|
Summary
The present report has been prepared in accordance with the
provisions of resolution 1612 (2005). The report, which
covers the period from 1 November 2005 to 31 October 2006,
provides information on compliance and progress in ending the
recruitment and use of children and other grave violations being
committed against children in situations affected by armed
conflict in Sri Lanka. The report notes that despite previous
commitments by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, that group
continues to use and recruit children. In addition, a
particularly disconcerting development during the reporting
period was the increase in abductions and recruitment of
children in the east by the
Karuna faction, a breakaway group of Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam. The report sets out a series of recommendations
with a view to securing strengthened action for the protection
of war-affected children in Sri Lanka.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The UN Security Council is a political
institution concerned with advancing the political interests
of its member states. It is not an human rights institution.
Pinochet of Chile, the Shah of Iran and Guantanamo Bay serve
as a few of the outstanding examples of the UN Security
Council's track record on human rights and humanitarian law.
Having in 2002
adopted a double standard in the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child for the age of recruitment by States and Armed
Groups, it is, perhaps, not surprising that States
have then been concerned to secure the implementation
of the double standard. The UN Security Council
Resolution
1612 (2005) and the
establishment of the "Council Working Group"
served as mechanisms to advance the political agenda of
states concerned to prevent armed resistance movements from
recruiting 16 year olds whilst
States themselves continue to recruit 16 year olds to
their armed forces.
States would like to offer 16 year olds in their own schools
‘ a career’ in the
armed forces, produce
video games (given
free to 16 year olds and freely seen by 12 year olds)
and in this way encourage the child recruitment process and
at the same time shout ‘child soldiers’ and 'war crime'
where under 18 children, without schools to attend, and in
many cases without families to look after them, join a
movement resisting
oppression and alien rule of their homeland.
Having said that, the current United Nations S/2006/1006
Report on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, has
signally failed to address the question whether the LTTE is
an 'armed group' within the meaning of that expression in
the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child 2002
The political and juridical reality is
that the LTTE is not an 'armed group' but a politico
military entity
enjoying a monopoly of legitimate coercive power within
lines of control recognised by a
Ceasefire Agreement – which Agreement itself has
received international recognition and acceptance.
This is a characteristic which the LTTE shares with states.
A state enjoys a monopoly of coercive power within its
territorial boundaries - and, indeed, that is the defining
characteristic of a state. The
LTTE
administers a
defacto state within internationally recognised lines of
control. The state is de facto
because it has not been recognized by other states but the
lines of control are de jure because they have been set out
in an
internationally recognized ceasefire agreement.
States have armed forces, and they also have
administrative services. In some cases like Pakistan, the
chief of the army is the political head. In other cases like
the USA, the political head is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. In both cases the administrative services may
include police, training schools, judiciary etc. In
the case of Tamil Eelam, persons recruited by the LTTE serve
in the administrative services of this
de facto state – and these include the judiciary and
court, school of law, police stations, police academy,
medical and technical colleges, small industries, a
community bank and children's homes. It appears to us that
such participation is lawful – and given the conditions
prevailing in these areas both humane and warranted.
The Australian M.P. Ms Virginia
Judge
declared on 15 September 2005 (after a visit to Tamil
Eelam) –
“…I observed that in a remarkable three year period the Tamils developed a
virtual state within the north and north-east of Sri Lanka. I visited their
judiciary and court, school of law, police station, police academy, medical and
technical colleges and small industries, a community bank plus a children's home
housing 278 children left orphaned by the war and the recent tsunami. The Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) runs a variety of development, relief and
reconstruction projects as well as assisting several non-government
organisations with their projects. All this is a tribute to the spirit and
resilience of the Tamil people…”
And it was to this political reality
that Sri Lanka President Kumaratunge alluded in
April 2003 when she declared that the "LTTE has set up a separate state".
And it was to this political reality that Professor Kristian Stokke referred
in
Building the
Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in
LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka, 2006 -
"Sri Lanka’s third Eelam War created a
political-territorial division of the island with a resultant dual state
structure in the North-East. In the context of the
2002 Ceasefire Agreement and based on earlier institutional experiments, the
LTTE is currently engaged in a comprehensive process of state building within
the areas they control."...
Reason suggests that the LTTE is
not an 'armed group' within the meaning of that expression
in the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child 2002. Article 4 of the Optional Protocol does not
apply to a state but applies only to an 'armed group'. It
has no applicability to a defacto state with
dejure lines of control. Just as much as Sri Lanka is
not an 'armed group', the LTTE too is not an 'armed group' -
though each do have armed forces.
However the Security Council may not be moved by reason -
and that should not come as a matter for surprise.
And it will be naive to expect that the
"Council Working Group" will act against the political
interests of the states who were responsible for its
appointment. And as for the Reports of "Special
Representatives"
and "Special Advisers" the words of
Upton Sinclair
come to mind - "It is difficult to get a man to understand
something when his salary depends on his not understanding"
I. Introduction 1. The
present report has been prepared in accordance with the provisions
of
United Nations Security Council resolution 1612 (2005)
and covers the period 1 November 2005 to 31 October 2006. It
provides information on compliance and progress in ending the
recruitment and use of child soldiers and other grave violations and
abuses being committed against children in situations affected by
armed conflict in Sri Lanka, including the abduction of children;
the killing and maiming of children; rape and other grave sexual
violence against children; attacks against schools and hospitals;
and denial of humanitarian access for children.1
2. A task force on monitoring and reporting has been established in
Sri Lanka, and its inaugural meeting was held on 26 July 2006. The
Task Force has undertaken significant efforts to confirm that the
information that was presented to it has been vetted and is accurate
and reliable.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The credibility of the information
gathered by the Task Force would have been enhanced if the
procedures the Task Force adopted were transparent and open
to scrutiny by the party against whom allegations had been
made. The political reality is that the Task Force
functions under an umbrella provided by the Sri Lankan state
and that its informants are those who may be influenced by
the Sri Lankan's state agencies. Given the horrendous human
rights track record of the Sri Lanka state authorities, it
will be of interest to learn of the 'significant efforts'
that the Task Force had taken to secure that the information
presented to it was "accurate and reliable" - and the
nature of the so called "vetting process".
Special Adviser Alan Rock states in his Report of 8 February
2007 "..it is important to stress that I was neither
asked nor empowered to conduct a judicial inquiry or a
police investigation into the conduct of the parties to the
conflict..." It will be helpful to learn whether the Task
Force acted under similar restrictions, particularly as the
Report recommends punitive actions.
II. Overview of prevailing political, military and
social background
3. Sri Lanka2
has been affected by an ongoing conflict between the Government of
Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
since 1983.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The statement in the Report that Sri Lanka
has been affected by the ongoing conflict since 1983 is
misleading. For one thing, the LTTE itself traces its
beginnings to around a decade before that. For another, if
the Report was intent on providing an "Overview of
prevailing political, military and social background" it may
have found it illuminating to refer to
Tarzie Vittachi:Emergency
'58 – The Story of the
Ceylon Race Riots
-
"What are we left with (in 1958)? A
nation in ruins, some grim lessons which we cannot
afford to forget and a momentous question: Have the
Sinhalese and Tamils reached the parting of ways?"
and to Paul Sieghart Q.C. Mission to Sri
Lanka on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists,
March1984
" Communal riots in which Tamils are
killed, maimed, robbed and rendered homeless are no
longer isolated episodes; they are beginning to become a
pernicious habit." [see also
1958,
1961,
1974 and
1977]
It is estimated that the conflict has killed more than 65,000
people, displaced over 800,000 people and detrimentally affected the
entire population, particularly
in the north and east of Sri Lanka. In February 2002, the
Government and LTTE
signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway, which created
the
Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM), consisting of members from the five Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) to monitor
the ceasefire agreement.
4. During the reporting period, the ceasefire agreement between
the Government and LTTE continued to hold despite
escalating levels of violence, particularly after May
2006.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The statement that levels of violence
escalated "particularly after May 2006" is not in
accord with the facts. The truth is that the levels of
violence escalated spectacularly after the election of
President Rajapakse in November 2005 and his
reneging on the 2002 Oslo Declaration - and the facts
speak for themselves: e.g.
Pesalai,
Joseph Pararajasingham,
Colombo,
Trincomalee,
Iyathurai Baskaran and
many other Sri Lanka attacks in December 2005/January 2006.
It appears that the Report attempts to downplay the fact
that the escalation of violence occurred soon after
President Rajapakse assumed office and seeks to portray the
LTTE as the initiator of violence and Sri Lanka as simply
responding to attacks by the LTTE - by adopting this
approach, the Report puts in issue the Reporter's
impartiality and credibility.
"The Tamil civilians murdered by, and
under the supervision of, the SLAFs since the Geneva
talks on 24 February are given in a Table in this
report. With a brief explanation of the data in this
Table. This Table tells the story of the gruesome
terrorizing nature of the murderous campaign by the
SLAFs. After reading this Table, it is not too hard to
imagine the state of terror in which the Tamil people
are living in the SLAFs controlled areas of Northeast.
These murders were carried out by two main methods.
These are, killing by direct shooting of the SLAFs and
killing by direct shooting of the paramilitary while
SLAFs stood guard nearby."
LTTE Peace Secretariat Report on Tamil civilians
murdered, by and under the supervision of, Sri Lankan
Armed Forces (SLAFs) Since Geneva talks on 24 February
until 8 May 2006
Between 1 November 2005 and 31 October 2006, the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission ruled on 662 ceasefire violations,
comprising 193 violations by the Government, 451 violations by LTTE
and 18 violations by the
Karuna faction. Included in those rulings are 106 ruled
violations concerning the abduction and recruitment of children.3
5. In November 2005,
President Mahinda Rajapakse won presidential elections that were
marked by
LTTE obstruction of voting in parts of the north and east. Since
early December 2005, violence has intensified with almost
daily attacks on security forces personnel; the
killing of members and supporters of the LTTE and other Tamil
factions, including the LTTE breakaway Karuna
faction;4
assassinations of high-profile public and military persons;
clashes at sea between the Sri Lankan navy and LTTE sea units; and
increased death and injury of civilians.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
Tamil civilians killed by Sri Lanka - in the Shadow of a
Ceasefire... 12 months to December 2006 included -
Daniel Quinton (24),
Mylvaganam Thavarajah (28),
Nadarajah Raviraj,
Murugesu Markandu (62),
Murugesu Shanmugarathinam (56),
Rathinam Sarawathy (59),
Shanmugaratnam Sasi (20,
Shannmugaratnam Krishanth (18),
Sivamaharajah,
K.Vimalathasan (30),
C.Vijayasekaran (25),
Sivasangaran,
Thambirasa Lakiya (17),
Mahalingam Vensidiyoola (17),
Thuraisingam Sutharsini (17),
Nagalingam Theepa(19),
Thambirasa Theepa (19),
Thirunavukkarasu Niranjini (18),
Raveenthirarasa Ramya (18),
Kanapathipillai Nanthini (18),
Vijayabavan Sinthuja (18),
Naguleswaran Nishanthini (17),
Tharmakulasingam Kemala (19),
Arulampalam Yasothini (18)
Muthaih Indra (18),
Murugaiah Arulselvi (18),
Sivamoorthy Karthikayini (18),
Santhanam Sathyakala (20),
Kanagalingam Nirupa (17),
Kanagalingam Nirusa (17),
Navaratnam Santhakumari (18),
Nagalingam Kokila(19),
Sivamayajeyam Kokila,
Shanmugarasa Paventhini,
Balakrishnan Mathani (18),
Sivanantham Thivya (18),
Thambirasa Suganthini (18),
S.Vathsalamary (20),
Thanabalasingam Bakeerathy (19),
Thanikasalam Thanusa (19),
Pathmanathan Kalaipriya (18),
Markupillai Kelansuthayini (18),
Rasamohan Hamsana (19),
Vivekanantham Thadchayini (18),
Santhakumar Sukirtha (19),
Uthayakumaran Kousika (19),
Nallapillai Ninthija(18),
Veerasingam Rajitha (18),
Thamilvasan Nivethika (18),
Suntharam Anoja (17),
Puvanasekaram Puvaneswari (17),
Kiritharan Thayani (17),
Mahalingam Vasantharani (18),
Thuraisingam Thisani (18),
Vairavamoorthy Kirithika (19),
Chandramohan Nivethika (17),
Sellam Nirojini, Tharmarasa
Brintha (17),
Thevarasa Sharmini (17),
Varatharaja Mangaleswari (17),
Rasenthiraselvam Mahilvathani (18),
Nilayinar Nivakini (17),
Kubenthiraselvam Lihitha (19),
Chandrasekaran Vijayakumari (27),
Kandasamy Kumarasamy (48),
Solomon Singarasa (65),
S Jeyarubi (20),
G. Kavitha ( 27),
S. Ganesh (54),
K.Kovarthani (28),
S.Romila (25),
V.Kokilavathani (29),
G. Sreethraran ( 36),
Primus Anandarajah,
Matahavarasa Ketheeswaran (36),
M. Narmathan (24),
R. Arulraj (24),
P.Pratheeban (27),
M. Rishikeshan (28),
Y. Kodeeswaran (31),
Muraleetharan (35),
K. Koneshwaran (24 ),
Abdul Latif Mohamed Jauffer (Age 31),
A. Jaseelan,
Pon Ganeshamoorthy,
Ambalavanar Punithavathy,
Manaval Claramma Leela (75),
Jesuthasan Jude Nixon (23),
Cyrilappar St.Jude (22)
Turairaja Vijekumar (39),
Kodalingham Linganathan (20),
Abdul Raheem Latheep (28)
Mary Medaline (27),
Moorthy Martin (35),
Ann Nilxon (7),
Ann Luxica(9),
Ketheeswaran Yathursan (4 months),
Ketheeswaran Thanushkanth (4),
Palachamy Ketheeswaran (25),
Ketheeswaran Anex Ester (23),
Abraham Robinson (28),
Sellathurai Amalathas (28),
Kanesh Navaratnam (50) ,
Joseph Anthonymuttu ,(64)
Sinnathurai Sivanesan (46,
Murugesu Shanmugalingam(72),
S Kantharoopan (29),
Shanmugalingam Parameswari (65),
Ratnam Senthuran (38),
Somasuntharam Maheswary, ..Thanuskodi
Premini,
Kasinather Ganesalingam,
Thangarasa,
Shanmuganathan Sujendram,
Thambiraja Vasantharajan,
Kailayapillai Ravindran,
Arunesarasa , Satheesharan, .Ramanathan
Ratheeskumar,
Thanuskodi Premini,
Kasinather Ganesalingam,
Thangarasa,
Shanmuganathan Sujendram,Thambiraja
Vasantharajan,
Kailayapillai Ravindran,
Arunesarasa Satheesharan,
Thambiah Jeyarajah,
Major Kapilan,
Thambipillai Selvarajah,
Ramalingam Suntheralingam,
Kandasamy Vaikunthan,
Anthonippillai Soosainather, Thevasahayampillai Jeyakumar
Soosainather,
Subramaniam Sugirtharajan,
Chandrakanthan Vijayatharson.
Chandragajan Krishnagobi,
Illayathamby Ramakrishnan,
Thurairajah Ravichandran,
Kanapathy Murugesu,
Mariyanayagam Maruthanayagam,
Suppiah Murugan,
Sithambari Ganesaratnam,
Visuvar Krishnan,
Bojan Renuka,
Bojan Shanuka,
Bojan Arthanageswary,
Tharmarasan Tharmaseelan,
N Kandeepan ,T
Tharmasri,
Soosaithas K Marinthiran,
Sebastiampillai P Ruban,
Selvarajah Uthayarajah,
S. Thanabalasingham,
Balakrishnan Rajeevmohan,
Parimalarajah Robinson,
Iyathurai Baskaran,
Thangathurai Sivanantha,
Logithasan Rohanth,
Shanmugarajah Sajeenthiran, Manoharan
Rajeehar,
Yogarajah Hemachandran (20),
Thambirajah Arulajanthan (15),
Joseph Pararajasingham (71),
Jude Sugathy (Theresa) Croos (30) ,
Jude Arokiyathass Fernando,
Emmanual Croos (42),
Emmanuel Anthonikkam Croos (42),
Jude Arokiaraj Parunandu (3)
The situation was further complicated by armed actions
of the
Karuna faction and the suicide bomb attack on the army commander
in Colombo on 25 April 2006, which resulted in the Government
launching a
military retaliation of limited duration against LTTE positions.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
It may have been helpful if the Report
which was concerned to provide an Overview of the
'Background' had also provided some background to the
emergence of the Karuna faction.
"In an interview published in (the
Sinhala owned Sri Lanka) The Daily Mirror on 8
November, journalist Champika Liyanaarachchi spoke with
UNP Member of Parliament, Milinda Moragoda, to discuss
Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidential campaign. Moragoda
confirmed that the UNP was behind the creation of the
Karuna Group stating, “Karuna is a product of the peace
process for which the UNP had made the bulk of the
contributions.”
UNP leader admits to Karuna Group support in Daily
Mirror interview
Furthermore, the statement in the Report
that Sri Lanka's military
retaliation was of "limited duration against LTTE positions"
is factually incorrect. The record shows that the aerial
bombardment of the Trincomalee area was for a period of more
than 3 days, was directed at Tamil civilian targets and not
at so called "LTTE positions" -
Tamil Population Centres in Trincomalee Are Under Non-Stop
Bombardment, 25 April 2006
Sri Lanka Armed Forces Attack on Civilian Population Centres
Continued For Second Day; 13 Dead; Many wounded, 26
April 2006
12 bodies of civilians recovered from Muttur east, 26
April 2006
Urgent Appeal by TRO for Internally Displaced (to ICRC,
UNHCR, Bilateral and Multilateral donors) for humanitarian
assistance to the War IDPs, 26 April 2006
Sri Lankan Air force bombs Muthur - D.B.S.Jeyaraj, 26
April 2006
"Within hours of the explosion in
Colombo, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces launched air and
artillery attacks in Trincomalee in the East – some
150km away. The speed at which this occurred leaves not
the slightest doubt that it was pre-planned.
Seven Tamil villages near Trincomalee were
indiscriminately bombed and shelled. Israeli-built
Kfir war planes made 5 ‘visits’ dropping scores of bombs
on civilian targets while the Sri Lankan Navy shelled
the area from gun boats which fortuitously ‘happened to
be’ off the coast. Between 6.30pm and 8pm on 25 April
2006, some 96 naval shells landed in just one area
alone. Air strikes continued the next day."
Sri Lanka bombs its own People - Dr.Brian Senewiratne
27 April 2006
For the Report to describe these sustained
aerial and naval bombardments by Sri Lanka on Tamil
population centres, which left around a hundred dead,
several hundreds wounded and around 30,000 displaced from
their homes, as a 'military retaliation' of a 'limited
duration against LTTE positions' is to do violence to
language, expose the partiality of the reporter and to raise
questions yet again, as to the weight that may be
properly attached to the material submitted by the Reporter.
6. The conflict
escalated further in late July 2006 following the closure by
LTTE of the Mavilaru sluice gates on 22 July, affecting the supply
of water for a reported 15,000 families in Trincomalee District. The
Government
launched a military operation to gain control over the area and
reopen the gates.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
It may have been
helpful if the Report alluded to the views of
SLMM Head Ulf Henricsson that the Sri
Lanka operation had nothing to do with securing water.
"Q: What are your views on the water
crisis? Could it have been resolved a different way?
A: I think that the importance of the water was
exaggerated a lot. Of course it was bad but it was
definitely not 30,000 acres which was in the short term
dependent on this water. And the crops could have done
definitely much more days without water. So I think
there were several days for negotiation without
launching an attack. And I am definitely rejecting
the government’s claim that this was a humanitarian
operation, because an operation that causes some hundred
deaths and 30,000 refugees is not a humanitarian one.
I understand the military reasons for it, but don’t call
it a humanitarian operation.
Ulf
Henricsson Interview 20 August 2006
The Report also
fails to point out that the Sri Lanka engaged in its
military operation despite discussions over the
Mavilaru water crisis held between Maj. Gen. Ulf Henricsson,
Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and
villagers of LTTE held Eachchilampathu Vaharai division at
Kallady.
"A crucial
discussion over the Mavilaru water crisis held between
Maj. Gen. Ulf Henricsson, Head of the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and villagers of LTTE held
Eachchilampathu Vaharai division at Kallady LTTE
political office ended abruptly following aerial strike
on civilian targets in the area by Sri Lanka Air Force.
Buildings of the Verugal Muhathuwaram Government Tamil
School were damaged and two Tamil civilians were injured
when Kifir jets dropped bombs on the area located about
750 meters away from the Kallady LTTE political office
where the SLMM head had discussion with representatives
of the villagers.
SLMM Head,
villagers discussion abruptly ends following aerial
strike,29 July 2006
The confrontation extended to the Mutur town, displacing
approximately 50,000 persons. By 27 August, the Government had
captured large parts of LTTE-controlled areas in Trincomalee,
including Sampur. In separate military incidents, on 11 August
the LTTE attacked the forward defence lines, separating government-
and LTTE-controlled areas at the southern tip of the Jaffna
peninsula. The Government
responded with attacks against several front line posts in
LTTE-controlled areas
in Jaffna,
Kilinochchi and Trincomalee and Batticaloa Districts.
7. The
preceding confrontations resulted in the closure of the A9 road,5
greatly reducing access to Jaffna District and the Vanni area
(Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts), and the displacement of more
than 40,000 civilians in both Jaffna and Kilinochchi Districts, and
of more than 60,000 civilians from Batticaloa District. According to
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), between April 2006 and 22 October 2006, a total of 201,835
people (54,794 families) were displaced from their homes by the
escalation in violence and insecurity. That number is in addition to
more than 312,712 persons who were displaced previously as a result
of the conflict and the 15,849 Sri Lankan refugees (4,665 families)
reported to have arrived in Tamil Nadu, India, since the beginning
of 2006. There continues to be a heightened risk of injury to the
civilian population, especially children and youth, from unexploded
ordnance and anti-personnel mines owing to the increased
displacement in and around the shifting battle areas.
8. Against the background of the heightened tensions and increased
military activity in the country, humanitarian and development
assistance efforts faced various challenges and constraints, both in
terms of physical access to beneficiaries and the systematic
tightening of Government approval for the International
Non-Government Organizations (INGO)/Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGO) operations, specifically in the North and East. Those
constraints resulted in the scaling down of humanitarian and
development support to the affected population, including to
vulnerable children, and also in the hampering of access of
independent observers and monitors to those affected areas.
9. On 31 May 2006, the
Council of the European Union added LTTE to the European Union list
of terrorist organizations for the application of specific
measures. Following this, the LTTE insisted on the
withdrawal of SLMM monitors sent by States Members of the
European Union by 1 September 2006. Further, the latest talks on the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the Government and
LTTE
in Geneva from 28 to 29 October were inconclusive.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
It is correct that the talks were
inconclusive. But in the interests of accuracy, the Report may
have pointed out it was the Government which refused to open the
A9 road and in this way continued to maintain the economic
blockade on the Jaffna Peninsula.
”Discussions were also held on the urgent
humanitarian situation and the need to address the plight of
a very large number of civilians. Several issues were
discussed. The LTTE requested the A9 to be opened. The
Government refused to do so at this point. "
Statement by the Norwegian Facilitator at Conclusion of
Talks, 29 October 2006
10. The Government of Sri Lanka has
appointed a new Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights
and revitalized a permanent standing committee and inter-ministerial
working group on human rights which has, inter alia, played an
important role in following up the investigation of certain cases.
The Penal Code of Sri Lanka was amended early in 2006 to include a
new offence of recruitment of children under 18 years of age into
armed groups.
In September, the President announced the establishment
of a special commission of inquiry, with the participation of
international observers, to investigate a range of
serious human rights abuses since August 2005, including several
of the cases detailed later in this report.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
III. Grave violations of children’s rights A.
Recruitment and use of children in armed forces and groups
1. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 11. The Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam is listed in annex II of the present report of
the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict6
and in all his previous reports as a party recruiting and using
children as soldiers. LTTE previously made commitments to
immediately cease the recruitment of children and release all
children within its ranks to Olara Ottunu, the Special
Representative for children affected by armed conflict, in
Kilinochchi in 1998; to UNICEF in October 2002; to the Executive
Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in January
2003; and under the Action Plan for children affected by war in
March 2003. LTTE most recently articulated its position in a
published document on child protection that outlaws enlisting of
children under 17 years in Armed Forces and makes participation of
children under 18 years of age in armed combat illegal.7
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
“Child recruitment by the LTTE is an issue
that has been extensively politicized in Sri Lankan and
international debates concerning the consequences of the
civil war in Sri Lanka. This process of politicization began
after 1996 when the government of Sri Lanka, headed by
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, launched an international
campaign to ban the LTTE. The Foreign Ministry that
spearheaded this international campaign was also the main
state agency to carry out the international campaign against
the LTTE on the theme of child recruitment.”
(Prof.
Jayadeva Uyangoda
-Sri Lanka’s Protracted Armed Conflict: Background, Context
and Dynamics in Children and Armed Conflict, Sri Lanka:
Country Report, Social Science Research Council, New York,
2006)
12. The United Nations Children’s Fund monitors and
reports on violations of children’s rights, including underage
recruitment. Parents whose children have been recruited or are at
risk of being recruited by LTTE are encouraged to report to UNICEF
directly or through other international agencies.
UNICEF verifies all of the reported cases and has maintained a
comprehensive database of underage recruitment since 2001, which is
updated when the child’s status changes. The database provides a
record of known cases of recruitment and has proven to be an
effective advocacy tool for use with LTTE and other factions.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
That the database has proven to be "an effective
advocacy tool" is understandable but where the database is
sought to be used to justify punitive action, the way in which
the particulars in the database were compiled and verified
become of crucial importance. Here several questions will arise
- the age of the individual, the nature of the recruitment
whether voluntary or conscripted, whether recruitment was
to the armed force and so on. In respect of each of these
matters, the procedures adopted to verify particulars must be
open and transparent. Here see also "False
accounts and charges" and "Bias"
in International
Federation Observations
on Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict in Sri Lanka.
13. During the reporting period, UNICEF received reports
of 541 children recruited, of which 66 were re-recruited by LTTE. As
indicated in table 1 below,
during the reporting period the number of verified reports of
recruitment received by UNICEF peaked in July 2006, with 63 children
verified to have been recruited and three children re-recruited.
14. The following examples illustrate the direct experience of those
children. According to their mother’s report to UNICEF, two
17-year-old boys living in the Batticaloa District were visited in
their family’s home on 10 July by a member of LTTE and were asked to
join its military wing. He beat the two children when they resisted
the abduction. Three days after the incident, the two children
decided to go to their uncle’s house to find refuge. At 8 a.m.,
while cycling on the main road to reach the relative’s house, they
were stopped by the same LTTE member, beaten, and taken away on his
motorcycle. Some villagers witnessed the incident and confirmed the
identity of the abductor. On 24 July, UNICEF was informed that the
two children had escaped from the LTTE camp. UNICEF continues to
undertake protection follow-up with these two boys, who fear to
return home. 15. The parents of a 15-year-old boy living
in the Batticaloa District reported that their child and another 11
children were abducted while participating in a religious festival
at the temple in their home village. Although the identity of the
LTTE member who perpetrated the abduction is known, and
notwithstanding the many visits of his parents to the LTTE camp, the
child has not been released to date.
16. As of 31 October 2006, out of the 5,794 total cases of child
recruitment verified by UNICEF
since April 2001, 1,598 recruited children are believed to
remain with LTTE. Of those 649 children are currently under the age
of 18, and 949 are individuals who were recruited when they were
under the age of 18 years, but are now 18 years of age or older.
The above figures represent only the number of cases
reported to UNICEF, and there are indications that the prevailing
security situation might be deterring families from reporting cases.
The overlap between children recorded on the UNICEF database and
children who left LTTE (released, ran away or returned home) is
approximately 37 per cent, suggesting that the UNICEF figures
reflect approximately one third of the total cases of recruitment.
Table 1
Reported LTTE recruitment and re-recruitment of children from 1
November 2005 to 31 October 2006
17. During the reporting period, the majority of reports of
recruitment of children came from Kilinochchi District, with 26 per
cent of documented child recruitment or re-recruitment occurring in
the district. That figure represents a 66 per cent increase in
reports of recruitment and re-recruitment of children by LTTE in
Kilinochchi, as compared with the previous twelve-month period.
Batticaloa reported the second-highest number of cases, with 23 per
cent of the total reported cases of recruitment and re-recruitment.
That represents a 49 per cent reduction in recruitment or
re-recruitment of children by the LTTE in Batticaloa as compared to
the previous twelve-month period. 18. The data also
reflect that the number of boys recruited was higher than the number
of girls (68 per cent of recruits were boys and 32 per cent of
recruits were girls). However the recruitment of more girls than
boys was reported in Mullaitivu District. Recruitment of a
relatively high proportion of girls was also reported in Kilinochchi
District during the period, as indicated in table 2.
Table 2
Gender analysis of recruitment by district from 1 November 2005
to 31 October 2006
19. On the basis of
cases reported to UNICEF, the average age of underage recruits
during the reporting period was 16 years, as indicated in table 3.8
Table 3
Age analysis of children at the time of recruitment from 1
November 2005 to 31 October 2006
20. During the reporting period, LTTE notified UNICEF that 362
children had been “released” from its ranks, including the recent
release of 79 children in September 2006. According to the LTTE
release list, 224 of the 362 children were released directly to
their parents, while the remaining 138 children were reportedly
released to their families through the North-East Secretariat on
Human Rights (NESOHR) or transferred to the educational skills
development centre by LTTE or NESOHR. During the same period, UNICEF
verified the release of 90 children from LTTE ranks, including 69
children on the LTTE release list. UNICEF was not able to verify the
alleged release of the remaining children included on the list, as
some of the children were allegedly residing at the educational
skills development centre, where UNICEF access is limited.
21. UNICEF expressed its concern to LTTE about the transfer of
children to the educational skills development centre, as children
are being placed in the facility without parental consent and
independent verification of the grounds for the child’s placement.
Parents have also encountered difficulties in gaining access to the
children in the facility. UNICEF and LTTE are currently discussing
the development of an appropriate and transparent release mechanism
for the children, although no firm commitment has yet been received.
22. It should further be noted that the number of children verified
by UNICEF actually to have been released by LTTE during the
reporting period was consistently lower than the number of children
recruited each month, as depicted in table 4.
Table 4
Trends in reported LTTE recruitment and verified releases of
children from 1 November 2005 to 31 October 2006
23. Also a matter for concern was a systematic programme of civil
defence training provided by LTTE to civilian communities throughout
the north and east. Training periods varied from 5 to 45 days. The
content of the training is not fully known; however, the training
included physical exercise and drills of a paramilitary nature.
UNICEF received reports of children as young as 16 years being
included in the training programmes. School principals and teachers
were also required to attend during school hours, affecting
children’s schooling. Reports were received from Batticaloa, Ampara,
Trincomalee and Kilinochchi Districts of children not returning
after attending the training programmes and it was suspected that
they had been recruited. Parents who went to find their children
were informed to return after three or four months, as their
children were said to be undergoing military training.
2.
Karuna faction 24. A particularly disconcerting
development during the reporting period was the increase in the
abduction and recruitment of children in the east of Sri Lanka by
the Karuna faction since May 2006. As of 31 October 2006, UNICEF had
received 164 reports of children being recruited by the Karuna
faction. Fourteen of the recruited children have been released, 15
other children are known to have run away and 7 children have been
re-recruited; therefore, as of 31 October 2006, there is a residual
caseload of 142 children who are believed to remain in the ranks of
the Karuna faction.
Table 5
Trends in the recruitment and releases of children by the Karuna
faction as of 31 October 2006
25. During the reporting period, there were two peaks of child
recruitment activity by the Karuna faction, in June and in August
2006, as depicted in table 5. In the space of one week in mid-June,
UNICEF received 30 reports alleging that children had been abducted
by the Karuna faction in the areas of Santhiveli, Kiran, Mankerni,
Valachchenai and Iruthayapuram (Manmunai North) in Batticaloa
District. The majority of children abducted and recruited by the
Karuna faction were in the Batticaloa District (145 children),
followed by Ampara District (17 children), and a child was recently
recruited in Trincomalee District. The average age of the child
recruited by the Karuna faction is 17 years, and many of the
children were taken in group abductions in villages or near their
homes. 26. One of several group abductions in recent
months took place on 15 June 2006 during a religious ceremony in the
area of Kiran, Batticaloa. At around 1.30 p.m. approximately 25
members of the Karuna faction arrived at the temple where villagers
were gathering and abducted 18 people, all males. Four of the
abducted were children. Witnesses to the incident declare having
recognized some of the perpetrators because of their frequent visits
to the village. There has been no report about the release of the
four children to date. 27. To date, UNICEF received
reports of abduction and recruitment only of boys by the Karuna
faction. Children have been abducted from the streets, temples and
their homes, mainly in Government-controlled areas. Reports were
also received that children were recruited and abducted in areas in
close proximity to government security offices and checkpoints. All
of the cases involved forced recruitment and abduction, in some
cases by armed men who directly identified themselves as members of
the Karuna faction. Reports have also been received in Batticaloa
District that on 14 and 26 June, Sri Lankan Army personnel carrying
weapons, accompanied Karuna faction members who forcibly abducted
and recruited nine children aged 14 (two children), 15 (one child)
and 17 years (six children). 3. Other concerns
28. On 12 September, new emergency regulations were promulgated by
the President appointing the Secretary of Justice as Commissioner
for Rehabilitation to oversee protective accommodation and
rehabilitation centres for “surrendees”9
where they should receive rehabilitation and vocational training
prior to release. This new system is in the process of becoming
operational; however there is still no distinction between children
and adults as “surrendees”, which goes against the accepted practice
for child release. 29. A further concern relates to the
treatment of formerly recruited children who come into the custody
of the Sri Lankan security forces. A particular concern is the
public exposure of children who have surrendered to the Sri Lankan
security forces. Insensitive media exposure of former child recruits
has led to stigmatization and increased vulnerability on the part of
the child and his/her family. For example, in March 2006, two
formerly recruited children who surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army
in Trincomalee District were transferred to Colombo and paraded
before the print and electronic media, demonstrating the use of a
weapon that was given to them by army personnel. B.
Abduction 30. The abduction of children has generally
been reported in the context of forced recruitment. Cases have
included children being grabbed off the street or taken away en
route to their destinations and forcibly recruited from temple
festivals at night, as well as houses being broken into and children
forcibly taken away. There has also been an increase in group
abductions as opposed to the abduction of individual children during
the past six months. 31. In the reporting period, the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission received 237 complaints of child abduction,
including 117 complaints against LTTE, 105 complaints against the
Karuna faction and 15 complaints against the Government. From those
complaints, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission made 37 rulings against
LTTE; 3 rulings against the Government; and 6 rulings against the
Karuna faction for the abduction of children. As of 31 October, SLMM
had 146 open cases concerning child abduction which had yet to be
ruled upon, including 70 complaints against LTTE, 9 complaints
against the Government and 67 complaints against the Karuna faction.
32. As a result of the rapid escalation of violence since May 2006,
disappearances and abductions are increasing. In Jaffna alone in
August 2006, more than 60 disappearances and abductions of the
civilian population by LTTE, government security forces and
paramilitary groups were reported. The known and reported cases
include the abduction of two children 17 years of age in separate
incidents in Jaffna on 9 and 19 August 2006 in Kantharodai Veethi
and Punkuduthevu divisions respectively. Government security forces
are alleged to have been involved, and the Human Rights Commission
of Sri Lanka is following up on those cases. C. Incidents
of killing and maiming
33. According to the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, there were at least 2,118 known conflict-related
deaths, including the killing of 1,135 civilians, a significant
number of them being children, during the reporting period. The
acceleration of violence since May 2006 has resulted in an increase
of child casualties in recent months. For example, in early August,
the Government recorded 12 child deaths in Mutur division alone. The
deteriorating security situation, however, precludes obtaining a
comprehensive tally of the number of children killed in affected
areas.
34. During the reporting period,
several of the children who were killed had been utilized by LTTE as
child soldiers or were alleged to have been affiliated with LTTE.
For example, on 17 June, a 15-year-old boy from Point Pedro was
killed in the Government and LTTE zone of separation, close to
the Muhamalai checkpoint. According to SLMM, the boy was carrying
pictures of himself in LTTE uniform when he was found dead. Three
Sri Lankan Army soldiers reportedly admitted to shooting the boy. On
29 July, the body of a 16-year-old boy affiliated with LTTE was
found dead with gunshot wounds in Kayts, Jaffna. An ongoing inquiry
is being conducted; however, the case remains unresolved at the time
of reporting. Further, on 29 August, 16 mutilated bodies, including
the bodies of three Tamil boys 15, 16 and 17 years of age, were
delivered to Vavuniya Hospital.
It was alleged by the Government that the victims were LTTE members
killed while they were attacking a Sri Lankan Air Force base in
Poovaragankulam, Vavuniya. However, according to SLMM, the victims
were reportedly unarmed. 35. Children were also among the
casualties of the indiscriminate use of claymore mines. From January
to June 2006, a United Nations mine action group received reports of
more than 440 persons, including 202 civilians, being killed or
injured by claymore mine incidents in Sri Lanka. According to SLMM,
the number of attacks, the targets, the tactics used and the
geographic dimension pointed towards LTTE as being the most likely
perpetrator. It does, however, not rule out the possibility that
some attacks might have been executed by other actors or that they
could be covert operations. 36. Indiscriminate use of
claymore and pressure mines and other methods of killing that
allegedly were employed by LTTE and that resulted in child
casualties include a case on 19 January in which a child 15 years of
age was killed by a claymore mine attack allegedly conducted by LTTE
in Thandavanveli, Batticaloa District. Further, on 15 June, 65
civilians, including 14 children, were killed and 70 other civilians
were injured by a claymore mine attack on a civilian bus at
Kebitigollewa in Anuradhapura District. 37.
Indiscriminate use of claymore mines, aerial bombardments and other
methods of killing allegedly conducted by the Government also
resulted in child casualties.
They included a bombing raid by the Sri Lankan armed
forces on LTTE positions around Sampur and
Mutur in Trincomalee District on 25 April, which killed four
children, ages 4, 14, 15 and 16, and injured 14 children, ranging in
age from three months to 17 years.
Another example is the
aerial bombardment of a compound in Valepuram, Mullaitivu, by
the Government on 14 August, which killed at least 40 adolescent
girls and injured at least 100 other girls. It was reported that at
the time of the aerial strike 400 to 600 adolescent girls were
assembled at the compound where they had been required by LTTE to
undertake “first aid and propaganda training”.
10
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
Yet again the Report misleads by using quotes.
The suggestion is that girls may not have been actually engaged
in "first aid". It appears that the Report preferred not to rely
on the conclusions of
Ulf Henricsson, Swedish Head of Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission on 21 August
2006 -
Q: Was there any evidence to
prove it was an LTTE training camp of some kind?
A: It was a training camp – but for first aid. We found no
traces at all for military training or military equipment.
Or for that matter the
conclusions of Ann M. Veneman, UNICEF Executive Director. UNICEF
on 15 August 2007
"UNICEF staff from a nearby
office immediately visited the compound to assess the
situation and to provide fuel and supplies for the hospital
as well as counselling support for the injured students and
the bereaved families. "These children are innocent victims
of violence"
D. Attacks on schools and hospitals
1. Attacks on schools 38. The
intensification of the conflict during the reporting period resulted
in an increased number of attacks on schools that were traditionally
preserved as zones of peace and safe places of refuge. For example,
on 25 April, the Sri Shanmuga Pre-School and the science laboratory
of Chenaiyoor Central College were damaged in government air and
artillery strikes around Mutur in Trincomalee District and were
forced to close, while on 3 October, the Murunhan MV School in
Mannar District was subject to shelling by government forces, which
resulted in damage to school buildings, the district education
office and the teacher centre in the surrounding area. According to
reports, the Murunkan area is frequently shelled which has resulted
in the temporary night displacement of the local population. The
school also reportedly experienced a significant reduction in school
attendance, as most children are afraid to attend school, and
approximately 75 children have stopped attending.
39. Schooling throughout the
north and east, particularly in Jaffna, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and
Batticaloa, was also severely affected by security incidents.
Schoolchildren in Jaffna District were particularly affected by the
rapid onset of the conflict on 11 August, with the forced closure of
all schools in Jaffna from 9 September until 9 October owing to the
student union boycott called in protest to the ongoing hostilities
in Jaffna. Two schools in the high security zone in the Tellipallai
area (Union College and Thanthai Selva Vidyalaya School) of Jaffna,
are not operational as they have not been accessible since 11 August
owing to security reasons. The re-opening of those schools is not
currently envisaged. The children are currently attending classes in
their displaced locations. 40. In Trincomalee,
Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, school attendance rates were also
reduced in many places owing to fear of recruitment and the general
insecurity. The fear of attending school was not restricted to the
north and east of Sri Lanka; after the assassination of Major
General Parami Kulatunga on 26 June 2006, many schoolchildren in
Colombo and the south did not attend school on the days that
followed, as there were widespread rumours that all schools would be
bombed by LTTE. 41. In addition, throughout the north
and east of Sri Lanka, military checkpoints and the Tamil Makkal
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) political offices are positioned in very
close proximity to schools, including directly adjacent to and even
on the grounds of schools and pre-schools. In Batticaloa, for
instance, the Karuna faction opened a political office of the TMVP
next door to St. Cecilia’s Girls High School.11
The close proximity to military checkpoints and political offices
further perpetuates fear among those children who attend school and
exposes children to a heightened risk of physical attack, as these
locations are often the target of grenade and claymore mine attacks.
On 25 October 2006, for instance, an LTTE member allegedly threw a
hand grenade at the TMVP office in Chenkalladi, Batticaloa, killing
three people and injuring eight people. Further, the constant
exposure to a highly militarized environment has further compounded
the immense fear among children. 2. Attacks on hospitals
42. During the period, there was one reported attack on hospitals.
On 2 August, the maternity and female wards of the Mutur Base
Hospital in Trincomalee District were completely damaged, and the
operating theatre complex, the outpatient department and the nursing
quarters were partially damaged as a result of the shelling. The
identity of the responsible party has yet to be determined.
43. The high-security presence surrounding hospitals also caused
fear among community members and deterred them from entering the
hospital premises. For example, Mannar District Hospital has an army
checkpoint at its entrance, and there is occasional firing from the
sentry, particularly during the evenings, which inhibits the access
of civilians to the hospital premises. E. Grave sexual
violence 44. While several cases of rape were reported
from the conflict-affected areas, the reported cases were not
applicable to children.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
It may have
been helpful if the Report had taken care to point out that the
LTTE was not involved in any case of rape.
"The
Tigers are ruthless and authoritarian but they are not
corrupt - they don't tolerate stealing, bribery or rape,
things other armies are famous for.
In fact they are perceived as being single minded in their
defence of Tamils. " -
Statement before US Congress Committee on
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Hearing on Sri Lanka November 14,1995
F. Denial of humanitarian access 45.
Following the escalation in hostilities, the Government has imposed
restrictions on humanitarian agencies. This has had a serious impact
on humanitarian access, particularly as it affects those most
vulnerable, especially children. 46. The July and August
2006 military operations in Trincomalee and Batticaloa Districts
prompted large-scale displacement and created an urgent need for
humanitarian assistance. As a result of Government restrictions on
the movements of humanitarian agencies, access to displaced persons
in many areas has been extremely limited, with some areas remaining
off-limits altogether, including the entire Eachcilampattu Division,
and for a period, much of Mutur division in Trincomalee. In Vaharai
DS Division, Batticaloa, where there were an estimated 42,880
internally displaced persons as at the end of September,
humanitarian access was limited to the International Committee of
the Red Cross and the organizations and agencies of the United
Nations only, and only at regular intervals. 47. The
closure of the forward defence lines by the Sri Lanka Army on 11
August 2006 has seriously impeded movements between Vavuniya and
Kilinochchi for almost two months. Humanitarian agencies, including
those of the United Nations, were prevented from delivering
essential supplies, and only limited supplies were provided by the
Government, leading to a critical shortage of food, medicines and
fuel in particular. Restrictions on movements of United Nations
personnel were eased at the beginning of October, but movements of
international staff of international non-governmental organizations
remains restricted. The closure of the forward defence lines and the
A9 highway also led to the stranding in Vavuniya for several weeks
of approximately 2,000 people, many of whom were children separated
from their families and unaccompanied minors, including a group of
23 schoolchildren from Jaffna. 48. In Jaffna, a strict
curfew imposed when hostilities began on 11 August 2006, combined
with the closure of the A9 road and cessation of commercial air
flights, effectively left the peninsula cut off from the rest of the
country for over a month. The measures resulted in shortages of
food, medicines and other essential items, which could be brought
into Jaffna only by means of government cargo ships, which started
arriving on 24 August. By mid-September, the curfew had eased
intermittently throughout much of the peninsula; however, many areas
remained off-limits for United Nations entities, including areas
east of Kodidkamam and the islands off the coast of Jaffna.
49. Humanitarian organizations, including organizations and agencies
of the United Nations system, have had particular difficulty in
gaining access to areas controlled by LTTE. Military checkpoints
frequently impose registration requirements beyond those required by
the Ministry of Defence, including the registration of the staff and
vehicles of local NGOs. In Batticaloa District, Government
restrictions limit NGO access to LTTE-controlled areas.
50. There have also been frequent incidents of threats and attacks
against humanitarian workers, which have severely affected the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, on 30 January
2006,
10 members of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) were
abducted by unknown men on the Batticaloa-Polonaruwa highway.
Three of those abducted were released; however, seven remain
missing.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The Report chooses to avoid linking
the abduction with the Karuna group and the Sri Lanka
security forces. It prefers to use the phrase "unknown
men" rather than even the phrase 'allegedly'.
"....The fate of Premini was terrible.
The dusky woman with attractive features and a slight
squint was taken to another camp and raped first by
Sinthujan himself. Threafter it was a horrible gang rape
with TMVP cadres taking turns to sexually assault her.
Fourteen cadres raped the poor girl. Some troubled TMVP
cadres did not participate in the rape but were
powerless to stop it. Premini was heard to shout and cry
at the start. Later she merely sobbed and whimpered.
Premini was taken out before dawn by TMVP cadres to the
jungles. She walked like a “nadaipinam” (walking corpse)
without crying or showing signs of emotion said one ex -
TMVP cadre. She was apparently hacked to death and
thrown into the bushes...."
First Anniversary: The tragic fate of TRO employees
abducted by Karuna cadres, D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The partiality of the Report follows
an unmistakable pattern. The Report downplays and/or
ignores the gross crimes against humanity (and children)
committed by Sri Lanka President Rajapakse and by the
armed forces under his command. Its 'background report'
is directed to prepare the ground for 'targetted' action
against a movement struggling for freedom.
On 10 April, a claymore mine attack in Mirusuvil, Jaffna
District resulted in the death of six persons, including two Caritas
workers. Further, on 16 May, a driver from the Norwegian Refugee
Council was shot and killed in Vavuniya, reportedly by the Sri
Lankan forces; and on 4 August 2006,
17 local employees of the French NGO Action contre la faim were
murdered in Mutur, also allegedly by the Sri Lankan forces. The
Government has referred the latter case to the special commission of
inquiry and has invited a team of Australian forensic specialists to
observe and assist the investigation into this case.
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
The failure of the Report to refer to the
views of
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission on 30 August 2006, speaks
yet again to the partiality of the Reporter -
"...security forces had been present
in Muttur at the time of the killings... the government
had prevented the truce monitors from going to the crime
scene to investigate immediately after the discovery of
the bodies and ...confidential conversations with highly
reliable sources had pointed to the culpability of
security forces... The Security Forces of Sri Lanka are
widely and consistently deemed to be responsible for the
incident... the killings are one of the most serious
recent crimes against humanitarian aid workers
worldwide..."
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission on 30 August 2006
And the Reporter is disingenuous in
suggesting that a special commission of inquiry will
somehow resolve the issue. The PR technique is self evident
- and nothing new. Down play the murderous onslaughts by Sri
Lanka, present the situation as a complex and two sided and
play up efforts at reform. The truth is that during the past
five decades and more the Sri Lankan security forces, para
military groups and
Sinhala goondas have violated the rights of the Tamil
people, have
killed,
tortured,
raped and
massacred
with
impunity, free from any fear of punishment.
"The Bindunuwewa massacre was
reminiscent of the
massacre of 52 Tamil prisoners held at the
maximum-security prison of Welikeda in the capital
Colombo in July 1983....The ethnic biases have plagued
the administration of justice in Sri Lanka. It has been
almost impossible for the ethnic minority Tamils to
obtain justice. The impunity accorded by the Sri Lankan
government to the perpetrators of racial violence has
increased the alienation of the ethnic minority
Tamils...The judgement of 27 May 2005 which established
the fact that not a single person could be held guilty
for the mass murder of 28 Tamils in the protective
custody of the State at Bindunuwewa will further
increase the distrust of even the moderate Tamil
minorities..."
Mass Acquittal in Bindunuwewa Massacre Case, June 2005
In addition, on 20 August 2006 a local staff member of
the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society was shot dead by unknown gunmen in
Cheddikulam, Vavuniya District; and on 24 August 2006, a consultant
for the Office for Project Services was found shot dead in
Thambiluvil, Ampara District. 51. Following
discussions between United Nations entities, INGOs and NGOs
regarding impediments to humanitarian access, a consultative
committee with United Nations entities, the International Committee
of the Red Cross and representatives of the European Union has been
established under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human
Rights. It includes the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs
and the Commissioner General of Essential Services. The purpose is
to solve problems related to fuel, food supplies, medicine and
essential items and respond to the difficulties the agencies face in
carrying out their activities. IV. Dialogue, action
plans and monitoring and reporting to redress violations of
children’s rights A. Dialogue 52.
There was sustained public advocacy on child protection issues,
particularly in respect of the military recruitment of children and
the rising levels of violence and its impact on civilians and
humanitarian workers. A variety of sources within the United Nations
system, including the Secretary-General, the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United
Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and UNICEF issued public
advocacy initiatives. Concern for children’s rights was also
reflected in several international statements and interventions by,
inter alia, the donor co-chairs (European Union, Japan, Norway and
the United States of America), the European Parliament and
international non-governmental organizations, including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. Domestic agencies, including
the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, also advocated concern for
children’s rights. 53. The United Nations Children’s
Fund continues to pursue efforts with LTTE to obtain the release of
children and stop their recruitment into its ranks. Monthly
recruitment reports are produced by UNICEF, and copies of that
report are shared with LTTE. In a meeting between UNICEF and LTTE in
October 2006, it was agreed that each side would designate three
persons (known as a “3x3 meeting”) to meet regularly to discuss
technical issues concerning the release of children and measures to
stop recruitment. Dialogue continues to take place between UNICEF
and LTTE through that forum; two meetings were held in 2006. LTTE
also announced the formation of a child protection unit; however,
the unit’s terms of reference require further clarification. In June
2006, LTTE and UNICEF further discussed the importance of
maintaining an appropriate release mechanism and the role of the
educational skills development centre in the release of children to
their families. 54. Following the reported recruitment
of children by the Karuna group in Batticaloa District, UNICEF also
met with the “political wing” of the Karuna faction, the TMVP, in
June 2006 to remind them of their obligations not to recruit
children and to seek the release of underage recruits. That dialogue
is ongoing. B. Action Plan for children affected by war
55. In June 2003,12
the Government and LTTE endorsed an action plan for children
affected by war in the North-East of Sri Lanka (henceforth referred
to as “the Action Plan”) in collaboration with key technical
partners including agencies and organizations of the United Nations
system and international and national NGOs. The Action Plan was
initially a two-year programme, from July 2003 to June 2005.
However, it was extended until July 2006, pending completion of a
comprehensive review. 56. The Action Plan was a
multi-agency and multisectoral programme designed to improve the
living conditions of all children affected by war in all eight
districts of the North-East of Sri Lanka, including underage
recruits, children engaged in hazardous labour, school dropouts,
street children and other vulnerable children. 57.
Under the Action Plan, LTTE committed to cease all recruitment of
children and release all children already in its ranks. Important
progress was made in reducing the rate of recruitment, as
recruitment reported to UNICEF steadily fell from 1,464 children in
2002 to 1,213 children in 2003, 819 children in 2004, 586 children
in 2005 and 424 children in 2006, as of 31 October 2006.
Re-recruitment trends fluctuated, with 29 children in 2002, 67
children in 2003, 277 children in 2004, 115 children in 2005 and 55
children in 2006, as of 31 October 2006. Further, the average age of
recruitment increased from 14 years to 16 years during that period.
However, the commitment made by LTTE to cease all recruitment and to
release all underage recruits clearly was not achieved. A true
commitment to the Action Plan would be signalled by the immediate
release of all children remaining on the UNICEF database, open
access to independent monitoring and verification and immediate
cessation of any further recruitment of underage children.
C. Monitoring and reporting 58. The Government and the
United Nations country team held extensive discussions on the terms
of reference and modalities for the establishment of a task force on
monitoring and reporting within the framework of
Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). The inaugural meeting
of the Task Force was held on 26 July 2006. The task force is
chaired by the Resident Coordinator, and the UNICEF Representative
serves as the Deputy Chair. The task force currently comprises
representatives from the United Nations (United Nations Development
Programme, United Nations Children’s Fund, Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International Labour
Organization and the senior human rights adviser to the United
Nations country team); from the Government of Sri Lanka bodies
concerned with the protection of rights of children (the National
Child Protection Authority and the Human Rights Commission of Sri
Lanka); and from civil society, including a national NGO (Sarvodaya)
and an international NGO (Oxfam Great Britain) with experience in
the protection of rights of children affected by the armed conflict
that could support monitoring and reporting. The International
Committee of the Red Cross participates in the task force as an
observer, and a representative from SLMM has assisted the task force
with additional information pertaining to the verification of cases.
59. In the districts and in Colombo, meetings are held between the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission and UNICEF to follow up on the situation of child
recruitment. International agencies and NGOs have also collaborated
on specific prevention and protection initiatives. For instance, in
June 2006 a number of agencies working in Batticaloa and Trincomalee
Districts organized a rotating international presence at temple
festival sites where recruitment had previously occurred. There have
been no reported cases of child recruitment at those festivals in
2006. 60. In Colombo and at the district
level, there are also inter-agency coordination forums aimed at
increasing the participation of community actors in the prevention
of child recruitment and other forms of violations. In May 2006, an
inter-agency child protection meeting involving key international
agencies and United Nations organizations working in the north and
east of the country was held, resulting in key action points that
are aimed at enhancing district-level collaboration and community
participation. In addition the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees leads the monthly working group for the
protection of internally displaced persons in Colombo.
61. Additional programmatic responses include recording of cases by
the regional offices of the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission and
the establishment of help desks in Government-controlled areas.
However, currently the regional offices are receiving only an
estimated 30 per cent of the actual cases owing to limited access to
areas and a culture of rumours, intimidation and fear in relation to
the reporting of violations. UNICEF has held discussions with the
police in order to build confidence within the community with
respect to reporting cases, as many community members are afraid to
report at the local level. The level of trust the community needs to
report violations may also be enhanced by the recent drafting by the
Law Commission of Sri Lanka of a witness protection law that aims to
protect the identification of witnesses. V. Challenges
in the delivery of assistance to conflict-affected children
62. The child protection community in Sri Lanka continued to face a
number of significant challenges in addressing violations against
children in the context of the conflict, including the following:
(a) There is a continued lack of commitment from LTTE to stop
all child recruitment and release all children within its ranks
within the agreed procedures; (b) The abduction and
recruitment of children by the Karuna faction in the Eastern
districts is increasing, as well as the challenges of developing
and sustaining a humanitarian dialogue on child protection
issues with the Karuna faction; (c) The political and security
context in Sri Lanka has deteriorated rapidly, accompanied by
heightened levels of violence affecting children and
communities, particularly since May 2006; (d) Restrictions on
humanitarian agencies imposed by the Government following the
escalation in hostilities, particularly since July 2006, have
seriously impeded the agencies’ ability to reach and assist the
children most vulnerable to the conflict; (e) Conditions
applied by LTTE continue to impede the impartial delivery of
assistance by NGOs; (f) A climate of fear exists among
community members owing to insecurity arising from the
prevailing security conditions, intimidation from the parties
involved in the conflict and the lack of a mechanism to ensure
the security and safety of complainants. The overwhelming fear
felt by community members impedes the reporting of violations
and hinders the mobilization of communities for effective
preventive action to enhance the protection of children. In
addition, weaknesses in State institutions, such as the police,
the judicial system, the National Child Protection Authority and
the Human Rights Commission, impede the effective and timely
verification and investigation of cases, the identification and
holding to account of the perpetrators of grave violations and
the ability of agencies to follow up and respond to the needs of
children; (g) The highly-polarized media environment
exacerbates the ethnic tensions and the media continue to be
insensitive to the best interests of children; (h)
Communication difficulties between the police and local
community members prevent the reporting of violations. The vast
majority of police officers deployed in the conflict-affected
Tamil areas are Sinhalese officers who do not speak Tamil; (i)
There are limitations in the current capacity of the Sri Lankan
task force on monitoring and reporting to further develop and
maintain the monitoring and reporting on child rights violation
mechanisms, and there is a need to strengthen the child
protection capacities of national organizations. Unlike other
countries on the agenda or of concern to the Security Council,
Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated human rights monitoring
mission.
VI. Recommendations
63. In view of the developments outlined above, I would like to
make the following recommendations:
1. I urge all parties to the conflict to immediately cease
all violence and re-engage in the peace process in order to
reach a negotiated settlement. Such a peace settlement should
include provisions to ensure the protection of children, thereby
preventing grave violations and abuses against children. 2.
Although limited progress has been made in the release of some
children from LTTE over the last three years, the refusal of
LTTE to completely cease recruitment and use of children,
release all children remaining on the UNICEF database and engage
in transparent procedures for release and verification of
demobilization warrants the undertaking of targeted measures
against LTTE political and military leadership. 3. LTTE must
immediately cease the release of children to the educational
skills development centre and instead release them directly to
their families as stipulated in the Action Plan, with adequate
information shared with UNICEF for the purpose of timely
verification. 4.
LTTE must respect the right of freedom of movement of
internally displaced persons to leave areas of conflict and
cease all use of civilians as human shields. 5.
TMVP and its military wing, the Karuna faction, should cease
all recruitment and use of child soldiers, including abductions,
with immediate effect and engage with UNICEF, as a matter of
priority, to release all children among its ranks, ensure a
transparent verification process and devise procedures for age
verification with UNICEF, to prevent further recruitment,
failing which targeted measures may be considered.
6. I stress the need for the Government to investigate
immediately allegations that certain elements of the Sri Lanka
security forces are involved in aiding the recruitment and/or
abduction of children by the Karuna faction in the East, and I
invite immediate support from UNICEF and other relevant agencies
to address those allegations. 7. I encourage the co-chairs and
the Norwegian facilitators to approach the parties to include a
substantial child protection component in the mandate of the
peace monitoring mission, in order to intensify efforts to
monitor and verify compliance by parties listed in annex II of
the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed
conflict.6 8. The United Nations country team stands ready to
support the Government of Sri Lanka in rapidly devising
child-appropriate release and interim care for “surrendees” from
armed groups in the custody of the Government of Sri Lanka. 9.
The international community should support the work of UNICEF
and other relevant agencies to increase the capacity of the
monitoring and reporting mechanism, including the necessary
funding to increase the capacity of the Human Rights Commission
of Sri Lanka and the National Child Protection Agency. 10. I
urge all parties to recognize and commit to maintaining the
neutrality and security of schools, hospitals and religious
institutions as “safe zones” in conflict-affected areas. 11. I
call on the Government of Sri Lanka and all relevant parties to
ensure open and safe access by humanitarian actors in Sri Lanka
to affected areas.
Notes
1
In accordance with article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, for the purposes of the present report, a child means
every human being below the age of 18 years.
2 See annex for a map
of Sri Lanka.
3
Thirty-seven rulings against LTTE for abductions; 60 rulings
against LTTE for child recruitment; 3 rulings against the
Government for abductions; 6 rulings against the Karuna faction
for abductions.
4
The unregistered political party, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai
Pulikal (TMVP), which is led by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan,
a.k.a. Colonel Karuna, is more commonly known as the “Karuna
faction” and is referred to as such in the present report. The
Karuna faction split from LTTE
in the Eastern province in March 2004.
5 The A9
highway is the only land access route to LTTE-controlled areas
in the north, as well as to Jaffna.
6
A/61/529-S/2006/826. “Child
Protection Act 2006” (Act No. 03 of 2006), enacted by the
Tamileelam legislature secretariat.
7
It should be noted that this policy statement is in conflict
with the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement
of children in armed conflict (United Nations Treaty Series,
vol. 2173, No. 27531).
Comment by
tamilnation.org:
Reason suggests that Article 4 of
the Optional Protocol which does not apply to a state but
applies only to an 'armed group', has no applicability to a
defacto state with dejure lines of control. The
LTTE is not an 'armed group' within the meaning of that
expression in the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child 2002. more
8 On the basis
of cases reported to UNICEF, the average age of underage
recruits has been 16 years since 2004. The average age of
underage recruitment was 15 years in 2002 and 2003 and 14 years
in 2001.
9
Combatants, including children under 18 years old who have
surrendered or were captured by government forces.
10 Based on
interviews with three survivors of the incident by a consultant
to the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process,
Government of Sri Lanka.
11
The parents and school authorities have protested to the
Government against the positioning of the political office.
12
As agreed during the peace talks in Oslo in December 2002 and in
Berlin in February 2003.
|
