Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
- Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C 

 Why the conflicts in Gaza and Sri Lanka will continue

Damien Kingsbury  
“The Age” , Melbourne,Australia
January 6, 2009 

Israel will have to accept a genuine two-state outcome for the Palestinians, and allow the two parts of such a state — Gaza and the West Bank — meaningful access to each other. Jerusalem, as the site of much Israeli-Palestinian contest, will need to become an open city, owned by no single power and administered by all.

In Sri Lanka, the Colombo Government will have to genuinely devolve a high degree of political authority to its Tamil minority, if not as a separate state then at least as a genuinely autonomous and unified region.

The ruling parties in both Sri Lanka and Israel will have to overcome their own nationalist chauvinism — the sub-text of which is that as "chosen" people they have territorial primacy — and understand that others' claims to territory are as necessary to survival as their own.

Without such recognition, peace in either place will be impossible.

But the hardliners had persuasive arguments. Sri Lanka's various governments have lacked sincerity in following through with their promises for even a limited settlement to Tamil political claims. Israeli governments have similarly failed to allow progress on negotiations, largely by strangling the Gaza economy.

In both cases, the Sri Lankan and Israeli governments are also hostage to their own hardliners, who view genuine compromise as a recipe for political loss.

While significant elements of Sri Lankan and Israeli societies want peace, both governments are electorally vulnerable to claims of giving in to "terrorism" — that both the Tamil Tigers and Hamas are widely declared to be "terrorist" organisations further hinders meaningful dialogue. Yet both can claim to represent their constituencies. Hamas has the clearest mandate, having won a majority in the 2006 Palestinian elections, predominantly, although not exclusively, in Gaza. The Tamil Tigers have refused to participate in elections, claiming that war conditions preclude a meaningful vote, but they enjoy widespread support in Sri Lanka's north and east.

In both cases, too, these organisations represent the wishes of a disenfranchised minority. Their political legitimacy (in the eyes of their own constituencies) will count for little, however, if the strategic reality is that they lose their administrative capacity.

Removed from quasi-state status, both organisations can be expected to return to the hit-and-run tactics, especially against "soft" civilian targets, that earned them the "terrorist" tag in the first place.

While suffering serious military setbacks, Hamas and the Tamil Tigers are both likely to continue as movements capable of inflicting real damage. Military responses against them will only further feed into their support base, providing them with recruits into the foreseeable future.

But from positions of power, both Israel and Sri Lanka can find lasting solutions to these conflicts, including holding out the hope of peace by addressing the fundamental concerns of the people with whom they are now at war

But the hardliners had persuasive arguments. Sri Lanka's various governments have lacked sincerity in following through with their promises for even a limited settlement to Tamil political claims. Israeli governments have similarly failed to allow progress on negotiations, largely by strangling the Gaza economy.

In both cases, the Sri Lankan and Israeli governments are also hostage to their own hardliners, who view genuine compromise as a recipe for political loss.

While significant elements of Sri Lankan and Israeli societies want peace, both governments are electorally vulnerable to claims of giving in to "terrorism" — that both the Tamil Tigers and Hamas are widely declared to be "terrorist" organisations further hinders meaningful dialogue. Yet both can claim to represent their constituencies. Hamas has the clearest mandate, having won a majority in the 2006 Palestinian elections, predominantly, although not exclusively, in Gaza. The Tamil Tigers have refused to participate in elections, claiming that war conditions preclude a meaningful vote, but they enjoy widespread support in Sri Lanka's north and east.

In both cases, too, these organisations represent the wishes of a disenfranchised minority. Their political legitimacy (in the eyes of their own constituencies) will count for little, however, if the strategic reality is that they lose their administrative capacity.

Removed from quasi-state status, both organisations can be expected to return to the hit-and-run tactics, especially against "soft" civilian targets, that earned them the "terrorist" tag in the first place.

While suffering serious military setbacks, Hamas and the Tamil Tigers are both likely to continue as movements capable of inflicting real damage. Military responses against them will only further feed into their support base, providing them with recruits into the foreseeable future.

But from positions of power, both Israel and Sri Lanka can find lasting solutions to these conflicts, including holding out the hope of peace by addressing the fundamental concerns of the people with whom they are now at war.