U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues

By Lora Lumpe
with contributions by Frida Berrigan, Kurt Biddle, John Gershman, and Ingrid Vaicius

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Project Directors
Tom Barry (IRC)
Martha Honey (IPS)

Communications
Erik Leaver (IPS)
erik@ips-dc.org
Kathy Spillman (IPS)
kathy@ips-dc.org

Project Administrative Assistant
Nancy Stockdale (IRC)

Design/Production
Tonya Cannariato (IRC)

Orders and subscription information:
Mail: PO Box 4506
Albuquerque, NM 87196-4506
Voice: (505) 842-8288
Fax: (505) 842-8288
Email: infocus@irc-online.org

Editorial inquiries and information:
IRC Editor
Voice: (505) 388-0208
Fax: (505) 388-0619
Email: tom@irc-online.org

IPS Editor
Voice: (202) 234-9382/3 ext. 232
Fax: (202) 387-7915
Email: ipsps@igc.org

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Cover Images:

1: The Royal Thai Marines (RTM) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) have long experience in training together. USMC 2nd Lt. Michael Lorence and RTM Lt. Somchai, both combat engineers, discuss a demolition training exercise during COBRA GOLD. Photo by SSgt. Stan Parker, USAF


3: A soldier from the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC teaches a Malian soldier proper firing techniques. Special Forces soldiers are in Mali teaching peacekeeping and providing humanitarian assistance as part of the ongoing African Crisis Response Initiative. Photo by: Maj. T. McCollum.
Executive Summary

Over the past decade one of the principal means by which the U.S. has interacted with almost all governments in the world is by training their military forces. In recent years U.S. forces have been training approximately 100,000 foreign soldiers annually. This training takes place in at least 150 institutions within the U.S. and in 180 countries around the world.1

The means and programs through which this training is provided have mushroomed. Since 1994, funding for the best-known of these programs, the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), has increased fourfold. During this period each of the military training programs has been justified, at least partially, as strengthening human rights and democratization. In truth, most of the programs have had no discernible focus on human rights and have been carried out in a highly, if not completely, unaccountable manner. The State Department’s 2002 Human Rights Report cited the security forces in 51 of the countries receiving IMET training (38% of the total) for their poor human rights records (see Map 1, page 24, and Appendix 2, pages 41-45).

Several different congressional committees bear oversight responsibility for military training. None has command of the big picture—the scope, magnitude, and potential impact of this domain of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. military training programs expanded during the 1990s with insufficient congressional oversight and scant public debate.

Training programs in the past decade were justified mainly on counternarcotics or “peacekeeping” grounds, but the September 2001 terrorist attacks have created a new rationale for expanding them. In December 2001, Congress established a new regional counterterrorism fellowship program to fund training of foreign officers at U.S. military institutions. This program is aimed primarily at Indonesian officers—currently banned by a separate act of Congress from receiving other forms of military training due to the Indonesian Army’s egregious human rights record.

Since September 11, the Bush administration has offered police or military training to a growing list of countries said to be at the front lines in the fight against global terrorism—including Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia. Many of these new allies have extensive records of ongoing human rights violations, including torture and assassination (see Appendix 2, pages 41-45). The administration’s March 2002 “emergency supplemental appropriations” request includes well over a billion dollars in new military aid and training. Among the items requested is $100,000,000 that the
Defense Department would distribute for weapons and training to countries it would secretly choose; it would do so without congressional oversight; and it would assert the right to discard any human rights or other conditions that Congress has developed over the past decades to minimize unintended negative consequences of U.S. military aid.

Training conducted by covert intelligence units has been a perennial problem for oversight, and new problems have been created by the trend toward outsourcing training to private companies. Now the Bush administration is seeking to restrict the flow of information to Congress and the public even more. Most notably, the executive branch is trying to scale back the Foreign Military Training Report, which in recent years has provided the most comprehensive public accounting available, and is seeking authority to provide assistance with no transparency or accountability, as in the 2002 emergency supplemental request.

Greater scrutiny needs to be devoted in particular to the widespread training deployments of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). These troops, which operate in small commando units and utilize unconventional warfare tactics, have gained acclaim for their role in the war in Afghanistan and enjoy greater public prominence with recent revelations that they are training Filipino, Yemeni, and Georgian troops. In reality, these forces have been training foreign military and paramilitary forces in these and other countries around the world throughout the past decade, but their routine training deployments have been shrouded in secrecy.

Questions persist about the skills that SOF units are conveying and the impact of this assistance. During the cold war and throughout the 1990s, these troops were revealed to be training foreign units with bloody records, including the Atlacatl Battalion in El Salvador in 1989 (this battalion killed six Jesuit priests whom they viewed as too sympathetic to guerrillas, their housekeeper, and her young daughter during that same year) and Kopassus units in Indonesia through mid-1998 (these units supported and armed militias in East Timor that brutally attacked and killed citizens and UN officials during the vote for independence in 1999).

The long-term legacies of foreign military training must not be excluded from current decisionmaking about the costs and benefits of this exercise of foreign policy. Throughout the cold war, the U.S. government facilitated and condoned many human rights abuses by providing training and assistance justified in the name of fighting “global communism.” Some of the unintended consequences of doing so are only now coming to light. Most notably, by arming and training local anticommunist forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. government helped establish the global network of militant anti-Western Muslim fundamentalists that it is now combating.
If in this current effort U.S. forces intervene and provide training in support of regimes repressing legitimate political activism and/or using torture or coercion to maintain power, they are likely to foster, rather than diminish, political violence (terrorism) around the globe.

Given the pace at which military-to-military relations are now being established and ratcheted up in the name of fighting terrorism, serious scrutiny is needed more than ever to ensure that America’s fight against terrorism is pursued by means and in partnerships consistent with its democratic ideals and with national and international legal obligations.

This report outlines the range of known training programs, the budgets for those programs, some of the human rights issues raised, and areas needing congressional and public oversight.

Among the key recommendations of this report are:

- Increase transparency regarding SOF foreign training missions in order to help ensure public accountability, given the major SOF role in foreign military training abroad, their unconventional warfare tactics, and their recent training of abusive troops in Colombia, Indonesia, and elsewhere.

- Ban unaccountable covert intelligence-run military and paramilitary training programs, given the record of terror such operations have inflicted on civilians.

- Declassify all curricula and doctrine being taught to foreign military trainees and ensure that all training includes a strong emphasis on human rights and international humanitarian law obligations that pertain both in internal and in international armed conflicts.

- Require increased disclosure about the activities of private military companies that the U.S. State Department has authorized or hired to train foreign militaries.

- Cut off all forms of operational military assistance and training to any government when a pattern of abuse by its military is identified.

- Establish greater dialogue and cooperation between the various congressional committees with oversight responsibilities for U.S. military training programs both to ensure that the committees do not work at cross-purposes and to increase oversight.
OVERVIEW

U.S. law defines foreign military training as formal or informal instruction of foreign soldiers by officers or employees of the U.S. government or by private contractors authorized by the U.S. government. Training includes theory (book learning) as well as operational field instruction, and it can occur in the U.S. or overseas.

More than 150 documented institutions within the U.S. provide instruction to foreign soldiers. These institutions range from degree granting universities (like the National Defense University in Washington, DC) to professional military schools on U.S. military bases (like the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School in Ft. Huachuca, AZ, or the Army Infantry School at Ft. Benning, GA), which focus on particular combat-related skills. In addition, in the 1990s the U.S. government established five regionally focused security studies centers, which bring officers and civilians from militaries and governments in different parts of the world together to study security policies such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counternarcotics, and military budgeting.

All told, according to the Foreign Military Training Report released in January 2001, the Department of Defense and armed forces branches teach 4,100 different subjects. The courses cover the range of modern military skills—from military accounting to basic training in infantry war fighting skills to “evasive driving for general officers” to operating or repairing particular weapon systems to conducting psychological operations.

In addition, U.S. regular and reserve military forces are training foreign troops in approximately 180 countries around the world. This training includes visits of small mobile training teams, joint combined exercises of U.S. and foreign troops, deployments specially intended for training, and military unit exchanges. U.S. Special Operations Forces alone train foreign troops in 150 countries annually; U.S. intelligence agencies continue to school undisclosed numbers of government and insurgent forces around the world. Other U.S. government agencies, including the FBI, Customs, and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), also provide training courses for overseas security forces. Finally, private American companies, operating with U.S. government approval, have stepped up their training of foreign security forces in recent years.

Foreign police also receive training in a number of military institutions in the U.S., including at the notorious School of the Americas (which has been renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation), as well as in their home countries. Since the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of
Defense (DOD) have trained foreign police forces, originally focusing on counterinsurgency missions (military operations aimed at neutralizing internal opposition) and, since the end of the cold war, adding counterdrug, antiterrorism, and international crime operations. Police training programs have grown, despite a 1973 congressional ban on funding following revelations of grave human rights abuses by U.S.-trained police in Vietnam and South America. Police and military training have become increasingly intertwined, mainly in counternarcotics programs and missions. Although this report does not cover police training in detail, it will note a couple of programs where this military overlap is most apparent.

Although no aggregate official figure is available, public records indicate that by 1998 approximately 100,000 foreign police and military officials annually were receiving training from U.S. forces and private American military companies, both inside and outside the United States. This training is financed through dozens of different U.S. government programs spread across many agencies and departments (see Box 1, this page). Though other countries have granted or currently offer similar forms of military assistance, the U.S. is by far the leader, both in scale and global reach.

**Box 1:**

**Major U.S. Foreign Military/Paramilitary Training Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)/Africa Region programs</td>
<td>State Department-funded training, conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces and private military contractors; offered in African countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiterrorism programs</td>
<td>Some funded by Defense Department, conducted in foreign countries; some funded by State Department, conducted in the U.S. and abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Budget and locations of training abroad are classified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Theater Security Cooperation Plans</td>
<td>Defense Department-funded training in host countries and at regional U.S. strategic studies schools, some in the U.S. and some abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counternarcotics programs</td>
<td>Some funded by Defense Department and conducted in host countries; some funded by Justice Department or State Department and conducted in the U.S. or in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI International Training</td>
<td>Funded by Department of Justice, training in the U.S. and abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance programs</td>
<td>Medical training of foreign forces funded by Defense Department, conducted in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</td>
<td>State Department-funded, mostly conducted at military bases in the U.S.; some of this funding used to send mobile training teams abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint bilateral or multilateral military exercises</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department, conducted in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department, conducted in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military academies</td>
<td>60 slots each at four U.S. armed forces war colleges, funded by Defense Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine clearance training</td>
<td>Funded by State Department, conducted by Special Operations Forces in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Training Teams</td>
<td>Traveling versions of IMET courses, funded by State Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Some funded by State Department in the U.S. and abroad; some funded by Defense Department in host countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal Personnel Exchange Program</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department, training of foreign personnel in the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal visits by military units</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department, foreign personnel in the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department; brings foreign personnel to training centers in the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense training</td>
<td>Funded by Defense Department, conducted in host countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See Tables 1 and 2 for recent and current funding levels for many of these activities.
RECENT EXPANSION OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

With the end of the cold war, most countries—including the U.S.—began cutting back on military spending. However, while the world’s armies were shrinking, the U.S. embarked on a significant expansion of its overseas military training programs. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), the best-known of the U.S. training programs, grew from 96 participating countries in 1990 to 133 countries today. The IMET budget has quadrupled since 1994, and the number of foreign military personnel trained doubled between 1993 and 1999. Existing schools, such as the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare School in Ft. Bragg, NC, enrolled more foreign students during the 1990s, and new training centers were created, including both the Asia-Pacific and the African centers for strategic studies. In addition, new training programs—such as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), counternarcotics training, and the African Crisis Response Initiative—were born.

Successive U.S. administrations have long viewed training of and assistance to armed forces around the world as important instruments of U.S. national security policy. In the 1990s, training was increasingly perceived as a cost-effective tool for forging and maintaining military ties. The surge in U.S. arms sales following the Gulf War (making the U.S. the world’s number one exporter by 1991) also expanded foreign military training, since instruction in the operation and maintenance of equipment is an integral part of all weapons sales or grants.

The new post-cold war alignments and the countries created by the breakup of the Soviet Union were another boon to foreign military training. For geostrategic and commercial reasons, Washington officials—and American arms corporations—were eager to develop military relationships with the newly independent Eastern European states and Central Asian former Soviet republics. Reciprocally, these states wanted to befriend the West in order to win economic, military, and political benefits. In Eastern Europe, military training was a first step in forging these new ties, as well as a vital step toward membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Meanwhile, many states hoped that military collaboration would help pave the way for eventual entrance into the European Union.

In Central Asia, such strategic alliances were a little harder to come by, as U.S. military training relationships with the former Soviet republics were somewhat constrained by concerns about the repressive records of the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik
governments, in particular. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, however, such constraints have been set aside as these and other states have been enlisted into Washington’s global coalition to fight terrorism. More generally, training of foreign militaries was a prime component of the Clinton administration’s strategy of “constructive engagement.” During the last decade, America’s four regional unified military commands (Central Command, Southern Command, Pacific Command, and European Command) took the lead in forging ties with local militaries through a number of “engagement activities,” or training operations. The scope and frequency of these contacts have given the commanders-in-chief greater political influence in some countries than the U.S. ambassadors posted there.7

Training was also viewed as a reward for political support, no matter how small the nation. One U.S. government document, for instance, justified $12,000 of U.S. military training for the tiny Pacific island nation of Tuvalu as follows: “Tuvalu is a consistent supporter of U.S. positions internationally…. Tuvalu was one of only four countries to join the U.S. and Israel in voting against the October 2000 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Israel [for its indiscriminate use of force in Palestine].”8

Foreign military training became a principal part of the new missions that the U.S. military undertook in the post-cold war years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. training in support of counternarcotics and—even before September 11—counterterrorism superceded training aimed at combating external or internal communist threats.

Peacekeeping training for local forces became another of the U.S. military’s new missions. The Clinton administration viewed training of regional or global forces as an alternative to deploying U.S. combat troops to contain ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and state collapses. This rationale became particularly strong following the killing of U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia in 1993; thereafter, the administration was even more reluctant to send U.S. troops or to authorize and help to finance UN peacekeeping missions. Following U.S. and UN inaction during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the U.S. further stepped up military training of local forces (especially in Africa) as a way of deflecting criticism for its failure to act.

Though small in terms of the overall Department of Defense budget, these training programs can have a major impact in recipient countries, primarily by bolstering their military forces in relation to other segments of their governments and societies.

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Since September 11, training programs for foreign armed forces have become a key component in President Bush's global war on terrorism. The president entered office pledging to cut back on all but the most strategically vital foreign military entanglements; since the terrorist attacks he has done an about-face. The administration's increasingly aggressive and ambitious military response has grown beyond Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban to encompass war on “every terrorist group of global reach” and on “those nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorists” as well as against North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—“axis of evil” nations that, administration officials charge, seek to possess weapons of mass destruction.9

In a speech marking the six-month anniversary of the terrorist attacks, President Bush reiterated that the U.S. is prepared to provide military training and resources to governments everywhere: “I have set a clear policy in the second stage of the war on terror: America encourages and expects governments everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and the peace of the world. If governments need training or resources to meet this commitment, America will help.”10

By March 2002, the Bush administration had identified 19 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America as “friends and allies in the fight against terrorism,” although the State Department has cited the security forces in 14 of these countries for committing serious human rights violations (see Appendix 2, pages 41-45). Washington has also established (or pledged to dramatically increase) military training programs with Yemen, Georgia, and the Philippines and has redefined Colombia’s civil war as a war against terrorism (as well as a war against drug trafficking) with a request for funding to train a new counterinsurgency battalion there.
PROGRAMS AND FUNDING

As a result of this post-cold war growth and the rapid acceleration since the September terrorist attacks, the U.S. now trains foreign forces through at least a dozen different types of programs spread across many different departments and agencies (see Box 1 on page 2). Some are considered “security assistance” and are designed primarily to enhance the capabilities of friendly foreign military forces. These programs are funded from the State Department’s annual foreign aid budget or paid for by the customer. Others are justified principally as “readiness training” or “engagement activities,” said to be primarily for the benefit of U.S. military forces. These military contacts are funded from the much larger and more opaque Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance budget. In addition to State and Defense, the departments of Justice, Treasury, and Transportation as well as the CIA all run programs that provide operational military/police skills training.

Though small in terms of the overall Department of Defense budget, these training programs can have a major impact in recipient countries, primarily by bolstering their military forces in relation to other segments of their governments and societies. Yet this expansion of training programs has occurred with little congressional oversight and public debate; in fact, most of the training programs are well-hidden from public and even congressional view. No executive branch or congressional office has the full picture of the scope and range of U.S. training programs.

Because many of these security forces are responsible for ongoing human rights abuses and because, as elaborated below, there is no evidence that U.S. military training serves to curb these abuses, much more public debate and congressional oversight of foreign military training is needed. Appendix 1 (pages 37-40) reviews the annual reports that the executive branch is currently required to provide to Congress on these programs. It provides an outline of the tools that, by law, are available to Congress for fulfilling its oversight responsibilities. Public access to this and other information about the specifics of U.S. training programs is critical if U.S. and local human rights defenders are to monitor the impact of the training (and the actions of the trainees) on local civilian populations.

The following sections examine the foreign military training programs listed in the FY 2003 budget that are financed primarily by the State and Defense departments. Several programs, however, are listed only partially or not at all in the budget.
State Department Programs

Table 1 (below) highlights the items in the State Department’s foreign assistance budget request for FY 2003 that include at least some funding for military training. In most cases these programs existed and were well-funded prior to September 2001, but the Bush administration is requesting substantial increases, mostly in the name of fighting terrorism. Short program descriptions follow the table to explain the various budget lines.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)

IMET has long been the most visible of all foreign training programs; until recently most members of Congress (and the public) mistakenly thought this program represented the totality—or at least the bulk—of foreign military training. Created by Congress in 1976, IMET grew out of the Vietnam-era Nixon Doctrine that aimed to avoid U.S. casualties by preparing “Asian boys to fight Asian wars.” Since the mid-1990s, funding levels for this program have been rising steadily. In FY 1999, Congress provided $50 million for IMET, which trained nearly 9,000 students (usually officers) from 124 countries. The FY 2003 request of $80 million seeks funding for 133 countries and one regional group (ECOWAS in West Africa), and it will presumably support the training of many more soldiers. Nearly every state in sub-Saharan Africa is on the list of potential recipients. This includes Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, where there are cross-border or civil wars ongoing and/or repressive, undemocratic governments in power. Worldwide, more than 50 countries—including

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>FY 2001</th>
<th>Requested FY 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>$57,875,000</td>
<td>$80,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>$3,576,240,000</td>
<td>$4,107,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>$2,320,000,000</td>
<td>$2,290,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi opposition</td>
<td>$24,945,000</td>
<td>$25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$149,670,000</td>
<td>$250,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>$3,991,000</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for Eastern Europe and Baltic States</td>
<td>$675,825,000</td>
<td>$495,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for Independent States of the Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>$810,000,000</td>
<td>$755,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Assistance</td>
<td>$38,000,000</td>
<td>$64,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Counternarcotics Initiative</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$731,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Control &amp; Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)</td>
<td>$19,100,000</td>
<td>$36,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Demining</td>
<td>$39,912,000</td>
<td>$45,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Regional Fund</td>
<td>$30,882,000</td>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
<td>$15,618,000</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. State Department, Account Tables for the Foreign Assistance Budget Request for FY 2003 (available at http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7809.htm). Note: Special programs with their own line item in the budget have evolved for Africa and for the Andean region.
former Soviet Central Asian republics, the Philippines, and Turkey—listed by the State Department as having “poor” human rights records are slated to receive IMET training (for a map showing the intersection of countries receiving IMET training and cited for human rights abuse, see pp. 24-25; a chart of this information appears in Appendix 2, pages 41-45).

Most IMET training occurs in the U.S. at a network of 150 specialized military schools where foreign soldiers train alongside U.S. officers in courses primarily designed to educate U.S. forces. All five military branches train foreign troops, but the U.S. Army is responsible for training the majority. The School of the Americas (SOA) in Ft. Benning, Georgia (see Box 2, this page), has captured the lion’s share of public attention. However, with 600 to 800 foreign military and police trainees per year, the SOA constitutes a small part of a much larger system. Between 1998 and 2000, for instance, the U.S. trained some 10,000-15,000 Latin American soldiers per year. And, according to an interagency governmental working group, a total of 48,000 foreign soldiers and law enforcement officials from around the world came to the U.S. for some form of operational training in 2000.

Other schools that receive large numbers of foreign trainees include the Naval Special Warfare Center at Coronado, CA, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland Air Force Base, TX, the Air Force Special Operations Command school at Hurlburt Field, FL, the

**Box 2:**

**School of the Americas & SOA Watch**

In November 1989, Salvadoran government troops shot and killed a woman, her daughter, and six Jesuit priests who had been supportive of the popular movement in El Salvador for democracy and human rights. Subsequent investigations determined that 19 of the 26 soldiers linked to the murders had previously received some training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA). This Spanish-language military training school has been based since 1984 at Ft. Benning, Georgia.

Following the murders, a dozen protesters launched a vigil at the gates of the school to press for its closure. The SOA Watch campaign gained momentum in 1996, when it was publicly revealed that from 1982-91 the institution had used seven different Spanish-language intelligence training manuals that advocated blackmail, torture, and executions. Although the Army said it had stopped distributing these “assassination” manuals in 1991, it did not recover all of those already in the field. In addition, SOA officials actively denied the existence of the manuals until September 1996.

SOA Watch has now grown into an extremely effective citizen movement, with 10,000 people gathering at the school in November 2001 to commemorate the anniversary of the priests’ murders and to call attention to the legacy and impact of the military training given at the SOA. Although this campaign has not yet reached its goal of closing the school, it has focused congressional attention on the SOA, resulting in a number of reforms.

In 2000, Congress revised the charter for the school and changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. They also codified the existence of an external board of visitors with oversight responsibility, mandated an annual report to Congress on the institution, and required the renamed SOA include eight hours of instruction in the law of war and human rights for any training course up to four weeks long. Courses that run from four weeks to six months must include twelve hours of human rights instruction, and courses that are longer than six months require at least 40 hours of such instruction. This instruction includes a case study of the My Lai (Vietnam) massacre by U.S. troops, highlighting a soldier’s duty to disobey illegal orders. Human rights activists involved in the SOA Watch campaign remain skeptical, feeling that these modifications amount to little more than add-ons to existing curriculum rather than a thorough overhaul, and they continue to press for the school’s closure.

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b Public Law 106-398 (Section 2166 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code) renames the School of the Americas and lays out its mission statement.
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, AZ, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, and the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg, NC. In addition, mobile training teams of U.S. forces conduct some IMET-sponsored training overseas.

**FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)**

This program, which provides grants for foreign militaries to buy U.S. weapons, services, and training, has been expanded in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The FY 2003 request includes grants of $50 million each to Pakistan and India “for the war on terrorism and $3 million in FMF for Nepal to counter the Maoist insurgency and terrorism.” In South America, it includes $98 million to train and equip a brigade to protect a Colombian oil pipeline and $4 million to “help support Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru in sustaining and expanding the capabilities of militaries through force modernization, training, and equipment and enabling them to respond to spillover effects of the drug interdiction effort.”

Although the majority of these funds are used to buy weapons, mobile training teams are often deployed as a facet of weapons sales packages to train the foreign country’s forces in the operation and maintenance of the weapon system(s). In other cases, aid recipients use this money to buy training for their soldiers in specific skill areas. In such cases, U.S. mobile training teams, usually made up of Special Operations Forces, are sent to the host country for up to six months.

**THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF) AND ASSISTANCE FOR EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS**

These budget lines represent cash transfer grants to foreign governments based on U.S. political and military goals rather than on poverty or development need. Although these funds are described as providing balance-of-payment support to foreign governments and are not targeted specifically for military programs, in practice, they free up national monies for military expenditures, including training. According to the State Department, most of the FY 2003 ESF funding is justified as “building up front-line states and building new relationships as the campaign against global terror widens.” The total amount requested for ESF in FY 2003 is $2.29 billion. (Table 1 on page 8 provides several examples of ESF funding levels requested for specific countries.) An additional $1.25 billion is requested in similar cash grants for Eastern European and former Soviet republics.
Training for a New Mission in Colombia

By Ingrid Vaicius

In July 2000, President Clinton signed legislation to give more than $1.3 billion in aid to Colombia and its neighbors over the next two years. About 75% of this aid, known as Plan Colombia, is military and police assistance, including training. As a result of this program, U.S. military aid to Colombia has increased sixfold since 1997—to $1.5 million a day by 2002. Although the bulk of this aid has focused on military hardware (such as Black Hawk and Huey helicopters), much went to the creation, equipping, and training of three new 950-man counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army. This effort alone increased the number of Colombian military personnel trained each year by the U.S. to at least 4,000-5,000.a

Congress and the Clinton administration sought to restrict U.S. efforts in Colombia to the drug war, fearing that involvement in Colombia’s counterinsurgency campaigns could become a Vietnam-like “slippery slope.”b The Bush administration appears to be uninhibited by such fears. By mid-March 2002, the administration had announced its intention to fold its Colombia policy into the global war against terrorism. As part of its Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Request, the administration requested $25 million for anti-kidnapping training and $6 million to train a “quick reaction force” to protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline, which runs from Arauca department to Sucre department in northeastern Colombia. It also asked Congress to remove most human rights restrictions on U.S. military aid, training, and fumigation operations—except the Leahy Law and the caps on the number of U.S. military personnel and private American military contractors (400 each) permitted in the country. For 2003, the administration has requested $98 million more to establish (or retrain) a new Colombian military brigade to protect economic infrastructure. Specifically, the new unit will protect the oil pipeline, a frequent target of rebel attacks. Much of the oil in this pipeline belongs to Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum.

As the scope of U.S. policy expands beyond the drug war into Colombia’s civil war—the hemisphere’s oldest and most intractable conflict—U.S. training programs in Colombia are likely to expand even more, with a particular focus on combat and intelligence skills. Since 1987, more than 35,000 noncombatant civilians have been murdered or “disappeared,” mostly by military and police forces and their paramilitary allies. While the proportion of abuses directly attributable to the armed forces has declined, murders and human rights violations by the paramilitaries have expanded dramatically. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, these paramilitaries are responsible for an estimated 79% of the political killings and forced disappearances registered in Colombia between April and September 2000.

Officially the Colombian government disavows any connection with these paramilitaries and condemns their actions. Yet, a report by Human Rights Watch in 2001 documented “abundant, detailed, and compelling evidence that certain Colombian army brigades and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own.”c The Bush administration’s March 2002 supplemental appropriation request removes the requirement that, as a condition for receiving U.S. military aid, the Colombian armed forces demonstrate progress in breaking their ties with the paramilitary forces.

In the past, the U.S. Congress consistently rejected openly supporting Colombia’s counterinsurgency war against guerrilla groups that posed little threat to the U.S., and it shunned deeper U.S. ties to a Colombian military accused of human rights abuses and of maintaining close ties to paramilitary forces. However, with the collapse of peace talks and with increased fighting in Colombia in early 2002, the mood in Congress appears to be shifting. In March, the House passed a nonbinding resolution supporting more flexibility in aid to Colombia.

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a U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for FY 2000-
01, Executive Summary, at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2001/.
ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE

According to the State Department’s FY 2003 budget request, this program “supports the global campaign against terrorism by providing training and equipment to coalition partners.” These funds will support, for instance, increased counterterrorism training for countries in South/Central Asia and the Middle East, new courses developed with resources from the emergency response fund established just after the September attacks, a new Kidnap Intervention Training course, and an Advanced Crisis Response Team training course.

ANDEAN COUNTERNARCOTICS INITIATIVE

The bulk of funding for this program ($439 million in FY 2003) is going to Colombia, where the U.S. is becoming more deeply involved in both the war on drugs and the civil war (see Box 3, page 11). According to the State Department, these funds...
will “support Colombia’s push into the former coca-growing sanctuaries in Putumayo and elsewhere by adding a second new Army air mobile counternarcotics brigade to expand the force for joint operations with the Colombian National Police’s anti-narcotics unit.” In addition to training, these funds are also earmarked for “maritime and aerial interdiction, the Colombian National Police’s aerial eradication program including additional spraying aircraft, and human rights and judicial reform in Colombia.”

**EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEMS AND BORDER CONTROL**

These funds provide training, equipment, and services to help countries around the world establish or enhance their infrastructure to control the movement of goods and people across their borders.
**HUMANITARIAN DEMINING**

This program deploys U.S. Special Operations Forces to train foreign demining troops in countries around the world. In previous years, U.S. troops have conducted such training in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, among other countries, and in March 2002 the U.S. opened a demining center in Armenia.¹⁴

**AFRICA REGIONAL FUND**

This funding underwrites training and military equipment to the regional military forces of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), a group of 15 West African states, and to militaries in other African countries “committed to providing peacekeeping troops.” U.S. Special Operations Forces have previously trained, equipped, and deployed two 800-man battalions of Nigerian soldiers for peacekeeping duty in Sierra Leone as part of Operation Focus Relief, Washington’s response to the terror inflicted by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) guerrillas in that country.¹⁵ Other countries in the region are receiving training under this program as well.

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### Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>FY 2002</th>
<th>Requested FY 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction &amp; Counterdrug Activities (from central transfer acct.)</td>
<td>$847,628,000</td>
<td>$848,907,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Contingencies (from central transfer acct.)</td>
<td>$178,394,000</td>
<td>$50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Affairs</td>
<td>$56,855,000</td>
<td>58,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism/WMD Defense</td>
<td>$474,678,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Forces Readiness Support: Unified Commands</td>
<td>$86,502,000</td>
<td>$83,961,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Activities</td>
<td>$1,581,487,000</td>
<td>$1,607,610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Support of Other Nations (all military branches combined)</td>
<td>$66,637,000</td>
<td>$78,123,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Operation and Maintenance Programs, Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2003 (February 2002). Note: This table is not a complete list of funding available from the overall DOD budget for foreign military training. At the same time, the programs listed are not solely (or even necessarily largely) engaged in training. Rather, training of or with foreign military troops is one of the activities that might be undertaken with funds from these accounts.

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**AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE**

Under this program, begun in 1997, U.S. Special Operations Forces from the 3rd and 5th Army Special Forces groups conduct in-country basic training of the armed forces of several African states for the stated purpose of preparing them for regional and UN peacekeeping missions. In conjunction with private military companies contracted to help, SOF have trained more than 8,000 troops in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire.
The FY 2003 budget request describes this program as a “peacekeeping/humanitarian relief training course tailored to recipient countries’ needs. Where possible, it will emphasize training African trainers.” The number of countries receiving common training and equipment for peacekeeping operations is being increased and, according to the State Department, it “will provide the basis for lethal peace enforcement training.” According to the State Department’s budget submission to Congress, countries likely to receive training include, but are not limited to, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, and Botswana.

**Defense Department Programs**

Increasingly in the past decade, foreign military training has been funded out of the much larger and more complex Pentagon budget. The September 11 attacks have accelerated this trend. For example, in March 2002 the Bush administration requested (as part of an emergency supplemental appropriation) $100 million for weapons and training “on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.” The administration sought to exempt this aid from all human rights, nonproliferation, and other conditions that exist in U.S. law. Some of the current and potential sources for foreign military training in this budget are not known, but the requested levels for those that appear to have funded training are included in Table 2 (opposite).

The Pentagon spends untold amounts each year in deployments of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) abroad. No single report compiles budget or trainee data on these overall training deployments. However, according to March 2002 testimony by Gen. Charles Holland, the commander-in-chief of the Special Operations Command, SOF training with foreign troops occurs through the following programs:

- Combatant Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Theater Security Cooperation Plans;
- Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET);
- State Department’s African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI);
- Humanitarian programs;
- Mine action training;
- Counterdrug programs; and
- Foreign Internal Defense training.17

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*The bulk of funding for this program [the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative] is going to Colombia, where the U.S. is becoming more deeply involved in both the war on drugs and the civil war.*
Box 5:

Special Concerns About Special Operations Forces

U.S. Special Operations Forces—which include Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces, and Air Force special tactics teams—provide most of U.S. military instruction abroad. These forces differ from conventional military forces in that they are specially organized, trained, and equipped to achieve military, political, or psychological objectives through unconventional means, such as covert small unit operations behind enemy lines or in the midst of a foreign population. Collaboration with, and training of, local military forces is a hallmark of Special Operations Forces.

Overseas deployments of SOF have grown dramatically. In 1991 they were operating in 92 countries; by 1999, 40 more countries had been added to the list. Any additional number of classified missions is, of course, unknown. Between 1991 and 1997, at a time when other parts of the military were being cut, the unconventional forces budget grew from $2.4 to $3.4 billion. For FY 2003, the Bush administration is seeking to increase this figure to $4.9 billion.

In recent years the annual Foreign Military Training Report (see Appendix 1, pages 37-40) has provided a largely impene-trable breakdown of the types of training provided and the numbers of personnel trained in each country. In Latin America, particularly in Colombia, counternarcotics training has been a major focus of Special Operations Forces, as it has of all U.S. military training and operations in the hemisphere. Until recently, however, there was no public reporting on the Pentagon’s counterdrug training activities.

In the current war against terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Special Operations Forces are being lionized for their training and combat roles. However, throughout the cold war, SOF were used in CIA and other clandestine operations to train paramilitary groups and regular armed forces in brutal, unconventional warfare. The SOF training tactics included black propaganda operations and assassinations, torture, kidnappings, and hit-and-run commando raids against noncombatants intended to end public support for the enemy.

It is not clear their tactics have changed. Even the SOF’s presence in Afghanistan has been controversial. In late January 2002, SOF troops attacked a school in Uruzgan, central Afghanistan, killing 19 men, and taking 27 others prisoner. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reluctantly admitted several weeks later that this attack was a case of mistaken identity; the men targeted were not al Qaeda fighters. Several of the men reported being tortured and beaten savagely by masked U.S. soldiers who demanded that they admit to being with al Qaeda. These prisoners reported seeing the dead bodies of several of their Afghani colleagues, handcuffed and with bullet wounds in the back of their heads.

Special Operations Forces sometimes provide training for humanitarian demining, medical first aid and triage, and veterinarian services, but the centerpiece of most training missions is foreign internal defense—training in counterinsurgency techniques, including, presumably, the tactics being used in Afghanistan today. In February 2002, for example, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Robert Andrews publicly advocated a policy of preemptive assassinations and attacks against “third-party sponsors of terrorist groups.”

Many SOF trainees serve undemocratic governments that are engaged in fighting internal opposition movements. For instance, Special Operations Forces JCET training missions in 1999 included:

• advanced military operations on urban terrain with Egyptian Special Operations;
• raids, ambushing, patrolling, and immediate action drills with the Sultan’s Special Forces Battalion in Oman;
• small unit tactics with the Yemen 26th Republican Guard;
• raids/ambush/patrolling with the Chad Gendarmerie;
• small unit tactics with the Georgian Battle Staff;
• patrolling and reconnaissance with Senegalese Airborne Commando Parachute Unit; and
• direct action and psychological operations training with the Philippine Special Operations Command.

In addition, several SOF JCET exercises and training partners in 1999 were classified.
Table 2 (on page 14) likely includes funding for several of these programs; no detailed breakdown is available for the Pentagon’s entire range of training missions. In addition, much if not most SOF overseas activity remains classified and hidden entirely from the public. A classified budget document for FY 2001, obtained by military analyst William Arkin, listed hundreds of covert training visits with militaries, police, and intelligence agencies around the world.18

**Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)**

As a result of investigative reporting, JCET is now the Special Operations Forces’ most visible training initiative. The Pentagon created this program in 1991 for the stated purpose of allowing SOF to practice their language skills and gain familiarity with foreign militaries and overseas terrain. Congress authorized this program, passing a statute that year allowing regional unified commanders and the Special Operations Command to pay both the costs of deploying and training U.S. SOF abroad and the incremental costs incurred by the host country, if that nation is unable to pay them. But Congress apparently lost sight of this program until the Washington Post reported on it in a series of articles that highlighted training with various countries around the world—including Indonesia, which Congress had banned from receiving IMET due to human rights concerns.19

An annual report required on the JCET program disclosed that in FY 1999 the Defense Department spent $12.8 million for 118 JCET exercises in 62 different countries. More than 2,400 U.S. Special Operations Forces soldiers and 8,500 host nation soldiers took part in these exercises.20 The Pentagon budget does not delineate...
how much will be spent on JCET and other SOF foreign training programs in FY 2002 and FY 2003, including expenditures for the high-profile counterterrorism training missions that President Bush authorized in early 2002 for the Philippines, Yemen, and Georgia.21

In addition to these programs, the Pentagon has several other means not reflected in the budget to bring foreign military officials to the U.S. for military training. These programs include:

- up to 60 slots for foreign officers at each of the military branches’ academies22;
- one-year (or longer) reciprocal exchanges under a Personnel Exchange Program23; and
- reciprocal visits by military units.

**REGIONAL DEFENSE COUNTER-TERRORISM FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM**

For FY 2002, Congress appropriated $17.9 million in the Pentagon budget to create this new program. It will fund foreign military officers’ attendance at U.S. military educational institutions and selected regional centers. Commanders-in-chief of the various U.S. regional military commands will nominate candidates and schools, with a joint staff review and approval by the secretary of defense.24 This program will provide training at existing facilities, including both regional security schools and professional military schools located on military bases in the United States.

**FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)**

In addition, foreign countries can purchase training from U.S. military forces with their own money through the Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which authorizes the Pentagon to negotiate sales of weapons systems. Usually the deal includes training in the operation and maintenance of the system being purchased. According to one study, done in the early 1990s, more than half of all training of foreign soldiers in the U.S. was paid for by foreign governments with their own money (as opposed to U.S. military aid).25 The requirement that all U.S.-funded foreign military trainees be vetted for human rights violations, known as the Leahy Law (see below), does not extend to training bought with a nation’s own funds.
Special Report: U.S. Foreign Military Training

Box 6

U.S. Training of Indonesian Armed Forces

By Kurt Biddle

The Indonesian military carries a deserved reputation as one of the most brutal militaries in the world. Until the 1990s, the U.S. openly trained and equipped its forces. In 1991 Indonesian troops supplied with U.S. weapons massacred more than 270 unarmed people in Dili, East Timor. This attack prompted Congress to cut off all IMET funding the following year for training of the Indonesian military. In 1995, some training money was restored under the banner of the expanded IMET (E-IMET) program.

In 1998, however, the East Timor Action Network discovered that throughout the 1990s, the Pentagon had been circumventing the intent of Congress by training Indonesian special forces troops in urban guerrilla warfare, surveillance, sniper marksmanship, and psychological operations through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. Rep. Lane Evans (D-IL) took the lead in shutting this training down.

Following the East Timor referendum in 1999 in which citizens voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia, the Indonesian military and their militia proxies launched widespread attacks on the Timorese population, killing more than 1,000 people, injuring thousands more, destroying 75% of the infrastructure of East Timor, and forcing more than 250,000 people across the border into Indonesian territory. Public outrage finally forced President Clinton to ban all joint military exercises and commercial arms sales to Indonesia. Congress wrote this ban into law in the 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, restricting IMET and foreign military financing (FMF) for Indonesia until specified conditions were met.

These conditions include the return of refugees to East Timor and accountability for military and militia members responsible for human rights atrocities in East Timor and Indonesia. The law also requires Indonesia to prevent militia incursions into East Timor and to cooperate fully with the UN administration in East Timor. The White House is required to certify to Congress that the conditions have been met before restrictions can be lifted.

Just eight days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush met with Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri and promised to lift the embargo on commercial sales of nonlethal military items. This was a substantial step by the administration in its ongoing effort to circumvent congressional restrictions on training the Indonesian military. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2002, which covers State Department programs, retained the military ban and actually strengthened the restrictions. However, a last-minute addition to the 2002 Defense Department Appropriations Act included $17.9 million to establish a Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program. Since this new program is outside the jurisdiction of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and contains no restrictions on which countries can participate, it allows training for Indonesia. In addition, the administration's March 2002 supplemental request for FY 2002 included $8 million to "vet, train, and equip a counterterrorism unit in Indonesia," plus another $8 million to be used in part for military assistance.

Many at the Pentagon and in the administration call the Indonesian military the only viable, organized institution in Indonesia, and support resumption of training. But the Indonesian military has yet to meet any of the basic conditions that Congress passed into law before training can resume. And years of U.S. training have produced no discernible improvement in the Indonesian military's human rights record. Recently released Australian intelligence documents show that senior Indonesian military intelligence officers were in close consultation with the militia men who laid waste to East Timor following the August 1999 vote for independence. During 2001, the military killed more than 1,400 people in Aceh province alone. Unless the Indonesian military (including its budget and command) is placed under full civilian control, refrains from meddling in politics, focuses on external defense, and stops committing human rights abuses, in other words, shows it is serious about becoming a professional military, U.S. taxpayers' money is best spent helping civil society groups build Indonesia's democracy.

Meanwhile, in early 2002, the New York Times reported that the U.S. was planning to concentrate on establishing an extensive in-country police training program for Indonesia, through the FBI, rather than a large in-country military training program. The police training initiative reportedly grew out of concern expressed by the Indonesian government that the presence of U.S. military trainers would undermine the consolidation of democracy in that country.

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a See http://www.etan.org/


Intelligence Training

In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, authorizing the executive branch to engage in covert military operations. Throughout the cold war, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly advised, trained, and equipped numerous foreign government, paramilitary, and guerrilla forces that were responsible for large-scale human rights abuses and repression in many countries. The CIA also sent training agents and materials to support guerrilla movements attempting to overthrow communist or leftist regimes in many countries, most notably during the 1980s as part of the Reagan administration’s efforts to roll back communist influence in Central America (Nicaragua), Southern Africa (Angola), and Central Asia (Afghanistan).

Each of these training operations sustained years and even decades of bloody combat while, in some cases, strengthening networks of terrorists. In the case of the Afghan operation, this network has turned directly against the U.S.: Osama bin Laden—the presumed mastermind of the September 11 attacks, as well as attacks on U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, a U.S. warship in port in Yemen, and two U.S. embassies in East Africa—was part of the alliance of mujahedin that the CIA funded, trained, and armed in the 1980s to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Despite this and other examples of “blowback” and the CIA’s abysmal record of collusion with abusive forces, such operations continued through the 1990s.26 And in the days following the September attacks, the administration reportedly signed off on CIA antiterror operations that are either currently underway or planned in 80 countries. (The CIA’s complete failure to anticipate the attacks seemed not to have figured in the administration’s decision to assign the agency these new roles.) The new operations are said to range from propaganda to lethal actions and probably include some training.27

Covert operations are conducted with no human rights training and no background vetting of participants. In 1995, the CIA implemented a weak guideline governing the recruitment of informants who have committed human rights violations. It was created in response to the revelation that the Guatemalan military officer who tortured and murdered the husband of an American human rights lawyer was on the CIA payroll. The CIA had testified that the new guideline has not hindered agency operations.28 Yet in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress repealed even this tepid requirement.
Justice Department: FBI and DEA Training

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose mission is enforcement of federal law, is also involved in training foreign police and paramilitary forces. This training is justified primarily as part of its efforts to counter drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. According to the FBI, “If these organized criminal enterprises with roots elsewhere in the world are allowed to grow and mitigate beyond their borders, they will inevitably invade the United States.”

The Bureau’s international training initiatives include country evaluations and/or needs analyses and training of foreign law enforcement officials both within the U.S. and abroad. No annual report provides public information on FBI foreign training programs; however, a European criminal justice group reported that in a recent (unnamed) fiscal year, the FBI provided training to approximately 1,200 international students through 32 separate international training initiatives. Of these students, the vast majority—approximately 900—received training from FBI instructors who traveled abroad. The remainder came to the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia.

Two ongoing FBI international training programs are the Pacific Rim Training Initiative and the Mexican/American Law Enforcement Training. The latter has involved training the 5,000-member Mexican Federal Preventive Police, a unit implicated by the media as perpetrating human rights abuses—including torture—in Guerrero state.

In addition, the FBI cosponsors and trains foreign troops at International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) in Budapest and Bangkok. The ILEA in Budapest began operations in 1995, with a curriculum modeled after that of the FBI Academy. Representatives of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have all sent students to the facility. The school hosts 50 students during each eight-week session, with at least five sessions held each year, in addition to topical seminars and special courses. Instructors come from the ranks of the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies.

Perhaps the most controversial international FBI program has been training of the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland. (The RUC is now renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and in November 2001 a new...
oversight board was created.) In 1999, Congress barred the FBI and any other federal law enforcement agency from using federal funds to provide training for or conduct exchange programs with the RUC or any successor organization until the president certified that certain requirements had been met. The ban was motivated by concerns that the FBI had trained forces that committed or condoned the murder of several defense attorneys in Northern Ireland.

In December 2001, President Bush approved the resumption of FBI training of the RUC. In doing so, he: 1) submitted a required report on training and exchange programs conducted by the FBI for the RUC or its members from 1994-99; 2) certified that any new training programs will include a significant human rights component; and 3) certified that vetting procedures were in place to ensure that resumed training or exchange programs will not include RUC members who appear to have committed or condoned violations of internationally recognized human rights.32

The FBI is also slated to play a major role in support of U.S. antiterrorism goals in Indonesia. FBI Director Robert Mueller quietly traveled to Jakarta in late March 2002 to develop training and exchange programs.33

The Drug Enforcement Agency, also part of the Justice Department, conducts international police training as well. The DEA International Training Section, located at Quantico, consists of 16 Special Agent instructors and five support personnel. From this group, three teams of instructors travel around the world, providing drug law enforcement training to foreign antinarcotics officials. Much of this counternarcotics training occurs at the ILEAs in Budapest and Bangkok. (ILEAs have been proposed in previous year counternarcotics budgets for Latin America and Africa; however, they were never established and have dropped out of the FY 2003 budget request.) Foreign counternarcotics police also go to Quantico to attend training at the DEA’s new Justice Training Center.

According to the DEA website, “since 1969 the DEA and its predecessor agencies have trained more than 40,000 foreign officers and officials. In 1998 alone, the DEA trained over 3,000.”34 The subject matter covered includes surveillance, drug field testing, intelligence collection, management, and basic law enforcement skills.
The international police training programs of the FBI and the DEA are funded at least in part out of the annual appropriation for Justice Department operations and are, therefore, technically exempt from the Leahy Law vetting requirements (which currently cover only programs funded by the foreign aid and Defense Department appropriations).
Since 1994, funding for IMET (International Military Education and Training), the best-known of the U.S. foreign military training programs, has increased fourfold. Based on the State Department’s Human Rights Report, the armed forces in 50 of these countries that receive over $100,000 in IMET funds have poor human rights records. For a country-by-country accounting of IMET recipients and the State Department’s assessment of their human rights records, see Appendix 2, pages 41-45.
Methodology: This map includes all countries currently receiving IMET funds. The darkest color indicates those countries receiving over $100,000 in IMET training whose security forces are cited by the State Department for human rights violations. Guatemala, Haiti, Nepal, and several other countries generally cited by human rights organizations for poor human rights records are not included because the State Department report did not reach the same conclusion.
PERSISTENT HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

In FY 2003, the U.S. government is proposing to give military training (and often military hardware) to at least 51 countries whose security forces are responsible for persistent human rights abuses. A comparison between IMET funding for 2001-2003 and the State Department’s annual human rights report, issued in March 2002, reveals that 51 countries, or more than one-third of those receiving U.S. military training through this program alone, have “poor” human rights records (see Appendix 2, pages 41-45). Among other violations, many of these countries’ military and police forces have engaged in torture and assassination. In addition, other countries with poor human rights records are undoubtedly receiving JCET or other types of training for which no specific information is made publicly available.

U.S. training programs for foreign forces have long been dogged by serious human rights violations. In 1973 and 1974, Congress passed legislation banning funds for overseas police training following revelations of grave human rights abuses by U.S.-trained police in South America and Southeast Asia.\(^3\) In 1978, growing concerns about human rights violations by U.S. allies led Congress to amend the list of objectives of the IMET program to include the goal of increased awareness and understanding of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.\(^3\) During the 1980s, however, violations of human rights by U.S. allies continued. In 1990, therefore, Congress created an Expanded IMET (E-IMET) open to both civilian and military personnel. These training courses focus on topics such as military justice, resource management, civilian control of the military, and better understanding of human rights.

In recent years, legislators have stipulated that certain countries with egregious human rights records—such as Indonesia and Guatemala—are eligible only for E-IMET courses. Yet the aggregate of training offered by the U.S. to foreign personnel still relates primarily to fighting skills; significant emphasis is placed in military leadership courses on tactics and doctrine, logistics, and counterinsurgency techniques. Moreover, this training still focuses on central cold war-era counterinsurgency doctrine—called foreign internal defense (FID)—rather than on new peacekeeping or defensive strategies.

Throughout the cold war, the U.S. government trained militaries and supported the counterinsurgency operations of several countries that were systematically repressing peaceful social and political movements. In countries such as Chile, Colombia, El
Box 7

Hot Pursuit Training with the Philippine Army

by John Gershman

During the cold war, the U.S. provided substantial training and assistance to the corrupt and dictatorial regime of Ferdinand Marcos for counterinsurgency operations against the New People’s Army (NPA), a Maoist guerrilla group. Beneficiaries of U.S. training were accused of complicity in human rights violations and were key leaders of coup attempts against the democratic government of Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

After the Philippine Senate refused to renew a lease for U.S. military bases in 1991, following the ouster of Marcos, the U.S. cut military aid and annual joint training exercises. The number of Filipino troops trained under IMET declined from more than 400 in FY 1990 to roughly 100 annually by the end of the decade. The major U.S. training effort in place in the Philippines during the 1990s involved JCET exercises known as “Balance Piston.” Since the mid-1990s there have been two to four training exercises annually, generally conducted with the Philippine Army Special Operations Command.

With the Philippine Senate’s ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999, IMET funding increased and annual joint military exercises resumed. These exercises (known as Balikatan, or “Shoulder to Shoulder”) cover the range of combat, humanitarian, and rescue scenarios and typically involve a major training component.

Since September 11, U.S. training efforts have primarily focused on counterterrorism operations directed against the Abu Sayyaf, Islamic guerrillas operating in the southern island of Basilan and alleged by the Bush administration to have ties to al Qaeda. Overall military assistance increased significantly, including training through the IMET program. U.S. funding was $1.4 million in FY 2000 and in FY 2001, and is scheduled to rise to $2 million in FY 2002 and to $2.4 million in FY 2003.a In addition, the Bush administration is seeking to provide the Philippine military with $20 million in Foreign Military Financing grants in FY 2003, a dramatic increase from under $2 million in FY 2001.

Meanwhile, JCET’s “Balance Piston” exercises have expanded to include counterterrorism training. These exercises have not focused on training explicitly targeted at combating the Abu Sayyaf, however, and are taking place in regions where the NPA is active. The Philippine troops involved in these exercises are also responsible for training the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), paramilitary militias that have come under repeated criticism by Philippine and international human rights groups for their recurring human rights abuses. In July 2001 the Arroyo administration revitalized the CAFGUs program on Mindanao as part of its broader counterinsurgency efforts.

The most controversial aspect of U.S. training since September 11 is the Balikatan 02-1, six-month exercises that officially began on January 31, 2002. These exercises are controversial for two reasons: 1) because the involvement of U.S. troops in this kind of exercise at least skirts, if not violates, the Philippine Constitution; and 2) because the training exercises allow U.S. trainers/advisers to go along on combat patrols and to fire if fired upon. In mid-January, the first of the scheduled 650 U.S. troops arrived in the Philippines to train with and advise Philippine forces in their hot pursuit campaign against the Abu Sayyaf.b A second Balikatan exercise, not aimed at the Abu Sayyaf, is scheduled for April 2002.

Meanwhile, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the State Department all record significant abuses by Philippine military and police forces in the past two years, including extrajudicial killings (i.e., murder), forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention—all of which most often occur during counterinsurgency operations.c

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a http://disam.osd.mil/intl_training/Resources/Legislation/FY02-03%20Alloc.pdf
Salvador, Indonesia, and Turkey, among others, intellectuals, journalists, trade unionists, human rights activists and peasant leaders have been, and in some cases still are, considered legitimate military targets. There is grave danger in many countries around the world that governments will cast an overly wide net in the new “war on terrorism,” again targeting people who are advocating for democratic social change.

U.S. training in the past exacerbated this danger. Military training manuals from the School of the Americas, made public in 1996, revealed that, through at least 1991, the U.S. Army encouraged foreign military intelligence counterparts to consider “governmental officials, political leaders, and members of the infrastructure” as among the most useful counterintelligence targets that should be “neutralized.” These manuals were based, in part, on training instructions used in the 1960s by the Army’s Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, entitled “Project X.” Much of the current U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine is classified, and so it is not clear how U.S. trainers identify and discuss threat assessments with foreign trainees today.

E-IMET has proved an inadequate response to widespread human rights abuses by U.S. allies. Rather than mainstreaming human rights content into all foreign military courses, E-IMET has had the unfortunate side effect of “ghettoizing” human rights and humanitarian law training. The vast majority of foreign military training courses include no countervailing human rights content to contextualize what is permissible and what is illegal in the conduct of military operations. This gap is true both for military training courses funded by U.S. taxpayers (through IMET and other security assistance programs) and for those funded by foreign governments. Today, the School of the Americas (see Box 2, page 9) and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland Air Force Base, TX are the two notable exceptions; all courses taught at both are required by law to include instruction on human rights law and the law of war. For the other 148 or so schools in the U.S., the contention is that exposure to U.S. culture, values, and civil-military operations will informally, but adequately, convey human rights values.

Whether or not this hypothesis is well-founded, it is currently untestable. Since the Pentagon and State Department have kept no records on the career milestones of past IMET trainees, it has been impossible to measure any of the goals of this 25-year-old program. In 2000, Congress finally passed a law requiring the Defense Department to set up a database to track the future career paths of IMET trainees. For JCET and all other programs there is both little transparency and no tracking of graduates.
The Leahy Law

In its most aggressive attempt to safeguard against human rights abuses by U.S. military trainees, Congress passed a provision in 1996—known as the Leahy Law after its Senate patron, Patrick Leahy (D-VT). It required that all recipients of training and equipment through the State Department’s international narcotics control program be checked for credible allegations of prior human rights abuses. The law was enacted in response to allegations that the U.S. military was training forces in Colombia that had been implicated in civilian massacres.

Subsequently, Congress applied this vetting requirement to all forms of State Department-funded “security assistance,” and in 1999 it was extended to counternarcotics and other military training provided through the Defense Department budget (including JCET operations).40

Procedures have been implemented in both the State and Defense departments to require such checks. The commanders-in-chief of the regional military commands now request the U.S. embassy in a country where a proposed JCET event is to take place to gather and evaluate any credible information on the human rights record of the unit to be trained. And before the secretary of defense signs off on any JCET event (which he is now legally required to do), he secures a statement from the relevant regional command verifying that the Department of State possesses no credible information of gross violations of human rights by the unit designated to be trained.

Yet the desire and ability of U.S. embassy personnel to conduct sufficient background checks of U.S.-funded trainees is highly questionable, and it varies greatly from embassy to embassy, largely depending on the amount of congressional or media pressure being applied. No effort is made to check the background of foreign military personnel whose training is paid for by their own government’s funds.
CONCLUSIONS

Military training relationships have the potential to play a positive role in promoting democratic practices and enforcing human rights standards and international humanitarian law among foreign military, security, and police forces. Such promotion could facilitate the development of well-trained peacekeeping forces better equipped to end or prevent human rights violations. U.S. training could also help redirect police and militaries away from corruption and human rights violations and toward increased professionalism and respect for the rights and protection of citizens.

However, few—if any—clear success stories in this regard can be identified. Instead, throughout the cold war, the U.S. provided counterinsurgency training and equipment to some of the most notorious and antidemocratic leaders and human rights violators worldwide. In the 1980s, clandestine CIA training and equipment for counterrevolutionary insurgent forces led to massive death and suffering in Central America, Southern Africa, and Central and East Asia.

During the 1990s, human rights and democratization were added to the list of goals of nearly all U.S. foreign military and police training relationships. But the U.S. military system has avoided a serious integration of human rights into its contact and training programs. Moreover, the September 11 attacks have become the justification for a sweeping disregard for human rights and democratization concerns. Since the attacks, President Bush has sought authority to waive all existing human rights restrictions on U.S. military assistance and arms exports if he judges them to stand in the way of fighting terrorism.

Revelations in the mid- to late 1990s made clear that the U.S. government continued to provide training or equipment to security forces accused of human rights violations, apparently placing regional or regime stability, or some other geopolitical or economic interest, above the protection of people. These cases included combat training (at least through 1998) of Indonesian forces that have carried out widespread human rights violations against the people of Indonesia and East Timor. Current concerns focus on several battalions being trained in Colombia, as well as training ongoing in several other countries involved in fighting internal wars—such as the Philippines—and those actively putting down democracy movements—such as Uzbekistan.
Closure of the U.S. Army’s recently renamed School of the Americas (SOA) has been the principal focus to date of human rights campaigners concerned about U.S. military and police training. Diligent research by the School of the Americas Watch campaign brought to light numerous instances of former trainees at the SOA who later committed human rights abuses. Similar careful analysis of foreign soldiers attending the many other training institutions in the U.S. would undoubtedly reveal thousands more examples.

The SOA Watch campaign’s organizing and lobbying efforts have forced the Army to increase the level of transparency around the school’s curriculum, to institutionalize human rights training, and to establish internal and external oversight mechanisms at the school. Lacking comparable scrutiny and pressure, the rest of the U.S.-based foreign military training system has escaped similar scrutiny and institutionalization of oversight.

The Bush administration is pursuing its war on terrorism on the premise that the urgency of this war makes close scrutiny of its actions a luxury our country and the times cannot afford. Yet the post-cold war history of U.S. foreign military training, as outlined in these pages, suggests rather that as the war on terrorism and the U.S. role in training expands, the task of oversight must expand with it.
AREAS FOR ACTION

The history of dreadful intended and unintended consequences of U.S. military training has led some analysts and human rights monitors to call for a ban on this unilateral activity in favor of multilateral—UN or regionally backed—training operations. Although desirable, such a policy shift is not imminent. Thus, several intermediate steps—some of them major steps in their own right—need to be taken to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will be training foreign forces in abusive behavior and/or undermining popular democratic movements or democratic accountability. These recommendations for Congress include:

Limit countries with poor human rights records to E-IMET support. Any foreign military forces that the State Department deems to have “poor” human rights records should be eligible only for Expanded IMET until such time as the abuses end and violators are held accountable. In addition, great vigilance should attend training for armed forces in any country actively engaged in fighting an internal war against some subset of its people. If abuses are being perpetrated—whether in the name of counterinsurgency, a war on drugs, or a war on terrorism—then a particular country or government should be cut off from all military, security, or police training or exchanges, except those that focus solely on promoting accountability and human rights by the armed forces.

Reform the curricula. U.S. military doctrine taught to foreign forces around the world focuses on teaching concepts and skills related to “foreign internal defense”—a term synonymous with cold war-era counterinsurgency. All doctrine taught to foreign forces should be subject to public and congressional scrutiny (that is, it should be unclassified), in order to ensure that abusive practices are not being taught. In addition, all training must incorporate the duty of soldiers to respect human rights and international humanitarian law obligations during the conduct of military operations. U.S. forces or officials should review these legal obligations in an effective and serious way whenever training foreign security officers.

Ban covert intelligence programs. No matter how they are justified, covert intelligence training operations are of the highest concern, given the CIA’s egregious historical record in facilitating and perpetrating human rights abuses. Such operations are completely nontransparent and, therefore, those who conduct them are not accountable to the U.S. public or to people in countries where such operations are occurring. Human rights defenders should seek to eliminate covert military, security, or police training programs. As part of this effort, Congress must be persuaded to enact the Human Rights Intelligence Act,
introduced in the House in March 2001 by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), which would release information on past training and other military operations by the intelligence community in countries where widespread human rights violations occurred.

Either unshroud or ban Special Operations Forces training. U.S. Special Operations Forces were complicit in terror campaigns in Vietnam and Central America during the cold war; they have recently trained troops in abusive practices in Indonesia, Colombia, and elsewhere, and their operations lack transparency and public accountability. Given this track record, oversight of SOF training activity should be a high priority. At minimum, the Defense Department must disclose all Special Forces JCET and other training deployments. Annual reports to the public (including via the Internet) must detail in which countries Special Forces units conducted training and the type of training they provided. If the U.S. government is unwilling to be open and accountable for deployments and training missions involving SOF, activist citizens and members of Congress should work to bar all SOF foreign training programs.

Improve regulation of private military companies (PMCs). Congress should require increased disclosure about the activities of private military companies that the U.S. State Department has authorized or hired to train foreign militaries. At a minimum, lawmakers should mandate an annual report listing which private companies were authorized in the preceding year to do what, where, for whom (which branch of a foreign country's security forces), and for what duration. This legislative requirement should also mandate oversight by U.S. embassies of the conduct of these private training programs. Additionally, Congress could require that the State Department notify the congressional foreign relations committees of all licenses for private military training before they are granted. Staff could then review these and consider the implications before the training activity is authorized.

Expand human rights background checks. Leahy Law background checks should be expanded to cover all Justice Department training programs and foreign military training that is purchased with foreign funds. The requirement for this vetting should be put into permanent law, rather than having to be renewed each year.

Monitor trainees. A law passed in 2000 requires the Pentagon to set up a database to track former IMET students’ career milestones. Congress must ensure that this system is being developed and that it includes a full assessment—both positive and negative reports—about U.S.-trained personnel.
Increase congressional cooperation and oversight. As the Defense Department moves to establish its jurisdiction over new programs of foreign military assistance, relevant staff from the congressional foreign aid and defense committees must be in close contact about developments relating to military training and exchange. They need to ensure that the administration is providing required information to Congress to allow this branch of government to perform its oversight duties, and that congressional staff is able to review these documents and prepare questions for responsible officials. In this regard, members of Congress and staff should work to restore the original reporting requirements in the Foreign Military Training Report and resist efforts by the administration to eviscerate it and other reporting requirements (see Appendix 1, pages 37-40).
Appendix 1: Who’s Minding the Store?

Annual Oversight Calendar
for U.S. Overseas Training Programs

Until the 1990s, Congress paid for most foreign military training through the foreign aid budget—which the State Department presents, the foreign relations committees of Congress authorize, and the foreign operations subcommittees appropriate. Increasingly, however, the armed services committees, with jurisdiction over Pentagon spending, are authorizing more of the overseas training programs and operations. Unfortunately, the armed services and foreign relations committees in the two chambers of Congress operate largely in isolation from each other. As a result, one committee will sometimes legislate a ban on military aid and training to a particular country while the other will be authorizing a new or expanded program for that same country.

For example, in 1992, Congress—under the leadership of its foreign aid committees—cut off IMET funding for Indonesia in response to a massacre by Indonesian troops of peaceful demonstrators in East Timor the previous year. Members of Congress who backed this initiative apparently believed that they had cut off all U.S. operational and lethal military training for the Indonesian armed forces. However, from 1992 to May 1998 the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy Special Forces continued to train Indonesian Special Forces units through 36 JCET exercises.41

The Pentagon had been reporting annually to the military oversight committees in Congress about these and other JCET exercises, as required by law. Apparently, however, no one in Congress was reviewing these reports, and/or they were not shared with the foreign aid committees. Responding to a seeming lack of congressional interest, the Pentagon proposed in early 1998 that this reporting requirement be eliminated as too onerous and unnecessary. However, when the Washington Post reported on the JCET exercises in mid-1998, Congress finally took note and legislated increased oversight measures for this program.

Then, in 2001, the Bush administration sought to scale back the annual Foreign Military Training Report as too onerous. Without the Foreign Military Training Report (which is itself still far from comprehensive), congressional staff and the public have even less of a window through which to view U.S. training activities.

A central conclusion of this Foreign Policy In Focus report is that congressional oversight of foreign military training programs is vital. The following is a summary of annual reports that the administration is obliged to submit to Congress on or related to foreign military training. The due dates are provided, although in many cases these are observed in the breach—if at all. The required reports are listed in chronological order:
Appendix 1: Who’s Minding the Store?

January 1: U.S. military activities in Colombia

Secretary of defense sends an annual report to foreign relations and armed services committees detailing the number of members of U.S. armed forces deployed or otherwise assigned to duty in Colombia during the preceding fiscal year, the length and purpose of their stay, and the costs and risks associated with their deployments.

January 31: Foreign Military Training Report

The secretaries of defense and state are required to produce an annual Foreign Military Training Report. The law requires that the contents include the aggregate number of students trained and the aggregate cost of training (to the U.S.), the foreign policy justification and purpose for the activity, the number of trainees by country, their home unit of operation, and the location of the training. It also calls for the report to be unclassified, but permits classified annexes. All unclassified portions are to be posted on the Internet.

The first iteration of this report, covering training during FY 1998 and FY 1999, was massive, not terribly well-presented, and full of inconsistencies and errors. Nevertheless, it provided a tremendous window into U.S. training. It covered all countries receiving U.S. military training and included information on training purchased with foreign nations’ funds. Also of great interest, it showed where foreign soldiers were studying in the U.S. and which foreign units these trainees came from.

In 1999, Congress directed that this report be published annually and that it be put on the Internet, thereby enhancing possibilities for public oversight of training programs and trainees. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense has used this requirement—intended to increase transparency—as an excuse for reducing the amount of information released. In particular, notation of foreign military personnel’s unit designations was dropped, as was the location of the training. In addition, NATO allies were dropped from the report, as was detailed information about training purchased by foreign nations.

A bill pending before Congress in 2002 would require the previous level of disclosure—that is, information about which unit a trainee comes from and the location of training within the United States. Such information is vital to human rights activists and investigators and would enable them to use the report to ensure that U.S. trainees are not committing human rights violations. The latest version of this report, published in 2001, can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2001/.

February 1: Unit exchanges

The President is required to send Congress a listing of reciprocal military training exchanges, whereby foreign soldiers can attend U.S. training institutions free of charge and U.S. soldiers attend similar institutions overseas within a year’s time. The report is to cover all activities conducted under this program during the preceding fiscal year, including the estimated costs of training and related support provided by the U.S. to each country and the estimated value provided to the U.S. by that country.

February 1: Consolidated military assistance report

The secretaries of state and defense are required to compile a comprehensive report on military assistance provided in the preceding fiscal year to each and all countries. The report must be published on the web and include all military articles, services, and training authorized and delivered (excluding those covert programs run under the National Security Act of 1947). While the report includes commercial arms deals licensed for export by the State Department, it does not currently provide data on private military contractors licensed to train foreign militaries.
Appendix 1: Who’s Minding the Store?

March 1: Humanitarian assistance worldwide
A report is due on humanitarian and other assistance carried out during the preceding fiscal year. This report is to be submitted to the foreign relations and armed services committees, and it is to include the list of countries in which operations took place, the type of activities in each country, and the amount of taxpayer money expended. Covered activities include demining training.

March 1: Bilateral and multilateral military exercises
The secretary of defense is to send Congress a report listing the developing countries for which the U.S. has paid the costs of participation in bilateral or multilateral military exercises during the preceding fiscal year.

March 1: International narcotics and law enforcement aid
The secretary of state is to report annually to the appropriate committees on assistance provided or proposed to be provided by the U.S. government during the preceding, current, and next fiscal years to support international efforts to combat illicit drug production or trafficking. The report is to specify the amount and nature of assistance, including training.

March 15: School of the Americas
The secretary of defense, in cooperation with the secretary of state, is to submit to Congress a report detailing the activities of the School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, GA—now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation—during the preceding fiscal year.

March 31: China contacts
The secretary of defense must submit to the armed services committees a report on U.S.-China military-to-military contacts during the period since the last such report. Among other things, the report is to include a list of upcoming exchanges scheduled for the next 12 months. A report, due on March 31, 2000, was required to list all general and flag grade officers of China’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) who have visited U.S. military installations since January 1, 1993, plus a list of the facilities visited. The report is to be unclassified, but can have a classified annex.

April 1: JCET exercises
The assistant secretary of defense for special operations sends a report to Congress on Special Operations Forces training abroad with friendly forces during the preceding fiscal year. Each report is to specify all countries in which training was conducted; the type of training undertaken, including whether such training was related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism activities; the duration of the exercise; the number of U.S. and foreign soldiers involved in the training event; and the affiliation of foreign troops. It also includes the relationship of this training to other overseas training programs, such as military exercises sponsored by the joint chiefs of staff or by one of the combatant commands, or military training activities sponsored by a military department (including deployments for training and unit training events). Finally, the report is to include a summary of expenses under this section. Although not classified, these reports are generally not available to the public.

Mid-May 2002: Military aid and training to Uzbekistan
While not put into binding law, the conference report for the FY 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act calls on the secretary of state to submit a report describing U.S. weapons, services, and financial assistance provided to Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan’s use of these weapons and services during the preceding six months. A second report is due ten months later. The request derives from concerns about Uzbekistan’s lack of democracy and abuse of human rights.
Appendix 1: Who’s Minding the Store?

**No specified date:** Training or assistance to Azerbaijan\(^{54}\)

Within 60 days of providing military training or assistance to Azerbaijan, the executive branch must report to the foreign operations subcommittees of the appropriations committees. In December 2001, Congress waived section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited military aid to Azerbaijan for the past decade due to its conflict with neighboring Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Such assistance may now be undertaken if deemed necessary to support operational readiness of U.S. armed forces or coalition partners.

**No specified date:** Consolidated DOD antiterror programs\(^{55}\)

The Defense Department is required to provide Congress with an annual consolidated budget justification (in both classified and unclassified form) that includes all programs and activities undertaken by the DOD for combating terrorism. Semi-annual reports (due April 15 and November 15) are also required on the actual expenditure of funds under these programs.
## Appendix 2:

### IMET Training* & Human Rights Abuse: The Official Record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Despite continued improvements, particularly in addressing problems of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation remained generally poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor... Members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings, were responsible for disappearances, and tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained generally poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses... Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings and were responsible for disappearances. They also tortured and otherwise abused detainees, generally with impunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>The Government's poor human rights record worsened in some areas... Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including government-approved executions of suspected bandits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor.... State security forces committed extrajudicial killings and disappearances, and they continued to torture, beat, and abuse persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses... Security forces were responsible for extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, beatings, rape, and other abuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor ... Members of the security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings. There were credible reports that security forces beat, otherwise abused, and at times tortured detainees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it committed serious abuses... Many observers believe that the police occasionally resorted to torture and physical beatings of prisoners, particularly during interrogations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. Security forces committed a number of extrajudicial killings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was generally poor in some areas, and some longstanding human rights abuses continued... The security forces beat and tortured prisoners and detainees; arbitrary arrest and detention were problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in thousands.
### Appendix 2: IMET Training & Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IMET 2019</th>
<th>IMET 2020</th>
<th>IMET 2021</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was poor… Extrajudicial killings; disappearances; use of torture, beatings, and rape by police and military personnel; and police abuse of prisoners and detainees. Soldiers, police, and civilian militia groups killed, beat, and raped citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor; it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses… Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings, torture detainees, use excessive force, rape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained generally poor. Police used excessive force, beat, or otherwise abused detainees, and used arbitrary arrest and illegal searches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained poor, and although there were some improvements in a few areas, it continued to commit serious abuses. Police continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings, excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; although there were improvements in several areas, some serious problems remain… Police and members of the security forces beat and otherwise abused persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was poor; although improvements continued in several areas during the year, serious problems remain. The national police, army, and security forces committed extrajudicial killings and often used excessive force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the Government continued to commit numerous, serious abuses; however, there were some improvements in a few areas… The security forces committed extrajudicial killings within the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas; while there continued to be significant improvements in some areas, serious problems remained… There were numerous deaths in custody.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was generally poor… The Government generally failed to prosecute or otherwise discipline officers who committed abuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was poor; while there were improvements in a few areas, there continued to be serious problems… Police killed several persons, and regularly threatened or mistreated suspected criminals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Government's human rights record was poor… Security forces used excessive force, at times resulting in death, and committed or failed to prevent some extrajudicial killings of suspected rebels and civilians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2: IMET Training & Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; however, there were some improvements in a few areas. Police officers reportedly committed several extrajudicial killings and frequently beat and otherwise abused criminal suspects and detainees.

### EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor. Security forces were responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya), and elsewhere in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor throughout the year. Prisoners are abused and tortured, and prison conditions generally are extremely harsh and life threatening.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some areas; however, its record was poor in a number of other areas, and significant problems remain. Police committed a number of extrajudicial killings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government generally respected the human rights of citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members of the security services were responsible for extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention; there were allegations by human rights groups that these problems worsened as the Government sought to intensify its campaign against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record was generally poor in several areas, and the principal human rights abuse remained severe restrictions on the right of citizens to change their government.

### EUROPE AND EURASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record was poor in many areas; however, there were some improvements…Police beat and otherwise abused suspects, detainees, and prisoners…. Prison conditions remained poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor; however, there were improvements in a few areas. …There were deaths in police custody and deaths in the military as a result of mistreatment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Extrad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor… Some prison inmates and detainees died in part due to mistreatment by the authorities. Police tortured and beat persons in custody and used excessive force to extract confessions. Arbitrary arrest and detention was a problem.
## Appendix 2: IMET Training & Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. Police continued to abuse and physically mistreat detainees and other citizens.

The Government's human rights record remained poor and worsened in several areas. Security forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse detainees.

The Government's human rights record was poor; although there were significant improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. Members of the security forces committed a small number of extrajudicial killings during mistreatment of detainees and abuse of military conscripts.

The Government's human rights record remained poor; members of the security forces at times tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated persons.

The Government's human rights record significantly worsened during the year in the context of the ethnic-Albanian insurgency led by the NLA. Police committed extrajudicial killings and killed civilians during combat operations.

The Government's human rights record remained poor. Some members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings. There were a number of disappearances and kidnappings. Security forces at times tortured, beat, and abused detainees.

The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in a number of areas; however, its record was poor in some areas, and several serious problems remained. Extrajudicial killings continued, including deaths due to excessive use of force and torture.


The Government's human rights record was poor; however, there were improvements in a few areas. Police and prison officials tortured and beat detainees and prisoners, at times killing them.

The Government's human rights record remained very poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of several citizens in custody. Prison conditions were poor, and pretrial detention can be prolonged.
Appendix 2: IMET Training & Human Rights

### NEAR EAST ASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's overall human rights record was poor… Members of the security forces used excessive force and tortured and abused some detainees…. Government abuses also included the arbitrary arrest and detention of persons who were critical of government policies.

### SOUTH ASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record remained poor. Police committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons died in police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely used torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators.

### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government's human rights record was poor in a number of areas and serious problems remain. There were credible reports that police committed extrajudicial killings. Security forces killed several protesters during demonstrations.

The Government generally respected human rights in some areas; however, its record was poor in several other areas, and serious problems remain…. Members of the security forces killed a number of persons during the year.

Serious problems in some areas, and the ongoing war with the LTTE continued to lead to serious human rights abuses by both sides. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings during the year. Disappearances also remain a problem. The military and police reportedly tortured detainees.

There were improvements in some human rights areas during the year; however, the Government's human rights record remained poor or worsened in other areas… The police and military committed extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects at an increased rate… Excessive use of deadly force by police and security forces continued to be a serious problem.

* Saudi Arabia receives a relatively small amount of IMET assistance, but like the other countries on this list has a poor human rights record according to the State Department. Although receiving little direct U.S. military aid or training assistance, Saudi Arabia has received U.S. arms exports totaling $35 billion in the past decade.
ENDNOTES


2. Section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act.

3. These are the Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, which hosts officers from Europe and Central Asian former Soviet republics; the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI; the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, African Center for Strategic Studies, and Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, all based at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.


5. In Summer 2002, Foreign Policy In Focus is publishing a special report on U.S. training of foreign police forces.

6. The Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Training for FY 1998 shows that 51,700 foreign military and law officials received training in the U.S. in 1998 (available at http://www.iawg.gov/). A report on JCET deployments for the same time period lists 17,000 foreign soldiers trained abroad, for a minimum total of 68,700 foreign police and military students. For dozens of other programs, many classified and operated overseas, it is not possible to quantify the number of foreign personnel receiving training, but a combined estimate of an additional 30,000 would be a reasonably modest guess.


8. FMTR 2001, III. Department of State Foreign Policy Objectives (available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2001/).


13. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes in this section are citations from the U.S. State Department, Program Descriptions accompanying the Account Tables for the Foreign Assistance Budget Request for FY 2003 (available at http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7808.htm).


21 According to testimony on March 12, 2002, by Gen. Charles Holland, the commander-in-chief of the Special Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the command does not yet know how much it will be spending for the training missions in the Philippines, Yemen, and Georgia recently announced by President Bush.

22 Section 2111b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code calls on the secretary of defense to establish a program to facilitate the enrollment and instruction of persons from foreign countries as international students at the senior military colleges (the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, USAF Academy, National Defense University, the war colleges of the armed forces). The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 made $2 million available for this program. No public or congressional report is required on attendees, but it does call on the secretary of defense to identify to the senior military colleges those foreign military students whom the secretary recommends be considered for admission under the program.

23 Part 2, Chapter 5, Section 544 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes one-for-one reciprocal exchanges with military institutions abroad. This provision also allows the attendance of foreign military and civilian defense personnel at flight training schools and programs (including test pilot schools) in the U.S., without charge if reciprocated.


31 The FBI's Training Division manages this complex of 21 dormitories, classrooms, research, and ancillary training facilities. One of the most recent additions is “Hogan's Alley,” a mock town where practical hostage rescue and antiterror training exercises are conducted.


35 Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

36 The Foreign Assistance Act originally stipulated the purposes of IMET as “encouraging effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries; and improving self-reliance of foreign militaries to effectively utilize their resources.”


38 Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland Air Force Base is a Spanish-language facility chartered in U.S. law for the purpose of providing military education and training to military personnel of Central and South American countries, Caribbean countries, and other countries eligible for IMET funding assistance. That law also requires background vetting of attendees to protect against training of anyone convicted of, or known to U.S. authorities to have committed human rights violations, and it states that the Air Force “must provide concentrated instruction in democratic government and human rights protections to each attendee of IAAFA” (Section 9415 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code).


40 Section 568 of the FY 1999 Foreign Operations Act and section 8130 of the FY 1999 DOD Appropriations Act.


42 Required by Chapter 113 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

43 Required by Section 656, Foreign Assistance Act and by Section 564, Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2002; separate legislation enacted in January 2002 also directs publication of
the Foreign Military Training Report, this time by March 1, 2002. The report is supposed to include information on all military training provided to foreign military personnel (excluding sales, and excluding training provided to the military personnel of NATO countries) under programs administered by the Pentagon and Department of State during fiscal year 2001 and proposed for 2002. It calls for the information to be publicly available unless a classified annex is “deemed necessary and appropriate.”

44 H.R.1594, the Foreign Military Training Responsibility Act.
45 Required by Section 30A of the Arms Export Control Act.
46 Required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
47 Required by Section 401 of Chapter 20 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
48 Required by Section 2010 of Chapter 101 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
49 Required by Section 489b of the Foreign Assistance Act.
50 Required by Section 2166 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
52 Required by Section 2011 of Chapter 101 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
54 Required by Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2002.
55 Required by Section 229 of Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
About the Author

Lora Lumpe <llumpe@mindspring.com> is a researcher and writer based in Washington, DC. She is a senior associate with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, working on the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, and she consults with and for several human rights and peace groups. She is on the advisory board for the Foreign Policy In Focus Project. Her recent books include Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed Books, 2000) and The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for Investigators and Activists (Washington: Federation of American Scientists, 1998).

Contributors:

Frida Berrigan is a Research Associate at the World Policy Institute’s Arms Trade Resource Center.

Kurt Biddle is Washington Coordinator for the Indonesia Human Rights Network.

John Gershman is Co-Director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center’s Global Affairs Program, and Asia Pacific Editor for Foreign Policy In Focus.

Ingrid Vaicius is an Associate with the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Project.

Editors:

Miriam Pemberton is the Peace and Security Editor of Foreign Policy In Focus.

Martha Honey is Co-Director of Foreign Policy In Focus.

Design and Layout: Tonya Cannariato

Copyediting: Chuck Hosking, Nancy Stockdale, and Noelle Beatty

Project Assistance: Juliette Niehuss
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For more information about this report contact:

Co-Directors

Tom Barry
(505) 388-0208
tom@irc-online.org

Martha Honey
(202) 234-9382 x. 232
martha@ips-dc.org

Media Director

Kathy Spillman
(202) 234-9382 x. 258
kathy@ips-dc.org

Peace and Security Editor

Miriam Pemberton
(202) 234-9382 x. 214
miriam@ips-dc.org

Legislative Outreach

Erik Leaver
(202) 234-9382 x. 240
erik@ips-dc.org

Director: Global Affairs Program

John Gershman
(609) 688-9509
john@irc-online.org