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The Limited Scope of the CFA
26 July 2008
The long rambling article by Mirak Raheem entitled “Paramilitaries: The need to
re think,” is an uncalled for effort to revise the CFA drastically, by resorting
to details that are either already covered by the broad terms of the CFA, or
include subjects that should form no part of this Agreement.
The first fundamental to grasp is that the CFA is defined as “An Agreement on a
ceasefire between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”.
Its limitations are explicit. It covers a “Ceasefire” and does not extend to
such concepts as Human Rights Violations, which are controlled by other
organizations, such as the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, and, it is
restricted to the two parties to the Agreement. This must by necessary
implication include those who can be proved to be acting as agents on behalf of
either party to the Agreement. The problem here is satisfying the burden of
proof to establish this connection, not redefining the meaning of “paramilitary”
or “alternate power” or any other term one wishes to use to describe them. That
is an exercise in futility.
The broad overall objective, as stated in the Preamble, is to find “a negotiated
settlement to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka” and“bringing an end to
the hostilities” and “improving the living conditions of all inhabitants
affected by the conflict”.
Proceeding from these broad objectives outlined in the Preamble, let us analyze
some of its general terms.
Article 1.2 states that “Neither party shall engage in any offensive military
operation” which includes a host of specifically designed forms of “offensive
activity” . Does Mr Raheem imagine that this does not encompass any group proved
to be acting as agents on behalf of either party to the Agreement? The problem
as I stated earlier, is proving the connection between the third party and the
party to the agreement. No redefinition of the terms “para military” or
“alternative powers” or whatever other term one uses to describe them, could
overcome that problem.
Article 1.3 emphasizes the right of the SL government to safeguard the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of SL, without engaging in offensive
operations against the LTTE. It is the function of the GOSL, not the LTTE,to
maintain the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation,making a
reciprocal obligation on the part of the LTTE to do the same,superfluous.
The final relevant paragraph is 1:8, obliging the GOSL to disarm “Tamil
paramilitary groups” by D-Day plus 30” . This was obviously founded on the
recognition by the then GOSL, that these groups were acting as their agents. The
huffing and puffing by the present government, trying to downplay this admission
by its predecessor is defied by the very wording of this paragraph. They cannot
at this stage deny the position to which they were committed by their
predecessor, on the ground that the predecessor was a rival political party,
whose actions they opposed.Solemn Agreements bind them, regardless of which
political party bound them to these obligations. However, the 30 day limitation
has to extended by virtue of the fact that the meeting to revitalize the terms
of the original Agreement are well past this 30 day limitation. The obligation
to disarm the Tamil military groups however remains un altered. The issue as to
which particular military groups were referred to may involve obtaining a
statement from Mr Wickremesinghe as to who they specifically referred to when
agreeing to abide by this obligation. The Royal Norwegian government, as the
intermediaries on that occasion, may be able to provide a more reliable answer
to that question, based on their notes or the recorded transcripts of the
proceedings on that occasion.
Mr Raheem’s broader concerns are of a political, not a legal nature. He ignores
the fact that we are dealing with a legal agreement, not an overall political
solution to the problems that confront us. The fact that Sinhalese racism has
increased to an alarming degree; and methods used by the GOSL to contain this
evil phenomenon are totally lacking, cannot be solved by the CFA. The fact that
the opposite is true, namely, that this government and others have fanned these
hatreds and capitalized on them politically, is again, not a matter that can be
solved by the CFA.
The GOSL must develop the flair and imagination to realize that the Tamils and
other ethnic groups can hardly be expected to acknowledge their inherent racism
with unbounded admiration. It can hardly be expected to command or inspire their
loyalty to the Sinhalese SL governments. The International Community must in
turn realize that the only way to move Sinhalese governments away from this
inherently prejudicial path, is to ensure that the Tamils have substantial
regional autonomy in the Northeast. This is the only way to protect the Tamils
from their reversible prejudices that the Sinhalese governments have always
exhibited, but tried without success to disguise.
Under the present Unitary Constitution, we are not in control of the cards that
are dealt to us. The GOSL controls the deck. We cannot choose the parts we are
to play. Our daily fate remains as uncertain as the movement of the erratic ball
on the roulette wheel. The time has come,when we can finally say to ourselves
“Today is the first day of our new life” We hope the IC can ensure that this
becomes a reality, not through the CFA, but by using the requisite political
pressure that could make this so. The GOSL is certain to use every conceivable
ploy to shatter this hard won right to regional autonomy, but who can honestly
sympathize with them?
Mr Raheem’s effort to solve this multiplicity of complex issues by resorting to
the CFA is unquestionably misplaced. These can only besolved by the proper use
of political pressure by the only forces that are capable of fashioning a just
solution to this long drawn and seemingly endless nightmare.
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