Jain Commission: Growth of Tamil militancy - Chapter 1 Sections 16 & 17

Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

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Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu
Chapter I - Phase II (1987-1988)

31 After the induction of the I.P.K.F. in Sri Lanka, and especially after the hostilities broke out between the LTTE and IPKF, the LTTE network in India went underground and started functioning clandestinely. The propaganda unit of the LTTE, headed by Kittu in Madras, appears to be active and was continuing to resort to anti India propaganda, albeit discreetly. There is evidence that an organised group of LTTE members and some Indian Tamil chauvinist elements were involved in sustained LTTE propaganda in India.

Kasi Anandan, a member of the Central Committee of the L.T.T.E. had come to Madras from Sri Lanka after the hostilities broke out between the IPKF and LTTE in Sri Lanka. He, as per his deposition given before the Commission, stated that L.T.T.E. propaganda literature was being published from clandestine LTTE offices in Madras. He stated :-

"It was in the end of 1987 after .....the outbreak of hostilities in December 1987, I came back to India and I stayed for about two years. I went to Sri Lanka in 1989. I again returned to India in June 1990.

I was member of the Central Committee of the Political wing of LTTE. When IPKF was in Sri Lanka I was in India..... I, Baby Subramaniam and Kittu were allowed to stay in Madras. Presence of we three was known to the State Government. Propaganda was a part of political wing...... ..... I have read a lot of articles which appeared in Tamil papers when IPKF was operating in Jaffna....... One of the paper's name was 'Tamil Eelam' published from Madras in Tamil. 'Viduthalai Puligal' was another Tamil paper of LTTE (Liberation Tiger)..... It was published from LTTE office. Baby Subramaniam was in charge of LTTE papers published. Muthu Raja was also working with him for these papers. There were three or four rented houses at Adyar rented out to LTTE. Baby Subramaniam was staying in one of the houses at Adyar."

Evidence indicates that prior to the signing of the Accord, the LTTE had an elaborate communication network all over Tamil Nadu for the purpose of propaganda. Anita Pratap, journalist, who had extensively covered LTTE activities during this period, deposed before the Commission of the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu as it existed around the time when the Accord was signed. She stated :-

"LTTE had an excellent communication system. That is, communication from Madras and, vice versa. The communication bases of the LTTE were not only located in Madras but all over Tamil Nadu including coastal areas and it had a wide communication network all over the world."

"I had access only to political office and not to the places where communication system is installed. .. .. LTTE would have attacks on Army camps in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan army attacks on Tamil villages and of these events, LTTE would have all the details in a matter of hours and then pictures would be released in a day's time ....."

It appears that this entire propaganda machinery of the LTTE went underground after the hostilities broke out between the LTTE and IPKF in Sri Lanka and continued to operate in a clandestine manner.

In order to sustain the battle wih the I.P.K.F. in Sri Lanka, the L.T.T.E. required a continuous flow of supplies. There is evidence to indicate that, during this period, the L.T.T.E. also increasingly resorted to clandestine activity like procurement of illegal arms, ammunition, explosives and smuggling them across the Palk Straits to the Jaffna peninsula.

31.1 The favourable climate created by various regional political parties and Tamil chauvinist groups in Tamil Nadu further facilitated the clandestine operations of the LTTE. It appears that soon after the commencement of operation against LTTE by the IPKF, Tamil Nadu became hot-bed of LTTE activities and intrigues. Taking full advantage of the favourable political climate and a well sustained support base, the LTTE started using Tamil Nadu as a launching pad for its operations in Sri Lanka. (Annexure M-4)

(Note on LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM attached to Affidavit No 102/93 JCI & No 134/93 JCI)

31.2 The existence of an elaborate wireless network of the LTTE in various places in Tamil Nadu, including the coastal areas, has been spoken about by several witnesses who deposed before the Commission.

Major General Yashwant Deva, who was Chief Signal Officer of the IPKF operations during the period June 1987 till July, 1988, deposed before the Commission regarding the existence of an organised wireless network of the LTTE during the period. In his deposition dt. 26th. July, 1996, he stated :-

"Our estimate was that approximately 12 HF communication sets were operational in Tamil Nadu..... I am certain that there were communications between the supremo and Tamil Nadu wherever he was located; and with LTTE's London office. The latter was partly on radio and partly on overseas communication system."

"..Generally speaking the LTTE adopted a system of passing over telephone messages from the place of occurrence to the coastline on the mainland, and from the coastline, transmit over sky wave mode to the Jaffna peninsula or Eastern provinces or to the jungles of Vavunia."

"There were hostile communications at a place 7 Kms. on the road from Ramanathapuram to Rameswaram. The communication base was located on the left side of the road. Another location was casuarina forests between Rameswaram and closer to Dhanushkodi. The third, Point Calimere. Other locations were Cuddalore, Portonova, Nagapatnam, Thiruvenkadu. Often, these locations were changed."

The existence of an elaborate clandestine wireless network of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu during this period is also narrated by Shri N.V. Vathsan, former Special Director, I.B. , during his deposition before the Commission. He stated :-

"Since 1987, we started monitoring the wireless/radio transmission of various Sri Lanka Tamil groups for clandestine radio stations and monitored their propaganda activities..... Over a period of time, we were able to identify the stations belonging to the militant groups... we managed to locate the call signs of LTTE stations in general and their intelligence wing in particular. .....

After hostilities between LTTE and IPKF sometime in October, 1987, it was noticed that the traffic in the intelligence network was on the increase. So efforts were made to concentrate on this subject. Most of the messages were sent in codes...."

There is evidence to suggest that the Government machinery in Tamil Nadu was not in a position to effectively intervene to bring an end to the clandestine activities of the LTTE in the State due to the public sympathy generated by the majority of political parties in favour of the LTTE. It appears that, during this period, the public mood had percolated to the junior Government functionaries as well, who were harbouring hostile feelings about the I.P.K.F. and were sympathetic to the LTTE cause. This has been brought out clearly by Major General Yashwant Deva of the IPKF during his deposition before the Commission.

31.3 Major General Yashwant Deva, during his deposition before the Commission, further elaborated that the local population of Tamil Nadu as well as the majority of State Government functionaries, barring a few in the higher echelons, were supportive and sympathetic to the Sri Lankan Tamil militants and non cooperative and critical of the IPKF. He substantiated this view in his deposition dated 7th. August, 1996, before the Commission, where he stated :-

"I made this observation ...on what I myself found in the various instances during my stay in Tamil Nadu. One is the bomb threat to my exchange; two, frequent fiddling of the communications between Sri Lanka and the mainland by the local DOT personnel; three, acknowledgement of senior officers of the Deptt. of Telecommunications that their rank and file were sympathetic to the LTTE cause. .... Locals were not cooperative to the IPKF in supplying water, electricity and other amenities. I had to put pressure on the authorities for these essential services. Senior officers of the establishment were very cooperative, than the junior level from whom I was not getting any cooperation. ...at the grassroots level of the Govt. departments, the people were sympathetic to the militants."

31.3.1 Major General Yashwant Deva also spoke about a raid conducted by him at Mandapam, Tamil Nadu, during which he seized highly sophisticated communication equipment as well as explosive devises. This raid is indicative of the continuing clandestine activities of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu while the IPKF was engaged in militarily subduing them in Sri Lanka.

It has been also implied by the witness that the State Police machinery was indifferent in locating / seizing such prohibited items belonging to the LTTE. In his deposition dated 26th. July, 1996, Major Genl. Deva recounted :-

"I conducted a raid with my party on a hostile communication centre at Mandapam. The raid yielded a cache of communication equipment which included a high powered communication set functioning between Mandapam and Jaffna peninsula, a number of radio controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other miscelleneous gadgetry for establishing communications as well as disrupting communications. .... We located two stations at Kodungaiyur and Kottivakkam from where sets were seized and the information was passed on to the Police. No action was taken by the Police."

It appears that in the face of such upsurge of Tamil sentiments in the State of Tamil Nadu, and the strong anti Centre feelings propagated by several regional political parties and Tamil Chauvinist groups in the State, the State Government machinery was reluctant to take any effective action against the LTTE. Whenever the Central Government pressed for action, it appears that the State authorities would project that any action against the LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu would spark off law and order problems in the State especially in view of the strong pro-LTTE stand taken by some regional parties notably the D.K. and TNKC.

31.3.2 Shri R. Nagarajan, former Home Secretary, Tamil Nadu, in Annexure II (a) of his affidavit no. 85/93-JCI, filed before the Commission, has narrated the events of this period as follows :-

2 " ...... The Vadamarachi Operation launched by the Sri Lankan Armed forces in May 1987 culminated in the formulation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. Before signing the accord the RAW had taken the representatives of PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF, EROS to Delhi. Prabhakaran, Balasingham and Yogeswaran of the LTTE have also been taken to Delhi by the RAW. Except the LTTE, others accepted the Indo-Sri Lankan accord which was signed on 2.7.1987. As a part of the Accord the Indian Peace Keeping Force sent to Sri Lanka to disarm the militants and maintain law and order in the North and Eastern region of Sri Lanka. It was decided for the formation of the North Easter Provincial Council. The death of 13 top LTTE leaders on 4.10.1987 in the hands of the Sri Lankan Armed forces and the failure of the IPKF to save their lives was the beginning of the confrontation between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

The reluctance of the State machinery in enforcing the rule of law on the LTTE in Tamil Nadu is evident from the following incident narrated by Shri Nagarajan :-

3.In handling of the Sri Lanka Problem no representatives of the State Government was taken in the decision making process despite some suggestions to this effect. At times, instruction were received from various Central Government Agencies which were at cross purposes to each other. On 7.10.87, Director, IB informed the DGP that the telecommunication in possession of the LTTE militants in Tamilnadu should be seized and they should not be allowed to communicate with any body in view of their having launched strong adverse propaganda offensive. The DGP while informing the Director, IB, that instructions would be acted upon receipt of the orders from the State Government, gave the Director, IB his assessment of possible repercussions arising out of such an operation specially advising against any arrests. The DGP conveyed the instructions received from the Director IB to the Chief Secretary, who in turn requested the Home Secretary to seek instruction from the Hon'ble Chief Minister then undergoing treatment in the USA. In the meantime, pickets were ordered to be posted and patrolling done in areas where the militants were residing. In the coordination meeting convened by the Chief Secretary on 8.10.87, the Police assessment given was that despite escalation of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka there had been no serious repercussion in Tamilnadu. However a precipitate action in Tamilnadu or serious turn of events in Sri Lanka could provoke students community and hard core members of the DK and TNKC to launch agitations. The Cabinet Secretary in Delhi was kept informed of the steps taken by the State Administration in this regard.

It appears ironical that the top bureaucrats of the State of Tamil Nadu hesitated in taking legitimate action against the illegal activities of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and sought instructions from their ailing Chief Minister who was on his deathbead thousands of miles away, in the U.S.A. This hesitation is seen when it was the Central Government who was bringing the illegal activities of the LTTE to the notice of the State authorities. It appears that, finally, some action was taken by the State authorities after constant pressure from the Centre and the Indian Army, and, after the Union Cabinet Secretary, reportedly, threatened the State Government that adverse inference would be drawn in case the instructions were not carried out. The following passage from the above mentioned affidavit of Shri R. Nagarajan illustrates this :-

4. "On 10.10.87, the GOC-in-C ATNKK Area informed the DGP that in view of the fighting that had broken out between the IPKF and the LTTE, the Government of India had decided that the telecommunication equipment held by the LTTE Cadres in Tamilnadu should be immediately seized. The Cabinet Secretary to Government of India while conveying similar instruction to the CS informed the latter that adverse inference might be drawn in case the instruction of Government of India were not carried out. Similar instructions were conveyed by the Home Minister to the Government Tamilnadu. After discussions with the then Hon'ble Minister of Finance, the Government issued the following instruction to the Police in respect of LTTE cadres alone:

i) All the premises of the LTTE cadres of Tamilnadu should be searched and telecommunication equipment in the possession, if any, seized.

ii) If any arms and ammunition are found in their illegal possession, these should be seized.

5. Pursuant to this premises of LTTE were searched on 11.10.87 and 7 wireless sets were seized. Cases were registered and investigations taken up. His Excellency the Governor was kept informed of the steps taken by the Police. Security arrangements for VIPs were tightened."

A mention of this raid is also found in Annexure II(b) of the above affidavit of Shri Nagarajan, where it is stated that in the surprise raid conducted in LTTE camps in Tamil Nadu, 6 W.T. sets, 1 transmitter, 2 charges, 1 Air Pistol, 80 hand grenades, 2 revolver rounds etc. were seized.

Shri S. Guhan also referred to this raid during his deposition before the Commission. He stated :-

"By October 1987 there were open hostilities between the LTTE and the IPKF in Sri Lanka. On 11th October 1987 some communication equipments were seized from the LTTE by the Madras Police, but no LTTE personnel were arrested."

It does not appear that the above action of the State enforcing agencies precipitated any serious law and order problem in Tamil Nadu, apprehensions about which were earlier being expressed by the State Government authorities.

It appears that confusion again prevailed when it was found that even after the above action was taken by the State Government, some hard core LTTE cadres, led by Kittu, continued to indulge in anti- India propaganda from Madras. It appears that Kittu and his associates were in regular contact in Madras with politicians and press and anti-India propaganda was being indulged in freely.

Regarding the state of the situation prevailing on this front during that period, Major General Deva confirmed that the LTTE cadres were operating from some pockets of Tamil Nadu. In his deposition dt. 26th July, 1996, he stated as follows :-

"It is also known that telephones were provided to the militant leaders at Madras and Mandapam. The militant leaders often made press statements......it was widely mentioned that ..youngsters were recruited by the LTTE to run communication errands in the Southern India..."

About this conduct of the LTTE cadres, it appears that there existed considerable concern even at the level of the Prime Minister. Shri R. Nagarajan has narrated this event as follows in his affidavit (No. 85/93- JCI):-

6. "On 16.10.87, the CS informed the DGP that the Secretary to late CM had informed to the CS from Baltimore on the previous night stating that the PS to the PM had complained that Kittu of LTTE and his close associates were having access to politicians and the Press in Madras despite surveillance having been mounted on them. The late CM had instructed that no one not even the ministers were to be allowed to meet Kittu and others. When the DGP spoke to the Director IB, about this, the Director IB expressed surprise. The DGP explained to the Director IB that total ban on the movement and the contact of Kittu and his associates was impossible except when they were arrested and remanded to the judicial custody. Keeping them away from the Press and contacts was thus difficult and could lead to undue publicity in the media. It was also pointed out by the DGP that if a decision to arrest and remand the LTTE members was taken, it would be better the leaders of other militant groups living in Tamilnadu should also be arrested on selective basis to prevent any possible criticism of lop-sided and partial action against one particular group. The Director IB wanted to have a discussion with the Cabinet Secretary on this subject.

7. At about 12.15 hrs on the same day a contact was established with the Director IB and the Cabinet Secretary. While accepting the basic necessity to keep Kittu and other LTTE members away from the Press, Public, and Political Leaders, the Cabinet Secretary felt that it was essential for a channel of communications to be kept open through the AIADMK in general and particularly the Ministers. The DGP pointed out that this would be difficult in the light of specific instruction from the then CM that even the Ministers of TN Cabinet should not be allowed to have access to Kittu and others. Thereupon the Cabinet Secretary suggested that the channel of communication with these members of LTTE could perhaps be maintained through the officials like DIG(INT), DGP and the CS.

8. On 16.10.87 evening, the CS spoke to the Director IB and informed him that imposition of restrictions on Kittu and others had led to a L&O problem as an Hon'ble member of the Parliament was insisting on having an interview with Kittu who was threatening to use Potassium Cyanide Capsules in case such restrictions were continued. On 17.10.87 morning, the DIB informed the DGP on phone that the restrictions placed on the LTTE members be relaxed to the extent as per the discretion of the State Government. The DGP informed the Director IB that having regard to personal security of Kittu and others it was proposed to allow visitors only after they were thoroughly checked and personal security officer of Kittu was to be present during the conversation."

It is again evident from the above incident that the State Administration, on its own, appeared reluctant in initiating any precipitative action in matters relating to LTTE. Under the uncertain political climate of the State, the bureaucracy in Tamil Nadu appears to be playing safe, and choosing to be deliberately vague and ambiguous in dealing with LTTE. In the absence of any clear cut political direction, since the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Shri M.G. Ramachandran was not available in the country, the bureaucracy appears to be vacillating in dealing with this serious law and order issue.

It cannot be ruled out that the bureaucracy, under the given circumstances, was also reluctant to incur the wrath of the powerful opposition parties of the State, primarily, the D.M.K.

The AIADMK, without its leader, M.G.R. was not perceived to be as strong as earlier, and the strident pro LTTE posture of the important regional parties, especially the D.M.K. appears to have brought in a significant element of hesitation in the minds of the bureaucracy and the enforcing agencies of the State to tackle LTTE in Tamil Nadu.

Shri M.G. Ramachandran returned to India from the U.S.A. in October, 1987; however, his condition continued to deteriorate and he died by the end of 1987 on 24th. December at Madras.

Soon after his return, Shri M.G. Ramachandran, on 29th. October, 1987, appealed to the Prime Minister to hold talks with the LTTE. (Affidavit No. 85/93- JCI , Annexure II(b)). This appears to be one of his last utterances on this issue.

Regarding the political equations developed by the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, Dr. S. Chandrashekharan, former Special Secretary (R), deposed before the Commission. He stated :-

"LTTE was with MGR till he died. DMK also found a good opportunity to getting close to LTTE after MGR's death. LTTE exploited the Tamil Nadu politics, I would say, to the fullest extent. If the top is with the LTTE, the whole down the line would be with the LTTE."

The changing equations of the period and the new alliances between the LTTE and DMK in Tamil Nadu, during this period have been also spoken about by outside observers. Ms. Anita Pratap, while deposing before the Commission, stated :-

"The whole Tamil issue became so politicised in Tamil Nadu, that all political parties took sides. LTTE was seen being in M.G.R. camp, and TELO was seen being in the DMK camp."

"TELO was being supported by DMK and LTTE was supported by MGR. It was in early eighties and mid eighties. In 88/89/90, Karunanidhi was supporting the LTTE as TELO had already been wiped out and ..... MGR died in 1987."

31.4 The activities of the Tamil regional parties in stoking anti Centre feelings in Tamil Nadu became even more pronounced in 1988.

During the Republic Day celebrations to be held on 26th. January, 1988, the President of Sri Lanka, Shri J.R. Jayawardhane, was invited as the Chief Guest by the Government of India. This decision of the Government of India appears to have created serious misgivings in the mind of the regional Tamil parties and pro LTTE chauvinist groups in Tamil Nadu. This issue was taken up by these groups and resulted in open expressions of virulent anti Centre sentiments all over Tamil Nadu. It appears that the political propaganda of this kind was being indulged in by parties such as D.M.K. in order to whip up Tamil sentiments of the populace by projecting the alleged collaboration between the Government of India and Government of Sri Lanka to be an anti LTTE and anti Tamil stand of the Central Government. The protests were not confined to the streets but were also being manifested on the floor of the Legislative Assembly by the D.M.K.

These protests also indicate that these political parties did not hesitate to propagate anti Rajiv Gandhi sentiments going to the extent of holding out threats to his life. Visible undercurrents of encouragement to secessionist tendencies are also seen in these protests.

"Separate calls given by DMK and the DK-TNKC combine to observe January 25 as a protest day against the visit of the Sri Lankan President to India during the Republic Day celebrations . evoked poor to moderate response in 17 districts of Tamil Nadu. Over 45,000 DMK workers including 30000 in Madras city , 7000 in Coimbatore and 5000 in Tirunelveli put on black badges and hoisted black flags on house tops (including 1200 in Coimbatore and 600 in Madras city). The DMK MLAs put on black bands even while attending the Assembly session.

The DK -TNKC had a more militant programme of burning the effigy of the Sri Lankan President at various places. They succeeded in doing so in 4 places ( Trichy, South Arcot, Tanjore East and Ramnad) while at 8 other places they were prevented from burning the effigies by the Police who arrested 258 DK-TNKC workers in this connection. The total participants among the DK-TNKC workers numbered only around 2,000.

The student groups under the aegis of Tamil Student Federation, All College Students Association and Sri Lankan Tamil Students Union (all pro DMK) in Madras and Tanjore East also participated in the programme by taking out processions (500/1000) shouting provocative slogans like ' Sikh shot Indira and Tamilian will shoot Rajiv', ' If Eelam is not forthcoming, separate Tamil Nadu will be formed', 'Don't make the hand which carry books to carry weapons', and 'Down , down India's aggression'. They also burnt the effigies of Sri Lankan President and the Prime Minister of India.

2. The progrmme has, to some extent succeeded in arousing the dormant feelings in the State over the Sri Lankan Tamil Issue after a lull in the activities for over a month. The DMK and DK-TNKC combine are likely to revive the pressure by follow up actions."

(REF :- DIB UO No 5/J1/88/33 dated 27.1.88- Tamil Nadu- Protest activities against Sri Lankan President's visit.)

13. Reports continued to indicate the anger and frustration of militant Sri Lankan Tamils and their Indian supporters at the Sri Lankan situation. Letters written by Tamil sympathisers of the LTTE and containing threats to the security of PM continue to be received. In the course of observance of protest day on January 25 against the visit of Sri Lankan President to India as Chief Guest during the Republic Day celebrations, the various students groups....took out processions...."

REF :-AFFIDAVIT NO. 292/95-JCI, OF SHRI V. VAIDYANATHAN, JOINT DIRECTOR, INTEL. BUREAU, APPENDIX NO. 5

During this period, there were also reports of armed L.T.T.E. cadres infiltrating into India. These activities of the L.T.T.E. were a cause of concern for the intelligence agencies who perceived them to be threats to the security of the Prime Minister and other leading political personalities. While assessing the threat perception for Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, during his proposed visit to Kerala, this concern was brought out by the Intelligence Bureau. In their threat perception report, it was, inter alia, observed :-

3. Sri Lankan militants, particularly the LTTE and their Indian supporters and sympathisers have been extremely bitter at the developments in Sri Lanka and the operations of the IPKF. Several threatening letters apart from other intelligence reports , have been received warning of danger to the Prime Minister's security. Open expressions of anger of these elements against the PM have also been noticed. During the observance of protest against the invitation extended to the Sri Lankan President as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day function, the Sri Lankan Students' Union ...took out processions ...

According to one report, about 60 -70 LTTE cadres had landed at Tamil Nadu coast in early January and moved out in different directions. That the LTTE has access to sophisticated firearms and explosive devices could add to their threat potential. They are also adept at camouflage and impersonation.

(REF :- AFFIDAVIT NO. 292/95-JCI, OF SHRI V. VAIDYANATHAN, JOINT DIRECTOR, INTEL. BUREAU, APPENDIX NO. 6; (DIB UO No. 11/VS/88(7)- 314 Dated 12.2.88)

31.5 President's Rule was imposed in Tamil Nadu on 30th. January, 1988, in view of fact that no elected Government could be formed due to split in the ruling AIADMK after the demise of Shri M.G. Ramachandran. The political situation in Tamil Nadu, at this stage, was, perceptibly different from that which prevailed at the time of signing of the Indo Sri Lankan Accord. The AIADMK had split into two factions - one owing allegiance to Smt. Janaki Ramachandran, who held the post of Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu for a very short period; the other faction was headed by Selvi J. Jayalalitha. The uncertainty of the prevailing political situation, it appears, affected the bureaucracy of the State as well.

31.6 It appears that during this period, unfortunately, instead of engaging themselves seriously in the task of cleaning up the State of militant anti national elements, both the Central and State Government agencies entered into trading of charges against one another on the issue of growth of L.T.T.E.'s anti national activities which required a single minded decisive action.

There also appears that a confusion was created by the State Government bureaucracy that peace initiatives being taken by the Central Government Agencies to bring L.T.T.E. around and to make it amenable to a peaceful solution were coming in the way of enforcing the law in the State against L.T.T.E. cadres. Actually, it appears, that the State Government machinery was reluctant to take any deterrent action against the L.T.T.E. and conveniently put the blame for non enforcement at the doorstep of the Central Government Agencies. This mutual trading of charges is evident from the following excerpts from the enclosures to the affidavit no. 85/93-JCI of Shri R. Nagarajan :-

9."Often faced with a difficult situation on Sri Lankan Front, various Central Organisations had been voicing allegations generally on the lines that the State administration was either sympathetic to or soft in taking action against the militants who were sending reinforcements in arms and ammunition from Tamilnadu. A letter received from Gen. Dipender Singh, VSM, GOC-incharge, Southern Command on these lines was replied to by the DG in his DO Letter No. 1244/C dated 8.2.88 giving a detailed account of the action taken by the State administration and refuting the allegations. Another DO Lr dated 12.2.88 received from the Home Secretary consequent upon receipt of a telex message from the Government of India was replied by the DGP on 15.2.88 refuting the allegations contained therein, and also enclosing a list of cases registered and being investigated by the TN Police against the Sri lankan Tamil Militants in Tamilnadu from the September'87 to February'88.

10. In his Do Lr No. SR/Govt.II/1569-188 dated 3.5.88, the Secretary Public wanted a detailed report from the then IG(INT) on the allegations that i) Senior LTTE leaders like Balasingam and others were allowed to function on freely; ii) that Kittu has been provided with a telephone in Madras leading to leakage of information in the negotiations; iii) that LTTE had been bold enough to bring out brochures and pamphlets and distribute the same freely in Tamilnadu; and iv) that smuggling of explosives and arms and ammunition continued from Tamilnadu.

11. In his detailed reply in DO Lr No. C.11(A)4155/C dated 5.5.88 the then IG(INT) listed out the consequences of action taken by the State administration in dealing with the Sri Lankan problem. Each of these allegations were dealt with in detail and refuted. In the end, IG(INT) mentioned categorically, that the State administration had taken every effort to implement the policy of the Government of India and that all important decisions were taken not only after consulting the State Government but also the Government of India. He also suggested that a clear policy on dealing with the militants should be laid down after taken into consideration the possibilities of some LTTE cadres swallowing Cyanide capsules, and subsequent political repercussions in case of their arrests.

12. Because of shrinking financial and casualties suffered by the militants in hostilities in Sri Lanka, financial aid was given by the State Government on a few occasions to some of the philanthropic organisations as well as the militant groups who were in dire circumstances in 1987 and 1988. The records about this are available with State Government."

31.6.1 There is further evidence to show that during this period, the Central Government was continuously prodding the State Government machinery into action by furnishing specific information regarding L.T.T.E. activities. The State Government machinery, it is evident, was extremely reluctant to take any stern measures against the L.T.T.E. It is seen that the reports of L.T.T.E. activities were being continuously downplayed and wherever strict enforcement was insisted upon by the Central Government, the State Government machinery expressed their difficulties by trying to focus on the law and order problem which could arise in the State as a fallout of stern measures against the L.T.T.E.

This attitude of the State Government bureaucracy and enforcement agencies conveys an impression that they were reluctant to initiate any serious action against the L.T.T.E., since, given the changed scenario, it had become a distinct possibility that D.M.K. and allies could come to power in the forthcoming elections, and, given their staunch pro L.T.T.E. stand, any action against Sri Lankan militants may not meet with their approval. In a specific instance of attempts made by both the Central and State Government for keeping the L.T.T.E. spokesman Kittu away from the media and local politicians since he was indulging in anti India propaganda, it is seen that the D.M.K. leader Shri Vai Gopalaswamy insisted on meeting Kittu and wanted to court arrest when he was denied permission. Finally, the conditions imposed on Kittu had to be relaxed.

The consistent anti IPKF stand taken by the DMK party and Tamil Chauvinist parties was manifested from the various agitations organised by them in Tamil Nadu both before and after the imposition of the President's Rule. Shri R. Nagarajan, in his affidavit no. 80/93-JCI has listed out some such instances as follows :-

26.10.87 852 DK, TNKC members arrested including K. Veramani and P. Nedumaran when they picketed AIR & TV.

27.10.87 7881 DMK men including MLAs and MLCs were arrested when they picketed Central Govt. office.

20.02.88 60,000 DMK men observed token fast protesting against the action of IPKF - DMK Chief and others participated.

At this juncture, both the factions of the AIADMK, apparently, sensing the general political mood and the heat which the anti IPKF and Pro LTTE sentiments had generated, started coming out with statements on this issue. The Janaki faction of AIADMK was openly critical of the IPKF and even held out threats of serious repercussions in the State if V. Prabhakaran of the L.T.T.E. was harmed.

Shri M. Karunanidhi, leader of the DMK and Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, during his deposition before the Commission on 22nd. November, 1996, referred to a press statement made by Selvi J. Jayalalitha which was published in the "Indian Express" dt. 23rd. February, 1988, captioned "Jayalalitha backs LTTE on peace move." (Annexure M - 5). In the press report, J. Jayalalitha is reported to have, inter alia, stated that it would be impossible to safeguard the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils without including the LTTE in any peace moves. However, the news item states, she refused to comment on the role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. It appears that these statements made by the AIADMK at this juncture were not followed up by any concrete action and were made keeping in view the prevailing political climate.

It is evident that this posture of the prominent DMK party and its allies did affect the decision making of the bureaucrats and the law enforcers of the State. The following correspondence between the Central Government and the then Advisor to the Governor of Tamil Nadu, Dr. S.S. Sidhu, is an indicator of this trend :-

Letter of Dr. S.S.Sidhu, Adviser to the Governor addressed to Cabinet Secretary dt. 20-5-1988.

"Report on the main points raised in D.O.Letter No.34/2/6/87-TS, dated 26th April, 1988 from Thiru R.Rajamani, Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, to Thiru M.M. Rajendran, Chief Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Madras.

It has been remarked that the senior LTTE leaders like Balasingam, Thilagar, Shivakumar and Castre are allowed to function unhampered in Tamil Nadu. Balasingam is reported to be in Karnataka, perhaps in Kolar Gold Fields or near Bangalore. Thilagar is perhaps in United Kingdom. There is no leader by name Castre in the LTTE, though there is one Castro who is only a cadre looking after the office of the LTTE at Madras. This Castro is assisted by one Shivakumar and a few others. So far neither Shivakumar nor Castro have come to any adverse notice for any activity apart from the fact that they do not have any valid documents for entry into the stay in India. As per our intelligence reports, some of them on a few occasions, have gone to Sri Lanka and come back in I.A.F. planes.

2. Kittu does not have a telephone in his name. Telephone No.417777 belongs to the owner of the house (Vaidyanathan-an Indian national) in which the LTTE has its office. This was disconnected by the P.&T. Department on 12-10- 87 for non-payment of dues. It was re- connected on 25-3-88 by the department after payment of the charges by the owner. This telephone is also under surveillance by some Central intelligence agencies. Leakage of information through this phone, though possible, is highly improbable. In this connection, it is a fact that a very large number of friends and supporters of Sri Lankans in general and LTTE in particular travel to and from the island by air and sea, providing ample opportunities to carry messages, pamphlets, letters, cassettes, etc.,

3. Police have come across a few pamphlets criticising the role of I.P.K.F. and carrying materials supporting the LTTE. There is no information that these are printed in Tamil Nadu. Mostly, these have been printed in Sri Lanka and other countries and brought here by the sympathisers and friends of Sri Lankan militants. This position is, however, being examined for obtaining legal opinion so as to take appropriate action under the law.

4. As regards smuggling of arms and ammunition, Tamil Nadu police have in co-ordination with the Coast Guard and the Customs detected during the last four months, 82 cases resulting in the arrest of 311, seizure of 10,776 gelating sticks, 21,322 detonators, 14 hand-granades, 700 Kgs. of explosive powder, 2,750 rounds of ammunition, 35 Kgs. of ball ammunition, 10 hand-held rockets, 10 anti- rockets, 276 coils of fuse wire and I remote control device. Informants have been set up to collect intelligence about the possession of arms, ammunition and explosives by Tamil militants. Coastal patrols have been organised extensively to prevent movement of arms, ammunition and explosives across the sea. It may also be emphasised in this connection that patrolling of the sea is the responsibility of the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. Despite the fact that the State police do not have any boats, they have been able to seize 10 boats during the months of March and April due to sustained vigilance on their part. These boats were, after seizure, handed over to Custom authorities. It is learnt that the capture of 4 boats, by the Navy on the 15th March was not reported at all to the police and the boats really belong to the PLOT group and were anchored at Vedalai for more than a year. One of these boats, is a trawler belongs to the Sri Lankan Fishing Company.

5. From all these averments, it can be said that the State administration has been taking effective steps to curb the activities of the militants including the LTTE and preventing any possible movement of arms, ammunitions and explosives across the sea. It is however, to be said that messages from Delhi on the manner of dealing with the LTTE have sometimes been contradictory. For instance, when the hostilities broke out between the I.P.K.F. and the LTTE, telephonic instructions were received that the telecommunication equipment held by the LTTE in Tamil Nadu should be immediately seized.

Accordingly, in consultation with the Government of India, the premises of LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu were searched and telecommunication equipment seized, in addition to arms and ammunitions. Important LTTE leaders were also placed under informal surveillance. The then Director- General of Police also informed the Director, Intelligence Bureau that there cannot be a total ban on movement and access to Kittu and his associates unless the concerned are arrested are remanded to custody. After a round of discussions, instructions were issued that though these leaders must be kept incommunicado from the Press, Public and the Political parties, it was essential that a channel should be maintained with the AIADMK in general and particularly through Ministers. The difficulties in this process were also explained that even the Ministers should not be allowed to have any access to Kittu and others, as per the order of the late Chief Minister. It was only then that a channel of communication was established through official lines viz., Director-General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police (C.I.D.) and the Chief Secretary.

6. It may also be pointed out that it may not be possible to ban transmission of all information. When the Government placed some restrictions on public contact with Kittu and others, Thiru V.Gopalasamy, M.P.(DMK) went to the residence of Kittu and insisted on meeting him. On being refused permission, he demanded to be arrested. Later on, after the intervention of the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the restrictions on Kittu and others were relaxed and visitors were allowed to meet Kittu in the presence of a Police Officer. Direct and close contacts by certain Central Intelligence agencies, creates confusion about the policy to be followed. The State Government is keen to offer full co-operation to the Central agencies in all matters. However, it will be more effective if we have a clear picture of the basics of the policy towards LTTE to ensure co-ordinated action and will be otherwise very helpful if the State Government is kept fully appraised of the developments from time to time."

This correspondence also brings out the extent of the smuggling activities of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants during this period.

31.6.2 The situation in Tamil Nadu continued to remain volatile. As the news of the successes of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka against the LTTE kept coming, the protests in Tamil Nadu took an even more serious turn.

The IPKF operations in Sri Lanka were gaining ground and there were several reports being received that the LTTE Chief, V. Prabhakaran was on the run. These reports indicating the possible outcome of death or physical harm to V. Prabhakaran evoked strong reactions in Tamil Nadu. This issue became the focal point of speeches and activities of several opposition groups in Tamilnadu.

Threats to the lives of Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi, his family members and senior Congress (I) members were being openly aired.

Intelligence reports of the period June, 1988, (Annexure M-6) indicate this trend. On 1st. June, 1988, the Liberation Tigers Solidarity Organisation (LTSO), during a procession organised by them at Coimbatore, came out with public expressions of hostility against the Central Government, the Prime Minister and the IPKF. During the slogan shouting, the protestors warned of chaos in Tamilnadu and attacks on Congress-I leaders including the Prime Minister in case any harm came to V. Pirabhakaran, the LTTE Supremo.

Similarly, in another demonstration at Madras on June 7th, organised by the DK, Tamilnadu Kamraj Congress (TNKC) and seferal other such parties, in front of the Army Sub Area Headquarters, was a demonstration, which was held directly against the Indian Army for the first time. Critical speeches were made by the leaders of various groups in condemning the Central Government for deploying Indian Army to kill LTTE cadres in Srilanka.

Secessionist tendencies of the Tamil Chauvinist elements again manifested themselves publicly. K.Veeramani, General secretary DK, in his public speeches demanded a separate Tamilnadu and Tamil Eelam. This found support also from other regional radical groups going by the names of 'Intellectual Forum' and 'Tamilnadu Republican Party.'

Other regional pro LTTE groups, such as Tamizhaga Munnetra Munnani (TMM) led by Sivaji Ganesan also held protest fasts in various districts all over Tamil Nadu and condemned the operations of the IPKF in Sri Lanka which they painted as merciless attacks on LTTE and Srilankan Tamils. TMM also accused the IPKF of deliberately attempting to wipe out LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran and urged the Government of India to hold talks with him without any pre- condition.

During these protests by the TMM, threats were held out to Shri Rajiv Gandhi. It was asserted that the Prime Minister would not be able to move freely in Tamilnadu if any harm was done to V. Prabhakaran.

The DMK party continued its relentless anti centre tirade during their public meetings. M.Karunanidhi, DMK President, addressing a largely attended public meeting in Pudukottai District on June 6, 1987, declared that the IPKF operations would leave a permanent scar on the minds of the Tamils against the Central Government. He also threatened in his speeches at other places that there would be turmoil in Tamilnadu if anything happens to V. Prabhakaran.

Similarly, the AIADMK (Janaki faction) leaders like Aladi Aruna and R.M.Veerappan in their speeches also threatened of large-scale violence and blood- bath if V. Prabhakaran was killed.

During the visit of Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi, during this period, to Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the Intelligence Agencies were apprehensive about the activities of these parties and the chauvinist militant groups.

The intelligence agencies pointed out specific threats to the life of Prime Minister by the LTTE as well. A wireless intercept purportedly between two LTTE stations,created suspicions about threat to Prime Minister's security during the visit.

"Sri Lankan Tamil militants have a fairly well- spread out presence in Tamil Nadu. While no plan to cause harm to the Prime Minister has come to notice, the presence of Sri Lankan Tamil groups supporting or sympathetic to the LTTE has to be kept in view....

5. Various opposition groups consisting of Dravida Kazhagam (DK), Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress (TNKC), Lok Dal, Janata Party etc., organised a joint demonstration (600- Madras June 7, 1988) in front of the Army sub area Hqrs. at which their leaders condemned the Central Government for allegedly deploying Indian Army to kill LTTE cadres in Sri Lanka. On June 5, 1988, the Jan Morcha leaders of Coimbatore district decided to stage black flag demonstration against the Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit to Coimbatore."

The visit of the Prime Minister passed off without any serious incident; for the period, following was the assessment of the I.B. as regards L.T.T.E. activities :-