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A Comparison
26 November 2006
The question of how long the U.S. should remain in Baghdad should depend on how
strong the insurgents are in relation to the Iraqi government, currently propped
up by the US. Can this newly created institution ever rival the power and
influence of the insurgents? If they cannot, any question of the US remaining to
help them is a waste of time and money. All dreams to the contrary should be
promptly cast aside.
How does this compare with the situation in Sri Lanka? Should the International
Community throw up its hands and say the Sri Lankan situation is beyond our
control and let events evolve as they will, without any interference from us?
Such a policy would be fine, provided no one interferes with clandestine support
for either combatant, which is extremely unlikely.
Every non combatant observer seeks some stability in the island. Does helping
the present government survive make this a realistic possibility? If not, what
can the independent observers do to stimulate stability? What policy is followed
will depend on the interests the supposedly independent observers have in the
island.
The rumors are strong that the U.S has strong interests in Trincomalee harbor
and control of the possible existence of untapped oil in the Northeast. Does
supporting the government help them to fulfill their desires, or is that a wild
dream? The chief government allies that keep the government alive will
virulently oppose any effort whatsoever to bolster US influence on the island.
Short of using force, can the US hope to fulfill its desires by helping to keep
this government in power? If not, what alternative hopes do they have?
The UNP has little or no chance of satisfying U.S. dreams and expectations
either. They cannot expect the extreme left or the Buddhist monks to be virgin
voices in things political. In short, political or other clandestine
interference is a pointless exercise in helping to fulfill US expectations on
the island.
What power or influence do other nations have to urge the government to renounce
its policy of state terrorism and return to a policy of peace? My answer is
none, other than a denial of financial aid. (In any case, the government’s
allies condemn the 'interference' of this financial aid.) This harsh conclusion
has to be accepted by us and dealt with.
We must accept the fact that the Sinhala mafia have filled the power vacuum on
the island. Like granite, they will never respond to outside influences. Do we
have either the power or influence to counter them? That is what we have to face
up to and deal with. A tougher assignment could never have been visited upon us.
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