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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Jane's  Editor interviewed by Australian Broadcasting Corporation
on Intelligence Report on LTTE

Presenter - Corinne Podger  
Speaker - Jane's Intelligence Review editor Christian LeMiere
  ABC Radio Australia, 25 July 2007  [also audio]

"..The most significant number of arms (for the LTTE)  comes from the Sri Lankan armed forces themselves and raids on Sri Lankan armed forces bases... LTTE has demonstrated in the past that it's very strategically able and has surprised many observers by coming back from what people may have thought was almost certain defeat... The funding (200-300 million dollars a year) almost exclusively comes from the overseas diaspora of which there are 600-800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils overseas... "

[see also USD200 million profit margins maintain sophisticated Tamil Tiger war - Janes Intelligence Review, 19 July 2007  and Velupillai Pirabakaran Press Conference at Killinochi, Tamil Eelam, 14 April 2002 "Q: Is the LTTE using the ceasefire as an opportunity to re-arm? A: It is during the armed conflict that we were able to amass a large quantity of weapons and it is during peace time that we are deprived of that opportunity. During the battle of Elephant Pass we were able to acquire a large quantity of arms worth millions of rupees and also ammunition in large amounts. It is during the peace process that we are deprived of this opportunity.]

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LEMIERE: Well the report really outlines not that there is a significant flow of weapons from Cambodia to Sri Lanka on an annual basis but that Cambodia has in the past been the second most significant source of arms for Sri Lanka, approximately five to ten per cent of the arms held by the LTTE are of Cambodian origin in terms of their supplier country. The most significant number of arms comes from the Sri Lankan armed forces themselves and raids on Sri Lankan armed forces bases. But the instability in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s has helped fuel a black small arms market that has greatly aided the Tamil Tigers.

PODGER: Cambodia's Interior Ministry has said in response to your report that it is doing everything it can to prevent the movement of weapons. Is that an assessment that you would share?

LEMIERE: I think given the resources available for the Cambodian government there has been a concerted effort and they have been fairly successful in stymieing the use and the flow of small arms coming from Cambodia. The death by small arms in violent crime in Cambodia has fallen significantly over the last five to ten years. But it's a slow process. The Cambodian government is still aware that it's dragging its feet on the Khmer Rouge trial for instance because it doesn't wish to upset any Khmer Rouge that may still exist within the country. So there's only so much the Cambodian government can do. While it may have good intentions its lack of resources means that the process is somewhat slow.

PODGER: Why is the Cambodian government having difficulty in fully eradicating the movement of weapons?

LEMIERE: The Cambodian government is still not entirely in control of all areas of Cambodia, there are still areas where there are autonomous administrators if you will in areas of the country and it's a very difficult country in which to exert full control from the centre. There's not a complete monopoly of control by the government and so it's unable to force its will everywhere. The borders are fairly porous and there's still large numbers of small arms in rural communities around the country.

PODGER: Your report also says the Tamil Tigers have an income of around two to three hundred million US dollars a year, funding capabilities which now include a rudimentary airforce. How's that income being generated?

LEMIERE: The funding almost exclusively comes from the overseas diaspora of which there are 600-800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils overseas. Although there are some funds in fact raised within Sri Lanka within Tamil-held areas. But the majority of it will come from overseas communities. And there seems to be more of a trend now to use agents rather than direct Tamil representatives within countries to raise funds, and in particular international agents who are not necessarily ethnic Tamils. There is one particular case that involves a Singaporean and two Indonesians who have pleaded guilty to attempting to illegally export arms in January this year on behalf of the LTTE.

PODGER: There are also suggestions in your report that some of the Tamil Tiger income comes from human trafficking?

LEMIERE: Yes I mean it's difficult to confirm figures and numbers when dealing with the LTTE, for obvious reasons, but it has been estimated by the government - and Tamil diaspora sources have confirmed - that there may be some funds that are tracked from illegal activities including human trafficking.

PODGER: The Sri Lankan government's capture of a key rebel bastion in the east of the island, is that likely to affect the rebel's activities do you think?

LEMIERE: The fall of the east the Sri Lanka government would like to have two direct effects on the LTTE; one is obviously a clear sign of its lack of influence in the east and its seemingly poor thrust militarily speaking, which has been driven very rapidly out of an area that it previously controlled to a greater extent.

The other is that it no longer has much control or freedom of movement in the coastal areas of the east which previously could have been utilised for smuggling, maybe of arms, perhaps of humans and even of cash as well. So it will affect both the ability of the LTTE to move goods into the island and outside of the island, but also its ability to stash naval equipment near the coast and to operate in the east.

Whether it will mean the defeat of the LTTE is far from certain because it still holds a significant area in the north of Sri Lanka and the LTTE has demonstrated in the past that it's very strategically able and has surprised many observers by coming back from what people may have thought was almost certain defeat in the past.