing	Total
Afghanistan	4	7	1	3	15
Angola	2	6	3	1	12
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	6	3	2	12
Cambodia	3	3	4	1	11
Guatemala	1	7	9	3	20
Mozambique	2	3	9	–	14
Rwanda	–	5	4	2	11
Sri Lanka	–	7	4	6	17
Sudan	1	6	–	3	10
TOTAL	14	50	37	21	122

Among security projects, most were humanitarian mine action. There was a broader range of projects under the socio-economic heading, with emphasis falling on return of refugees and displaced persons and on health and education infrastructures. Projects in the political framework emphasise democratisation – especially election assistance and media – with work also in the fields of human rights, good governance

and institution building. Most of the reconciliation projects are about bridge-building and dialogue in society, with some support to truth and reconciliation projects. The Norwegian study notes that, among the socio-economic projects there are, in general, fewer with clearly defined peacebuilding goals than in the other categories (p.25), despite the policy emphasis on the role of development in building peace.

Chart 4: Surveyed Norwegian Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors (governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)



Norway's policy emphasis on cooperation is reflected in about 40 per cent of the peacebuilding projects in the survey being carried out on a cooperative basis (Chart 4). This is about the mid-point for the U4 between Germany and the Netherlands.

4.1.4 The UK

The British study²⁷ notes that the UK does not have a peacebuilding policy as such. Current policy terminology is conflict prevention (formerly conflict reduction). However, the UK is active in many countries where there is current armed conflict so it does not limit itself to conflict prevention, and with these activities it does what other countries do under the peacebuilding heading. This does not mean that peace-

building and conflict prevention, if properly understood, are the same, for conflict prevention is a sub-category within peacebuilding; rather, it means that the UK calls its policy by a different name. We return to the issue of policy labels below.

In 1997, the new government issued a White Paper on development cooperation, the first for 22 years – *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. This brought violent conflict into the framework of policy on development cooperation and the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department was set up within the Department for International Development (DFID). The White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globali-*

27) The British national study is reported in three papers – one on strategy, an addendum to it, and a compilation of lessons learned (see Annex 4). When referring here to specific points or quoting, the in-text reference indicates “1” for the strategy study, “2” for the addendum and “3” for the lessons learned.

sation Work for the Poor followed in 2000. It stated that it is necessary to address conflict in order to take development forward, while keeping eradication of poverty as the key long-term goal.

The British policy analysis identifies six principles in the UK's policies and activities: the correlation between poverty and conflict; the importance of personal safety; that democratic systems are a necessary condition of conflict prevention; that an integrated and multi-level approach and international coordination are required for conflict prevention; the importance of partnerships with a wide range of actors and institutions; front-loading post-conflict aid to reduce chances of conflict recurring.

Policy evolution continued with the founding of the *Conflict Prevention Pools* (CPP) system in April 2001. This is a system that "pools" expertise and resources from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and DFID. There are two such pools – Africa and Global. Funds pooled by the FCO, MoD and DFID are topped up by the Treasury. This can be seen as a financial incentive for cooperation between three departments with not only different policy remits, but also different traditions, styles and core concerns. A further incentive for conquering these barriers is the argument that inter-departmental cooperation, coordination and coherence leads to better policy making, based on improved conflict analysis and leading to more effective implementation. The British study notes that the three departments appear to have gone to considerable efforts to make the CPP system work (1. p23).

The CPP system is designed to be holistic. Strategies that draw on pooled resources should embrace development, foreign policy, defence/security considerations, law enforcement and, in principle, trade issues. Seen in international perspective, the system is highly innovative, and the British study notes the view that it has influenced other donor governments (1. p.23). At the same time, it is an almost archetypical reflection of the aim of the current UK government to achieve what it calls "joined-up"

government. Evaluation of the CPP was under way in late 2003; this will provide better knowledge about how the system is working and the degree to which it meets expectations. Subject to the results of the evaluation, the system must be regarded as, potentially at least, a watershed in British development cooperation policy.

Compared to the other three countries, the survey of UK peacebuilding projects found the smallest number to sample (Table 5). Particularly striking is the relative lack of socio-economic projects and of projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This does not mean the UK does less in relation to conflict and peace than the other *Utstein* countries. The lower number of projects may be explained by differences between the concepts of peacebuilding on which the survey was based and the concepts embedded in UK policy and projects. Projects were included in the survey if the documentation reflected explicit peacebuilding intent. The survey may indicate that socio-economic projects are implemented without explicit (and therefore conscious) reference to any conflict-related aim; note that the Norwegian survey also comments on this. In addition, the strikingly low number of projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were identified as showing peacebuilding intent may be because, given the unmistakable context of recent armed conflict, it was thought unnecessary to make explicit reference to the aim of building a sustainable peace there. Where aims are implicit, however, policy coherence may be sacrificed. Thus, the relatively small sample in the UK survey – covering the period from 1997 to 2001 – may reflect in part, at least, the need for the CPP system that was introduced in 2001.

Problems in the financial data on the UK's projects mean that only estimates of expenditure are possible (the British study suggests a margin of error of +/-10 per cent). With that reservation, expenditure on peacebuilding projects in the nine countries in the survey totals about 350 million Euros, in a development cooperation total for the nine of about 1.4 billion (2. p.7). In other words, UK peacebuilding expenditure

in these countries in the survey period is about a quarter of all development assistance.


The survey suggests the UK focuses more on security and reconciliation activities than its U4 partners. Unlike the other three donors in the survey, the UK also focuses a considerable proportion of its projects outside individual coun-

tries, and places considerable emphasis on working through both inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and NGOs. Important points are working thematically on regional and global levels, improving policy instruments, research, and strengthening multilateral institutions.

Table 5: Project Survey Overview: The UK

	Security	Socio-Economic	Political Framework	Reconciliation, Justice & Healing	Other	Total
Afghanistan	1	1	-	-		2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	1	-	-		2
Cambodia	3	-	2	-		5
DR Congo	1	-	1	3		5
Mozambique	1	-	-	-		1
Rwanda	2	-	3	1		6
Sierra Leone	3	-	2	1		6
Sri Lanka	-	1	2	3		6
Sudan	-	-	-	4		4
Sub-total	12	3	10	12		37
Africa Regional	-	-	1	5	1	7
Not country- specific	6	-	-	-	8	14
TOTAL	18	3	11	17	9	58

Chart 5: Surveyed British Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors (governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)



The British study notes that the UK has partnership agreements with IGOs such as UNICEF as well as with the Red Cross, with benchmarks and targets, and evaluates them. These agreements give the UK considerable leverage with these partners, aimed at increasing strategic coherence and coordination. In general, as Chart 5 shows, the UK also implements a significant proportion of its projects (45 per cent) with other major actors.

4.2 Themes and Contrasts in U4 Peacebuilding Experience

4.2.1 Adapting to new priorities

A World Bank document in 1998 set out objectives and components of post-conflict reconstruction. The objectives then stated were to “facilitate the transition to sustainable peace” and “support economic and social development.” Of seven components, three were economic and financial measures and two others prominently include economic or financial measures; the list also included governance, health and education infrastructure, demining, return of displaced populations and DDR.²⁸ The 1997 DAC guidelines offer a less crisp and considerably fuller version of peacebuilding, with emphasis not only on economic reconstruction, internal peace and security, the rule of law, DR and return of refugees, but also good governance and the development of civil society, human rights, institution building, security

sector reform, the judiciary, media and education in mediation and negotiation.²⁹

These two documents together represent a reflection of the state of the art around 1997/8. From today’s perspective, only five or six years on, the Bank’s list in particular seems narrow and wooden. Both documents lack the social-psychological elements of reconciliation and healing, for example. The 2001 DAC supplement to the guidelines brings in new principles for the methods used in peacebuilding (“Do no harm”, flexibility, transparency, dialogue with stakeholders, emphasis on local capacity building) and gives new emphasis to some of the content, especially in gender, work with youth and children, small arms and light weapons, and the twin themes of justice and reconciliation.³⁰

The combined project portfolios of the U4 countries are considerably broader than the range indicated in the 1997 DAC and 1998 World Bank documents. Taking into account projects of healing and of bridge-building dialogue as well as projects that are thematic and global in scope, the combined U4 peacebuilding portfolio also outreaches the 2001 DAC guidelines. This is evidence that peacebuilding has been developing during the period under review in the U4 survey. The U4 countries are themselves centrally placed in this process of development and learning.


28) *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank* (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1998) pp 4–5.

29) “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997,” *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.

30) “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001,” *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.

Table 6: Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects by Donor and Category

	Security	Socio-Economic	Political Framework	Reconciliation, Justice & Healing	Other	Total
Germany	5	38	32	14	–	89
Netherlands	13	8	32	13	1	67
Norway	14	50	37	21	–	122
UK	18	3	11	17	9	58
TOTAL	50	99	112	65	10	336

Chart 6: Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects by Donor and Category

1: Security projects

2: Socio-economic projects

3: Political framework projects

4: Reconciliation and justice projects

5: Other projects

If the 336 projects in the survey are approximately representative of the whole peacebuilding effort of the U4, Table 6 and Chart 6 indicate that, in terms of numbers of projects, it leans towards the political dimension – exactly one-third of projects surveyed – with the socio-economic category accounting for a marginally smaller proportion. The security and reconciliation dimensions jointly account for the last

third. Germany stands out for doing rather little in the security dimension, Norway for doing very much on the socio-economic front, the Netherlands for emphasising the political side within its portfolio, and the UK for emphasising security and reconciliation – the two peacebuilding categories that are non-traditional within development cooperation – as well as for its emphasis on projects that are not specific to

a recipient country but are regional, global or thematic in scope.³¹ If it was possible to compare project expenditures, we would expect the socio-economic and security categories to be much more prominent than indicated by comparing the numbers of projects.

In conducting the survey, the research teams often had difficulty in assigning a project to just one of the 17 categories with which they were equipped. The difficulties did not only lie in deciding whether to regard a project as primarily democratisation or good governance, or primarily physical reconstruction or education infrastructure – in other words choosing between categories within a major heading such as the political framework or socio-economic foundations. Equally often, they lay in deciding whether a project was repatriation or grass roots dialogue – in other words, choosing whether a project should be regarded as socio-economic or about reconciliation. The problem was that some projects fit two or more categories equally well. In compiling statistics for this study, choices were made about which single category each project fitted, on the basis of the dominant objective and the dominant activity within the project. That was necessary in order to generate statistics, but – as is often the way with statistical exercises – does damage to the subtlety of the reality of peacebuilding. This is why the term “palette” is preferred to the more usual “toolbox” to describe the range of peacebuilding possibilities. The survey shows that peacebuilding colours are mixed to produce amalgams that combine activities in fundamentally different fields, requiring a very wide range of skills for implementation.

In the case of all four donor countries in the survey, there is evidence of adaptation to the evolving policy agenda of peacebuilding and, in the UK case, conflict prevention. The Dutch peacebuilding portfolio has a different shape from its normal development assistance portfolio, and the UK emphasis on the newer elements has been remarked on. The UK has made the institutional innovation of the CPP, while Norway

has introduced the transitional funding mechanism, Germany the Civil Peace Service, National Peace Funds and FriEnt, and the Netherlands the Stability Assessment Framework. This general process of adaptation is partly caught in the project survey for the period from 1997 to 2001, but has gone further in the last two years as lessons from the late 1990s and the start of the new century have been absorbed.

4.2.2 The complex challenge of multi-dimensional policies

Of the challenges taken on by the U4, the most demanding concerns the breadth of their policies. Recognising that when countries are torn apart by civil war, the causes lie deep in the social and socio-economic fabric, the U4 – by no means alone in the international community – aspire to implement peacebuilding at multiple levels against multiple problems with multiple partners for many years.

The U4 have arrived at this point by a variety of routes. Dutch policy change in the early 1990s explicitly reflected the broader concepts of security associated with the end of the Cold War. The same influences are visible in the formulation of Norwegian policy in 1995. British and German shifts came later, and as step-changes rather than evolutionary processes, with the 1997 and 1998 elections.

Judging by research into the causes of armed conflicts, the multi-dimensional approach is essential. What makes it demanding is not just the consequent complexity of the policies but the associated necessity for multi-layered cooperation between ministries and departments that often have very different institutional cultures and prejudices against each other. Instruments such as the German FriEnt and the British CPP are means of addressing these problems.

Cooperation at working level is also required between governments. Agreements between ministers must find expression in practice. The

31) These summary comments reflect on numbers of projects, not their financial scale; conclusions on the financial commitment to different project categories could have little weight given the poor state of the relevant data in too many cases.

degree of cooperative project implementation varies, with the Netherlands most cooperative, followed at some distance by the UK, with Norway close behind and Germany further back again. This finding, however, by definition, only reflects cooperation in projects. There are other forms of cooperation, of which potentially the most decisive and influential would be a division of labour. It may be that the pattern of distribution of projects between the U4 is the basis for more or less formal agreement on a division of labour between them, if that is a direction in which they choose to move. Such a division of labour, whether case-specific or general, would require a considerable degree of coordination of objectives and methods in order to ensure strategic coherence.

4.2.3 Concepts and policy labels

Apart from the shared goals, two common strands emerge from the summaries of policy evolution and perspective above. The first is that no U4 country has what any of the research teams was prepared to characterise without reservation as “a policy” on peacebuilding – in three cases the policy had to be deduced from a variety of sources, and in the fourth a policy (or a strategy) is in draft form. The second is that in the U4 as in other donor countries, a major role in peacebuilding is played by the part of the government responsible for development cooperation. In these departments, there tends to be a strong and self-aware organisational culture with well-established policies, strategies and concepts.

Such an institutional setting for peacebuilding should lead us to expect that, if there is any lack of clarity about peacebuilding, there will be a tendency to slip into a default mode of the concepts, approaches and vocabulary of normal (i.e., peace-time) development. This tendency may be particularly strong if the concepts and terminology of peacebuilding are unclear, as indeed they are.

To take an example of lack of clarity in concepts and terminology, the UK’s policy is called “con-

flict prevention.” Actually, the UK does not seek to prevent conflicts, which is quite right since conflict motors change in societies and is necessary for development, and thus for meeting important goals in UK international policy. Rather, the UK seeks to help prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. So the UK has the wrong name for its policy, but does it matter since, as the British study notes, much of what the UK does in this field is the same as what other countries (and this joint study) call “peacebuilding”? Perhaps not at the level of overall policy and budget allocations, but the confusion may have an impact at lower altitudes. To illustrate, UK policy documents offer definitions of key terms. In DFID documentation on conflict assessment³² “peace-building” is defined as “action taken over the medium and longer term to address the factors underlying violent conflict”. In the same glossary, “conflict prevention” is defined as “Activities undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict” – even though the UK’s project portfolio, under the policy heading of conflict prevention, includes many projects whose purpose is clearly long term. It should be added that the UK example has been taken because it has been formalised and can be quoted. In the German case, as the German study notes (p. 25), there is also “no common understanding” of what peacebuilding means.

The confusion in policy terms, labels and definitions is evidence of a field that is still developing and therefore in flux. It was a formative assumption in designing the joint study, that there had been a decade of peacebuilding since Secretary General Boutros-Ghali introduced the term to the international vocabulary in 1992. That turns out to be true only in a rhetorical sense. The survey of projects and the summaries of national policies indicate that implementation of a peacebuilding approach did not start to go very deep until the latter part of the survey period – i.e., about the turn of the millennium. As the field develops, it will be important to clear up the confusion about broad goals, policy

32) See *Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes* (London, DFID, January 2002) pp. 35–36, and, with a slight variation in the conflict prevention definition, *Conducting Conflict Assessments: An Introduction* (London, DFID, January 2002) p.3.

labels, concepts and terminology, which is almost certainly the source of a major strategic deficit in U4 peacebuilding.

4.2.4 Identifying the strategic deficit

Alongside the lack of national peacebuilding policy or strategy, most peacebuilding projects lack strategic connection. In the case of more than 55 per cent of the projects in the survey, researchers were unable to identify a link with a broader strategy for the country in which it was being implemented. Were there a broader strategy, it is not credible that more than half of project documentation would omit reference to it. This is strong evidence of a strategic deficit.

The German study identifies both conceptual confusion (p.25) and a very variable degree of strategic consistency and thinking in project planning and country portfolios (pp.19–21). The Dutch study (2. pp.28 *et seq.*) notes that Dutch policy statements on small arms, child soldiers and reconciliation are not properly followed through in activities on the ground. It also notes that the clarity and degree of logic in strategic formulations in projects is variable, with some being little more than gestural (2. pp.28–9). Moreover, it notes that strategies in Dutch peacebuilding projects are mostly derived not from Dutch policy but from international norms and conventions. The Norwegian study (p.25) notes significant variations in the clarity with which projects' peacebuilding goals are stated, with socio-economic projects particularly lacking strategic focus. The British study notes that the CPP system requires more strategic clarity than had previously been the case (1. p.29) but examination of policy documents shows the persistence of conceptual uncertainties.

The strategic deficit is not specifically a U4 phenomenon. A synthesis study of Sida peacebuilding projects reported, "We have not found a

high level or extensive degree of strategic planning."³³ At a recent international conference on lessons learned from the Western Balkans, there was open discussion of the lack of a peacebuilding strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of a largely notional strategy in Kosovo.³⁴ There was no articulated strategy for international peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan in mid-2003, eighteen months after they began, and many observers of developments in Iraq since April 2003 conclude there has been no meaningful strategy there either.

Further, as the British study notes, to have a strategy is one thing but whether it covers what it needs to is another; some strategies reveal less coherence than others, and the cycles of strategic planning and budgeting do not match (1. p.24). If 55 per cent of projects lack strategic connection, that does not mean the other 45 per cent have clear and well worked out connections to broader strategies. In many cases, the links appear to be superficial and little more than *pro forma*.

The issue here needs specifying. The problem is a strategic deficit, not a strategic vacuum. There are many strategic documents for countries, regions and partnerships; the UK, for example, has 15 geographic and thematic strategies. But there seems to be a gap at both ends of the spectrum. In some cases projects lack connection to a country strategy because there is no country strategy. In other cases, there is a country strategy to which some but not all projects are connected – so to what strategy are the other projects connected? In yet others, a strategy can be deduced from project documentation or other sources such as interviews, but it has not been written down and formalised. In these circumstances, the rotation of personnel means that strategic understanding rotates away as well. Institutional memory seems to go back about three years, four at most; peacebuilding goes on for ten at least.

33) SIPU International AB, Stockholm; Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen; and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo: *Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding* – Sida Evaluation 00/37, 2000, p.6.

34) *Lessons Learned and Best Practices from the Western Balkans*, International Conference on Conflict Management and Conflict Prevention, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm, 8–9 October 2003.

However, a strategy is not – or should not – be simply a formal statement. It should be a process of analysis, planning, evaluation and learning that is revisited regularly. The most important meaning of the absence of reference to a broader strategy in project documentation is not that an appropriate piece of paper did not exist, or was not available to those who designed or approved the project. Rather, the most important problem is that those projects are not connected to a continuing process of strategic analysis, planning and evaluation.

The strategic deficit discussed here is within peacebuilding, not development cooperation in general. Projects were selected for the survey only if they showed evidence of peacebuilding intent. Over half of those selected thus reveal intent but no strategy. Where there is a country strategy for development cooperation, that does not *ipso facto* mean there is a country strategy for peacebuilding. The conflict context makes a fundamental difference and has to be taken into account in the planning of peacebuilding projects. It is, of course, possible that the problem is not that there is no strategic link but that it is not reflected in the project documentation.

Such a practice makes strategic consistence, coordination, coherence and evaluation all problematic.

The connection between the confusion over terms, labels and definitions on the one hand, and the strategic deficit on the other, is the lack of an established vocabulary of peacebuilding. Without it, various other vocabularies that come to hand will be used. In the case of peacebuilding, the language that is most to hand is that of development cooperation. It is, unfortunately, likely that where development cooperation is the default conceptual and planning mode, the specifics of peacebuilding – the war-defined context – will slip out of focus. The results of that could be serious.

A strategic deficit does not mean the projects are worthless. Nonetheless, with a strategic deficit, however good each individual activity is, there is a deficiency of control, therefore of responsibility and accountability, and it is less likely that the goals of policy will be achieved. This is, therefore, a matter for serious concern and, since it is unlikely to resolve itself, is in need of urgent political attention.

5 Project and Programme Issues in the Peacebuilding Experience of the U4

The national studies and surveys reveal many strengths but also a number of features that give grounds for concern. In this section the latter are highlighted by first tracking the classic project cycle – analysis, planning, implementation, evaluation; then by picking out a number of further issues that arise; and finally by looking at the larger planning context within which each project ought to sit.

5.1 The Project Cycle

5.1.1 Analysis

Systems of planning invariably begin with analysing the problem. Some systems are not much more than problem analysis. Planning using the SWOT system – strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats – aims to identify the components of strategy in the analysis of obstacles and openings. The widely used Logical Framework Approach goes even further by identifying objectives simply as the reverse of the problem – if the problem is war, the objective is peace, for example. Whether formally expressed and taught, or not, it is axiomatic that planning begins with analysis – treatment without diagnosis defies everything we regard as sensible.

It is striking that project documentation frequently offers no clear analysis of the problem that is to be addressed by the project. When present, the analysis often gets no further than acknowledging that there is a conflict and therefore conflict resolution activities are appropriate. The German study (p.59) notes that project documentation often refers only in passing to conflict and the British study quotes

a finding that, “In most cases, such (development) efforts are being undertaken without any direct relation to conflict.”³⁵ The Dutch study found little evidence in the documentation that planning was based on analysing the conflict, corroborating other studies showing that analysis is little used in Dutch policy practice (2. p.29); the introduction of the Stability Assessment Framework represents a response to this problem.

The issue of analysis is clouded by the common eliding of two different terms and concepts – peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA), and conflict analysis (or conflict assessment) (CA). This confusion is sometimes to be seen in the details of project documentation, sometimes in the way that analysis is discussed by officials. CA and PCIA are related, and any PCIA should include a rigorous CA, but they are different and it is not always necessary for CA to include PCIA. CA is an analysis of a conflict into which the analyst institution is considering an intervention. Generally, PCIA is treated as an analysis of the impact that a development project or programme under consideration by the analyst institution will have on conflict (actual or potential) in the beneficiary country.³⁶ To analyse that impact and see whether it might promote peace, conflict or neither, it will be necessary to analyse the conflict and conflict potential – and thus to conduct CA. The CA part of the exercise, however, is only a step along the way to a PCIA. On the other hand, a CA process can be carried out regardless of whether development projects are being considered, and its relevance is not limited to conclusions about development assistance.

35) Chakrabarti, *Compiling Lessons about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, Discussion paper, Evaluation Department, DFID, 2002.

36) One of the major efforts to draft a PCIA framework would see it differently and make PCIA a process of mutual learning that should be led by people from the beneficiary country, not the aid agency: Ken Bush, *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*, Working Paper #1 (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1998). Bush has recently complained that PCIA has deteriorated into a technocratic exercise by and for donor country experts, failing to challenge power relations within the world of development cooperation policy: *idem*, “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: The Commodification of an Idea”, in Alexander Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, eds, *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin, Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001) <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/>.

Confusion between these two kinds of analytical exercise is incomprehensible. The objects of analysis and the purposes are different. It may simply be lack of familiarity with the field of peace and conflict research that explains the problem.

Further confusion is found on close examination of some of the analytical frameworks. The UK, for example, has a very full framework, which in many aspects has the unusual double benefit of being both comprehensive and crisp. The guidance for analysing conflict does not specifically mention the objectives of the local conflict actors – these are left to be deduced from the interests of the actors, although political actors often act against their own interests. On the other hand, when international actors are brought into the frame, the first thing the analyst is told to look for are “interests and policy objectives” of the outsiders.³⁷ This neglect of the objectives of local actors is reflected also in a not-for-citation World Bank draft paper from December 2002 on the Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework.

It is arguable whether the category of interests allows the analyst fully to consider objectives. It does not actively block it, but nor does it push an analyst in that direction. USAID’s draft Conflict Assessment Framework dated January 2002 does considerably better in integrating actors’ interests and objectives with structural causes and factors such as opportunity. It is worth recalling that the Angola war ended upon Savimbi’s death, that low-level conflict festered in Cambodia until Pol Pot was dead, and the unlimited spoiler tactics of the RUF in Sierra Leone frustrated the UN and sabotaged the peace agreement until the British intervened directly against the RUF – these and a host of other examples warn those who would pursue peacebuilding not to ignore or underplay the role, objectives and calculations of local political and community leaders. There is no theoretical

or practical reason not to combine the structural long-term causes and the shorter-term objectives of political actors in a conflict analysis. War – even civil war – remains the continuation of politics by other means: it is a willed action that needs to be understood as such, even if it often also looks like an inchoate process. And once a full analysis has been conducted, it needs to be one of the elements that shape the strategic plan.

5.1.2 Planning

Absence of analysis, a degree of uncertainty about the object of analysis, and gaps in the methodology offer one set of problems for project planning. The foundations on which the house will be built are already weak. However, these flaws are probably not enough to explain why over 55 per cent of projects in the survey lacked connection to a broader strategy. As well as the absence in many cases of any such broader strategy, there is also another factor worth looking at.

Evaluations quite often reveal that seemingly obvious connections are not made at various levels of the policy and project machinery. A Norwegian evaluation of work in Mozambique remarked that, although “The end of the war did generate a process of rethinking the Norwegian aid program,” the main aid strategy papers revealed “little effort to relate aid to the particular challenges in post-war Mozambique.” Overall, the report remarks that Norway’s role was as “a reliable source of finance to programmes whose strategic terms were set by others,” quotes a Norwegian aid official as complaining that all they did was write cheques, and places this against a background in which the Mozambican peace process was not a major priority for Oslo policy-makers “and was in any case primarily seen as a foreign aid question.”³⁸ In not dissimilar vein, the Sida synthesis evaluation in 2000 complained that, “The documentation often contains no argument that logically

37) *Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes*, UK Department for International Development, 2002.

38) Alistar Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo and Astri Suhrke (project leader), *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique*, Evaluation Report 4.97 (Oslo, Norwegian MFA, 1997): p.11 (“The end of the war...”); p.xi (“reliable source”), p.11 (writing cheques), p.10 (“a foreign aid question.”).

links the proposed or reported activities to the conflict situation.”³⁹ The British study reports that UK project documentation appears to imply that the job of peacebuilding was viewed as over or irrelevant in Mozambique, Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1997–2001 period; although the conflict link may emerge at some point in the planning process, it may then get lost (1. p.29). The German policy analysis likewise notes that project planning often makes only passing reference to the conflict situation (p.59).

What these holes in the documentation reveal is that there is no certainty that peacebuilding projects are being planned in such a way that any established goals or criteria are being met. The inadequate linkage between strategy and projects is a source of uncertainty, a lack of internal transparency and non-accountability.

5.1.3 Implementation

Given these weak foundations, it is worth noting that the number of projects in the survey that can be identified as having been seriously flawed is small. Identification of seriously flawed projects was, in the survey, only available through evaluation reports, some internal and some external. There are a few outright failures but a considerable proportion of projects subjected to evidently rigorous evaluation emerge well from the scrutiny. It is also clear from the documentation that there is a wide range of projects that have been, as projects, well designed and that have good prospects of contributing positively to the beneficiary country’s projects of peace.

Among the projects surveyed are many with narrowly defined objectives – e.g., mine clearance, primary education, living conditions, a hospital, trauma-response training for women, support for a radio station or for a dialogue meeting or series of meetings. There are also many projects with multiple objectives – e.g., a

municipality where the mode of reconstructing homes was chosen so as to encourage local democracy. Further, a significant number have deliberately broad objectives, such as support for a civil society role in a peace process, with a commensurately broad range of means used to approach that objective. Norway has supported broadly-based, multi-faceted, long-term projects, usually combining political and reconciliation functions in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Guatemala and Sudan; Germany has done so in Sri Lanka, Mozambique and Guatemala; the Netherlands has done so in Sri Lanka and Rwanda. A UK variation on this theme is its use of multi-country projects and programmes. All the U4 governments support projects that combine socio-economic and political or reconciliation functions. While some projects in the political and reconciliation categories deal with the role of leaders as peace is built, many support ordinary people in their communities in trying to get control of their destinies and reconcile with those who have done harm to them, or to whom they have done harm. Means used include dialogue meetings, training seminars, public education programmes and the like. On this theme, the Norwegian portfolio offers a reminder that there are many paths to peace – in one project in Afghanistan, judo is a means of peacebuilding.

In other words, there are many kinds of projects, and also variety in the basic concepts of what a project is and what it can do. Along with variety, there is innovation. The problem is not that what is done on the ground is clearly deficient – and where it has been identified as such, it has been quickly corrected; rather the problem is the lack of connectivity between ground level and the centres of policy and strategy.

5.1.4 Evaluation

Project evaluation could not only be a means by which the functioning of individual projects is checked, but also a way of resolving – first of all

39) SIPU International *et al*: *Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, p.5.

by identifying and exploring – the problem of strategic disconnection. The U4 governments invest quite heavily in evaluation, and undertake evaluations of about 40 per cent of peace-

building projects (Chart 7). More than half of all evaluations identified in the survey are external evaluations, covering 25 per cent of all peacebuilding projects.⁴⁰

Chart 7: U4 Project Evaluations in Survey





Chart 8: Differences in U4 Government Patterns of Project Evaluation




40) In compiling these figures, internal evaluation exercises – such as the UK's “output to purpose review” – were distinguished from routine progress reports.

Of the U4 governments, Germany and the UK are keenest on evaluation, with both evaluating about 60 per cent of peacebuilding projects, while the Dutch evaluate 28 per cent and the Norwegians 25 (Chart 8). The picture changes somewhat when external and internal evaluations are distinguished from each other. The

UK has put 40 per cent of peacebuilding projects in the survey to external evaluation. All Dutch evaluations in the survey were external, so the Netherlands registers 28 per cent of projects externally evaluated, while Germany registers 24 per cent and Norway 21.

Chart 9: U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Project Categories



Variations in the evaluation rates of the different categories of project (Chart 9) are interesting, and explained by a range of factors. The most evaluated category is “other,” to which we return momentarily. Apart from that, the security category stands out with 60 per cent evaluated, of which more than half (38 per cent of total security projects) through external evaluation. This is probably explained by two factors: the UK – an enthusiastic evaluator – features strongly in security projects, and Norway – normally a light evaluator – selected a disproportionately large percentage of HMA projects for evaluation, because of concerns in the late 1990s about one particular Norwegian NGO. As for the other three categories, the evaluation rates are 42 per cent in the political category, 36 per cent in socio-economic and 26 per cent in


reconciliation, healing and justice. However, whereas the U4 evaluation average is that about 60 per cent of evaluations are external, for reconciliation projects the proportion of external evaluations is almost 80 per cent. The reason for this is not mainly because of the UK’s relatively strong commitment to reconciliation projects. Rather, it is more likely to be because reconciliation, justice and healing projects are the newest of the four categories. This has two effects: first, with less project time having elapsed in the period covered by the project survey, the frequency with which they are evaluated was probably lower than it will be in a few years’ time; second, when the projects are evaluated, external evaluators are commissioned because the government departments recognise their own relative lack of experience in this

part of the field. In coming years, we can expect to see the proportion of evaluated projects in this category increase, with a declining proportion of evaluations that are external. Newness may be the reason why the category of “other” shows high rates of evaluation and of external evaluation, but the sample is so small that no reliable conclusions can be drawn.

The likely importance of elapsed project time in explaining some features of the evaluation patterns is confirmed when the frequency of evaluation is assessed in relation to beneficiary countries (Chart 10).⁴¹ The proportions of projects evaluated are high in Cambodia and

Mozambique where U4 governments have had a peacebuilding engagement for a decade, compared to the more recent engagements in Guatemala and Rwanda. Longevity is not the whole explanation, however: projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina presumably get evaluation more frequently than some other cases such as Sri Lanka because of its higher political profile. The reason for the strikingly high evaluation rate of projects that are not country-specific is that most of these projects are British and DFID has placed specific emphasis on wanting to learn from its thematic projects, which, by definition, are not specific to any one country.

Chart 10: U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Beneficiary Countries



Despite this considerable effort in evaluating peacebuilding activities, and though many of the evaluations draw useful conclusions about individual projects, there is no basis for drawing

wider conclusions about, for example, what works and what does not work in U4 peacebuilding. The Dutch study notes that worthwhile lessons have been drawn but without

41) Angola, Colombia, DR Congo and Sierra Leone are omitted from Chart 10 because the number of projects in those countries included in the survey is too small for even modest conclusions to be drawn.

establishing the basis for general conclusions (2. p.39) and bemoans the tendency of evaluations to list concrete achievements without analysing what those achievements really add up to (2. p.35). The German study notes that knowledge about the effectiveness and efficiency of peacebuilding is generally very poor and sees large differences in the methodologies used in internal evaluations (p.30).

Beyond this, there are three major problems in the area of evaluation. The first two are presumably also problems in evaluation of development cooperation activities, and the third has its parallel problem there.

The first problem is doubt about whether anybody pays attention to evaluations. The problem is not evident in the project documentation but emerges in conversation and informally. The idea that there is resistance to evaluation is not new to anybody who has been engaged on either side – evaluator or evaluated – and nor is it surprising. It would, nonetheless, be worth developing mechanisms to follow up evaluations, to assess how their input is received and the degree to which it is acted upon. The Norwegian study found a noticeable lack of such mechanisms and found that evaluations that had been carried out were not included in the project archive (p.30).

The second problem is that the record of experience is, in general, in a condition that is difficult to access. The difficulties vary from one country to the next and include the decentralisation of archives (project files held by embassies with no copies in the capital), inconsistency and incomplete material in the archives, minimal or no cross-filing, inadequate use or non-use of policy flagging to make the DAC coding system more comprehensible from the perspective of those interested in looking at peacebuilding experience. The German project survey was unable to work from a unified database as a basis for selecting projects; the UK survey concluded that better information management is needed if evaluation is to be done

properly; the Norwegian survey found the NORAD archives more user-friendly than the MFA's and, like the German survey, could not produce expenditure figures; the Dutch survey was helped by a well organised database but there were deficiencies within it that made compiling basic information difficult. In general, the survey provokes the question, How is it possible to learn from experience if there is no organised body of experience from which to learn?

The third problem of evaluation in the peacebuilding field is how to assess the impact of projects in contributing to peaceful relations in the beneficiary country. As the Dutch study comments, impact assessments have problems in establishing causality and the intervention logic (2. p.31), a point seconded by the German study (pp.30–1). One of the boldest recent efforts to make progress comes from the Reflecting on Peace Practice project (RPP) – a multi-year, multi-donor and multi-participant project to synthesise and summarise lessons from the recent experience of NGO peace projects. RPP concluded that a peace programme is effective in contributing to “peace writ large” (i.e., peace in the country) if it leads beneficiaries to develop peace initiatives, produces political institutions to handle conflict grievances, prompts people to resist violence and provocations, and results in an increase in people's security.⁴² However, a community might develop its own peace initiatives and resist provocations, only to be destroyed by war coming from another part of the region or country: islands of peace sometimes exist and sometimes are inundated. Similarly, political institutions established to manage conflicts and address grievances can, in the wrong hands, also be the instruments for fanning the flames of conflict. Peacebuilding is haunted by awareness that things can go either way.

The RPP approach is bold, direct, and useful in many ways, but does not ultimately resolve the problem. How to assess the impact of one project or programme, when there are so many

42) Mary B Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge, Ma, The Collaborative for Development Action, 2003) pp. 16–18.

influences on the question of whether there shall be peace or war, and what timeframe should be used – a year, a decade, a generation – when the effects of war go so deep but its return can happen as a result of a crisis lasting only a month or two: these are challenges that have not yet been satisfactorily handled. The Dutch study also suggests that “complicated project implementation structures” also made it difficult to investigate impact (2. p.31).

According to a literature review conducted for the University of Ulster’s International Conflict Research (INCORE), there is a great deal of confusion about peacebuilding evaluation, especially in relation to assessing impact, in part because of the similarity of the term with PCIA.⁴³ As with the confusion between PCIA and CA, it seems conceptual clarity is required in order to distinguish different exercises from each other. The INCORE studies of what they call conflict resolution evaluation (CRE) admit that it is “an *ad hoc* process that conforms to the needs of the moment and is limited by a lack of skills, understanding and resources.”⁴⁴ As they point out, academic theory of social change is no help since it tries to explain how change happens rather than how it can be initiated, and in any case has paid scant attention to change in the context of peace and conflict.⁴⁵ The truth is that there is no science for gauging the effect of peacebuilding projects on the prospects of peace and war and CRE is too often a snapshot in a dynamic process.⁴⁶

Two conclusions have been drawn from this unsatisfactory state of the art. The first, in which the INCORE approach is quite at odds with RPP’s, is that judging the worth of interventions by their effect on “peace writ large” sets the standard too high. The INCORE

authors argue that both because conflict resolution interventions are often small, and because so many variables (“ranging from economics to droughts”) shape the link between an intervention and the prospects of peace, analysing the link is extremely difficult.⁴⁷ This is true not only for small interventions, but even for large and expensive ones in the security and socio-economic categories. The INCORE approach therefore asks for more limited and more reasonable expectations in CRE. A second conclusion is that since a project is an unfolding process, so impact assessment should be a process, with the hope that a cradle-to-grave assessment of a project’s impact would help strengthen the impact and make it sustainable.⁴⁸

These conclusions still fail to solve the problem of assessing impact. Asking for reasonable standards seems right, but begs the question, reasonable standards *for what?* The problem has been displaced, not solved. And while it is true that a few projects in the survey suggested that lifetime project monitoring is of benefit in fine-tuning the activity as it goes along, introducing it across the board would be extremely expensive. It would presumably be possible only for a selected few projects. Selection would have to be made even before projects have begun implementation. This would raise the challenge of finding a systematic basis for selection, suggesting a further displacement of the problem, and still with no answer to the basic question of how to identify and assess the impact of individual projects.

Faced with this problem and with a series of resourceful but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to solve it, the first part of the alternative proposed here is radically different: *we should simply admit failure.*

43) Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play* (Derry/Londonderry, INCORE, 2002) pp.8–9.

44) Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory* (Derry/Londonderry, INCORE, 2003) p.5.

45) *Ibid*, pp.30–31.

46) Church and Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory*, p.5.

47) Church and Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play*, p.38.

48) *NGOs and Impact Assessment*, NGO Policy Briefing Paper No. 3 (Oxford, International NGO Training and Research Centre, 2001) p.7.

So far as we know, there is no way to assess the impact of individual projects and we should therefore stop trying to do it. Academic research should be encouraged to try to solve the problem, with experimentation to be initiated if some interesting theoretical insights emerge. Until then, peacebuilding project evaluations should no longer bother about assessing impact. They should concentrate on identifying project outputs, ensuring that project partners have fulfilled their contracts, accounted for their spending, fulfilled their promises and in general implemented the project in line with best practice and with the expectations and demands they set out to fulfil. This should include as a priority verifying whether project implementation has remained strategically consistent.

The reason that this last element is so important is the second part of the alternative proposed here: *we should shift the assessment of impact from the project level to the strategic level.* Self-evidently, in order to implement this shift, there must be a strategy. We return to the discussion in section 7.2 and section 7.4 below.

5.2 Further Strategic Issues

It is worth drawing attention to two issues that have a bearing on the problem of the strategic deficit and the task of strategic planning: one is that some kinds of projects appear resistant to strategy, which emerges from the project survey, and the other is the more generally recognised problem of absorptive capacity.

5.2.1 Strategy-resistant projects

Apart from the absence of any strategic linkage for 55 per cent of projects surveyed, a further feature of the strategic deficit is the strange phenomenon of types of projects that seem particularly resistant to taking strategic considerations on board. In particular, these are HMA, DDR and socio-economic projects. The problem is visible both in the project summaries and

in evaluations and is noted in the Norwegian study (pp.25 and 38).

The role of mine action and DDR in peacebuilding is obvious, but that does not mean they do not need a strategy. Indeed, the past two to three years have seen an effort to rethink HMA because of the recognition that landmines are a social as well as a physical fact. Land cleared was not always used, for example, so mine clearance made the land safer but did not contribute to prosperity or even successful subsistence.⁴⁹ Likewise, for DDR projects to contribute to peace and stability, ex-combatants should be integrated into society in a phased process, and there must be job opportunities awaiting them. Otherwise, they are most likely to head for criminality.⁵⁰ And economic development can have negative as well as positive effects. To ensure the latter, socio-economic projects need to be tested by a PCIA that connects them to the overall peacebuilding strategy in the beneficiary country. In short, no activity can be permitted to be outside of the net of the intervention strategy.

5.2.2 Absorptive capacity and the wages problem

A country that endures an armed conflict with a high political and media profile in western countries and then comes to a peace agreement will next face the arrival of several thousand international staff and the inflow of a considerable amount of wealth in a relatively short period. Experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular brought the issue of absorptive capacity to the forefront, and the issue has again been made acute by the effort in Afghanistan: just how much peacebuilding aid can a war weary country usefully absorb? And “usefully” deserves emphasis because many things that are not useful – including widespread corruption and rampant price inflation – result from too much aid.

The UK has a specific position in favour of front-loading its peacebuilding aid – i.e., providing it early in the post-war period. The British study

49) Ananda S. Millard and Kristian Harpviken, *Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique*, PRIO Report 1/01 (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 2001).

50) Collier *et al*, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, pp.159–61.

says that this is based on research showing the high risks of peace agreements breaking down early. As a general proposition, however, the idea that aid should come early is challenged by World Bank research showing that a decade of aid is needed for post-conflict recovery and avoidance of further war, and that the peak absorption period is in the middle four or five years of the decade (i.e., from year four to year seven or eight).⁵¹ The study's authors argue that peacebuilding aid is given by the major donor countries at the wrong time and at the wrong rate.

Whether the British policy therefore needs to be recalibrated, however, is not immediately clear. It depends on what the other major donors do. If everybody follows the British example, the World Bank research team's complaint that peacebuilding aid peaks at the wrong time will be ever more justified. However, if other donors move more slowly, then there is a point in the UK moving quickly.

There is also the pragmatic point that donor government policies in peacebuilding are subject to the dictates of political fashion, in ways that have nothing to do with the exigencies of peacebuilding. From South Africa to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Kosovo, and thence to Afghanistan followed by Iraq, the fashion leaders shift their attention every couple of years, with sideways glances now and again at Somalia, the Great Lakes, Guatemala and East Timor. Getting the money while the inevitably short-lived attention of the major leaders is focused on the country makes sense. It would be useful then to have a trust fund mechanism that allows it to be spent at a different rate that is more responsive to the needs of peacebuilding.

While the World Bank study indicates the peak period of absorptive possibilities, it does not indicate how to calculate the appropriate scale. Many practitioners and close observers alike of peacebuilding might easily agree with the notion that too much aid is worse than too little,

but agreeing beforehand what is too much and what is too little is rather more difficult. This is a task for a focused research effort.

One consequence of the inflow of aid, IGOs and international NGOs is that employment opportunities open up for locals who can speak English or another major international language. In the first instance, they are not needed as executive officers or managers, but as translators, drivers, receptionists, guides and fixers. They tend to have university education. As the IGOs and NGOs compete for these valuable human resources, wages spiral; in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, graduates working for an international NGO can earn six to ten times more than they would as a school teacher. With some of the IGOs, the salary differential is said to be even greater. The result is that educated people are doing jobs that are well beneath their abilities and are unavailable to work in the state or in private enterprise, while the costs of goods rise to meet the available spending power, reducing the living standards of those not employed by the internationals. The problem surfaced in Bosnia-Herzegovina to considerable critical comment within the IGO-NGO community. No corrective was attempted when the Kosovo engagement began, however, and the problem surfaced just as sharply there. On the eve of peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, there were attempts to coordinate a wages policy, but it broke down immediately and by some accounts the problem is just as sharp there as it has been in the Balkans.

It is not clear how to deal with the wages problem. Implementing a wage policy requires unity. It only takes one major IGO to break ranks, and several hundred international NGOs will follow. It may be that timing aid so that it builds up to peak in years four-to-seven of the peacebuilding effort would itself be one contribution to finding a solution. For the rest, renewed attempts at coordination seem mandatory.

51) Collier *et al*, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, pp.157-9; also *Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries*, Dissemination Notes Number 2 (World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2002).

6 Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding by the *Utstein* Governments

One result of the survey of 336 projects is the recognition that it was mistaken at the outset of the joint *Utstein* study of peacebuilding to think in terms of a decade of experience of peacebuilding. The absorption of the concept has been slower and is still continuing and it would be misleading to treat all projects in the survey as peacebuilding in a strict and singular sense, even though they are in a more general and flexible way. This is not only part of the evidence – along with examples of conceptual and terminological uncertainty – that peacebuilding is a field that is still evolving. It is also an indication that, as part of that evolution, there is a significant learning process going on.

As indicated at the outset, it is not part of the intention of the joint study to produce a compendium of lessons learned about peacebuilding project implementation. The focus of the joint study has shifted inexorably onto the strategic level, as a result of the close examination of projects, and it is the lessons learned on that level that are presented here:

1. Recognising that when countries are torn apart by civil war, the causes lie deep in the social and socio-economic fabric, the U4 aim to implement peacebuilding at multiple levels. They therefore use a wide-ranging palette of peacebuilding activities.
2. The different activities in peacebuilding are inter-dependent. Each of the four main categories is indispensable and, depending on specific circumstance, each of the 19 kinds of peacebuilding activity in the survey has its uses.
3. There is value both in narrowly focused projects and in broadly focused projects with multiple objectives. U4 countries have developed experience in both. When appropriate, they have shown they can mix and combine different types of peacebuilding activity to maximise impact.
4. Carefully developed local partnerships are critical for identifying and responding to local needs.
5. Action at a global level can also be crucial to the success of local peacebuilding efforts – the efforts to prevent the illicit trade in diamonds from fuelling wars in Africa are an illustration of this.
6. Peacebuilding activities have to be responsive to their context and to change as that context changes. In this, the regional context is often important and may be decisive in determining the prospects for peace in the beneficiary country. Realism about both the national and the regional context is essential.
7. Knowledge about the conflict and the unfolding and possibly fast changing situation is an essential part of peacebuilding and the basis of responsiveness.
8. Responsiveness is also important both in initiating aid and in targeting it. To increase responsiveness, for example, Norway has introduced a budget line for transitional aid to bridge the gap between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid. Mechanisms such as the German system of National Peace Funds to support micro-project and the UK system of Conflict Prevention Pools are also means of improving responsiveness.
9. Peacebuilding interventions must be sustained – although it is not necessary that every project has a long life, an intervention as a whole must be sustained for a decade or more. Sustainable peace is only available on the basis of sustained effort.

10. The wide-ranging ambitions of U4 peacebuilding efforts and the need for sustainability call for coordination of efforts within governments, between them, and with IGOs, NGOs and multi-lateral organisations.
11. As a result of their expanded ambitions and their experience, U4 governments have introduced new policy instruments and mechanisms to improve coordination. For coordination of German peacebuilding efforts including those of NGOs, the government has established the Working Group on Development and Peace. For the purpose of inter-departmental coordination and cooperation, the UK has established the conflict pools system. For coordination with IGOs and major NGOs, the UK has also introduced a system of partnership agreements that highlights strategic planning, specific goals and benchmarks, and evaluation of progress.
12. In the course of developing their experience, the U4 are also developing a pool of qualified and experienced personnel in both governmental and non-governmental circles. Germany has placed one part of this pool into a trained Civil Peace Service that can be deployed in small numbers to offer expert assistance. Other U4 countries offer the same assistance without developing a standing arrangement in the same way.
13. The U4 have invested considerable effort in project evaluations. From these have come specific lessons about the specific projects. More generally, from this it has become clear that there is as yet no science by which it is possible to assess accurately the peacebuilding impact of an individual project.
14. The U4 have each seen cause in the past two-to-three years to initiate new policy directions and instruments to strengthen their peacebuilding strategies.

7 Addressing the Strategic Deficit

As well as strengths, the project survey and national studies reveal problems. Most striking is that a majority of peacebuilding projects in the survey have no stated connection to a country strategy. For some beneficiary countries, there is no peacebuilding strategy, including the high profile case of Afghanistan; in other cases, there is a country strategy but projects were not connected to it. Further, there is confusion about the meaning of central concepts and planning is based on relatively little analysis. There are also problems about the timing of financial flows and the influx of resources has unwanted effects in war-torn countries. There are major question marks about assessing the impact of peacebuilding efforts. There is, in short, a deficit in the strategic dimension of peacebuilding activities.

In different ways, the U4 countries have all begun to address this deficit with initiatives begun after the survey period of 1997–2001. The new German National Action Plan and cross-sectoral concept are intended to generate more strategic coordination and coherence. The Dutch SAF is an instrument for strategic analysis, planning and management. Norway's draft peacebuilding strategy was directed at addressing the same issues. The British CPP system is a major innovation for cross departmental cooperation and strategic coherence. The depth and reach of these initiatives vary. The arguments in this section and the conclusions and recommendations to which they have given rise are intended as proposals that move in the same direction, both intensifying and broadening the push for greater strategic consistency.

7.1 The Components of the Strategic Deficit

The strategic deficit that has been identified in the preparation of this study has the following components:

Analysis: Analysis of the problems to be addressed by peacebuilding is often lacking and, when there is analysis it often has clear flaws in the analytical framework and the underlying concepts. A particular lack is that the analytical basis for planning should be set by looking both at needs and at feasibility. The latter element does not seem to be taken up to any significant degree in the projects in the survey.

Strategic consistency and coordination: The widespread lack of explicit reference to stated strategies – and the purely gestural nature of many of the references to strategy that can be found – means that consistency between policy aims and activities is not systematic. In turn, this hinders the achievement of strategic coordination with other actors.

Evaluation: There seem to be shortfalls in the basis in knowledge and the methodologies of project evaluation, while impact assessment has proven to be an unreachable goal, and the problematic state of project archives creates a tenuous empirical basis for any comparative evaluation that searches for overall lessons learned from peacebuilding experience.

As the challenge is taken up to address these problems, particular attention needs to be given to two aspects:

Coordination between actors is self-evidently important in multinational peacebuilding efforts, and coordination begins at home in inter-departmental knowledge-sharing and cooperation. The different policy actors and instruments of donor governments towards a beneficiary country need all to be pulling in the same direction.

Experiences in, for example, the western Balkans, West Africa, and the Great Lakes region show that the regional context of conflict is often fundamental to the prospects for peacebuilding. When relevant, the regional dimen-

sion must be reflected in analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation.

7.2 Strategic Planning Frameworks

In some cases, though a peacebuilding strategy is not written down, it is in the heads of key actors – desk officers, officials on the ground, some of the lead NGO and IGO professionals. In fast changing situations, it may be that a tacit strategy among competent and well informed people is better than a strategy statement because the informal strategy is more likely to be flexible and responsive to changes. An informal strategy, however, risks being interpreted in radically different ways by key actors. Newly arrived staff may have trouble even finding out what it is. Some project evaluations comment on strategic misunderstanding between key project actors. In formal terms, this is the problem of a lack of internal transparency.

There is a further problem in relying on informal strategies. When that is the practice, what can often be achieved is an impressive degree of on-the-ground coordination. Peacebuilding actors should not, however, be misled into thinking that the coordination they have achieved is a valid substitute for the strategy they have not worked out. Coordination is only strategic if the actions being coordinated are serving joint strategies.

Discussions and some documentation suggest the value of clarifying two distinctions:

Between strategy and methodology: the distinction between a strategy, which sets out what we want to do and how we will do it, and a methodology, which consists of the different things we could do if we decided it was useful to, often seems blurred. Clarity is required in order to ensure that means do not take over from ends. The best known way of achieving that is by adopting and working consistently on the basis of an explicit strategic planning framework.

Between a donor country's general peacebuilding strategy and a peacebuilding strategy for a specific country or region in conflict: the former should give guidance for the latter. While the general peacebuilding strategy should indeed be general, the specific peacebuilding strategy must likewise be specific and cannot be written down in advance or derived directly from general principles.

The recommendations of this report include the proposal of a formal framework for a general peacebuilding strategy. As a formal framework, it is suitable for all donor governments; in line with the DAC guidelines from 1997, the adoption of a common strategic framework can be seen as a major benefit for peacebuilding efforts.⁵² It is designed to support the development of specific strategies for specific cases. The aim of the general strategy is to prepare the donor country government for a range of different specific cases. This includes not only understanding its own general objectives, but stating the criteria against which it considers whether to get involved in a peacebuilding intervention, identifying what it is good at in the peacebuilding field, and ensuring that its internal inter-departmental coordination can meet the needs of multi-faceted interventions.

The recommendations also propose a formal framework for a specific peacebuilding intervention strategy. It is designed both to respond to the specific features of each case and to be suitable for all donor governments, in line with the DAC guidelines.⁵³ It emphasises strategic coordination with other donors. Because it begins with analysis, it begins with utilising case-specific knowledge – i.e., the knowledge of the country desks and their networks of actual and potential partners.

The more that donor governments develop their strategic approaches, the more important it is to consider the relationship with NGOs and foundations. Apparently some UK NGOs have registered a decline in dialogue with the government while the CPP system was being intro-

52) "Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997," *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, p.96.

53) *Ibid*, pp.96 and 108.

duced. So much of peacebuilding is implemented with NGOs that extended dialogue with them is a strategic necessity.

7.3 Standing Arrangements for Strategic Coordination and Coherence

Improved strategic coordination and coherence between international donors in peacebuilding – as in development cooperation – have been repeatedly called for, not least in both the 1997 and 2001 DAC guidelines and the national policies of each donor country in this study. The *Utstein* agenda and statement of principles assert the importance of these goals and commit the group to work for them. The *Utstein* group now consists at its core of six important actors in peacebuilding. To improve peacebuilding coordination and coherence, therefore, the *Utstein* group is one appropriate starting point for launching an initiative.

Coordination and coherence will be helped if there are common frameworks for a general strategy of peacebuilding, for country-specific peacebuilding strategies, for conflict assessment and for evaluation and impact assessment. Beyond common frameworks, a second step would be to have coordination mechanisms, which should be set up from the outset of a peacebuilding intervention – before analysis or planning begin. This would be straightforward if they were to draw on a standing coordination arrangement. This is especially feasible and promising in the *Utstein* context and is also included in the recommendations.

Given a strong basis of coordination, especially based on a standing arrangement, it should be possible to develop peacebuilding intervention strategies around a mixture of cooperation and an agreed division of labour. It is not the case that every donor country needs to cover the full range of the peacebuilding palette. As the *Utstein* countries build up experience of working together, making such a division of labour explicit in the preparation of activities on the ground will be a natural step to take.

7.4 Strategic Impact Assessment

The conclusion about impact assessment at the project level is radical – to stop doing it. This should not be confused with a proposal that is not made here, to abandon project evaluations. These will continue to be important to ensure that public money is spent wisely, that projects follow best practice, that policy is implemented consistently, and that both strengths and weaknesses of projects are the basis for further learning. The radical but simple proposal is simply that in continuing with the important task of project evaluations, the component of impact assessment should be removed, and the argument for this is that, in the current state of knowledge, assessing the peacebuilding impact of an individual project is impossible.

However, this proposal does not mean an exclusive emphasis on process evaluation. Output should still be evaluated as well, but impact assessment should be shifted to the strategic level.

What this means in practice is straightforward: an HMA project can be evaluated for output (mines removed, hectares cleared, farmland returned to use, agricultural production increased, severe injuries and fatalities avoided), as can a dialogue project (people of different groups brought into dialogue with each other, shifts in attitude towards and discourse about the other group, coverage of activities in media). Returning farmland to use and saving lives, like bringing people into dialogue in such a way that their attitudes about each other change, do not of themselves mean that the prospects of peace are strengthened. The growing prosperity of one mine-cleared region of the country, for example, might generate resentment and hostility somewhere else. Similarly, the increasing number of reasonable people engaging in dialogue might lead extremists to take violent action before their political standing is seriously eroded. In short, any attempt to attribute positive overall change to one project or group of projects has a misleading starting point. In concert with other activities, however,

that led to a broadly based growth in prosperity or an assertion of democratic and legal norms in national politics, both the HMA and the dialogue projects might have a positive effect. Positive change might not be attributed to any of them, but each might make a contribution. Whether their impact is positive depends not on the project itself and cannot be identified by looking at the project. Thus, instead of trying to assess the impact of a project on peace, we should assess the prospects of peace itself.

In other words, strategic impact assessment is a continuation of the conflict assessment on which the planning for a peacebuilding intervention should be based. If conflict assessment is possible, so is strategic impact assessment. This also means that, although the argument in section 5.1.4 above was somewhat sceptical of

widespread use of lifetime evaluation of projects, strategic impact assessment lasts from beginning to end of the peacebuilding intervention. In this way – and in the same way that is foreseen in the Dutch SAF – analysis and assessment become instruments of strategic management, in a concept of strategy that is not static but seen as a process that is constantly revisited during the period of a peacebuilding intervention.

As well as the components of evaluation of individual projects listed above, projects would be evaluated on the basis of their fit with the overall peacebuilding strategy. Projects that adhered to best practice and showed strategic fit would only be dropped or altered if the intervention strategy as a whole had to be changed.

Annex 1

Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding: Notes on the International Seminar on the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, December 1–2, 2003, Asker, Norway

The keynote speech for the meeting was given by Norway's Minister for International Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson. During the meeting, the four national studies were presented on the peacebuilding experience of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, as well as the overview report. There were also presentations on the UK's Conflict Prevention Pools, the Netherlands' Stability Assessment Framework, Germany's experience with cooperation between government and non-government organisations, and the Norwegian instrument of Transitional Funding within the budget for development cooperation. Participants at the International Seminar discussed the issues raised in these speeches, reports and presentations in plenary sessions and in small discussion groups.

Taking the lead from Minister Frafjord Johnson's speech, the tone of the discussion was open-minded and self-reflective, and willing to be self-critical. In the context of acknowledging important achievements, much of the discussion focused on ways of improving how peacebuilding and related policies are implemented.

Discussion

There was general agreement on the principle conclusion of the overview report that a strategic deficit exists in peacebuilding. There are different forms and levels of strategic deficit – within and between donors, in their relations with implementing agencies, at regional and national levels. Activities are often carried out without enough attention to conflict analysis or to the work of other actors in the field.

At the same time as recognising that the problem is serious, participants emphasised that it should not be over-dramatized. There was agreement with the report's assessment that it is a strategic *deficit* rather than a *vacuum*: there are strategies in the field of peacebuilding, but they are often not connected, or linked all the way from policy statements to implementation in the field. Moreover, as recounted in the overview report, efforts are under way to address the deficit.

On the source of the strategic deficit, it was said that factors as different as the lack of documented evidence of results and the sensitive political nature of the work combine to make it difficult to work in an agreed or joint framework. The protecting of turf, institutional limitations, biases, bureaucracy, and sometimes narrow approaches to planning add to the difficulty of overcoming the deficit.

There was a wide-ranging discussion about the need to pay renewed attention to basics in an effort to deal with conceptual confusion, to base planning on analysis, to follow through general strategy in specifics, to follow through again to ensure that the strategy was implemented at the project level, and to ensure greater strategic consistency between different objectives and coherence between different actors.

There was considerable discussion about the proposal in the overview report to drop project impact assessment and shift impact assessment to the strategic level. Some participants argued that evaluating a project or programme in isolation from others conducted in parallel cannot be a valid exercise. Some, however, while acknowledging that project level impact analysis is difficult, disagreed that it was impossible, despite the lack of sure methodology and satisfactory experience. Others argued for combining the two levels of impact assessment. Overall, there was agreement that strategic impact assessment is essential and that its importance simply

emphasises the importance of adequate strategic planning, while likewise a commitment to strategic planning necessarily implies a commitment to strategic impact assessment. There was considerable interest in the idea of conducting evaluations of several donor countries' activities – taken as a whole – in a single recipient country.

On research, several participants argued that the research community has an opportunity and a responsibility to help clear up misconceptions and misinterpretations about the field. This was related to the need to develop a shared terminology in peacebuilding. The call from some was for a clear, quick and decisive project on terminology, reflecting the view that while semantics are important, we cannot get tied up in an endless terminological debate. In general, to meet the research agenda set out in the overview report, it was argued that it is important to address the capacity restraints on good research, especially by securing adequate and stable funding and by developing better and more fruitful links with donor agencies.

Next Steps

The following gained general consent as a focused and realisable follow-up agenda:

- Further dissemination of the basic themes and findings in the overview report, both within relevant DAC networks and within relevant government departments;
- Achieving buy-in from political leaders and from the policy departments;
- Further development of the conclusions and argumentation in the overview report and the national studies;
- Promoting the idea of a joint evaluation, with Sri Lanka as a possible case to focus on;
- Promoting the idea of beginning the anticipated peacebuilding effort in Sudan with a coordinated strategy, based on shared conflict analysis and needs assessment;
- Development of a broader training programme in strategic planning and implementation of peacebuilding, possibly using this as a pilot approach for peacebuilding focal points in the relevant government departments.

Annex 2

Terms of Reference for the Overview Report of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding

April 2002

1.0. Introduction

A joint initiative is promoted by the Heads of the Evaluation Ministries of Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the UK, the *Utstein* partners, to study the countries' support to peacebuilding efforts. The countries are represented by the Policy and Operations Evaluations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, the Evaluation Department, Department for International Development, United Kingdom, the Evaluations Unit, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany, and the Evaluation Section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA).

The Evaluations Section of the NMFA is responsible for coordinating the Study.

The Terms of Reference is made in accordance with the *Utstein* partners.

2.0. Background

Efforts to secure peace have had a prominent position globally throughout the majority of the twentieth century. The reconstruction after two world wars and many localised conflicts have provided significant understandings of the political and economic aspects of the transition between war and peace. The expression, *peacebuilding*, did however not become an integral part of international conflict resolution terminology until it was introduced by the United Nations (UN) in the early nineties. Since "*An Agenda for Peace*", the report by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding has been given an increasingly high profile. Responding to world changes in conflict patterns, this report marked a confir-

mation of the UN's attitude towards intervention. With this report the Secretary General signalled an assurance of the need for international intervention in local conflicts. Peacebuilding has since retained its global prominence and is, for example, emphasised as part of the newly launched Norwegian Action Plan 2015 for combating Poverty in the South.

The definition of the term *peacebuilding*, has remained somewhat elusive and vague. In the preparation of this project, emphasis has been placed on the fact that peacebuilding should be defined by reference to its activities, its objectives, and to the context in which it is applied. This context is one of crisis and conflict. The objective of peacebuilding is to limit the damage, hasten the recovery, and prevent reversion. Such activities are designed to contribute to ending, or avoiding armed conflict. Yet peacebuilding is not an imperative in every crisis.

A crisis situation may be a necessary stage through which social and political change may be achieved.

Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development. Experience shows that these activities range broadly and dig deeply into the social fabric of countries where they are carried out. The complexity of the matter that peacebuilding targets emphasises that "peacebuilding" as a label necessarily encompasses a number of inter-related activities.

The "*Agenda for Peace*", made peacebuilding an activity distinct from preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding is made up of different activities, such as economic infrastructure, health services and education, good governance and human rights, not to mention security sector reform and security operations. Some of these activities could

be classified as general instruments of development cooperation, others are highly specialised. For a number of these activities, it is therefore the overall context rather than the activities themselves that serves to categorise them as peacebuilding initiatives.

3.0. The Objective of the Study

The objective of the Study is to create a policy agenda of peacebuilding based upon an analysis of the experiences of the four *Utstein* countries. The Study will produce policy advice, and input to possible guidelines that can help direct future activities in peacebuilding.

From the outset it has been agreed that the project will contain two elements:

- A policy oriented study of peacebuilding, based on a typological survey of the four countries' experiences in support of peacebuilding activities the last five years, drawing on existing documentation.
- An international seminar to present and discuss the policy advice of the study in the context of OECD/DAC members and with participation from non-governmental organisations.

The objective has several components: to examine what should be categorised as peacebuilding efforts, to characterise the activities and the actors involved, to explore experiences of peacebuilding, to investigate lessons learned from experiences, possibly to identify policy conclusions, and to draw up an agenda to further knowledge through evaluations.

Through this objective the Study aims to assist the work of policy-makers and practitioners by providing an overview of options available, lines of work, what to look for, what problems may arise, and the pitfalls to avoid. This is different to developing a blueprint, or a universal template. Knowledge of peacebuilding is achieved through experience. Some aspects of experience are transferable. These will be identified so as to help policy-makers to continue improv-

ing the efficiency of the link between broad policy objectives, implementation strategy and specific programme targets.

3.1. Components of the Study

The components of the project are as follows:

- A *survey* of the *Utstein* countries' peacebuilding activities.
- An analytically oriented policy report based on the survey and drawing on other studies, literature including evaluations, interviews and discussions with policy-makers. The study is anticipated to amount to 30 pages with a 3-page executive summary.
- An international seminar to discuss the study and its conclusions and recommendations with a view to develop a policy guidance for peacebuilding.

The consultant shall carry out the survey and will be responsible for the Study report. The consultant shall furthermore prepare a conclusion to the themes and issues discussed in the seminar and include this to the Study report.

3.2. The Scope of the Study

The Study will consist of a survey of activities supported by the *Utstein* Partners and an analytical paper that explores these experiences, placing the knowledge in an international context.

The survey design aims to answer broad questions: what are we doing, how well are we doing it and last but not least, how do we know how well we are doing? To answer these questions, the definition of who "we" are must be clarified. These questions imply an open-ended approach: actors to be included are those who financially support and carry out these activities, meaning both governmental and non-governmental agencies. Information from cooperating institutions and beneficiaries will be included to the extent that this exists.

So far, the Study operates with four main categories of *peacebuilding activities*, each category containing a variety of instruments that are applied in different combination, according to need:

- *Security* (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants including child soldiers: security sector reform including control of small arms, and demining).
- *Economic* (reconstruction, the building up of infrastructure and of basic services in health and education).
- *Political* (democratisation, development of good governance, institution building, and strengthening of human rights regimes).
- *Reconciliation* (dialogue among social and political leaders and at grass-roots level, civil society bridge-building, and truth commissions).

The four categories form organising principles of the survey, constituting the first phase of the Study. These categories should not, however, be perceived as exclusive. The Study will take into account possible additional papers of the *Utstein* partners and the NMFA's paper "*Peacebuilding and Development: What can Norway do?*". This paper, based upon the UN's "*An Agenda for Peace*" and the OECD/DAC's "*The DAC Guidelines: Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the threshold of the 21st Century, 1997*", and "*The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, 2001*", has extended categories of peacebuilding to include a wider range of economic and social means.

Actors and activities identified in the survey will become the foundation for addressing the following issues in the analytical paper:

On a general level, the scope of the Study will include:

- The recent years' experiences of support for peacebuilding activities.

- The specific features of peacebuilding activities, as distinct from democracy building, or general development cooperation in practice.

More specifically, the Study will focus on the planning and the implementation of peacebuilding activities:

- How donors and major project partners prepare for peacebuilding activities.
- The institutional setting of peacebuilding as constituting both mainstream and specialist units, and how this is incorporated in the main policy and/or programme directions.
- The need for improved coordination in support of peacebuilding activities, and how this best can be achieved.
- Consistency in the implementation of policy by the different actors involved. In other words, the extent of overlap and/or contradiction between the different activities categorised as peacebuilding.
- The need for adequate flexibility in the mechanisms and instruments, both for the formulation and implementation of policy.

The Study will focus particularly on issues of cooperation and ownership:

- The consequences of ownership of initiatives and activities, including such issues as whether definitions of problems and needs are donor-driven as opposed to based upon local understandings.
- The consequences of the creation of local partnerships in peacebuilding, with its options in terms of working with formal or non-formal, and modern or traditional structures of leadership.

Questions of evaluation methodology will include:

- The general adequacy of current methodologies for assessing needs, risks and opportunities.
- The current state of knowledge, as reflected in the evaluation literature, and the general literature on peacebuilding, related to the experiences that the survey reveals.
- The knowledge about how to assess the impact of peacebuilding activities and how to assess the effectiveness of these activities. How this knowledge contributes to specify guidelines for operations, assessment of performance, and criteria for success.
- The different approaches that donors and project partners take towards monitoring and evaluation of programme activities and impact assessment.

4.0. Methodology

The scope of the *survey* forms the basic scope of the study. The methodology appropriate for the typological survey is a desk study combined with interviews.

Based on PRIO's framework report the four main categories of peacebuilding activities – *security, economic, political and reconciliation* – approached through an understanding of subcategories of activities. The subcategories are seen as a starting point to further discuss and clarify the main and subcategories of peacebuilding activities in the Study.

The *Study* takes the survey as its starting point. The analytical report will have a broader focus. In addition to the typological survey, the Study will draw on follow-up interviews and references to policy statements and discussions, relevant literature including evaluations, as well as academic studies.

Evaluations of projects, programmes and policies will be important sources. Emphasis is placed on referring to the work of institutions particularly involved in this field, such as Europaid, USAID and others.

It should be cautioned that the terminology utilised could be of less relevance in practice i.e. where programmes are implemented. The consultant must therefore continuously consider the relevance of the distinctions between the different activities may seem arbitrary or without meaning, likewise whether this set of categories of programmes might exclude potentially crucial activities.

If there are evaluations, studies or surveys available of the particular activities, the following information will be sought: locations, dates, programme objectives, evaluations (internal or external), and contributing actors (external, regional and local).

4.2. Relevant Countries (annex 1)

15 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Central and South America have been suggested. These suggestions represent a geographical spread, different political sources of conflicts, different degrees of political crises, and different depths and bases of international involvement.

These countries, written up in bold print in Annex 2, should be regarded as the basis for selecting a final list of country cases. *Utstein* partners will choose which countries to be included in the actual survey based upon this list. Countries deemed suitable should have been the sites of a major peacebuilding commitment, in which at least 3 of the *Utstein* countries have been active. The suitability of countries chosen will be confirmed by the steering group, after a first sweep of the available information that confirms the relevance of the *Utstein* partners' first selection.

The suggested period of peacebuilding activities covered in the study is 1997–2001 inclusive, i.e. five years. However, if it appears in the sur-

vey process that the five-year time frame is too narrow, the period under study may be adjusted by agreement between the implementing agency and NMFA.

5.0. Limitations of the Study

To avoid duplication, the Study will only include brief references to the existing Studies and evaluations of peacebuilding activities.

As different departments or ministries within each country are involved in different peacebuilding activities, difficulties retrieving relevant and comparable information are foreseen. The information gathered may not be directly comparable in terms of its level, density and form. Different *Utstein* partner ministries also have different geographical focuses, and there may be difficulties in finding geographical focuses where 3 out of 4 countries are/have been involved.

6.0 Organisation and Timetable

A Steering Committee with representatives of the evaluation units of Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the UK has been formed to oversee the process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway will chair the committee and be responsible for the management of the project. The committee meetings will be open for participants from relevant departments.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will select and hire the consultant. All countries will recruit research assistants with knowledge of their countries' peacebuilding efforts and the institutions involved in these efforts. These will assist the consultant and work according to guidance of the consultant. All countries will also be responsible for dealing with security clearance-related matters both in relation to their own research assistants and the consultant. When the consultant is chosen, research assistants will meet with the consultants to discuss the form and the content of the information they will supply.

The consultant will travel to the *Utstein* countries to have introductory meetings with the relevant departments.

When the survey stage of the Study has been completed, the consultant will conduct interviews that will aid the analysis, and have talks with policy-makers to discuss how to best ensure a policy-orientated analysis and conclusion.

The Study and its policy conclusions will be presented at a 2-day seminar to be held in Norway. The seminar will be convened by the NMFA and other *Utstein* governments and organised by the consultant, who will act as a rapporteur during the Seminar. Following the seminar, the consultant will add the policy conclusions of the seminar to the existing report.

6.3. Consultants

The Study will be conducted by a team of two professionals possessing expertise in the following fields:

- Extensive competence in peace activities, ranging from academic knowledge to an understanding of the practical activities as well as the policy debates.
- Excellent linguistic and geographic competencies required for a thorough understanding of the information collected, to consult with relevant policy-makers, as well as to present the analysis verbally and as a written report.

In a tender, the consultants are to elaborate on the Study design and to include a detailed methodology, including a description of how the research assistants will be instructed, the kind of information they will be asked to gather, as well as a detailed and justified budget. The entire work is estimated to take 7 months.

6.4. Dissemination

The Study will be published in English and distributed by the NMFA, in accordance with the *Utstein* Partners. The consultant will be responsible for the validity of the data included, for the analysis and the quality of the report. The report will include all major findings and recom-

mendations and models for policy guidelines. The technical quality of the final report will be proof-read, i.e. such that it can be printed without any further rewriting or editing. The NMFA's template for structuring the report will be used.

6.5. Projected Timetable

Month 1–2, July – August.

- The consultant is to meet the *Utstein* partners and the research assistants recruited.

Month 2–5, September– November.

- 1–15th of September: Preliminary data collection, literature review and data transmission from research assistants to researchers.
- 19th of September, Steering group meeting. First report on the survey material and the selection of relevant countries.
- 20th of September – 15th of November: Data collection and assessment.
- Follow-up interviews to compliment the survey, and consultations with policy-makers to discuss the direction of the Study.

Month 6, December.

- 10th of December: Circulation of note on the survey to the *Utstein* partners.
- Writing of draft Study.

Month 7, January.

- 10th of January: Presentation of a draft Study (full draft, full length, with Executive Summary plus survey as annex, references as appropriate etc.).
- 20th of January: Feedback from *Utstein* partners.
- Friday 24th of January: Steering group meeting to discuss the draft Study. Policy unit representatives will be invited to join the meeting.

Month 8, February.

- 7th of February: Finalisation of the Report.
- Proof-reading and printing by the consultant.

Month 8, March.

- 10–11th of March. The analysis and its conclusions will be presented at an international seminar.
- 31st of March: The conclusions will be presented in a written document encompassing the report along with the policy conclusions to the discussions that took place during the seminar.

6.6 Meeting schedule

- The next meeting of the Steering Committee will tentatively be the 19th of September, this year.
- There will be another Steering Committee meeting in month 6 of the Study, tentatively in January, 2003.
- The Seminar is expected to take place in March 2003.

7.0. Budget

NMFA has offered to bear the administrative costs of the consultant. All participating *Utstein* countries will contribute to the financment of the Study by hiring research assistants to assist the chosen consultant. How to finance the seminar should be dealt with at the steering group.

The consultant's budget should include staff-time calculation including preparation, drafting and finalisation of the survey and study, together with participation and reporting from the international seminar. The consultants' budget will not exceed 1 mill. NOK. The preparation, organisation and facilitation of the seminar will be negotiated at a later stage.

Annex 3

Interviews, Consultations, Meetings

In addition to steering group and research team meetings, consultation meetings were used as part of the preparation of this report, and some interviews. The participation of Norwegian MFA and NORAD officials in steering group and other preparatory meetings removed the need for a specific Norwegian consultation meeting, while the strong attendance at the two consultation meetings in the UK and detailed written feedback on drafts of the report removed the need for interviews with UK officials. All interviews and discussions were treated as background and unattributable briefings.

Consultation meetings:

9 September 2002: Department for International Development (DFID), London, with participation of officials from DFID CHAD, Evaluation Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet Office.

9 April 2003: DFID London, with participation of officials from DFID CHAD, Evaluation Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence.

21 May 2003: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with participation of officials from the Directorate for Human Rights and Peacebuild-

ing and academics from University of Utrecht and Wageningen University.

22 May 2003: German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn, with participation of BMZ officials and of NGO representatives.

23 May 2003: German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Eschborn, with participation of staff of GTZ, Financial Cooperation and NGO representatives.

Interviews:

Jan Berteling, Head of the Directorate for Human Rights and Peacebuilding, Dutch MFA;

Dr Martin Fleischer, Head of Global Issues Division, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Roeland van der Geer, Head of the Directorate for Africa, Dutch MFA;

Christiane Hieronymus, Desk Officer Afghanistan, BMZ;

Maurits Jochens, Head of the Directorate for Security Policy, Dutch MFA;

Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Deputy Director, Directorate Peace and Democracy, Human Rights, United Nations, BMZ.

Annex 4

Instructions for National Research Teams about the survey of *Utstein* Peacebuilding Projects

Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding

Survey:

Design and Instructions

Dan Smith

27 September 2002

This note is to help guide the researchers in each of the four Utstein countries who will be conducting the survey of their country's recent experience in peacebuilding. Drawing on feedback at meetings in the Hague, London and Bonn this note replaces an earlier (21 August) draft.

Aims

The aim of the project is to help shape peacebuilding policies and activities by producing policy guidelines based on experience. The aim of the survey is to provide part of the empirical basis for assessing experience, the other part being provided by a sweep of the evaluation and policy literature and some other sources, reaching more widely than the four *Utstein* countries. The key questions for the project to answer are, what works, what does not work, what gets missed out?

Activity

Seventeen categories of peacebuilding programmes are used in the survey. About each programme that is covered in the survey, fourteen questions will be asked. For those projects that have been evaluated, the evaluation report should provide most if not all of what is needed.

Many of the 17 types of activity are also carried out under other headings than peacebuilding – democratisation, development, support to civil society, etc. Like the project as a whole, the survey operates with a concept of peacebuilding activities that reflects on the implementation of the same kinds of activities under other headings – peacebuilding uses a variety of tools from a range of different toolboxes. When these activities are part of peacebuilding rather than, say, development, it is not necessarily because the activity itself is different but because its context and purposes are specific to peacebuilding – the context of crisis and conflict and the purpose of making things as peaceful as possible.

The survey will look at activities rather than policies, and therefore primarily at projects (or groups of projects, see below). The survey is not comprehensive or representative in a scientific sense. It will provide an adequate empirical basis for sustainable generalisations, and thus needs to be broadly representative (or illustrative) of the range of peacebuilding activities carried out or financed by the *Utstein* countries.

Selection

The number of projects that could be studied is far greater than the number that needs to be. In undertaking the survey the first task is one of selection. A quick scan of project files and evaluation reports should permit researchers to sieve out the projects to include in the survey. The following categories should facilitate this exercise:

- (a) Countries – see below
- (b) Project titles
- (c) Budgetary source
- (d) Period (= context) – see below

(e) Stated objectives – NB: Projects often have several objectives, of which only one may be peacebuilding. Such projects are to be included in the survey.

(f) Implementing agency

(g) DAC codes/own codes

(h) Desks' own assessment

The period of activities to be covered in the survey is within the five years 1997–2001; activities that either start or finish or both in that period are included as well as those that run within the period and those that started before and continue after it.

Country selection has been agreed as follows:

Norway	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Guatemala	Angola
Germany	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Colombia	Guatemala	Kenya
Netherlands	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Guatemala	Kenya
UK	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Sierra Leone	DRC

In the case of Afghanistan, the emphasis falls on looking at project plans worked out in the period since September 2001.

Once this first selection has been carried out, there are still likely to be too many projects for the time available for the survey. Further mechanisms of selection are the scale and the theme of the project, which can be understood in terms of a simple grid:

	Security	Socio-economic	Political	Reconciliation
<100,000				
100–500,000				
500–1,000,000				
>1,000,000				

The process of selection will be to list all projects in the four large categories – Security, Socio-economic, Political, Reconciliation – plus “Other”. From those listed in the four large categories, identify those activities that are clearly part of peacebuilding will indicate where the

emphasis of activities has fallen – in which category, at what scale, in what period within the 1997–2001 timeframe. This will permit researchers to characterise the overall approach of the donor towards each recipient.

Further selection, to arrive at a manageable number of projects to survey in each country, will be on the basis of:

- Those projects for which evaluations have been done;
- Discussions with desk officers etc;
- Inclusion of projects that are routine and projects that are innovative;
- Inclusion of projects at different phases in the conflict cycle;
- Arbitrary choice based on convenience.

If the *Utstein* donor funds programmes or groups of projects, as well as single projects, it will be important to include the programmes or groups in the survey.

Further guidelines

1. The survey is not interested in the detailed history of any project or programme. The survey covers actors, activities, objectives and identified results. *However*, in cases where objectives were modified along the way, the survey is interested.
2. The answers to the questions may range in length from one word (a country, if that is specific enough) to about 100 for questions 5–14. The language used is English.
3. Consistent liaison is the way to resolve many of the detailed issues that will arise as the material is confronted.
4. NGO projects that the donor government specifically approves are included; those that are independently carried out by an NGO with a multi-year framework grant (or independent funds) are left out.

5. It has been agreed that as well as carrying out the survey work and forwarding the results, the researchers will each write a paper based on the material they unearth in the course of the survey. The themes of these papers could vary according to what is most relevant and what has been brought out by the survey, but it could also be that the vertical consistency of policy from enunciation to implementation would be relevant for all the *Utstein* countries.

6. In the Dutch and German cases, it has been agreed that the researchers will write a brief paper outlining the policy of the government in peacebuilding activities.

7. For each recipient country, the researchers will briefly characterise the *Utstein* donor's approach – how much spent, evolution of spending pattern, which broad categories.

Survey categories

15. Security

- *Humanitarian Mine Action*
Mine clearance to restore civilian access/use and mine-awareness programmes
- *DD&R*
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants
- *DD&R Children*
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes for child soldiers
- *Security Sector Reform*
Retraining in the police, military services, prison services etc, with emphasis on professional efficiency and ethics, including respect for human rights

- *SSR: Small Arms*
Specific measures within Security Sector Reform to restrict availability of small arms in the country or the region

16. Socio-economic

- *Reconstruction*
Aid for physical reconstruction of buildings and structures, electrical supply and other utilities, roads, and for addressing war-related environmental damage
- *Infrastructure*
Investment in the future: Economic support for improving the economic infrastructure (communications, roads, water, sewage systems, electricity) and for training in issues relevant to the functioning of a modern economy
- *Investment in Health & Education*
Economic support for improving health service provision and for improving access to and quality of basic education
- *Repatriation & return*
Support for the repatriation of refugees and return of IDPs, including to regain access to property, restoration of land rights and distribution of land

17. Political

- *Democratisation*
Support for democratic institutions (political parties, independent media, NGO sector), and activities in the fields of education and culture that have a democratic theme or intention
- *Good governance*
Promotion of ethics, efficiency, transparency and accountability in government; Rule of law, justice system, legal reform
- *Institution building*
Training programmes in government and NGO sector and among political parties

- *Human Rights*
Promotion of awareness of international standards and of monitoring and reporting of abuses

18. Reconciliation

- *Dialogue (a) Leadership*
Dialogue opportunities between leaders of actually antagonistic groups
- *Dialogue (b) Grass roots*
Dialogue opportunities between members of antagonistic groups
- *Bridge-building in society*
Other activities (in media, education curricula, cultural activities) to erode barriers in highly divided societies
- *Truth and Reconciliation*
Commissions – and /or other means – of enquiry into recent and violent past, using knowledge as basis for reconciliation

We can also retain an eighteenth box for “other” – i.e., activities that do not fall under one or more of the headings listed above.

Survey questions

About each activity, the survey will seek the following information:

1. *Technical information*
 - (a) Project/programme name
 - (b) Location
2. *Category/ies*
Which of the survey’s 17 categories does the activity come under
3. *Dates*
The start and end dates or planned duration of the activities

4. *Budget*

- (a) Total
- (b) Donor's contribution

5. *Other donors*

6. *Project partners*

Who were the project partners:

- (a) Outside beneficiary country?
- (b) In beneficiary country?

7. *Summary aim*

The objective of the programme

8. *Strategic perspective*

The project's role (if stated) in an overall strategy towards the conflict problems of the country/region

9. *Cross-cutting themes*

What cross-cutting themes are addressed in the statement of aims/strategy?

10. *Evaluation*

Has there been an evaluation of the programme or of major components of it? If so, was the evaluation internal or external? (Specify documents)

11. *Impact assessment*

Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation)

assess the impact of the programme for the beneficiaries and on the society as a whole; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?

12. *Financial assessment*

Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation) ask whether the programme gave "value for money"; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?

13. *Organisational assessment*

Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation) assess organisational efficiency in the programme; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?

14. *Overall conclusion*

What was the overall conclusion of the evaluation (if any) or the project reports (if no evaluation) about the project's worth? What (if any) was the project's perceived contribution to peacebuilding? What (if any) lessons were identified?

Annex 5

The National Studies Contributing to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

GERMANY

Uwe Kievelitz, Gabriele Kruk and Norbert Frieters, *Lessons Learned from Five Years of Peace Building Support in Bilateral Development Cooperation: Donor Country Paper From the Perspective of Germany*.

NETHERLANDS

1. Georg Frerks and Marcel Scholten, *The Policy Context of Dutch Peacebuilding Activities: Background Note to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*.
2. Georg Frerks, Koenraad van Brabant, and Marcel Scholten, *Dutch Peacebuilding Activities 1997–2001: Results of a Survey: A Contribution to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*.

NORWAY

Wenche Hauge, *Norwegian Peacebuilding Policies: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead*.

UK

1. Simon Lawry-White, *Review of UK Government Strategy for Peacebuilding*.
2. Simon Lawry-White, *UK Government Strategy for Peacebuilding: Addendum to Survey of UK Peacebuilding Activities 1997–2001*.
3. Simon Lawry-White and Jane Lawry-White, *Summary of Lessons Learned from UK Government Funded Peacebuilding Projects 1997–2001*.

EVALUATION REPORTS

1.92	NGOs as Partners in Health Care, Zambia	13.98	UNICEF-komiteen i Norge
2.92	The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme	14.98	Relief Work in Complex Emergencies
3.92	De Private Organisasjonene som Kanal for Norsk Bistand, Fase I	1.99	WID/Gender Units and the Experience of Gender Mainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations
1.93	Internal Learning from Evaluations and Reviews	2.99	International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy and Effectiveness at Country and Regional Levels
2.93	Macroeconomic Impacts of Import Support to Tanzania	3.99	Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus
3.93	Garantiordning for Investeringer i og Eksport til Utviklingsland	4.99	Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation 1994–1997
4.93	Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards Integration and Recipient Responsibility	5.99	Building African Consulting Capacity
1.94	Evaluation of World Food Programme	6.99	Aid and Conditionality
2.94	Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with UN Organisations	7.99	Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian Development Aid
1.95	Technical Cooperation in Transition	8.99	Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
2.95	Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge	9.99	Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
3.95	NGOs as a Channel in Development aid	10.99	Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African European Institute
3A.95	Rapport fra Presentasjonsmøte av «Evalueringen av de Frivillige Organisasjoner»	1.00	Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation 1988–1997
4.95	Rural Development and Local Government in Tanzania	2.00	Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
5.95	Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance	3.00	The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”
1.96	NORAD’s Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana	4.00	En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennom frivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999
2.96	Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review of Evaluation Studies 1986–92	5.00	Evaluation of the NUFU programme
3.96	The Norwegian People’s Aid Mine Clearance Project in Cambodia	6.00	Making Government Smaller and More Efficient. The Botswana Case
4.96	Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs	7.00	Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation
5.96	Evaluation of the Yearbook “Human Rights in Developing Countries”	8.00	Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
1.97	Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS	9.00	“Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East
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9.97	Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International Foundation	6.01	Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
10.97	Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS	7.01	Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
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12.97	Cooperation for Health Development WHO’s Support to Programmes at Country Level	2.02	Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
1.98	“Twinning for Development”. Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South	3.02	Evaluation of ACOPAM An ILO program for “Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
2.98	Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities	3A.02	Évaluation du programme ACOPAM Un programme du BIT sur l’« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l’Ouest de 1978 à 1999
3.98	Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firms	4.02	Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
4.98	Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations	1.03	Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
5.98	Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report	2.03	Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africa in the World Bank
6.98	Managing Good Fortune – Macroeconomic Management and the Role of Aid in Botswana	3.03	Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
7.98	The World Bank and Poverty in Africa	1.04	Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding
8.98	Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples		
9.98	Evaluering av Informasjonsstøtten til RORGene		
10.98	Strategy for Assistance to Children in Norwegian Development Cooperation		
11.98	Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict		
12.98	Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua		

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