Map of Sri Lanka
GlossaryI.
Summary
II.
Recommendations
III.
Background
IV.
LTTE Recruitment of Children
During the Cease-Fire
V.
Life in the LTTE for Child
Soldiers
VI.
LTTE Split and Release of
Children
VII.
Re-recruitment
VIII.
LTTE Commitments to End the
Rescruitment and Use of Child Soldiers
IX.
The LTTE’s Failure to Meet
Its Commitments
X.
The Action Plan for Children
Affected by War
XI.
The Role of UNICEF and the
Future of the Action Plan
XII.
Response by the National
Government
XIII.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission
XIV.
International Donors
XV.
International Legal Standards
Acknowledgements
Footnotes
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My parents refused to give me to the LTTE so about fifteen of
them came to my house—it was both men and women, in uniforms,
with rifles, and guns in holsters…. I was fast asleep when
they came to get me at one in the morning.… These people
dragged me out of the house. My father shouted at them,
saying, “What is going on?”, but some of the LTTE soldiers took
my father away towards the woods and beat him…. They also
pushed my mother onto the ground when she tried to stop them.
-girl recruited by the LTTE in 2003 at age sixteen
They took away my younger brother the other day. He was
coming home from the market and he was taken away. I went
and begged them, saying, “I gave you years of my life and I gave
you my health. Please let me have my brother back—he is
the only one I have who takes care of me, helps me to go to the
toilet, helps me get into bed.” They didn’t release him,
and they threatened to shoot if I reported his abduction to any
NGOs. They also told me at the same time that I had to
re-join. Is this how they thank me for all the time I gave
them? Why are they doing this to me?
- girl who was recruited by the LTTE at age sixteen and severely
disabled in combat
For Tamil families in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the
February 2002 cease-fire that has brought an end to the fighting
between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) has brought little relief from one of the worst aspects of
the twenty-year conflict: the LTTE’s recruitment and use of children
as soldiers. Despite an end to active hostilities and repeated
pledges by the LTTE leadership to end its recruitment of children,
the practice has continued not only in LTTE controlled areas, but
now reaches into government areas in the North and East where the
LTTE previously had little access. This report focuses on continued
LTTE recruitment of children during the cease-fire period, including
re-recruitment of children released from the LTTE’s eastern faction
in 2004.
Tamil children are vulnerable to recruitment beginning at the age
of eleven or twelve. The LTTE routinely visits Tamil homes to inform
parents that they must provide a child for the “movement.” Families
that resist are harassed and threatened. Parents are told that their
child may be taken by force if they do not comply, that other
children in the household or the parents will be taken in their
stead, or that the family will be forced to leave their home. The
LTTE makes good on these threats: children are frequently abducted
from their homes at night, or picked up by LTTE cadres while walking
to school or attending a temple festival. Parents who resist the
abduction of their children face violent LTTE retribution.
Once recruited, most children are allowed no contact with their
families. The LTTE subjects them to rigorous and sometimes brutal
training. They learn to handle weapons, including landmines and
bombs, and are taught military tactics. Children who make mistakes
are frequently beaten. The LTTE harshly punishes soldiers who
attempt to escape. Children who try to run away are typically beaten
in front of their entire unit, a public punishment that serves to
dissuade other children who might be tempted to run away.
The Norwegian government-brokered cease-fire between the
government and the LTTE in February 2002 brought a very welcome end
to active hostilities that have cost more than 60,000 lives over
twenty years. However, the cease-fire may have exacerbated the
LTTE’s recruitment of child soldiers from government-controlled
areas. By the terms of the cease-fire, unarmed LTTE cadres may
lawfully enter government controlled areas, known as “cleared”
areas. In reality the LTTE dominates the administration and security
of the major towns in the North and East, including Jaffna and
Batticaloa. The LTTE has used this control to extend their
recruitment of children to these Tamil population centers.
Throughout the cease-fire, the LTTE has sought new recruits for
its forces. The LTTE may be trying to strengthen its hand during the
peace talks, prepare for its control of the North and East in the
event of a final peace agreement, or be militarily prepared in the
event the peace talks collapse—or for all of these reasons. Sri
Lankan government sources and local nongovernmental organizations
believe that the LTTE has recruited several thousand new cadres
during this period, though hard figures are elusive.
As of October 31, 2004, the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) had documented 3,516 new cases of underage recruitment
since the signing of the cease-fire agreement (including the
re-recruitment of formerly released child soldiers noted below). The
LTTE formally released only 1,206 children during this time. Of the
cases registered by UNICEF, 1,395 were outstanding as of November
2004.1
UNICEF notes that the number of cases it registers represent only a
portion of the total number of children recruited, as some families
may be unaware of the possibility of registering, may be afraid to
do so, or may have difficulty reaching a UNICEF office. Of the
children who have been released or returned from the LTTE, only
about 25 percent were previously listed in the UNICEF database. This
suggests that the total number of children remaining with the LTTE
may be as much as four times higher than the 1,395 figure suggests.
In March 2004, the commander of LTTE forces in the East, V.
Muralitharan, popularly known as Col. Karuna, split off from the
main LTTE forces loyal to supreme leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran,
based in the North, a region known as the Vanni. In April 2004, the
Vanni LTTE attacked and defeated Karuna’s eastern forces, which
quickly disbanded. Some 2,000 child soldiers under Karuna fled or
were encouraged by their commanders to return to their families.
The children’s return home, primarily to Batticaloa district,
only marked the beginning of a new ordeal. Within a few weeks, the
LTTE began an intensive campaign to re-recruit Karuna’s former
cadres, including child soldiers. Vanni LTTE members, often armed
and in uniform, went from village to village, house to house,
insisting that the former soldiers report back to the LTTE. The LTTE
organized village meetings, use motorized three-wheeled vehicles to
make announcements, and sent letters to families, demanding their
return.
The LTTE has re-recruited many of the returned children, often by
force. Parents who have resisted their children’s being taken away a
second time by the LTTE have been intimidated and sometimes beaten.
The remaining children and their families live in fear. The families
are afraid to allow their children to return to school, worried that
the LTTE will abduct them as they walk between school and their
home. Some children refuse to leave their homes at all. Others go to
live with relatives or even leave the country to seek jobs in the
Middle East. Because there is a general perception that the LTTE
does not recruit from among married persons, some boys and girls
have married believing that it will provide a measure of protection
against recruitment. Girls feel particularly vulnerable—they can
instantly be identified as former cadres by the short haircuts that
the LTTE gives its recruits.
The LTTE has recruited and used children as soldiers throughout
the two-decade-long civil war in Sri Lanka, and especially since
October 1987 when the LTTE attacked and eventually forced the
departure of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force from the northern Jaffna
peninsula.2
LTTE recruitment of children has over the years been fueled by
several factors. First, a sophisticated LTTE propaganda machine
regularly exposed Tamil children throughout the North and East to
special events honoring LTTE heroes, parades of LTTE cadres, public
displays of war paraphernalia, and speeches and videos, particularly
in the schools. Families of LTTE heroes were afforded special
respect, and children were drawn to the status and glamour of
serving as cadres.
Second, children who witnessed or suffered abuses by Sri Lankan
security forces often felt driven to join the LTTE. Government
abuses prior to the cease-fire included unlawful detention,
interrogation, torture, execution, enforced disappearances, and
rape. A 1993 study of adolescents in Vaddukoddai in the North found
that one quarter of the children studied had witnessed violence
personally.3
In response, many children joined the LTTE, seeking to protect their
families or to avenge real or perceived abuses.
Third, deprivation, including poverty and lack of vocational and
educational opportunities often fueled recruitment, particularly
among Tamils of the eastern districts, where families were typically
poorer and considered of lower status than Tamils in the
North. Enlisting in the LTTE was perceived as a positive
alternative to the other options children saw around them.
Finally, coercion and force brought many children into the LTTE.
Particularly in the East, the LTTE has pressured Tamil families to
provide a son or daughter for “the cause.” If a family resisted,
they were often subject to threats and harassment. In many cases, a
child was eventually taken by force.
Under international law, recruitment of children to be soldiers
is not only unlawful if the children are forcibly recruited. The
LTTE is also violating international law by accepting into its ranks
children who join “voluntarily.”
Children were initially recruited into what was known as the
“Baby Brigade,” but were later integrated into other units. An elite
“Leopard Brigade” (Siruthai puligal) was formed of children
drawn from LTTE-run orphanages and was considered one of the LTTE’s
fiercest fighting units.
UNICEF reports that more than 40 percent of children recruited by
the LTTE are girls.4
The LTTE claims that the recruitment of girls and women is a way of
“assisting women’s liberation and counteracting the oppressive
traditionalism of the present system.”5
Female soldiers within the LTTE are known as “Birds of Freedom.”
Unlike many other conflict situations where girls are recruited,
sexual abuse of girls in the LTTE is rare, and relationships between
the sexes are generally prohibited.
Prior to the cease-fire, the LTTE regularly deployed both boys
and girls in combat.6
A major LTTE military operation against the Elephant Pass military
complex in 1991 reportedly used waves of children drawn from the
Baby Brigade and resulted in an estimated 550 LTTE deaths, mostly
children.7
Assessments of LTTE soldiers killed in combat during the 1990’s
found that between 40 and 60 percent of the dead fighters were
children under the age of eighteen.8
A case study conducted for a major United Nations (U.N.) study on
the impact of war on children found that children were reportedly
used for “massed frontal attacks” in major battles, and that
children between the ages of twelve and fourteen were used to
massacre women and children in remote rural villages. The study
cited reports indicating the use of children as young as ten as
assassins.9
The LTTE gives cyanide capsules and grenades to its soldiers,
including children, with instructions to take the capsule or blow
themselves up rather than allow themselves to be captured by the Sri
Lankan Army.10
The LTTE was among the first armed opposition groups to use its
cadres, including children, to carry out suicide bomb attacks. Since
the 1980’s, the LTTE has conducted some 200 such suicide bombings.11
Female soldiers, girls among them, were used for numerous such
attacks, in part because they were less likely to undergo rigorous
searches at government checkpoints.
Since 1998, the LTTE has made repeated public promises to senior
U.N. officials to end its recruitment and use of children. In 2003,
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government formally agreed on an Action
Plan for Children Affected by War (Action Plan) that included a
pledge by the LTTE to end all recruitment of children and to release
children from its forces, both directly to the children’s families
as well as to new transit centers that were constructed specifically
for this purpose.
As of mid-2004, the Action Plan was the only signed human rights
agreement to result from the post-cease-fire peace talks. The Action
Plan provided for the establishment of three transit centers to
receive children released by the LTTE, and to provide children
affected by the conflict in the North and East with vocational
training, education, health and nutritional services, psychosocial
care, and other programs. The LTTE and the government agreed on the
plan in April 2003 and formally signed it in June 2003. UNICEF
played a primary role in negotiating the Action Plan, and is the
main implementing partner.
Since the Action Plan was signed, UNICEF figures show that more
than twice as many children have been recruited as have been
released. One transit center opened in October 2003, but received a
total of only 172 children in its first year of operation. Although
the center has the capacity for one hundred children, it has never
held more than forty-nine, and for a six-week period in mid-2004,
was completely empty. The two other transit centers were constructed
but never opened because of the low number of children released.12
By any measure, the LTTE has failed to meet its commitments to
end its recruitment and use of children. The LTTE’s continued
recruitment of children violates international human rights and
humanitarian law (the laws of war) that explicitly prohibits the
recruitment of children as soldiers and the participation of
children in active hostilities. The nearly-universally ratified
Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Sri Lanka is party,
and the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit
any recruitment or use in armed conflict of children under the age
of fifteen. This standard is now considered customary international
law, and such recruitment is identified as a war crime in the
statute for the International Criminal Court.
In the late 1990’s, a new international consensus that a minimum
age of fifteen was too low for military service resulted in stronger
standards. The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, adopted
by the International Labor Organization in 1999, prohibits the
forced recruitment of children under the age of eighteen for use in
armed conflict as one of the worst forms of child labor. An Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by
the U.N. in 2000 and ratified by Sri Lanka in the same year, set
eighteen as the minimum age for all participation in hostilities,
all forced recruitment or conscription, and all recruitment by
non-state armed groups.
This is Human Rights Watch’s fifteenth report on the recruitment
and use of child soldiers. We have previously documented this
practice in Angola, Burma, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
and Uganda.
Human Rights Watch conducted research for this report in Sri
Lanka in August 2004 and subsequently by telephone and electronic
mail from New York and the Hague. Our researchers visited Colombo,
Batticaloa, Ampara, Trincomalee, and Kilinochchi. During the course
of our investigation, we spoke with thirty-five former child
soldiers from the LTTE, who had been recruited between the ages of
twelve and seventeen. At the time of our interviews, they ranged in
age from fourteen to twenty-one. Most had been recruited
between 2001 and 2004 and spent between three weeks and eight years
with the LTTE. The average length of time in the LTTE for these
children was approximately 2.7 years.
We also conducted over forty other interviews for this report,
speaking to parents, human rights activists, representatives of
local and international nongovernmental organizations and
representatives of UNICEF, the LTTE-dominated Tamil Rehabilitation
Organization (TRO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and
the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM). We also spoke with
representatives of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.
The names of all children have been changed in this report in
order to protect their privacy, and because of the very real threats
of re-recruitment and reprisals that they face. Also for security
reasons, we do not identify many of the other individuals and
organizations interviewed for this report or name the location of
some interviews or events.
In this report, the word “child” refers to anyone under the age
of eighteen.
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II.
Recommendations
- Immediately stop all recruitment of children, including
efforts to re-register or re-recruit child ex-combatants from
Karuna’s forces;
- Release all children from LTTE forces and give those
recruited before age eighteen the option to leave:
- Inform families throughout the North and East of Sri Lanka
of the LTTE’s commitment not to recruit children under the age
of eighteen through public announcements and use of the local
media, including the LTTE’s own media channels, and ensure that
all recruitment materials clearly identify eighteen as the
minimum age for recruitment;
- Take all appropriate steps to ensure LTTE commanders and
other cadres do not recruit children under the age of eighteen
into LTTE forces, “voluntarily” or otherwise and provide the
international community (through UNICEF) with documentation of
disciplinary actions taken against LTTE cadre responsible for
such recruitment;
- Fulfill all commitments agreed under the Action Plan for
Children Affected by War;
- Approve for immediate dissemination the child rights
awareness campaign messages submitted to the LTTE by UNICEF in
January of 2004;
- Allow UNICEF access to all military training camps to assess
the age of recruits, and identify children for demobilization;
- Create a high-level task force to resolve outstanding cases
of under-age recruitment;
- Establish a hotline or rapid response mechanism to act on
reports of new recruitment and designate focal points in each
district who will be accountable for acting on any complaints;
- Publish the status of inquiries into cases raised by UNICEF
on a routine basis.
- Ensure that an end to child recruitment and immediate
demobilization of children from the LTTE are part of any new
peace agreement with the LTTE ;
- Take all appropriate measures in areas under its control to
protect children from LTTE recruitment, including increasing a
government presence near schools, temple festivals and other
places where children are likely to be abducted;
- Improve relations between the Sri Lankan army and police
with the Tamil population, including by increasing the number of
Tamil speakers within the security forces and providing language
training to non-Tamil speakers;
- Grant a formal amnesty to all former child soldiers for
their participation in the LTTE;
- Ensure that all eligible persons (including former child
soldiers without discrimination) are issued national identity
cards;
- Waive traditional entry requirements for state-run
vocational colleges for former child soldiers in order to
encourage their enrolment;
- Support the deployment of international human rights
monitors under the auspices of the Human Rights Commission of
Sri Lanka, as envisioned in the Hakone talks;
- Ratify the Rome statute for the International Criminal
Court.
- Set firm benchmarks and deadlines for LTTE compliance with
its commitments to end child recruitment and release children
from its forces; if the LTTE fails to meet the benchmarks by the
specified deadline, suspend operations at the transit centers,
including any funds going to the TRO for center operations;
- Continue and strengthen efforts to prevent child
recruitment, including re-recruitment of former child soldiers;
- Strengthen communication and working relationships with
local communities and local nongovernmental organizations in
order to effectively monitor child recruitment, put in place
effective prevention strategies, and better support affected
families, including their efforts to resist child recruitment;
- Intervene rapidly in cases of child recruitment by raising
cases with the LTTE as quickly as possible and accompanying
families, when possible, in requesting the return of their
children;
- Publish recruitment and release statistics on a regular
basis, together with the status of LTTE responses.
- As the lead implementing partner for vocational training
programs for former child soldiers, create vocational training
opportunities, when appropriate, that utilize former soldiers’
non-military training in the LTTE (e.g. medical training).
- Issue a public statement condemning child recruitment and
develop with UNICEF and the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
complementary strategies to prevent the recruitment of children
and to secure the release of children from the LTTE.
- As a facilitator of the peace process, ensure that an end to
child recruitment and immediate demobilization of children in
the LTTE are part of any new peace agreement.
- Negotiate a clear understanding with the parties that
“political work” conducted under the cease-fire agreement may
not include any form of child recruitment.
To the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM):
- Actively and consistently monitor and report on child
recruitment, in accordance with the cease-fire agreement’s
prohibition on intimidation, abduction, extortion, and
harassment of the civilian population;
- Regularly and consistently raise issues of child recruitment
with the LTTE, including specific cases;
- Establish a human rights unit, dedicated to systematically
monitoring the violations of international law stipulated in the
cease-fire agreement and staff it with trained human rights
monitors.
To Donors (including Japan, the United States,
the European Union, and Scandinavian countries):
- Create a donor task force for close liaison with UNICEF and
other local actors and to make urgent interventions with the
LTTE in cases of new recruitment;
- Provide financial and logistical support for the deployment
of international human rights monitors in support of the Human
Rights Commission of Sri Lanka as envisioned in the Hakone
talks;
- Consider the appropriateness of channeling economic
assistance through agencies, such as the Tamil Rehabilitation
Organization, that are linked to the LTTE;
- Use economic leverage to pressure the LTTE to put an end to
all child recruitment by the LTTE and to promote the release of
all children currently in the LTTE’s ranks.
- Express public opposition to the recruitment and use of
children in armed conflict by the LTTE and other serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in
Sri Lanka.
- Ensure that funds provided to organizations in Sri Lanka do
not directly or indirectly benefit the LTTE so long as it
recruits and uses child soldiers or otherwise commits serious
rights violations;
- Clearly communicate condemnation of the LTTE’s child
recruitment practices to members of the Tamil diaspora through
both the Tamil and mainstream media and meetings with leaders of
the Tamil diaspora.
- In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1539 on
children and armed conflict (April 22, 2004), paragraph 6, adopt
targeted measures to address the LTTE’s failure to end child
recruitment. Such measures could include the imposition of
travel restrictions on leaders and their exclusion from any
governance structures and amnesty provisions, a ban on the
supply of small arms, a ban on military assistance, and
restriction on the flow of financial resources;
- Local Colombo missions of the Security Council should meet
with the LTTE to insist on progress in the release of children,
in accordance with Security Council resolutions on children and
armed conflict.
To All United Nations Member States:
- In accordance with Security Council resolution 1379 on
children and armed conflict (November 20, 2001), paragraph 9,
use all legal, political, diplomatic, financial, and material
measures to ensure respect for international norms for the
protection of children by the parties to the conflict. In
particular, states should unequivocally condemn the LTTE’s
continued recruitment and use of child soldiers and withhold any
financial, political, or military support to the LTTE until it
ends all child recruitment and releases all children currently
in its ranks
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Sri Lanka is an island country southeast of India with a
population of nearly 20 million. Seventy-four percent of the
population is Sinhalese, 18 percent are Tamil, and 7 percent are
Muslim. The Sinhalese population is Buddhist and lives primarily in
the south and west of the island. Tamils, who are mostly
Hindu, live predominantly in the country’s North and East.
Between 1983 and 2002, the Sri Lankan government and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were engaged in a brutal
civil war, during which both sides committed numerous human rights
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. The
LTTE, led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, fought for a separate state,
“Tamil Eelam,” for the Tamil minority in the country’s North and
East. Until the cease-fire in February 2002, the conflict
claimed over 60,000 lives. An attempt at a negotiated settlement in
1995 collapsed when the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from the talks
and resumed hostilities.
In December 2001, the LTTE and the government announced a
cease-fire. In February 2002, under the aegis of a Norwegian
government facilitation team, a cease-fire agreement was signed by
both parties. The provisions of the cease-fire agreement most
pertinent to the issue of child soldiers state that:
- both parties are to refrain from hostile acts against the
civilian population, including torture, intimidation, abduction,
extortion, and harassment;
- all unarmed LTTE members are permitted freedom of movement
into areas under government control, including for political
work;
- a Norwegian led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) is to
monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement by both sides.
The government and the LTTE held six rounds of peace negotiations
mediated by the Norwegian facilitation team. In April 2003 the
LTTE pulled out of the negotiations and they have yet to resume.
The LTTE said it will only agree to new talks if the government
accepts in principle its proposal, announced in October 2003, for an
interim authority, referred to as the “Interim Self-Governing
Authority” (ISGA). The ISGA would extend to all eight
districts in the North and East and essentially give full control of
these areas to the LTTE. Despite the failure to resume talks,
there has been no resumption of hostilities.
The cease-fire agreement has been effective in ending armed
conflict between LTTE forces and the government. It has not
deterred killings and other serious rights violations from being
committed in the North and East, especially by the LTTE against
members of non-LTTE Tamil political parties, including former
militant groups who gave up their weapons under the terms of the
cease-fire agreement. Since the cease-fire, more than one
hundred political killings have been attributed to the LTTE.
The LTTE considers itself to be the sole voice of the Sri Lankan
Tamils, a position rejected by other Tamil parties. Members of
these Tamil parties live in fear of being gunned down by LTTE cadres
who have unprecedented access to government controlled areas.
Meanwhile, long-suppressed rifts within the LTTE began to
surface. In March 2004, the eastern commander of the LTTE, V.
Muralitharan, popularly known as Col. Karuna, broke away from the
LTTE. He denounced Prabhakaran and the northern (or Vanni)
dominated LTTE leadership, stating that the LTTE discriminated
against the eastern Tamils and sacrificed the interests of the East
in favor of the North.
The defection of Karuna was a serious blow to the LTTE, which has
always kept extremely tight control over its commanders. In
April, shortly after national parliamentary elections, the Vanni
LTTE attacked the approximately 6,000 soldiers under Col. Karuna
deployed in the East. The fighting was fierce but short;
combat deaths suggested that many child combatants were involved.
Sensing defeat, Karuna disbanded his forces and went into hiding.
Among those disbanded from his forces were thousands of children who
had either “volunteered” to join the LTTE or who had been forcibly
recruited. The release of all these eastern cadres, including
many children, resulted in massive and unique protection needs that
caught local and international agencies unprepared.
In mid-2004 there was a new surge in political killings of
Tamils, not just in the North and East, but also in the capital
Colombo. Many of the attacks have been directed at politicians and
journalists deemed to be opponents of the LTTE. Some of these
killings are attributed to both sides in the continuing struggle in
the East between the Vanni LTTE and persons believed associated with
the Karuna faction. Human rights workers who criticize the
LTTE are increasingly at risk.
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The February 2002 cease-fire agreement signed by the LTTE and the
government explicitly prohibited abduction, harassment, and
intimidation against civilians.13
However, since the cease-fire the LTTE has continued to recruit
children, often by force, and to pressure and threaten families that
resist. Between the signing of the cease-fire agreement and November
2004, UNICEF documented 3,516 cases of child recruitment by the
LTTE, with the largest number taking place in Batticaloa district in
the East. The actual number of children recruited by the LTTE may be
significantly higher.14
Sri Lankan government officials and local human rights organizations
believe several thousand new recruits, including many children, were
added to the LTTE ranks following the start of the cease-fire,
though this cannot be confirmed.
A UNICEF representative in Trincomalee told Human Rights Watch,
“An enormous recruitment drive began with the cease-fire. Reporting
increased, and we received SOS calls from schools. The LTTE had
access to government controlled areas like never before.” She
reported that in Trincomalee district, recruitment was so intense in
2002 that less than 50 percent of students were going to school.
Many parents kept their children at home out of fear that they would
be recruited while walking to and from school.15
Under the cease-fire agreement, the LTTE was allowed to open
political offices in government-controlled areas, effectively
providing it with access to new recruits.16
While the LTTE claims that these offices are used to educate people
about the LTTE, local human rights activists believe that the
offices are used for recruitment purposes, including forced
recruitment of children. The senior superintendent of police in
Trincomalee told Human Rights Watch that in July 2004 the LTTE had
opened four or five such offices in Trincomalee that are used for
recruitment.17
Many Tamil families felt that with an end to hostilities between
the LTTE and government forces, there was no longer a need to offer
their children for service. Instead, since the cease-fire agreement,
the LTTE has sought to increase the size of its forces. The LTTE may
be trying to strengthen its hand during the peace talks, prepare for
its control of the North and East in the event of a final peace
agreement, or be militarily prepared in the event the peace talks
collapse—or for all these reasons.
Recruitment through threats, coercion, and abduction have been
commonplace. Harendra de Silva, chair of the National Child
Protection Authority, told us that since the cease-fire, children
are more likely to be forcibly recruited into the LTTE:
People see no reason to give their children to the LTTE if they
don’t perceive themselves at risk by the government. So the LTTE
resorts to abduction. In 1994, I found that one in nineteen child
recruits was abducted. Now in 2004, the reverse is true and only one
in nineteen is a volunteer.18
In Batticaloa district, Human Rights Watch received numerous
reports of the LTTE seeking to secure one child from each Tamil
household. The LTTE communicates this “quota” through letters, house
to house visits, radio announcements, and community meetings.
Families that refuse to hand over a child are often subjected to
more coercive measures, including threats against the child’s
parents, burning of houses, and abduction.
One girl, recruited in 2002 at age fifteen, told Human Rights
Watch:
After school, I went to extra class in the evening with about
fifteen students. We were abducted the same day while walking to
extra class. All of us were fifteen years old. Each house had been
told to hand over one child. The LTTE had already issued the order,
but the parents had ignored it. First, they sent letters, then they
started to visit homes. They came to my house and said, “You know
about our announcement. Each house has to turn over one child. If
you don’t agree, we will take a child anyway.”
One day they came. The tuition class is held near the LTTE camp,
so it was easy to take us. They took me to a girls’ training center.
On the first day, we were told, “We already announced that each home
has to give one child. Your family didn’t agree. We have already
taken girls from your village, except for you fifteen. After
training, you can work in your village like us.”19
Another girl, Sakuntala, told us that after receiving a letter
from the LTTE requesting one child from the family, the family
decided to leave the area. After the family’s departure, the LTTE
burned the family’s house, along with the houses of about fifteen
other families who had left for similar reasons. The family returned
after five months. Within a week of their return in 2002, the LTTE
returned, looking for Sakuntala, then fifteen. She said, “This time
they insisted. My parents said ‘We can’t give you,’ but I was afraid
they would take my sister, so I agreed to go. They took five others
from the village. All were girls about my age.”20
Malar described how she traded herself in for her father’s
release from LTTE detention after the LTTE demanded that she join
them when she was fourteen:
The LTTE were having a recruitment drive at that time, and they
came to my village and announced that I and my sister had to join
them. My sister was very scared and so was my mother. My
father had been taken away by them a few days before. My
father is fifty years old and has arthritis. I thought that to
make it safer for them, I would volunteer myself. I told my
mother that I would join.
So my mother and I went to the LTTE political office, and I told
them that if they released my father, I would join them. They
agreed and let my father go. We were all hugging and kissing
and crying after he was released. I stayed at the political
office. From there they took us (about seventy new recruits)
to a training camp at Pullumanai. Of the group of seventy new
recruits, I think about ten or so were young kids.21
Another witness, Rangini, described the physical force used
against her and her family when they resisted recruitment in June
2003 when she was sixteen:
The LTTE had a recruitment process going on in my village where
they went around asking for us to join. My parents refused to
give me to the LTTE so about fifteen of them came to my house—it was
both men and women, in uniforms, with rifles, and guns in holsters….
I was fast asleep when they came to get me at 1:00 in the morning.
First they knocked on my door, and my mother opened the door
thinking it was my aunt.... These people dragged me out of the
house. My father shouted at them, saying, “What is going on?”,
but some of the LTTE soldiers took my father away towards the woods
and beat him…. They also pushed my mother onto the ground when she
tried to stop them.22
Children are often targeted for recruitment when about fifteen
years of age. One former child soldier told us she was assigned to
recruit others into the LTTE. She said:
I was told I had to capture two children or I wouldn’t be given
food. I thought, “I was captured, so why should I do that to another
child?” Usually we would try to capture people around age fifteen,
with a little larger size. They said, “We send you to the temple
festival, and each has to get two.” They said to get people about
fifteen years old, but with a build of a certain amount of strength.
They said, “Don’t bring people who are married.”23
Younger children are also frequently recruited. Human Rights
Watch interviewed several children who were taken by the LTTE at age
twelve or thirteen. Saraswathy, abducted at age twelve, told us,
“The LTTE came to our home at midnight. At the time, my family said
no, but they tried to beat my parents, so I agreed.”24
One witness described how, when she was thirteen, she joined the
LTTE because she wanted to be like the older teenage girls who had
joined and who would come through the villages talking to younger
girls about joining.25
All the children we interviewed reported that the LTTE recorded
their names and dates of birth at the time of recruitment.
A man from outside Vallechenai in Batticaloa district reported
witnessing the attempted recruitment of an eleven-year-old girl in
early August 2004.
It was about 5 p.m. I was walking along a road and saw people
from the LTTE come on a tractor. There was a child going to tuition
classes. I saw the LTTE speak with the child and understood that the
LTTE was forcing the girl to join with them. I got near the group
and the LTTE stopped talking. But then I asked the girl what had
happened to her and the LTTE took the girl. But I grabbed her. They
had a gun and they hit me with the butt of the gun so that I
released her. But I grabbed her again and put her in my house. The
girl was eleven years old. She wanted to study.26
Many children of twelve or thirteen are taken directly for
training, although some younger children are put into a special
unit—referred to as the “chicken” unit—and spend significant parts
of their days in classes. One sixteen-year-old who had been
forcibly recruited at age fourteen, told us that life in her unit
was similar to school, with classes every day and female teachers
similar in age to those in her regular school.27
Other young children, particularly those from very poor families,
who seek to join the LTTE may be first sent to LTTE-run orphanages.
At the orphanages, they attend school, but then spend holidays at
LTTE camps until they are older and become full-time cadres.28
The LTTE demand for one child from each Tamil family does not in
practice mean that they only take one child. Some children have
found that having another sibling serving in the LTTE does not
always offer protection against recruitment. Indra, then fifteen,
was approached by the LTTE when she went to a local shop. She said,
“They told me ‘You have to join with us.’” Indra had an older
brother who joined the LTTE at age eighteen and spent nine years
with the movement. She said:
I told them, “My brother is already in the LTTE,” but they didn’t
listen to me. They took me by force in a van. I was crying. My
parents heard I was taken and ran to the camp. The LTTE said, “We
did not take any girls today.” I was already in the camp. They kept
me in a closed room. I kept crying continuously, saying “I want to
go home; I want to go home.”29
Another girl said that her brother, who is only now seventeen
years old, was abducted in 2001; she was forced to join two years
later, at age thirteen.30
Hindu temple festivals are frequent sites for LTTE recruitment
because they draw large numbers of people, including children, who
can be easily approached by the LTTE. On July 31, 2004, just a few
days before Human Rights Watch’s visit to Batticaloa, the LTTE
recruited an estimated twenty-six people, mostly children, from the
festival at the Thandamalay Murugan temple. Local human rights
groups had warned UNICEF and other international groups that temple
festivals were traditional recruitment sites for the LTTE, but no
extra monitoring was in place when the festivals started.31
The next morning, a group of parents went to the LTTE political
office, demanding the release of their children. The parents
were told that they should go to the LTTE’s Meenagam camp the next
day where they would be allowed to see their children. The
parents informed UNICEF and local human rights groups about the
abductions as well.
The next morning, the parents together with local human rights
groups went to Meenagam camp. After they waited several hours,
Col. Kaushalyan, the LTTE local area commander, arrived on his
motorbike. Initially, he refused to speak with the parents,
and addressed only the joint local and international human rights
groups’ representatives. They described Kaushalyan as
aggressive and uncooperative, offering no explanations nor answers
to their questions.32
Kaushalyan also talked briefly to a UNICEF protection officer.33
After that, the human rights representatives were told to leave, and
the parents were invited into the camp by Kaushalyan. The
children were released later that same afternoon.
The release of the children did not put an end to the families’
fears. We learned that the families had been instructed not to
repeat either what they had been told by Kaushalyan at the camp nor
what the children had been through during the days they were held by
the LTTE. The intimidation and fear generated by the LTTE in
these families was palpable.
While the release of this particular group of children was
welcome, human rights activists pointed out that this case was
anomalous, and perhaps was the result of the presence of UNICEF and
the international human rights groups. Following this incident,
UNICEF and several international human rights groups agreed to
physically monitor the temple festivals on-site and around the clock
for the duration of the festival.
Some children decide on their own to join the LTTE. Many are from
very poor families and believe they have few other prospects. It is
the responsibility of the LTTE to reject such children. Vanmathi,
who joined in 2003 when she was sixteen, explained that:
I went to school to grade 5. I dropped out because my mother and
father died. No one cared for me, I had no parents, so I was willing
to join. I lived with my aunt after my parents died. I cooked for
her family. I had frustration in my life, so I was willing to join
the LTTE. I wanted to live in this world without anyone’s help.
When I joined the LTTE, I went to the political office, and told the
LTTE I wanted to join. They agreed. I told them I was sixteen, but
they didn’t care.34
A mother whose daughter joined the LTTE without her knowledge
explained:
My daughter was fourteen when she joined the LTTE. My husband
died. We had no income. No food. Other neighbors encouraged the
children to join the LTTE. She went with a neighbor. I was in the
paddy field. I came back and searched everywhere and then someone
told me that she went with the LTTE.35
Another girl mentioned that she joined the LTTE because her best
friend was going to join. She said she herself knew nothing
about the LTTE when she joined but her friend, who came from a
physically abusive home, had been convinced that the LTTE was the
only option for a better life.36
One boy who joined in 2002 at age fourteen explained that he felt
“astrology said I should go. I said I was going to school, but
instead I went to the LTTE without telling my mother.” He
volunteered together with other friends from school, he said.37
Some children are motivated by political beliefs or by government
abuses against their families or communities. One boy, from Jaffna
in the North, left school at age fifteen to join the LTTE because,
he said, “I wanted a separate Eelam.”38
Another boy from Jaffna said he was motivated to join the LTTE in
July of 2004 at age sixteen because, “In 1991, the army burnt my
house and raped women in my neighborhood. They tortured us.”39
One witness, who joined voluntarily when she was sixteen years old
explained her decision poignantly:
When I was eight years old, my father and all four of my uncles
were killed by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). None of them had any
links with the LTTE. They were normal simple Tamil men.
From that day to now, we don’t know what happened to them. I had a
lot of anger at the SLA because of that. Now, I am not so
angry but I still want to know what happened to my father.40
So-called “voluntary” recruitment has long been supported by LTTE
propaganda campaigns in the school system. LTTE cadres frequently go
into schools to speak about the LTTE, sometimes showing films that
show LTTE service in a positive light.41
For instance, according to the Trincomalee Senior Superintendent of
Police, the LTTE in July 2004 provided area teachers and principals
with exams on the history of the LTTE to give to their students.
“They [LTTE] collect them afterwards. This is part of their
propaganda work. The teachers and principals can’t refuse because
they need to survive. They have to carry out their instructions.”42
An international worker in Trincomalee said, “The LTTE calls
these history lessons. We call them propaganda campaigns. The LTTE
says it’s not recruitment, and if individuals choose to join
afterwards, so be it. Principals don’t have a choice. The LTTE
doesn’t ask permission, they just go.”43
In August 2004, LTTE cadres went from village to village in
Trincomalee district talking to every family.44
The purpose of this campaign was unclear but it caused renewed fear
in the villagers that their children might be abducted. These
house-to-house visits were conducted by persons who identify
themselves as members of the Vanni LTTE. Each family was asked
detailed questions similar to questions asked in census surveys.
Families who dared to say that they have no problems with the Sri
Lankan Army were chastised. A local priest said that the LTTE
cadres were telling each family that they had to give up one child
per family if the war should resume.45
The LTTE combines these family visits with street plays that are
used as a propaganda tool, and have a particular appeal to children.
One person who saw such a street play described the scene:
It was a very emotional drama about the struggle, basically
asking people to join the movement. There were all ages
present in the audience, but it was really a drama for children.
The story of the drama was that of a family—a father, mother, and
two children. One child gets shot and killed by the SLA.
The remaining child—in the drama, he was of school age, still a
child—then decides to join the movement. In the drama, the
mother resists and begs her remaining child not to join the
movement, saying she only has one child left. The mother is
hysterical. Then the father speaks. He is calm and
rational, although also very sad. He talks to the mother,
saying that the correct thing for them to do is to give their
remaining child to the LTTE.46
Recruitment drives are cyclical. Some observers believe that they
are timed to LTTE training courses, with new recruitment drives
taking place before a new training is to begin, to ensure a full
complement of trainees.47
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Former child soldiers told Human Rights Watch they were held at a
local LTTE political office or camp for two or three days before
being transported to a training camp. Males and females were
separated for basic training, which often took place in groups of
250 to 300 young adults and children. Former child soldiers reported
rigorous training, including physical exercise, weapons training,
and military strategy. Errors or attempted escapes were met with
harsh punishment.
A girl recruited at age thirteen described her training
experience:
At the camp we did exercise. We got the metal parts for the
weapons, and learned how to dismantle and put them back together
again. We did target shooting. If we didn’t shoot at the correct
target, then we were punished. We were hit. We had to do sit-ups.
One punishment was to crawl on our elbows and knees. This happened
to me. We also had to dig bunkers in the ground. We had training on
war tactics: if there is an army camp, how to approach, kill, plan
the attack.48
Trainees said they typically rose at 4 a.m. to begin training.
One girl, recruited in 2002 at age fifteen, said:
The training was very difficult. They don’t care if it’s a rainy
or sunny day. If you get too tired and can’t continue, they will
beat you. Once when I first joined, I was dizzy. I couldn’t continue
and asked for a rest. They said, “This is the LTTE. You have to face
problems. You can’t take a rest.” They hit me four or five times
with their hands.49
Another former child soldier trained in late 2002 said, “The
hardest thing was crawling to enter enemy camps. We learned to use
weapons but not real bullets. I was very unhappy, but we couldn’t
express our feelings.”50
The youngest cadres being trained were often twelve or thirteen.
One girl told us that at age twelve, she was the youngest in her
training group, but that there were about ten other girls her age.51
Another, recruited at age fifteen, reported that in her group, “The
youngest was eleven. There were about nine that age. The youngest
ones are given the same training [as older trainees]. Even if they
can’t do it, they have to do it.”52
Another witness, recruited at age fifteen, said that in her unit of
about thirty-five girls at least twelve were “very young, very
underage.”53
One girl trained in 2002 at age thirteen said that, “I was
unhappy and ill. Some of the training was easy to follow; some of it
was very difficult. The hardest part was having to roll on the floor
and jump over fences.”54
Most of the former child soldiers Human Rights Watch interviewed
said they were allowed no contact with their families during
training. Aruna said, “I was homesick. I missed my brothers and
sisters. My parents came to the camp to see me, but the LTTE did not
allow me to see them. So for one year, I could not see my parents.
Lots of times, my parents came to see me, but the LTTE would not
allow it.”55
Vimala said, “When we played together, I was happy, but at night,
I worried about my family. My parents could not come to see me. They
wouldn’t allow anyone to visit.”56
Rangini, who was forcibly abducted in 2003 at age sixteen,
described how she felt when her parents visited her for the first
time: “I was very happy to see my mother but very unhappy when
she left, even sadder than before.”57
She was able to see her mother one more time, but that was
completely by accident. Her mother had to report to the LTTE
camp about the death of her uncle and was allowed to visit her
daughter while at the camp.58
Selvamani, recruited in 2002 at age fifteen, said, “I was with
the LTTE for two and a half years. I only saw my parents twice. I
was not allowed to write letters.”59
After basic training, which typically lasts four to seven months,
LTTE soldiers are assigned to units for further, specialized
training, depending on what their superior officers have decided to
be their particular strengths. Further training can include combat
operations, use of specific weapons systems (including landmines,
bombs, or heavy weapons), security (including providing personal
security for senior cadres such as Karuna), intelligence, or
non-military skills, including first aid or administration.
Children with little education are frequently assigned to combat
units, while children with more years of schooling may be more
likely to be trained in medicine, intelligence, or administration.
A young woman recruited at age nineteen described her medical
training. “I learned first aid, how to prevent fever, to use saline
bottles, and dress wounds. I studied for one year. After training, I
was assigned to a group as a nurse and treated fever and minor
wounds.”60
One sixteen-year-old girl told us she was trained in front-line
medical care. She considered herself lucky because she was
able to learn English as part of the training. When the Vanni
LTTE attacked Karuna’s forces, her unit was assigned to the front
lines at Vaharai, but she managed to escape before the fighting
began.61
One former LTTE cadre described being sent for political
propaganda work. She was later assigned to an LTTE political
office where she worked until the split in the LTTE.62
Vimala, recruited in 2003 at age seventeen, said:
After four months I was sent to a landmines unit. I learned to
handle landmines, to place them. I did this for four months. I
couldn’t concentrate. Sometime a landmine would explode and children
would be injured. Their fingers, hands, face. One time we were
working in a line, and the last girl made a mistake when removing a
landmine. It exploded and she lost a finger. She was seventeen. I
was scared to handle them.63
Nirmala, recruited at age fourteen, said:
I was in a combat unit. I had nine children and was responsible
for their training. Some were twelve or thirteen. The most
difficult part was heavy weapons training, and using the RPG
[rocket-propelled grenade launcher]. We also used bombs and
landmines. We practiced placing [fake] landmines. If the opposing
forces come and the landmines didn’t go off, you were supposed to
sleep on the mines for punishment. In another drill, we were sent to
find hidden Claymore [remote activated] mines. If we didn’t find
them, we were forced to run for one to one and a half hours.64
Another witness, forcibly recruited when she was fifteen years
old, said that after receiving a head injury during frontline
combat, she was re-trained to do other tasks. She received
specialized training on LTTE administration and finance. She
was also taught English. After her injury, she was not sent to
the frontlines again, and instead did administrative work for the
LTTE.65
Discipline in the LTTE is strict, and punishment for mistakes can
be harsh. Manchula said, “After the first training I had special
training on carrying heavy weapons. We carried them around the
playground. One day I had cramps and fever and said I couldn’t come.
They poured hot water on my body and back as punishment. This left a
burn mark.”66
The LTTE practices collective punishment, often punishing an
entire group for the mistakes of one member. Ammani, who trained at
age thirteen, said, “If you make a mistake or don’t follow orders,
you are assigned difficult physical training. This happened to me
once. One girl in my group made a mistake, so we were all punished.”67
Vanmathi said that because she was an orphan, the LTTE “treated
me very well.” But she was still held responsible for mistakes in
her training group. “I had ten other cadres to train. If any of them
made a mistake or tried to escape, I had to face punishment.
Punishment could be being sent into the forest with two seniors for
a beating.”68
Punishment is particularly harsh for those who try to escape.
Children who are caught are typically beaten in front of their
training unit, in part as a warning to others. Nirmala said:
Lots of people tried to escape. But if you get caught, they take
you back and beat you. Some children die. If you do it twice, they
shoot you. In my wing, if someone escaped, the whole group was lined
up to watch them get beaten. I saw it happen, and know of cases from
other groups. If the person dies, they don’t tell you, but we know
it happens.69
Several children said that they considered trying to run away but
abandoned their plans when they saw the beatings others received.
Selvamani said, “Some others tried to escape, and ran to their
homes, so the LTTE was able to recapture them. They were tied and
beaten. I thought about trying to escape, but saw others being
beaten, so changed my mind.”70
Since the cease-fire agreement was signed in February 2002,
except for an occasional cease-fire violation, there has been no
significant military combat between the LTTE and government forces.
Very few of the former child soldiers interviewed by Human Rights
Watch had any combat experience, since the large majority had been
recruited in the two years since the cease-fire, or shortly before
the cease-fire took effect.
One young woman, who was twenty-one when we interviewed her, was
recruited in the late 1990s at age sixteen and trained as a medic.
She said she was exposed to combat many times:
I participated in many battles. There are incidents I can never
forget. I fought my first battle in 1998 in a Sinhala border area.
When the soldiers got wounded, they would be left there screaming
and I was supposed to treat them. There were times when I was about
to get caught by the army, but I escaped. At that time, you always
remember your home. I carried one grenade and one cyanide capsule.
We were medical personnel; this was for our protection. When the
army comes we were supposed to throw the grenade at them or blow
ourselves up. There are plenty of times when this happened.71
Another woman, who was forcibly recruited at the age of fifteen,
told us she fought her first battle at the age of sixteen armed with
an AK-47 assault rifle and no helmet. She was shot in the head
during that battle.72
Another woman experienced her first battle in 1997, at the age of
sixteen, four months after she had been recruited. Although
she was badly injured, she was sent to another frontline position
after she had recovered. She contracted a serious illness
after this second battle, and was in an LTTE hospital for an entire
year, recovering. She said she was sent to the frontline two
more times after this.73
Vanji, who joined voluntarily at the age of sixteen, was severely
disabled during combat on the frontlines. She is now very
bitter about her experience:
They took away my younger brother the other day. He was
coming home from the market and he was taken away. I went and
begged them, saying I gave you years of my life and I gave you my
health. Please let me have my brother back—he is the only one
I have who takes care of me, helps me to go to the toilet, helps me
get into bed. They didn’t release him, and they threatened to
shoot me if I reported his abduction to any NGOs. They also
told me at the same time that I had to re-join. Is this how
they thank me for all the time I gave them? Why are they doing
this to me?74
All the children interviewed who had experienced combat described
themselves as having been very scared.
Since the cease-fire, the LTTE has allowed some child soldiers to
study after completing basic training. Most, however, appear to
receive continuous military training. After basic training, they may
receive six months of specialized training, followed by additional
courses of military training.
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In March 2004, the commander of LTTE forces in the East, Col.
Karuna, split off from the main LTTE forces loyal to supreme leader
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, based in the Vanni (North). In April 2004,
the Vanni LTTE attacked and defeated Karuna’s eastern forces in
short but fierce fighting at the Veragul River, which divides
Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. An unknown number of people
died in the battle. Karuna disbanded his forces, which were
unprepared and outnumbered, and went into hiding. As a result,
all the children who were under Karuna’s forces either walked out
and found their own way home, or in some cases, were released into
the care of their families.
Manchula explained:
I was assigned the task of recruiting people, so I went around
and was allowed to see T.V. and read the papers. This was how I
learned about the split. I got a message to come to the Vaharai camp
and Meenagam camp. Our leaders said he would explain the problem and
we should come. The public also told us of the split. We got scared
and some said we should run away home out of fear. An elder sister
told us to prepare ourselves and to be ready to leave. We were
thinking of escaping, but there was no transport.75
Another said:
I was in a group guarding Karuna. Karuna personally addressed us
and spoke about the attacks at Vaharai. He said, “We should stick
together, we shouldn’t split.” But he disappeared after that, and at
night people started leaving. In the early morning we started
walking.... We walked from 12 noon until 7 the next morning. I
arrived home on April 13.76
Some of Karuna’s commanders told their soldiers to leave.
Eighteen-year-old Sakuntala said, “The commanders told us not to
join the Vanni group, and to go home.” Another former soldier
explained, “We were told, ‘Run away and save your lives.’ One
hundred ran away together.”77
Another girl said simply, “I saw everyone going home, so I went.”
A senior military commander with the Sri Lankan army stated that
they posted observers at entry and exit points to LTTE-controlled
areas. He reported that at ten to fifteen such points, soldiers
observed as many as 2,000 cadres entering government-controlled
areas. The majority were reportedly children. “I was there at the
Black Bridge, just to watch.78
On April 8, I saw 380 cadres [cross]. About 75 percent of the people
who came out were children.”79
A few children interviewed by Human Rights Watch participated in
the fighting between the Vanni LTTE and Karuna’s forces. Some saw
other soldiers killed or wounded. One child soldier saw about
thirty soldiers from her own unit killed during the fighting; she
ran away when she heard voices shouting that they should flee
because they were surrounded by Vanni LTTE forces.80
Sixteen-year-old Indra reported:
I saw the fighting. I was in it. The Vanni group came at
midnight, and surrounded the camp, and began to attack. When
attacked, most of the children died, but some survived and decided
to run. Each camp had about 350. I left the next day. I don’t know
the number killed during the attack. I saw about ten killed, about
the same age as me. When the attack happened, I was shocked and
afraid.81
Kanchana, who was trained as a medic, was also at Verugal. She
told us:
I was at the battle doing medicine for the mortar units. People
were injured on their forehead, arms, legs, backside. It was my
first time in battle. I was afraid. Some people were badly injured.
I treated them, dressed their wounds. Then all the injured were
taken by the Vanni group. I treated seven people. I don’t know their
ages.82
The deaths of numerous child combatants during the internecine
fighting between the Vanni LTTE and Karuna’s faction highlights the
willingness of the LTTE leadership not just to recruit children, but
to use them in battle. Reports of the number of dead and wounded
from the battle vary widely. The LTTE denied international observers
access to the area and during the interim, according to witnesses
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, either the LTTE or local
villagers reportedly burned or buried many bodies. According to news
reports, both factions reported a total of ten soldiers killed,
while military officials reported the dead at thirty-three,
including civilians.83
UNICEF reported that at least two child soldiers were among the
dead, including a seventeen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old who
had been recruited at age sixteen.
Residents of the area suggested a higher death toll, including a
much larger number of children. Human Rights Watch interviewed
several witnesses who saw as many as fifty bodies of slain soldiers
in the days following the battle. One witness reported, “I was going
to collect firewood in the jungle and I saw fifteen bodies. This was
about fifteen days after the fighting had finished…. The bodies were
in bad condition.”84
When asked how he knew they were Karuna’s fighters, he said:
Because we knew who the people were on that side. And they had on
uniforms. They were about thirteen to twenty years old. There were
three girls. I counted the bodies so that’s how I know there were
fifteen. They weren’t all in one place but were scattered around....
I didn’t see any weapons but I saw empty rounds.... When I went
back, the bodies weren’t there. I don’t know what happened, but when
I went back, the bodies were gone.85
According to UNICEF, over 3,000 people were displaced by the
fighting along the coast from Vaharai to Mankerni in Batticaloa
district.86
One man from the area told Human Rights Watch that on April 10, he
and residents from two other villages traveled about ten kilometers
away for safety. He said that, “On the way there, I saw four or five
bodies of people ages fifteen or sixteen.” The following day, the
villagers returned home. “On the way back, I saw forty or fifty
[bodies], also children.” He said, “Prabhakaran’s people asked some
village people to bury bodies in the village, but I didn’t go. They
asked me but I said, “No, you shot them, you can bury them.” There
were bodies in the village.... Maybe ten. They were ages twelve,
sixteen.87
Another person reported that on April 10, he saw twenty bodies
near Kathiraveli, including an ambulance driver dead in his
ambulance. He said:
We tried to take the ambulance driver’s body, but the LTTE didn’t
allow us then. We went again on the 11th. All the bodies
had a bad smell, but we took two of the bodies and buried them in
our village cemetery. We went around the villages and got six more
bodies. Altogether, I helped bury six boys and two girls. There was
one twenty-two-year-old, and the rest were under eighteen.88
Additional persons interviewed by Human Rights Watch also
reported seeing bodies, many of whom, they said, were children. One
said he saw forty to fifty bodies; another said he saw twenty-six.89
As word spread about the division between the Karuna and Vanni
forces and the subsequent fighting, parents in large numbers began
traveling to LTTE camps to demand the return of their children.
The mother of seventeen-year-old Nirmala told Human Rights Watch
that she joined hundreds of other parents:
Two hundred and fifty to 300 parents went and made a big noise at
Santhanamgam [a Karuna camp]. The LTTE [Karuna faction] hid the
children and told parents to go away. The parents stayed for three
days. I was shouting at Santhanamgam camp, but the children were at
Vaharai camp. People in the villages started talking about the
fighting at Vaharai. Some children were running away, so we went to
get the children. We were arguing with the LTTE for their release.
They fired shots to try to scare us. It was so loud we had to leave.90
Nanmani had just left Santhanamgam camp when she saw the parents
arriving, looking for Karuna to demand the return of their children.
She said there were a thousand parents, and discovered only when she
returned home on her own that her own parents were among them.91
Sixteen-year-old Manchula was at the Vaharai camp when parents
arrived. She said:
Mothers and fathers came to the camp and said, “Even if you kill
us we are not going away.” Karuna’s people tried to scare the
parents and shot around them. Karuna’s own people surrounded the
children because they thought they would run away. I was in the
middle. The elder ones surrounded us and told us to shoot our
weapons. We said, “It’s our own parents. How can we do this?” They
told the parents they had to leave, otherwise it would not be good
for them. So my father came and said to me, “Let’s go, come with me.
It doesn’t matter if they shoot me, then we will die on this spot.”
I said, “No, father. We can’t. You have to go and if there is a
problem, I will go home.” We were struggling with our parents and
shouting at each other. Some of the parents had brought civilian
clothes and even wigs so girls could cover their hair. They took
away about one hundred children by changing their clothes. The rest
went into the jungle.92
Local villagers also confronted the Vanni LTTE forces to protest
the conflict. In the Veragul area, large numbers of villagers went
to challenge Vanni’s forces on April 10. One person who participated
in the protests said, “People were fighting with the Vanni LTTE.
They said, ‘Why are you killing our children? Prabhakaran’s and
Karuna’s problems are separate—why involve our children?’ The
villagers blocked LTTE vehicles and threw stones.” He continued,
“The LTTE came and got out of a pickup and said, ‘If you continue we
will shoot you.’ We weren’t afraid. Then they shot over our heads
and into the ground.”93
Another person reported that in another village:
All the people came to fight, even children.... More than 1,000
people were fighting [to demand the return of their children]. All
the people came to the roadside when this happened. In every area,
people were blocked and were fighting.... We spoke directly with the
assistant political leader. He told us, “We came to protect you.” At
the same time, our people asked them—both Prabhakaran’s and Karuna’s
people, “You took our children from us and now you are shooting
those children....Why are you shooting these children? You say you
are Tamil leaders so why are you killing Tamil people? Please give
us our children back and then you can go away.”94
By April 13, most children from Karuna’s forces had either been
released by their commanders or left on their own. Senior cadres
transported some by motorbike or bicycle, while others sent messages
to their families asking them to come fetch them. Some walked long
distances, through jungles and unknown trails, only arriving home
several days later. Some children arrived home, only to discover
that their parents were still looking for them at other camps.
Sixteen-year-old Indra was at the fighting at Veragul. She said,
“Before I reached home, my parents were told I was killed, so my
parents started the rituals. When I arrived home, I was shocked; I
thought my grandmother had died. When my family saw me, everyone
started crying. This was the first time I’d seen my parents since I
was taken [in 2002].”95
Several hundred members of Karuna’s forces—both children and
adults—were captured at Veragul by Vanni LTTE forces and taken first
to Trincomalee, and then to Vaharai. On April 12 a representative
from the Vanni LTTE forces informed UNICEF that they would release
the children on the following day and confirmed that over one
hundred children were being held.96
Two of the children Human Rights Watch interviewed were part of
this group. Kanchana said:
The Vanni group captured the Karuna group very easily.... I
surrendered too. The Vanni group took me to Trincomalee. Then
the parents started to protest and ask for their children. At
Trincomalee there were 140 males and 200 females. My parents came
two days after the surrender. I saw my mother at Vaharai. I don’t
know the number of parents that came. The Vanni group released all
of us [children and adults] after two days. UNICEF was there. I
didn’t get any release papers, but parents placed their signature
[on a letter issued by the LTTE] when they received the children.97
According to UNICEF, more than 200 underage recruits were
released on April 13. Most were released to their parents after
registration by UNICEF and the LTTE. UNICEF provided transportation
for many of the children and their families, and temporary shelter
for seven children who could not be immediately reunified with their
families.
The LTTE may have intended the release of these cadres to be
temporary. Kanchana said that prior to UNICEF’s arrival, the LTTE
took identification information from the parents, and told the
cadres and their parents that whenever the LTTE called, the cadres
would need to return. She said, “They announced this on the
loudspeaker at 6:30 in the morning. UNICEF came at 10 a.m.”98
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After Karuna’s forces dispersed in April 2004, an estimated 4,000
to 6,000 soldiers returned home, including large numbers of
children. By early August 2004, UNICEF had registered 1,800 children
who had returned, primarily to Batticaloa district. The actual total
was certainly higher, as some families were not aware of the
possibility of registering, were afraid to do so, or found it
difficult to travel from their home to a UNICEF office, particularly
if they lived in an LTTE-controlled area, or a remote location.
By June 2004, the Vanni LTTE forces had launched an intense
campaign in the East to re-recruit Karuna’s forces. A UNICEF staffer
identified two reasons behind the campaign: “First, they want to
reassert control over the East. Secondly, they need to replenish
troops after losing Karuna’s forces.”99
The LTTE visited individual houses, organized village meetings, used
motor vehicles to make announcements from vehicles, and sent letters
to demand the registration and/or re-enlistment of former cadres.
Although the LTTE has told UNICEF that only cadres above age
eighteen are being sought, overwhelming evidence indicates that
children also were targeted.
The LTTE threatened families that they would take children by
force if they did not return, or that they would take other children
or parents in their stead. The LTTE made good on these threats:
parents described the LTTE coming to their homes at night and
abducting their children, and being beaten themselves when they
tried to resist.
One man told Human Rights Watch how the LTTE took his
seventeen-year-old daughter one night in late July. She had been
abducted the first time at age thirteen, while gathering firewood,
and served four years in the LTTE before her release in April. The
second time she was taken, he said:
The LTTE came to our house at night. There were about twenty. We
had seen them in the daytime on the roads, walking around, wearing
uniforms. Four of the LTTE women broke into our house and told our
daughter, “Come with us.” She said, “No, I won’t come. I really
suffered. I was wounded, so I’m not coming with you.” She was very
angry and refused. They insisted, “You have to come with us.”
I said, “She’s a girl, I can’t let her out of the house in the
middle of the night. I will bring her in the morning.” They told me
not to interfere, and beat me. They took sticks from my fence,
pushed me to the ground, and used the sticks to beat me two or three
times. They had brought rope with them and had weapons in their
hands. They pretended to tie me up and drag me. My daughter
then came out of the house. When she did, men took her and dragged
her off. She was in her nightdress. She didn’t even have a chance to
change her clothes.
We never expected it. If we had suspected, we would have sent our
daughter away. Previously, they had said she was wounded and they
didn’t need her back. They were lying.100
A woman told Human Rights Watch that her daughter had joined the
LTTE at age seventeen in 2003, returned from Karuna’s forces in
April 2004, and was abducted in July 2004:
She had registered for school. The sister (nun) had told us to
bring her on July 29 but the LTTE came first and took her.
The LTTE surrounded the house. There were seventy-five of them.
Grandmother protested and said my daughter had a high fever and that
she would bring her the next day. She said, “I already gave you my
son and he died on the battlefield. I won’t do it again.” The LTTE
promised to release her. My daughter said “Don’t let them take me
away.” But they took her.101
Between April and August, UNICEF documented nearly one hundred
cases of child re-recruitment, mostly from Batticaloa district.102
However, anecdotal evidence collected by Human Rights Watch suggests
that the number of children re-recruited may be far higher.
Witnesses from several villages north of Batticaloa town told Human
Rights Watch that in some cases, more than a third of the returnees
to their villages had been re-recruited by August.
A man living north of Valechennai said, “There are ten returnees
in my village. Four to six have been taken again, ages twelve to
fifteen. Over-eighteens can manage and protect themselves from the
LTTE, but small children can’t do anything.”103
Another person from the Vaharai area reported:
Forty people in my village went to the LTTE. Twenty people died
in the fighting [in April] and twenty came back. Then the Vanni
group took sixteen people—the people who were physically strong. The
balance UNICEF took to towns. Otherwise the LTTE would have taken
the rest as well.104
A third person from the Vaharai area reported that in his
village, there had been eighteen returnees. He said, “The LTTE took
back seven. Eleven people are in other places.... Of the seven
retaken, most were girls and most were under sixteen. They took them
in the nighttime. They were at home with their parents and the LTTE
came and took them.”105
Human Rights Watch interviewed approximately thirty former cadres
released from Karuna’s forces who had not been re-recruited. Without
exception, they all expressed fear that they would be forced to
return to the LTTE. Some children who worked in security or
intelligence believed that they could be shot if identified by the
LTTE. One said: “The LTTE have asked me to re-join…. They send
girls who were with Karuna but who now have returned to the Vanni
side. They say, ‘Come back and join.’ They don’t threaten to
do anything as such, but they really frighten me.”106
Many children said they were afraid to return to school, worried
that the LTTE would abduct them as they travel between their school
and home. Some refused to leave their homes altogether, while others
went to live with relatives, moved to other parts of the country, or
left the country altogether to take jobs in the Middle East. Some
former cadres got married, believing that marriage would provide a
layer of protection against recruitment (see further discussion
below).
Seventeen-year-old Selvamani told us, “One month after the
release by Karuna, they started re-recruiting. I left my village and
went to relatives home two hours away by bus. I stayed with them for
one month. I stayed inside the home. No one knew that I was there. I
didn’t go outside because I was afraid they would catch me. I didn’t
even go to the front door.”107
Another child said that, until she was taken to a safe home, she
kept moving each night to different houses in her village to avoid
being re-recruited.108
Sixteen-year-old Indra reported that after she returned home in
April:
The LTTE came looking for me, but I was hiding in the forest. I
slept in the forest close to my home, because the LTTE comes at
night. The LTTE has come to my village two times. They did not take
anyone yet, but they are looking. Someone else released by Karuna
showed them my home. When they came to my home, no one was there. I
heard that if the LTTE comes to my home and asks me to rejoin and I
refuse, they have an order that they can shoot me. I don’t want to
go back.109
None of the former Karuna cadres Human Rights Watch interviewed,
even those who had previously volunteered, said they wanted to
return to the LTTE. Many told us they found life in the LTTE too
difficult. Some said they wanted to study. Others felt conflicted
because of the split within the LTTE. Priya explained, “Earlier the
LTTE was one group. Now it’s two groups. If I go with the Karuna
group, I will face problems with the Vanni group. If I go to the
Vanni group, I will face problems with the Karuna group. My family
said I should not go with either group.”
According to twenty-one-year-old Vasuki, recruited at age
sixteen:
I don’t want to go back. I didn’t like the split but if there was
a possibility of one group, I might go back. The Tamil people are
suffering and they died. My family might not like it, but I think I
have a duty to serve. This battle is between Tamils. I didn’t get in
for this battle. It was against the Sinhalese. Now I don’t want to
be part of this. The Sinhalese are not fighting with us. Now we are
fighting with each other. I would like to be at home.110
In addition to visiting former cadres’s homes, the LTTE has sent
letters to some, demanding their return. Santhanam, age seventeen,
said, “The LTTE sent a letter to my house saying that I should
return. The letter was addressed to my father and identified me by
name. It said my father should come to the camp to discuss. But if
he went, they would take me away and my family would never get to
see me, so he didn’t take me.”111
Similarly, another former child soldier said that she received a
letter at home addressed to her specifically, demanding her
attendance at an LTTE meeting. She immediately went and
registered herself with UNICEF who managed to get her to safety.112
In some communities, the LTTE organized meetings to announce that
former Karuna cadres should return to the LTTE. One woman described
a meeting in her village in Batticaloa district, held in late July
2004:
Last Saturday the LTTE held a meeting here and said that the
ex-cadres must return to the LTTE. They announced on Friday at every
house that tomorrow there would be a meeting. I hid my daughter in
the back room and told them we would go to the meeting. There were
two men. They didn’t say they were from the LTTE because we all
already know who they are. They told every house that one person
from each house must go to the meeting.
The meeting was held at the village school. It started at 8:30
a.m. and finished at 9:30 a.m. There were six or seven high-ranking
LTTE at the meeting but more than fifty villagers attended. They
said they have doubts about the ex-cadres and that is why they say
the ex-cadres have to come back. They didn’t say where or when, just
announced that we must give the ex-cadres back. They didn’t say what
would happen, but we felt they would have another meeting. Earlier
they recruited after having three meetings.
That night they collected three boys, all ex-cadres. I was afraid
and hid my daughter. All together there are forty-five returnees in
this village. But on that day, they only took the boys that showed
themselves.113
Seventeen-year-old Nirmala described a similar meeting in her
village, also held in late July:
The LTTE came back and had a meeting announcing that former
cadres should rejoin. They said, “Those that have returned have to
come back. If the returnee doesn’t want to come back, you have to
give another child from the home.” People who went to the meeting
told us. I was hiding. I didn’t go. About twenty-five people went;
the rest were hiding. A girl nearby has gone back. Her relatives are
very poor. Others have left the areas for safer places. I am the
only one remaining.114
Risk to
Siblings
Because the LTTE commonly demands the service of one child per
household, many returnees expressed concern that their brothers and
sisters might be taken in their stead if the former child soldier
refused to return. Although most returnees clearly did not want to
rejoin the LTTE, many indicated that they would return to avoid the
recruitment of a brother or sister.
Seventeen-year-old Selvamani said, “If they try to take my
brothers or sisters, I will have to rejoin again. I am worried.”115
Manchula, now sixteen, said:
I don’t want to go [back] under any condition. The problem is
they can go all over and take children in public places, like when
they go to temples. I am nervous that they will take my brother, so
if that happens, I may have to go back. I have one brother and one
sister.116
One mother told us she sent her sixteen-year-old daughter to a
safe location to protect her from re-recruitment, but worried about
her other children:
I’m afraid now because if I don’t give one person, they may take
another child. Now that we’ve hidden one child, I’m afraid they may
take another. I would like my younger children to get a good
education, but I don’t want to give another child to the LTTE to
continue fighting. I don’t accept this. I worry about the children.
We cannot afford to go into town and rent a house. It is very
expensive.117
Larger towns in the East are under government control and may
provide more protection from recruitment. However, many rural
families are poor and do not have the resources to move to town.
Another mother expressed a similar concern: “I am afraid my other
children will have problems with the LTTE. I have only one son over
eighteen. Now he is studying. If the daughter is missing, they might
collect another person.”118
Fear of
Attending School
UNICEF reports that of the 1,800 children registered with the
organization after returning from Karuna’s forces, 700 were back in
school by early August 2004. However, few of the children Human
Rights Watch interviewed had returned to school, and many expressed
fear that traveling between their home and school put them at risk
of re-recruitment, particularly if their home was a long distance
from the school. Some said they began to attend school, only to drop
out once they saw LTTE recruiters along their route.
For example, fifteen-year-old Bamini told us:
After I went home, I started to go to school but only attended
five days. Then the LTTE started re-recruiting. I was afraid they
would take me while walking to school or come to the school itself.
While I was walking to school I was afraid they would catch me.
Everyday I saw them while I was walking. I had to walk three hours
to get to school. School starts at 8 a.m., but we would only reach
it at 10. For our safety, school would start late.119
Fourteen-year-old Aruna said, “I wanted to continue regular
school, but I couldn’t. It’s too far. The LTTE might catch me while
I’m walking to school.”120
Similarly, seventeen-year-old Selvamani said, “I couldn’t go to
school because I was supposed to join Vanni’s group. Some boys were
re-recruited, so I knew. I couldn’t go to school because I was
afraid the LTTE would take me. ”121
Marriage
Many young returning cadres have married, believing that marriage
will provide some protection against re-recruitment. There is a
general perception that the LTTE does not recruit from among persons
who are married (and for many years the LTTE had strict rules
prohibiting marriage between its cadres).
One NGO reported that in the area where it conducts programs,
about ten former cadres had married in the previous three weeks. The
youngest were fourteen or fifteen years old, the staff told us.122
In another village in the Vaharai area of Batticaloa district, a man
reported that of seven or eight returnees, five had married: “They
got married after they returned because the LTTE called them again
to join or said they would take them, so they got married.”123
Eighteen-year-old Nanmani said she fell in love with another
cadre while in the LTTE. After their release, she returned with him
to his home. She said, “The LTTE came searching for my husband about
a month later [after leaving Karuna’s forces], but when they found
we were married, they went away.”124
Nevertheless, she said she was nervous that the LTTE might return
again.
Eighteen-year-old Tharini married just a month after returning
home. Like many other former cadres, she married another former
cadre. She said, “I decided to get married because I feared they
might take me away again.125
One mother, when asked what could be done to protect children
from re-recruitment, said that she hoped to marry her daughter off.
Her seventeen-year-old daughter commented, “This is a way to
escape.”126
Another mother, who had sent her child away to keep her safe, said
that if there was one more threat, she would marry her daughter off
in order to keep her safe.127
Some children told us that if the LTTE came for them, they would say
they had gotten married, even if it was not true.128
A twenty-eight-year-old man told Human Rights Watch, “The only
way to protect children is to marry them early. I also got married
for my protection. This was in 2000. The LTTE captured me on October
27 but I escaped. I went to Trincomalee and got married there. Then
I came back. I got married to keep myself from being taken.”129
One twenty-one-year-old woman who was in a residential vocational
training program when we interviewed her, told us, “I don’t feel
safe going back to my village. Today my parents came and told me not
to come to the village. They said I was going to get married.
Another young girl from here said she got married and the LTTE let
her go. I don’t want to get married. My parents said getting married
would protect me. They are thinking this is the solution.”130
One man living in an area where LTTE re-recruitment was taking
place said that marriage did not always protect children. “The
parents get them married to keep the LTTE from taking them. This is
the only thing we can do. Then the LTTE won’t take them directly,
but it will still use them for support. It may give them training
and then use them in the border areas or in our own villages.”131
He also relayed that “[t]here were twenty-seven children in my
village taken by the LTTE earlier. Twenty-three came back. Now two
children got married, but the LTTE took five people again for
punishment…. They took the two who married—a twenty-three-year-old
and an eighteen-year-old. The LTTE asked them all to come back, and
when they didn’t, they put them in a bunker.”132
Staff with one NGO commented that “[a] lot of these marriages are
out of desperation.”133
One mother, whose daughter married another cadre shortly after
returning from Karuna’s forces, said, “They married because they
felt that if they were married, the LTTE couldn’t take them. Now
they are separated because he didn’t go to work and so they had no
income. I was supporting them.”134
After their separation, the girl’s husband was re-recruited by the
LTTE.
Vulnerability
of Girls to Re-recruitment
Virtually all Tamil girls in Sri Lanka, particularly those in
rural areas, wear their hair very long. As part of their
indoctrination, girls are typically given very short haircuts after
they become part of the LTTE’s forces. So unless they were long-time
LTTE cadres, the girls released from Karuna’s forces all had very
short hair when they returned home and were instantly identifiable
as former LTTE cadres.
Many girls are extremely self-conscious of their short hair and
believe it increases their risk of re-recruitment. One girl,
interviewed in the safe environment of a residential vocational
training program, said, “We want to increase the duration [of the
program] to one year, because in six months, our hair won’t grow
enough. We can be easily identified.”135
Another girl said that she had been threatened on the way from their
boarding house to the training center, and wanted to know if there
was some more private way to get to the training center.136
The training center is less than fifteen minutes away by foot, but
long enough for these girls to feel vulnerable and exposed.
Many felt they could make no definite plans for the future until
their hair grew longer. Eighteen-year-old Vimala said, “There are
eleven members of my family. Only my father has a job. Because of
the situation, I can’t go out to get a job at a shop or a garment
factory. I have to wait until my hair grows.”137
Role of Parents
in Resisting Recruitment
Several individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch commented
on the newly-emerging role of parents in resisting recruitment of
children. Harendra de Silva, chair of the National Child Protection
Authority, said, “What we didn’t see ten years ago, we see today.
Mothers are protesting. Families are protesting.”138
A UNICEF representative said, “We see parents getting stronger. They
were very strong and angry in April and May [during and after the
LTTE split]. They said, ‘We didn’t send our children to fight with
each other.’”139
A local activist in Batticaloa felt that the protesting by
parents was a significant development, and that it emerged from two
sources: parents’ fatigue with child recruitment and the LTTE’s lack
of control over the East after the split within the LTTE.140
One girl’s mother, who spent three days with other parents at
Santhanamgam camp in April 2004 calling for their children’s
release, expressed her determination to protect her daughter: “I
will try to hide the child, even if they shoot me.”141
One NGO representative cautioned that the activism of the parents
might have been temporary. “When the children first came back,
families resolved not to let the LTTE take their children again, but
now fear has taken hold again. . . . In other areas, parents are
beaten and homes burned. Up until now, no one has been killed. But
no one wants to be that person.”142
Subsequent to Human Rights Watch’s visit to the East, local
sources reported that due to continued intimidation, recruitment and
political killings, parental protests largely dissipated.143
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The LTTE has made numerous public commitments to end their
recruitment and use of child soldiers. In May of 1998, during a
visit to Sri Lanka by the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, the
LTTE pledged not to use children below age eighteen in combat and
not to recruit children below the age of seventeen.144
The LTTE reiterated this pledge to the then UNICEF deputy
executive director, Andre Roberfroid, during his visit to
northern Sri Lanka in February of 2001.145
In January of 2003, UNICEF executive director Carol Bellamy visited
Sri Lanka, securing yet another agreement from the LTTE to end child
recruitment and use.146
In early February 2003, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE
held their fifth round of peace talks in Berlin. Due to
international pressure, especially from UNICEF and the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the Norwegian led entity charged with
monitoring compliance with the cease-fire agreement, the issue of
child soldiers was one of the central issues of this round of peace
talks. According to Norwegian officials facilitating the
talks, LTTE senior officials guaranteed that there would be a
“complete cessation of recruitment of, and recruitment campaigns
aimed at persons under eighteen.”147
This pledge strengthened previous LTTE commitments by establishing
eighteen not only as the LTTE’s minimum age for combat, but also for
recruitment.
In March 2003, the LTTE and UNICEF issued a joint press release
pledging to develop an action plan on children affected by war. The
head of the LTTE political section, S.P. Tamilselvan, stated at the
time, “Our commitment to all children affected by war and not to
recruit children has been firm and remains firm.” He claimed that
the LTTE had informed all military commanders and heads of political
sections in writing of the policy not to recruit children under the
age of eighteen.148
A month later, in April 2003, seventy-five participants from the
LTTE, the government of Sri Lanka, UNICEF, and other international
agencies met and agreed on a ten-point Action Plan for Children
Affected by War (Action Plan). Under the plan, which was officially
signed in June of 2003 by both the LTTE and the government, LTTE
officials pledged again to end child recruitment, and to release
child soldiers who were in LTTE custody. The plan states, “The LTTE
wishes to emphasize their commitment to release and rehabilitate
children currently enlisted and children seeking recruitment with
the LTTE and will closely work and cooperate with local and
international organizations. The LTTE is totally committed to avoid
recruitment of children in LTTE ranks.”149
The Action Plan (discussed in more detail below) included plans
to establish three transit centers to receive children released by
the LTTE, which would be co-managed by UNICEF and the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), which is effectively the
humanitarian arm wing of the LTTE. It also included other
provisions: child rights training for the LTTE, government armed
forces, and communities; a monitoring mechanism administered by
UNICEF for children in the North and East; and programs providing
micro credit, vocational training, education, health and nutritional
services, and psychosocial care.150
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The LTTE has failed to meet its commitments to end its
recruitment and use of children. Recruitment of children has
continued during the cease-fire, and actually increased in
government controlled areas. And children participated in the
active hostilities between the Vanni LTTE forces and the
breakaway Karuna faction. At the same time, the number of
releases of children—both to the transit centers and directly to
families—has fallen far short of the numbers anticipated under
the Action Plan.
Between January 2002 and November 1, 2004, UNICEF documented a
total of 4,600 cases of under-age recruitment.151
During the same period, the LTTE released only 1,208 children
from its forces.152
Even after the Action Plan went into effect, from June 2003
through September 2004, the number of new cases of recruitment or
re-recruitment was more than double the number of children released.153
As of November 1, 2004, of the cases of child recruitment
documented by UNICEF, 1,395 cases were still outstanding.154
Many of these individuals are presumably still with the LTTE.
UNICEF has noted that the number of cases it registered
represents only a portion of the total number of children recruited.
Of the children who were released or returned from the LTTE, only
about 25 percent were previously listed in the UNICEF database.
The LTTE’s unwillingness to abide by the Action Plan was evident
almost immediately. On October 3, 2003, the day that the first
transit center was opened to receive released children, the LTTE
handed over forty-nine children whom they said had joined
voluntarily but were being returned because of their age. Hours
later, according to well-confirmed reports, the LTTE abducted
twenty-three children in one town in the East.155
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) said they received more than
eighty complaints of child recruitment by the LTTE during the month
the transit center opened, and that the vast majority of the
complaints were from the East.156
The SLMM told the National Human Rights Commission that
according to their investigations, only about 10 percent of all
abductions were reported to them.157
After the LTTE’s initial release of forty-nine children in
October 2003, the number of children released to the transit center
dropped significantly. In its first year of operation, the center
received a total of only 172 children. Transit center staff told
Human Rights Watch that although the center has the capacity for one
hundred children, it had never held more than forty-nine, and for
the six weeks between June 14 and July 29, 2004, the center was
completely empty.158
The profile of children the LTTE has released to the transit
centers also suggests that they are not fully integrated members of
the LTTE, or may even be recruited solely for the purpose of being
released to the transit center. According to UNICEF, nearly 70
percent of the children released to the transit center has been with
the LTTE for less than four months. Some were recruited only weeks
or even days before their release. Of the five children Human Rights
Watch was able to interview at the transit center during its visit
in August 2004, only one had been with the LTTE for longer than two
months. Both UNICEF and Save the Children believe that at least some
of the children released were those that the LTTE no longer wanted,
perhaps because of difficulties during training, or medical or
disciplinary problems. We also observed that of the fifteen girls
present at the center during our visit, all but one or two had long
hair. Typically, female LTTE cadres are given very short haircuts
almost immediately after arriving at the camp. Unless they were
veteran cadres, the girls’ long hair may indicate that they were
never recruited for the purpose of military service.
The secretary-general of the LTTE’s peace secretariat, S.
Puleedevan, told Human Rights Watch that the LTTE is “working very
hard on this issue,” and denied that the LTTE practices forced
recruitment. “We don’t ask people to join; they voluntarily come and
join. There is no threat of forced recruitment. The LTTE is
voluntarily giving their service to the people.” He conceded, “There
may be some lapses. Some forces may force one or two children, but
that doesn’t mean that the leadership is giving a green light to do
those kind of forcible recruitment cases.... Abduction is marginal.”159
Puleedevan did not address the issue that even “voluntary”
recruitment of children violates the LTTE’s international law
obligations.
In a meeting with Human Rights Watch, the secretary-general of
the LTTE’s political wing, S.P. Tamilselvan, referred to child
soldiers and claimed that “We do not have such a phenomenon.”160
He said that the LTTE did not practice forced recruitment of
children: “We reject the term of forced recruitment. Nobody forces
them.... No, definitely not, we do not do that.”161
He acknowledged some that children sought to join the LTTE
because of poverty, lack of educational and vocational
opportunities, or because they had lost their parents and had no one
to care for them, but claimed that when the LTTE discovers that a
child is underage, the child is released to the transit center.
Despite overwhelming evidence that the LTTE has been recruiting
children for many years, Tamilselvan blamed Col. Karuna, claiming
that Karuna’s recruitment of children was a primary reason that
Prabkaharan took “disciplinary” action against him. He
described Karuna’s recruitment of children as “cruel and merciless.”
Tamilselvan also claimed that the children released from Karuna’s
forces were “handed back to their parents” by the Vanni LTTE, even
though accounts gathered by Human Rights Watch indicated that the
vast majority either returned home on their own, or were encouraged
to return by Karuna’s commanders.
Tamilselvan, like Puleedevan, acknowledged to Human Rights Watch
that there were some “lapses” of child recruitment and that the
“leadership was not always very diligent in applying standards.”
He said that in mid-September, the LTTE took disciplinary action
against some individuals responsible for child recruitment, but did
not provide details.
Both Tamilselvam and Puleedevan complained that both UNICEF and
the international community place too much importance on the child
soldier issue. Puleedevan told Human Rights Watch:
The child has a lot of rights; child soldiers are tenth or
eleventh place. People tend to forget important rights and focus
only on the child soldiers issue. Children can’t find anything
tangible in their homes—no school, areas are under occupation.
People don’t focus on this, only on child soldiers. We need to focus
on why children are joining.162
The head of a newly-established Northeast Commission on Human
Rights (NECOHR) linked with the LTTE expressed concern
regarding reports of under-age recruitment, saying, “The LTTE has to
rectify these things.... We will work on this, no doubt about it.”163
However, he also complained that the LTTE’s recruitment of
children gets too much attention: “I agree with the international
community that children should be protected from war, but in these
reports, I only see accusations. The LTTE has done lots of good
things, but always people talk about under-age recruitment.”164
This database reflects under-age recruitment known to UNICEF.
The overlap between the database and children who have been
returned/released is about 25%
NOTE: UNICEF has registered 1,702 cases who have returned home;
these children will be considered released when they receive formal
release letters from the LTTE. Source: UNICEF Sri Lanka
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The Action Plan for Children Affected by War emerged out of the
peace process in Sri Lanka and, as of mid-2004, was the only signed
human rights agreement to result from the post-cease-fire talks. The
plan was intended to benefit 30,000 to 50,000 children affected by
the conflict in the North and East through a broad range of
programs. A key provision of the plan was the LTTE’s agreement to
end child recruitment and to release children from the LTTE’s
forces. The LTTE and the government agreed on the plan in April 2003
and formally signed it in June 2003. UNICEF played a primary role in
negotiating the Action Plan and is the main implementing partner.
The Action Plan gave UNICEF a formal monitoring role regarding
violations of the rights of children, including under-age
recruitment. UNICEF receives reports of under-age recruitment from
families and others, maintains a database of such cases, and follows
up on each report to verify its accuracy and when possible, to
obtain a birth certificate or other documentation of age for each
recruited child. Under the plan, UNICEF reports cases to the LTTE
and issues a monthly report to the LTTE political wing. Meetings are
held regularly between the UNICEF Representative and Tamilselvan,
the head of the LTTE political wing, as well as monthly with LTTE
representatives at the district level.
The Action Plan called for an awareness campaign on child rights
at the beginning of the implementation period, publicizing the
commitments by all parties in the plan with specific reference to
the commitment of the LTTE not to recruit children under eighteen
years of age. The campaign was to include posters, signs by the side
of the road, radio spots, and leaflets. UNICEF prepared a
series of posters on various aspects of the plan and submitted them
to the LTTE for approval in January 2004, but as of August 2004, the
LTTE still had not approved the poster series for dissemination.
When Human Rights Watch asked an LTTE representative about the
posters, he claimed that the LTTE was not opposed to the posters,
but was still working on “logistics.”165
Another component of the plan provided for vocational training
for young people between fifteen and eighteen. The plan anticipates
training 5,000 young people (including 1,200 former child soldiers)
by May 2005, with the International Labor Organization (ILO) as the
primary implementing partner. The program began operating in
April 2004, and as of early August, about 300 children were enrolled
in three- to six-month programs to learn skills including
construction, agriculture, motorbike and bicycle repair, tailoring,
welding, animal husbandry, and television and radio repair.166
The education component of the Action Plan aimed to encourage
children, including children returned from the LTTE, to return to
school; to provide students with catch-up education and school kits
as necessary; and to construct and repair schools. The program was
to be implemented by several partners, including UNICEF, the
government of Sri Lanka, and the LTTE Education Society. In a
progress report on the Action Plan, UNICEF stated that by the end of
June 2004, 6,751 children had enrolled back in school and over
40,000 children were enrolled in catch-up education. As noted
earlier, however, the benefits of these efforts have often eluded
former child soldiers who are fearful of returning to school because
of their vulnerability to recruitment or re-recruitment. Less than
40 percent of the child soldiers who returned from Karuna’s forces
in April 2004 had returned to school by August, and some who
initially re-enrolled subsequently dropped out because of fear.
The Action Plan includes ten main components, including those
mentioned above. Other aspects of the plan address child rights
training, microcredit and income generation, health and nutrition,
psychosocial care, social work, and alternative care for children
unable to return to their families.
Transit Centers
A key component of the plan calls for the release and
reintegration of underage recruits from the LTTE, including the
establishment of three transit centers to facilitate the return of
children to their communities. Although the plan envisioned that
many children would be released directly to their families, the
transit centers were designed to receive children who expressed a
reluctance to go home, children whose families could not be found,
and children with specific protection needs. Under the plan, the
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), effectively the
humanitarian wing of the LTTE, was given funds to build the centers,
and was designated to co-manage the centers together with UNICEF.
The first center opened in October 2003 in Kilinochchi. The other
two centers, in Trincomalee and Batticaloa, although completed, had
not opened by November 2004, in large part because of the low rates
of children released by the LTTE.
Children at the transit center stay for an average of one to two
months, although efforts were being made in August 2004 to reduce
the length of stay and “fast-track” children with no significant
protection concerns. While at the center, children participate in a
full program of activities, including educational and psycho-social
assessments; language, math, science, religion and other classes;
drama, music, and art activities; sports; and physical exercise.
They also have counseling sessions with staff social workers.167
At the time of our visit in August 2004, the center had four TRO
counselors and three UNICEF counselors.
The TRO and Save the Children also conduct home visits to assess
the family’s ability to care for the child. Save the Children and
the transit center staff then have joint care review meetings to
discuss the best options for each child. According to transit center
staff, “The most common concern is children coming from very poor
families, where the capacity of the family is very limited. Some
children find it difficult to go back. Many were suffering from
neglect [in the home].”168
After the child’s return to his or her family, Save the Children
social workers conduct follow-up visits to evaluate the
reintegration process, support the child’s re-entry into school or
vocational training, and provide support to the family. These take
place at intervals based on the individual child and family’s
particular needs, but roughly take place one week after the child
returns, and then after three weeks, six weeks, three months, and
one year.169
Although most children return to their families, in cases where that
is not feasible or in the best interest of the child, children may
be placed with extended family members or at a vocational training
program, boarding school, or children’s home.
Role of the
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization
The TRO’s involvement in both the Action Plan and the transit
centers was controversial from the start. The TRO was organized by
the LTTE in 1985 initially to assist Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka
taking refuge in South India. It eventually changed its stated
objective to focus on the humanitarian needs of persons affected by
war in the North and the East. According to the TRO website,
it is, among other things, “dedicated to addressing the needs of
children affected by war in the north-east of Sri Lanka by providing
them with much needed relief, rehabilitation and development.”170
Although the TRO claims to be a humanitarian nongovernmental
organization, it is widely acknowledged to be closely linked to the
LTTE. Local sources in Trincomalee told Human Rights Watch that many
TRO representatives are former LTTE soldiers.171
The TRO is controlled largely by the LTTE, and its credibility is
riddled with allegations about its political motives.
According to Canadian intelligence sources, the TRO raises funds
from Tamils abroad which it claims to use to assist displaced
peoples and former child soldiers in Sri Lanka, but channels much of
the money directly to the LTTE.172
Some observers and local NGOs have questioned the wisdom of
allowing the TRO, because of its links to the LTTE, to protect and
rehabilitate former child soldiers. Concerns have also been raised
by the funding arrangements for the centers, which were budgeted at
US$1.3 million between May 2003 and August 2004.173
Much of this funding was given to the TRO for construction and
operation costs. The director of the National Child Protection
Authority told us, “Groups may claim that they are not supporting
the LTTE by funding the TRO, but outside funding frees up other
money for military purposes.”174
UNICEF acknowledges that “for many, the TRO and LTTE are
synonymous,” but defends the TRO’s role by saying “In the beginning,
we didn’t have a lot of choice. We had our backs against the wall.
Initially the LTTE wanted the TRO to run the centers. We argued for
three months until we reached a compromise. The TRO is not going
away.175
A representative of UNICEF’s Kilinochchi office, which
administers the center, said, “If it hadn’t been with the TRO, the
transit center would have been impossible. The TRO has a strong
presence in the North-East. They have trust from the LTTE, so there
are advantages to working with the TRO.”176
UNICEF notes that it has implemented a number of safeguards to
minimize children’s contact with the TRO. UNICEF staff is present at
the transit centers at all times to provide oversight, and
children’s stay at the centers is limited to no more than three
months. The TRO is also excluded from any follow-up with children
once they return home; Save the Children is responsible for all
subsequent social work with the children.
Although UNICEF staff at the transit center expressed a hope that
in the future they would receive children released from the LTTE
“according to their capacity,” TRO staff suggested that the number
of children in the LTTE has already been exhausted. “The LTTE has
released other children directly home, so we don’t know if there are
any more children left to bring.”177
Similarly, TRO staff in Batticaloa said that the transit center
there is ready to start taking children, but that all the children
with the LTTE had already been released and gone home.178
Response to the
Release of Karuna’s Forces
The mass April release from Karuna’s forces of an estimated 4,000
to 6,000 soldiers, including more than 1,800 children, took all
actors by surprise. UNICEF and international NGOs were
unprepared to deal with the enormous number of new cases. A UNICEF
progress report on the Action Plan acknowledged: “The scale and
unexpected nature of this return has put an enormous strain on the
capacity and resources of all partner agencies under the Action
Plan.”179
After the release, UNICEF, supported by Save the Children, set up
mobile registration centers in Batticaloa and Ampara districts to
register the children who had returned home. Save the Children,
which is responsible for conducting follow-up visits with children
who return home, quickly scaled up its program, increasing its
number of social workers to twenty-five.
Of the 1,800 children who returned to Batticaloa or Ampara
districts from Karuna’s forces and registered with UNICEF, Save the
Children social workers had visited 1,300 by early August, and more
than half of that number had been visited twice.
180 In Trincomalee
district, where there is a much smaller number of returnees—fewer
than one hundred registered—Save the Children had visited each
family approximately five times between April and August.181
A representative of Save the Children told us, “Our main priority
is to get the children back to school or back to training. But many
children are not there, not at home. Some families send children to
relatives, abroad, or to marry.”182
In Batticaloa and Ampara, 700 of the children were back in school
by early August 2004, and 150 had been referred for vocational
training, but over 50 percent of the registered children were
neither back in school nor in vocational training. The large number
of children without assistance was due to both on-going fear of
re-recruitment (keeping many children out of school or leading them
to leave their homes, as described earlier in this report) and
according to UNICEF, the lack of capacity of Action Plan partners.183
UNICEF’s progress report on the Action Plan particularly noted
the challenges related to vocational training in the East: “ILO has
been constrained by its lack of resource, staffing and
infrastructure capacity which have caused delays in the
implementation of this project. This is particularly the case in the
East where ILO has faced considerable challenges given the large
numbers of children and its limited capacity.”184
UNICEF acknowledged that in general, partner agencies will need to
continue to expand to deal with the large number of referrals and
follow-up work.185
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UNICEF in Sri Lanka has placed the LTTE’s recruitment and use of
child soldiers high on its agenda. As noted above, it played a
principal role in negotiating the Action Plan on children affected
by the conflict and serves as the primary implementing partner for
the plan’s ambitious program of activities. Its recruitment database
is comprehensive and sophisticated, and it has a larger number of
staff devoted to child protection than any other UNICEF country
office. The UNICEF office in Sri Lanka has become increasingly
outspoken on the child soldier issue, issuing several public
statements calling on the LTTE to end its recruitment of children
and release the children in its ranks.
Human Rights Watch welcomes UNICEF’s vigorous response to the
on-going recruitment and use of child soldiers by the LTTE,
including its public statements, extensive monitoring, regular
advocacy with the LTTE at both district and senior levels, and
field-based protection activities. These activities in many ways
provide a model for UNICEF activities in other parts of the world
where child recruitment is an on-going concern.
At the same time, both UNICEF and the Action Plan have been
heavily criticized. As discussed above, a major area of controversy
has been the significant role that the plan gives the TRO, and
UNICEF’s agreement to both provide funds to the TRO and accept the
TRO as an implementing partner for the plan. As the LTTE’s failure
to comply with its agreements under the Action Plan have become
evident, some actors have suggested that UNICEF should withdraw from
that part of the plan related to under-age recruitment, renegotiate
key aspects of the plan, or even devise a new plan.
In part because local people do not see the Sri Lankan government
as an effective mechanism for child protection in the North and
East, expectations of UNICEF are extremely high. Local activists
have criticized UNICEF for not working closely enough with them, for
not placing enough emphasis on recruitment prevention and follow-up
on individual cases, and for failing to communicate its activities
effectively to local communities.
For example, one international NGO representative working with a
vocational training program in Batticaloa told Human Rights Watch
that many local people, including people working for local NGOs, did
not know the procedure to register cases of under-age recruitment
with UNICEF. “There’s an assumption that everyone knows, but it’s
not true.” She gave an example of a local priest on the main road in
Batticaloa, near the UNICEF district office who, she said, had a
large number of children return to his parish from the LTTE but did
not know how to register them.186
One local activist criticized UNICEF for not sufficiently
involving local community-based organizations or giving enough
emphasis to prevention:
UNICEF and the international NGOs need more meetings with local
NGOs. These can be regular, informal meetings. They need
representation from remote areas. They can go through church
organizations. But it must be systematic and regular. Especially in
remote areas where recruitment is high. But meetings are not enough.
They have to go into the field. They can’t wait for the mothers to
come to them. It’s not enough.
They should give information in schools. They should put
advertisements in Tamil newspapers and on the radio. Do little
plays. They have to flood this place with preventative measures.
Preventative measures must be a part of the plan.187
UNICEF, caught unawares, struggled to respond to the unique
challenges raised by the mass release of children in April 2004,
particularly the acute risk of re-recruitment. Local activists point
to UNICEF’s lack of coordination with local and other international
groups which were similarly trying to respond to the challenge.
One local activist said that in such an emergency situation,
coordination amongst all the actors is critical to ensure that
protection and monitoring can be spread out over as broad an area as
possible:
We understand UNICEF can’t do everything, can’t be everywhere.
But why did they not work with us? We were there, in the
field, in the remote villages, running around gathering information,
trying to spread information. In such an emergency,
cooperation and coordination is critical. Don’t sit around saying,
“Well, they should come to us.”188
Local activists also say they went to UNICEF before the temple
festivals to warn them that the festivals are sites of forced
recruitment. In spite of this warning, UNICEF did nothing to
monitor the festivals until after the abductions of twenty-six
persons, including several children. Subsequently, UNICEF began
coordinating efforts with international organizations to respond to
LTTE recruitment at temple festivals by ensuring an international
presence at the festivals. The presence was intended to both monitor
and deter recruitment activities. Because of the large number of
temple festivals, efforts focused primarily on the last few days of
the larger festivals where the attendance is usually between 10,000
to 20,000 devotees.189
This was a useful strategy and did appear to inhibit recruitments at
these events.
The Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF), a nongovernmental
organization made up largely of Tamil diaspora, issued a statement
in July calling for a “fundamental revision” of the Action Plan
“given the accentuated vulnerability of the newly released, and the
unrelenting brutality of LTTE recruitment.” Specifically, the SLDF
called on UNICEF to exert stronger efforts to protect children from
re-recruitment; to work with a wider range of actors, including
grassroots community-based groups; and to work more closely with
families and provide them with stronger support.190
In early August, UNICEF initiated stronger public awareness
efforts around child recruitment. It began distributing leaflets
without LTTE approval in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, at
school gates, hospitals, bus-stands, market places, government
buildings, and both government and LTTE checkpoints. The leaflets
referred to international and national law prohibiting the use of
child soldiers and the LTTE’s agreement not to recruit children. It
also encouraged families to report under-age recruitment to UNICEF
offices.
UNICEF reported that the reaction from families was interested
and positive. Numerous families visited the UNICEF office after the
distribution with new reports of recruitment or to update previous
cases. However, the agency received one report that LTTE cadres in a
village in southern Batticaloa took the leaflets from families and
destroyed them, saying that “UNICEF would not be around to look
after families at all times.” UNICEF indicated that it planned to
raise this incident at its next meeting with the LTTE.191
In its progress report on the Action Plan, released in September
2004, UNICEF stated that it was working to build alliances with
community-based organizations in order to develop strategies to
protect children from under-age recruitment, but gave few specifics.192
UNICEF’s representative, Ted Chaiban, states that the Action Plan
is a “strategy,” but that UNICEF’s work is not limited to the plan.
He emphasized that the action plan emerged in a particular political
context:
The action plan was devised under very different circumstances.
It was part of the peace process, at the request of the parties.
Everyone thought the [peace] process was going forward.. . . The
peace process broke down and now we are working in a vacuum, but
throughout, we’ve continued to meet [with the LTTE]. The question
now is what is in the best interest of the child?193
The change in context was echoed by other UNICEF staff: “If the
peace talks had continued and the political climate was more
favorable, we would have hoped for a more favorable result by now.”194
This is almost certainly true although it has to be noted that the
LTTE was failing to meet its commitments even before the breakdown
of the peace talks, so this expectation may place undue optimism on
LTTE cooperation.
Greg Duly, the country director for Save the Children said that
“The action plan was providing one of the few spaces where the
international community, the government, LTTE and facilitators could
talk.”195
Some observers question UNICEF’s continued cooperation with the
LTTE in view of the LTTE’s non-compliance with the Action Plan. As
one United Nations official put it:
UNICEF keeps talking about its access [to the LTTE] under the
Action Plan. And of course, at the higher levels, the LTTE
says the right things. But has UNICEF thought about what
leverage they actually gain by this access, what good does it do on
the ground? Through their weekly meetings with Kaushalyan [the
LTTE political leader in Batticaloa district].UNICEF gives
legitimacy to a man who is responsible for abducting kids.
That is the message they are sending out.196
Chaiban noted that the Action Plan is unique in that apart from
an agreement in Southern Sudan, it was the only formal agreement
with a nongovernmental armed force to demobilize children from its
forces in advance of a formal peace agreement. He also pointed out
its explicit monitoring and reporting role for UNICEF. Through the
initiative, he says, 1,000 children have gone home and that no other
mechanism has secured the release of as many children.
In a September 2004 report assessing the progress of the action
plan, UNICEF repeatedly emphasized the LTTE’s failure to meet its
commitments to release children from its forces, and end all
recruitment of children. “Without such a commitment, the work that
all Action Plan partner agencies can achieve is limited.”197
The report also emphasized the negative impact of continuing
recruitment on efforts to reintegrate children into their
communities: “The success of reintegration activities depends on a
safe and secure environment. Reintegration is seriously impeded by
the current climate of continuing, and in some places violent,
recruitment of children throughout the North East.”198
Human Rights Watch acknowledges UNICEF’s efforts to engage the
LTTE directly in addressing the LTTE’s on-going abuses and to secure
concrete implementation of the LTTE’s commitments to end its
recruitment and use of children through the Action Plan. The
Action Plan provides important avenues for a coordinated approach by
both U.N. agencies and NGOs to address some of the underlying issues
that facilitate child recruitment or inhibit the reintegration of
former child soldiers, including access to education, vocational
training, and child rights awareness raising. Human Rights
Watch does not advocate UNICEF’s withdrawal from the Action Plan as
a whole.
However, Human Rights Watch remains concerned that the LTTE’s
failure to fulfill its obligations regarding the recruitment and
release of children severely undermines the plan’s stated goals. The
lack of substantial progress in achieving these goals some sixteen
months after the LTTE’s formal agreement of the plan has undermined
community confidence in the plan’s strategy and raised legitimate
questions regarding UNICEF’s ongoing approach towards the LTTE.
Although UNICEF has rightly made several public statements regarding
LTTE non-compliance, Human Rights Watch believes that its continued
participation in the child soldiers component of the plan is
untenable and undeservedly legitimizes current LTTE policy towards
children.
In light of continuing LTTE non-compliance with its commitments,
Human Rights Watch urges UNICEF to set firm deadlines and benchmarks
for the LTTE’s compliance with its agreements under the Action Plan.
These could include, for example, a cessation of child recruitment
for a three-month period, and a specified number of releases during
that period. If the LTTE fails to meet these benchmarks within the
specified time, UNICEF should suspend operations at the transit
center, including the provision of funds to the TRO for the center’s
operations.
We encourage UNICEF to continue its monitoring and regular and
high-level advocacy with the LTTE and to continue to seek an end to
all recruitment of children and to assist children who are released.
Experience has shown that the UNICEF district offices are able to
facilitate family reunification in such cases on an ad hoc basis and
in a short period of time, with Action Plan partners providing
follow-up social work support.
Until the LTTE takes credible steps to change its practices,
UNICEF should prioritize its protection activities, in collaboration
with NGOs assisting the Action Plan and other interested NGOs and
local community groups.
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The government of Sri Lanka has not, until recently, spoken out
on the LTTE’s recruitment and use of children, perhaps not wishing
to jeopardize the peace process. In spite of ample evidence of child
recruitment by the LTTE, the government has taken little action to
protect children in government-controlled areas. The
government has effectively abdicated its responsibility to
international organizations such as UNICEF, ILO and Save the
Children.
The government is admittedly in a difficult situation.
Given the government’s numerous violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law during the conflict, the Tamil
population mistrusts the government and the state security forces.
Another major challenge is that the government’s control over the
eastern districts is largely nominal. A senior government
official conceded that the LTTE controls the administration of the
East, even in areas under official government control, and that the
government has very little influence over what happens in these
areas.199
For instance, while the government of Sri Lanka funds the health,
education, and food services throughout the country, in the East
even in areas officially controlled by the government, the LTTE
controls the distribution of these resources.
The government has, however, done little to address the local
population’s suspicions of the state. For example, security
forces in the East, whether army or police, are almost entirely
Sinhalese.200
While every station does have some Tamil officers who can
investigate and record complaints, there is no question that
language—and all that it signifies in this conflict—keeps people
from reporting to the police.201
The Senior Superintendent of Police of Trincomalee admitted that
parents would feel more comfortable reporting complaints in their
own language, and that it would be a very good idea to hire more
Tamil-speaking officers.202
A particular concern is protection for the children released from
Karuna’s forces whom the LTTE is specifically targeting for
re-recruitment. A senior policeman in Trincomalee told Human Rights
Watch that “we can’t provide extra protection for [these] families.”203
Persons under the government’s authority remain the government
responsibility. As one human rights activist told Human Rights
Watch, “The state has an obligation to protect its children.
Concerned individuals have talked about taking vulnerable children
out of the Northeast to provide them with safe haven in the south,
but they don’t have the capacity. The government should do that.”204
The Sri Lankan government has yet to convince critics that it can
actually protect such children. In October 2000, at least twenty-six
Tamil inmates of the Bindunuwewa rehabilitation camp were killed by
an Sinhalese mob armed with clubs and machetes. The victims were all
former members of the LTTE and were aged between fourteen and
twenty-three. The Tamil population saw these killings as further
evidence of the government’s lack of concern for their safety.
Following lengthy and controversial proceedings, two police officers
and three villagers were sentenced to death for the killings, with
the remaining thirty-six indictees cleared for various reasons.205
According to local and international NGOs, former child soldiers
often have difficulty obtaining identity cards from local government
offices. “Individuals with identity cards can travel more freely. If
you have no card, you are under suspicion,” an international NGO
staffer told us.206
The NGO reported that the local government officials are afraid of
repercussions from the LTTE for giving identity cards to former
combatants. In other cases, local government officials are pro-LTTE,
and children and parents are afraid to apply for documentation. The
government has the responsibility to ensure that all young people,
including former child soldiers, have this protective documentation.
Local observers also suggest that given the past history of
government harassment and abuses against former or suspected LTTE
members, the government should issue a formal amnesty to all former
child soldiers for their participation in the LTTE. Some NGOs report
that local communities are fearful of accepting former combatants
because they fear government reprisals if the cease-fire breaks
down.207
Children under threat of re-recruitment fear that, should
hostilities resume, the government might harass or prosecute them.
This keeps them from seeking help from government agencies.
The government has no history of prosecuting former combatants, but
the government’s pre-cease-fire history of harassing LTTE members
contributes to continuing fears. The government should not
provide amnesty to persons alleged to have committed war crimes, but
it should amnesty children whose only criminal offense was their
participation in the LTTE. Amnesty would make it much easier for
these former child combatants to reintegrate into Sri Lankan
society.
In Colombo, the National Child Protection Agency (NCPA) and the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) are independent agencies
established by the government. Both these agencies, in
different ways, have the mandate to investigate and report on the
problem of child recruitment. Both agencies are woefully
under-funded and receive little support from the government for
their activities. The National Child Protection Agency has
twenty-six staff nationwide, a number far from sufficient to cover
the spectrum of its mandate. The NHRC has been issuing
important reports from Colombo, but a visit to its regional offices
makes it clear that it is not getting sufficient support. A
member of the NHRC in Trincomalee said that they report regularly to
the chair and the NHRC, but do not find out what steps have been
taken in follow up.208
The NHRC has proposed monitoring the situation in the East in
partnership with various international actors. For such
monitoring to be successful, the NHRC would have to be capable of
deploying monitors throughout the East. Monitoring on this
scale would contribute significantly to a lessening of the
abductions of children, and the attendant intimidation and abuse of
parents that is going on now unabated. But for this to be
successful, the NHRC needs the support of the national government
and international donors.
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XIII. The
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was set up to monitor the
cease-fire agreement signed by the Government and the LTTE on
February 22, 2002. The members of the SLMM are Norway,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. The SLMM is
headquartered in Colombo, with six district offices in Jaffna,
Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara, Mannar, and Vavuniya. In
addition, there are naval monitoring teams in Jaffna and
Trincomalee. Each monitoring committee is comprised of five
members, two nominated by the government, two by the LTTE and the
fifth by the head of the SLMM mission.209
The SLMM’s mandate, as articulated in the cease-fire agreement,
is to “enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and
conditions of [the cease-fire agreement],” with the undertaking by
both parties to “fully cooperate and rectify any matter of conflict
caused by their respective sides.”210
The SLMM is further directed to “take immediate action on
complaints…and to enquire into and assist the Parties in the
settlement of any dispute.”211
Under the terms of the agreement, the SLMM is meant to monitor
technical compliance, such as maintaining zones of separation,
ensuring agreed upon distances between the two sides, tracking
movement of ammunitions, and ensuring disarmament of paramilitary
groups.
Significantly, the SLMM is also authorized to monitor the
violation of international law by the government and the LTTE, and
in particular to monitor that the two sides abstain from acts
“against the civilian population, including such acts as torture,
intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.”212
The SLMM has been criticized for neglecting the latter part of its
mandate, and Human Rights Watch’s interviews and analysis confirm
this criticism.
Between February 1, 2002 and September 30, 2004, the SLMM
received 1784 complaints of child recruitment and ninety-seven
complaints of abduction of children against the LTTE.213
Of these cases, the SLMM ruled that 1,441 of the child recruitment
cases and fifty-two of the abducted cases were violations of the
cease-fire agreement.
Although child recruitment cases make up the largest number of
complaints received by the LTTE, Human Rights Watch interviews with
SLMM monitors found that child recruitment is not treated
consistently as a priority. A SLMM representative in Trincomalee
told Human Rights Watch, “I don’t see child recruitment as anything
to do with peace. Other issues are more endangering to the
cease-fire than child recruitment, so we don’t raise it in meetings
with the LTTE.”214
Another monitor told Human Rights Watch that the SLMM mandate “isn’t
exactly directed at child recruitment.”215
According to the Trincomalee office, when the SLMM receives a
complaint of child recruitment, it requests further information on
the case from the LTTE, and if the allegation seems credible, makes
a report to the LTTE in Kilinochchi. However, the SLMM also said
that it handles very few complaints of underage recruitment, in
large part because it tells people that it doesn’t deal with the
issue.216
This position is troubling because it suggests that the issue of
child recruitment—although clearly within the terms of their
mandate, involving as it does the violations enumerated in the
cease-fire agreement (namely, intimidation, abduction and
harassment) not to mention other violations not specifically
enumerated in their mandate, but which nonetheless constitute
violations of international law—is not significant enough to be
vigorously monitored.
One monitor told us: “We are here on the invitation of the
parties…. We don’t see public statements as part of what we do.”217
Yet the head of the SLMM has issued two public statements on
political killings as a threat to the ceasefire.218
It has issued no such statements regarding child recruitment.
One approach to deal with the various aspects of the SLMM mandate
would be to separate the technical monitoring of the cease-fire and
the human rights monitoring functions of the SLMM. In order to
do this, the SLMM should establish a human rights unit, dedicated to
systematically monitoring the violations of international law
stipulated in their mandate and staffed with trained human rights
monitors.
In the absence of such a unit, SLMM leadership must highlight the
problem of child recruitment to its monitors. One monitor, who
chose to remain anonymous, said that most of the monitors do not
understand issues of human rights: “They [the monitors] think of
human rights as something soft and fuzzy, without shape, and so it
makes them nervous to engage the issues.”219
Another criticism against the SLMM is that there is no link
between the SLMM and the local population. The SLMM responds
to this charge by saying that its mandate is limited to dialogue
with the government and the LTTE. However, any serious follow
through on its mandate, particularly article 2.1, would mean that
the SLMM would have to have some dialogue with the local victimized
population.
The lack of dialogue between the SLMM and others was made clear
during Human Rights Watch’s interviews. In Batticaloa,
following the increase in recruitments during temple festivals as
described above, international organizations agreed to step up
monitoring at the temples. The SLMM monitors in Batticaloa
were not aware of such an initiative, and had not been invited to a
meeting during which this protection issue was discussed. One
monitor conceded that the SLMM does not have good local partnerships
with other groups and that this was something which impeded their
ability to gather information
220
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At the Sri Lanka Donor’s Conference held in Tokyo in June 2003,
the international community jointly pledged a total of U.S.$ 4.5
billion in post-war reconstruction and development aid to Sri Lanka.221
The conference was co-chaired by Japan, Norway, the United States,
and the European Union.222
The Declaration of the Conference explicitly linked the aid to the
peace process: “[a]ssistance by the donor community must be closely
linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace progress…in
view of the linkage between donor support and peace process, the
international community will monitor and review the progress in the
peace talks.”223
The Declaration went on to list ten objectives and milestones which
it would use to measure the progress. Some of the milestones
were ensuring an increase in Muslim participation, rehabilitation of
former combatants, and gender equity. The end of under-age
recruitment by the LTTE was set out as a milestone by which the
progress of a political settlement would be measured.224
In spite of this explicit linkage, the donors were, until
recently, largely silent on the recruitment of child soldiers.
At follow-up meetings to the Tokyo Conference, the donors have
encouraged the parties to recommence negotiations and urged them to
live up to the expectations of the Tokyo Conference. This
silence was particularly conspicuous during the sudden increase in
under-age recruitment following Karuna’s split in April 2004.
This lack of public condemnation by donors, combined with the
silence from other actors, allowed the LTTE to continue its
practices without fear of meaningful international censure.
Recently, the donor community has been more vocal, and there have
been statements from the co-chairs of the donor conference, the
European Union and the United States. The co-chairs released a
statement on June 1, 2004, in which they again reiterated the call
for the parties to resume the peace process, and specifically
enumerated under-age recruitment as an abiding problem.225
The United States released a statement on October 1, 2004, in which
it called on the LTTE to stop recruiting child soldiers.226
A significant percentage of the reconstruction aid is intended
for the war-ravaged North and East. The donor community must
use the leverage it has to pressure the LTTE to stop under-age
recruitment. While the exercise of this leverage must not come
at a cost of the humanitarian aid urgently needed in the outlying
areas, there are other ways to put pressure on the LTTE. One
possibility is to refuse to fund projects carried out by the TRO,
the LTTE dominated agency, unless the LTTE can show substantial
progress, measured against established benchmarks, in stopping
under-age recruitment. This need not stop the aid and
assistance from getting to people who need it, but it will send a
strong message to the LTTE.
The donor community is well-placed to insist that the LTTE abide
by its commitments under international law as well as under its own
repeated declarations to cease under-age recruitment. The
Tokyo Conference Declaration has provided the space for such an
insistence. Especially while the peace talks are ongoing, the
donor community must give serious thought to using its considerable
influence to stop child recruitment.
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XV. International Legal
Standards
The LTTE has violated its obligations under international law by
recruiting children into its forces and by having children directly
participate in hostilities.
International humanitarian law (the laws of war) and human rights
law prohibit the recruitment and use of children as soldiers and in
other combat-related roles. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, which applies during non-international armed conflicts (civil
wars) prohibits states and non-state armed groups from recruiting or
using children under the age of fifteen in armed conflict. This
standard is also reflected in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), which Sri Lanka ratified in 1991.227
The prohibition on the recruitment and use of children below the age
of fifteen is now considered customary international law, and is
binding on all parties to armed conflict.
Sri Lanka is also party to the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict, which was adopted by the U.N. 2000, and entered
into force in 2002. The protocol raised the standards set in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child by establishing eighteen as
the minimum age for any conscription or forced recruitment or direct
participation in hostilities. The protocol also places obligations
upon non-state armed forces. Article 4 states that “armed groups
that are distinct from the armed forces of a state should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the
age of eighteen.”
228
The Optional Protocol does not set a specific age for voluntary
recruitment by government forces, but requires governments to
deposit a binding declaration establishing their minimum voluntary
recruitment age. The age set cannot be below sixteen. In the case of
Sri Lanka, the government made a declaration at the time of
ratification establishing that the minimum age for voluntary
recruitment into government forces was eighteen. Thus, in practice,
the same age limits apply for all forms of recruitment by both state
and non-state forces in Sri Lanka.
In 1999, the member states of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) unanimously adopted the Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention (No. 182). It defines a child as any person under
the age of eighteen and includes in its definition of the worst
forms of child labor:
All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as
the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom
and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.229
Sri Lanka ratified the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention on
March 1, 2001.
The recruitment of children under the age of fifteen or their use
in hostilities is also considered a war crime under the Statute for
the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Statute was adopted in
July 1998 and considers such recruitment a war crime under its
jurisdiction whether carried out by members of national armed forces
or non-state armed groups.230
As of September 2004, Sri Lanka had not ratified the ICC statute.
Even though Sri Lanka is not a state party to the ICC statute,
LTTE members who are responsible for recruiting children under the
age of fifteen into the LTTE’s forces may still be criminally
responsible for acts amounting to war crimes under international
law. In May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone ruled that the prohibition on recruiting children below
age fifteen had crystallized as customary international law prior to
1996, citing the widespread recognition and acceptance of the norm
in international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone also found that the
individuals responsible for recruiting children under the age of
fifteen bear criminal responsibility for their acts:
The practice of child recruitment bears the most atrocious
consequences for the children. Serious violations of fundamental
guarantees lead to individual criminal responsibility. Therefore the
recruitment of children was already a crime by the time of the
adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, which codified and ensured the effective implementation of an
existing customary norm relating to child recruitment rather than
forming a new one.231
According to accounts collected by Human Rights Watch and
extensive other evidence, the LTTE recruits children into its forces
from the age of eleven or twelve, recruits children forcibly, trains
children for combat, and uses them as combatants or in other
capacities in armed conflict. As outlined above, these practices
have been condemned by the international community and constitute
violations of international humanitarian law, international human
rights law, international labor law, and international criminal law.
They also violate the LTTE’s own stated practices and commitments.
The Sri Lankan government does not recruit children into its
armed forces. However, it still has obligations regarding child
soldiers under international law. Under the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the government is responsible to take “all feasible
measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected
by an armed conflict,”232
and to take “all appropriate measures” to promote the physical and
psychological recovery and social reintegration of children who have
been victim to armed conflicts.233
Under the Optional Protocol, the state has the responsibility to
take measures to prevent the recruitment and use of children by
non-state armed groups, including by criminalizing such practices.234
The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention also places
responsibility on the state to “take immediate and effective
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst
forms of child labour as a matter of urgency,”235
which includes the forced recruitment of children for use in armed
conflict. The convention requires states to provide direct
assistance for the removal of children from these situations and for
their rehabilitation and social integration, and to ensure these
children access to free basic education and when possible and
appropriate, vocational training. The state is also expected to
identify and reach out to children at special risk and take account
of the special situation of girls.236
The convention obliges states parties to develop specific plans
of action to address the worst forms of child labor. The
recommendations accompanying the convention state that the plans
should aim to denounce these abuses, reach out to and work with
communities where children are at special risk, and inform sensitize
and mobilize public opinion and concerned groups, including children
and their families.237
UN Security Council Efforts to Achieve Compliance
Since 1998, the U.N. Security Council has addressed the issue of
children and armed conflict and adopted a series of resolutions
aimed at stronger enforcement of international standards. In 2001,
the Security Council specifically called on member states to
“consider appropriate legal, political, diplomatic, financial and
material measures, in accordance with the Charter of the U.N., in
order to ensure that parties to armed conflict respect international
norms for the protection of children.”238
The Security Council also took the unusual step of asking the
U.N. secretary-general to compile and publish a list of specific
parties to armed conflict that were recruiting or using child
soldiers in violation of their obligations. This “name and shame”
initiative was the first time that the Security Council had
specifically named abusive parties, and was intended to hold
violators accountable for their actions. The initial list was
limited to parties to armed conflict in situations on the Security
Council’s agenda, and thus excluded Sri Lanka.
In 2003, however, the Security Council expanded the scope of the
list beyond the Security Council’s agenda. As a result, in November
2003, the secretary-general specifically named the LTTE among a list
of parties that recruit or use children in armed conflict. In April
2004, the Council called on these parties to immediately halt their
recruitment or use of child soldiers and indicated its intention to
consider “appropriate steps” to address this issue in response to
reliable and timely information.239
At the time of writing, the secretary-general was preparing his
fifth report on children and armed conflict for the Security
Council’s consideration, including information on compliance and
progress made by the parties he had previously identified as
violators, including the LTTE, as well as further recommendations
for action.
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Glossary
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO
International Labor Organization
ISGA
Interim Self-Governing Authority
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NCPA
National Child Protection Authority
NHRC
National Human Rights Commission
TRO
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization
SLA
Sri Lankan Army
SLMM
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
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This report was written by Jo Becker, advocacy director of the
Children’s Rights Division at Human Rights Watch, and Tejshree
Thapa, South Asia researcher for the Asia Division at Human Rights
Watch, based on research conducted by the authors and Zama
Coursen-Neff, counsel to the Children’s Rights Division, in Sri
Lanka in August of 2004.
Lois Whitman, executive director of the Children’s Rights
Division; Zama Coursen-Neff, counsel to the Children’s Rights
Division; Brad Adams, executive director of the Asia Division; James
Ross, senior legal advisor for Human Rights Watch; and Iain Levine,
program director of Human Rights Watch, edited the report. Tim
Lohnes designed the map. Fitzroy Hepkins, Andrea Holley, Veronica
Matushaj, and Dana Sommers produced the report.
Human Rights Watch is grateful to the many nongovernmental
organizations and local activists who assisted our research and
especially to the children and families who agreed to tell us their
stories. For security concerns, the names of these individuals and
organizations must be kept confidential. We also appreciated
UNICEF’s help and cooperation throughout the course of our research.
Human Rights Watch gratefully acknowledges the generous support
of the Oak Foundation, the Malcolm Hewitt Wiener Foundation, and the
community of people who support our work to defend children’s
rights.
Previous Human Rights Watch reports on child soldiers
How to Fight, How to Kill: Child
Soldiers in Liberia, 2004
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/liberia0204/
“You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child
Combatants in Colombia, 2003
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/
Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in
Northern Uganda, 2003
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/
Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in
Angola, 2003
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/angola0403/
Stolen Children: Abduction and
Recruitment in Northern Uganda, 2003
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/
“My Gun Was as Tall as Me”: Child
Soldiers in Burma, 2002
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/
Reluctant Recruits: Children and Adults
Forcibly Recruited for Military Service in North Kivu, 2001
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/drc3/
War Without Quarter: Colombia and
International Humanitarian Law, 1998
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/
The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by
the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 1997
http://www.hrw.org/reports97/uganda/
Burma: Children’s Rights and the Rule of
Law, 1997
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/burma2/
Children of Sudan: Slaves, Street
Children, and Child Soldiers, 1995
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Sudan.htm
Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia,
1994
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/liberia2/
“In the Name of God”: Repression
Continues in Northern Sudan, 1994
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/sudan/
The Lost Boys: Child Soldiers and
Unaccompanied Boys in Southern Sudan, 1994
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Footnotes
[1] Data supplied to Human Rights Watch by UNICEF, November
2, 2004.
[2] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child
Soldiers Global Report 2001, p. 341.
[3] Somasundaram DJ, Child Trauma (Jaffna: University
of Jaffna, 1993).
[4] Recruitment Gender Analysis, information supplied
by UNICEF, November 2, 2004.
[5] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child
Soldiers Global Report 2001, p. 342.
[6] The ex-militant Tamil groups, most notably the EPDP,
also used children in combat until they were officially disarmed
under the Cease Fire Agreement.
[7]Rohan Gunaratna, “LTTE Child Combatants,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, July 1998.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, Children: The
Invisible Soldiers, Radda Barnen, 1998, pp. 93, 98. The case
study was conducted for the U.N. Study on the Impact of Conflict
on Children, prepared by Graça Machel and presented to the U.N.
in 1996.
[10] See, for example, Gunaratna, “LTTE Child Combatants”;
Yvonne Keairns, The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers Sri Lanka,
Quaker United Nations Office, January 2003.
[11] Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Q&A:
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 2004,
http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/tamiltigers_print.html (retrieved
October 13, 2004).
[12] Human Rights Watch interviews with UNICEF, Sri Lanka,
August 2004; E-mail communications from UNICEF staff to Human
Rights Watch, September 2004.
[13]
Agreement on a Ceasefire Between the Government of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, February 22, 2002, art. 2.1.
[14]
UNICEF notes that the number of cases it registers represent
only a portion of the total number of children recruited, as
some families may be unaware of the possibility of registering,
may be afraid to do so, or may have difficulty reaching a UNICEF
office. Of the children who have been released or returned from
the LTTE, only about 25 percent were previously listed in the
UNICEF database.
[15]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff,
Trincomalee district office, August 12, 2004.
[16]
Article 1.13 of the cease-fire agreement allows unarmed LTTE
members freedom of movement in the areas of the North and East
dominated by the government of Sri Lanka “for the purpose of
political work.”
[17]
Human Rights Watch interview with Upali Hegawe, Senior
Superintendent of Police, Trincomalee Division, August 11, 2004.
[18]
Human Rights Watch interview with Harendra de Silva, Chair,
National Child Protection Authority, Colombo, August 4, 2004.
[19]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[20]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Sakuntala,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[21]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Malar,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[22]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Rangini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[23]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[24]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Saraswathy,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[25]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Aruna,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[26]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[27]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Tamarai,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[28]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[29]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Indra,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[30]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Aruna,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[31]
Human Rights Watch interview with local activist, Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[32]
Human Rights Watch interview with local activists, names
withheld, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[33]
Human Rights Watch interview with Andrea James, Head of Zone
Office, UNICEF, Batticaloa, August 5, 2004, Batticaloa
[34]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vanmathi,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[35]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[36]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Pavai,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[37]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Ganeshan,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[38]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Arun,” Kilinochchi, August
2004.
[39]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Marudan,” Kilinochchi, August
2004.
[40]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Sivani,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004. During the conflict, many Tamils disappeared and
were believed killed by Sri Lanka security forces.
[41]
There continues to be strong sentiment in Tamil majority areas
that government-supplied text-books are Sinhala-slanted, and do
not represent accurately the history of Tamil subjugation and
revolt. Many parents in these areas are not unsympathetic
to LTTE supplying their children with what they themselves
consider to be a more accurate version of history.
Discussions about re-writing Sri Lanka history text-books have
been underway with no progress.
[42]
Human Rights Watch interview with Upali Hegawe, Senior
Superintendent of Police, Trincomalee Division, August 11, 2004.
[43]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[44]
Human Rights Watch interviews, names withheld, Trincomalee
district, August 2004.
[45]
Human Rights Watch interview with local priest, Trincomalee
district, August 2004.
[46]
Human Rights Watch interview, Trincomalee district, August
2004.
[47]
Human Rights Watch interviews, August 2004.
[48]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[49]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[50]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Indra,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[51]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Bamini,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[52]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nanmani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[53]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nadanam,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[54]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Ammani,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[55]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Aruna,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[56]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vimala,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[57]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Rangini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[58]
Ibid.
[59]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[60]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Kanchana,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[61]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Rangini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[62]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Thooya,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[63]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vimala,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[64]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nirmala,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[65]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Kaveri,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[66]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[67]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Ammani,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[68]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vanmathi,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[69]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nirmala,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[70]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[71]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vasuki,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[72]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Kaveri,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[73]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Pavai,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[74]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vanji,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[75] Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,”
Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[76] Human Rights Watch interview with “Nanmani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[77] Human Rights Watch interview with “Tharini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[78] The Black Bridge separates government and LTTE-held
territories, and serves as a major army checkpoint.
[79] Human Rights Watch interview with senior military
official, Sri Lankan Army, August 7, 2004.
[80] Human Rights Watch interview with “Malar,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[81] Human Rights Watch interview with “Indra,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[82] Human Rights Watch interview with “Kanchana,”
Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[83] “Refugees Return as Sri Lanka Mulls Asylum for Renegade
Tiger Leader,” Agence France Press, April 13, 2004; “Sri Lanka
Breakaway Rebels Retreating,” Associated Press, April 12, 2004,
“Renegade Sri Lanka Tigers Flee; Main Faction Releases Child
Soldiers,” BBC, April 13, 2004.
[84] Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Information provided to Human Rights Watch by UNICEF,
September 2004.
[87] Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[88] Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[89] Human Rights Watch interviews, August 2004.
[90] Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[91] Human Rights Watch interview with “Nanmani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[92] Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,”
Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[93] Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[94] Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[95] Human Rights Watch interview with “Indra,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[96] Information provided to Human Rights Watch by UNICEF,
September 2004.
[97] Human Rights Watch interview with “Kanchana,”
Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Human
Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff, Trincomalee district,
August 12, 2004.
[100]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[101]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[102]
Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Watkins, Project Officer
(Protection), UNICEF, Batticaloa, August 5, 2004.
[103]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[104]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[105]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[106]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Kaveri,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[107]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[108]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Pavai,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[109]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Indra,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[110]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vasuki,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[111]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Santhanam,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[112]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Tamarai,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[113]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[114]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nirmala,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[115]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[116]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Manchula,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[117]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[118]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[119]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Bamini,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[120]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Aruna,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[121]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[122]
Human Rights Watch interview with international nongovernmental
organization, Batticaloa district, August 5, 2004.
[123]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[124]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Nanmani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[125]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Tharini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[126]
Human Rights Watch interview with Nirmala,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[127]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004,
[128]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vanmathi,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[129]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[130]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vasuki”, Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[131]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[132]
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[133]
Human Rights Watch interview with staff of an international
nongovernmental organization, Batticaloa district, August 5,
2004.
[134]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[135]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Selvamani,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004.
[136]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Rangini,” Batticaloa
district, August 2004. Several other girls echoed this sentiment
during informal conversations.
[137]
Human Rights Watch interview with “Vimala,” Batticaloa district,
August 2004.
[138]
Human Rights Watch interview with Harendra de Silva, Chair,
National Child Protection Authority, Colombo, August 4, 2004.
[139]
Human Rights Watch interview with Christine Watkins, Project
Officer (Protection), UNICEF, Batticaloa, August 5, 2004.
[140]
Human Rights Watch interview with local activist,
Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[141]
Human Rights Watch interview, Batticaloa district, August 2004.
[142]
Human Rights Watch interview with staff of an international
nongovernmental organization, Batticaloa district, August 5,
2004.
[143]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with human rights
activist, October 19, 2004.
[144] Office of the Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict, Commitments,
http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/English/Commitments.html
(retrieved September 14, 2004).
[145] UNICEF, “Sri Lankan Children In Crisis,” press
release, July 20, 2001.
[146] UNICEF, Action Plan for Children Affected by War
Progress Report 2003, January 2004.
[147] Asia Human Rights Commission, “Sri Lanka: The Legacy
of Child Soldiers in the LTTE,” Asia Child Rights Weekly
Newsletter, vol. 02, no. 07, February 12, 2003,
http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/0114/ (retrieved October
13, 2004).
[148] UNICEF, “UNICEF, Tamil Tigers agree to new steps
forward for children,” press release, March 4, 2003,
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_7304.html (retrieved October
13, 2004).
[149] Action Plan: Addressing the needs and care for the
children in the North East affected by war: Outcome document
from 10-11 April Workshop on Children Affected by War, April
22, 2003, p. 3.
[150] The reintegration of child soldiers is only one aspect
of the Action Plan. The Action Plan focuses on children
affected by war in other ways.
[151]
Some of these cases were children recruited prior to January
2002.
[152]
One hundred seventy-three children were released to the transit
centers, and another 918 were released directly to families.
This figure includes 280 children whom the Vanni LTTE forces
captured during the April confrontation with the Karuna faction
and released two days later.
[153]
From June 2003 through October 2004, UNICEF registered 1,424
cases of recruitment, 323 cases of re-recruitment, and 831
releases.
[154]
Information provided to Human Rights Watch by UNICEF, e-mail
communication, November 2, 2004. UNICEF reported that in
addition to the children formally released by the LTTE, 507
children ran away from the LTTE, 1,702 were released by Karuna’s
forces, and five were deceased. Of the cases in its
database, approximately 43 percent were girls, and 57percent
were boys.
[155]
Frances Harrison “Tigers ‘still enlisting’ children,” BBC News
[online], December 10, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3306725.stm
(retrieved October 13, 2004).
[156]
Ibid.
[157]
Sri Lanka National Human Rights Commission report, May 2004.
[158]
Human Rights Watch interview with transit center staff,
Kilinochchi, August 13, 2004.
[159]
Human Rights Watch interview with S. Puleedevan, Secretary
General, LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi, August 13, 2004.
[160]
Human Rights Watch interview with S.P. Tamilselvan,
General-Secretary of the LTTE political wing, Geneva, October 5,
2004.
[161]
Ibid.
[162]
Human Rights Watch interview with S. Puleedevan, Secretary
General, LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi, August 13, 2004.
[163]
Human Rights Watch interview with Fr. Karunaratnam, chairman of
the Northeast Commission on Human Rights (NECOHR), Kilinochchi,
August 13, 2004. The Commission claims to be an independent body
but operates with the support of the LTTE. In a subsequent
meeting in Geneva on October 5, 2004, Fr. Karunaratnam informed
Human Rights Watch that the secretariat had secured the release
of four children from the LTTE, and was investigating several
other cases.
[164]
Human Rights Watch interview with Fr. Karunaratnam, chairman of
the Northeast Commission on Human Rights (NECOHR), Kilinochchi,
August 13, 2004.
[165]
Human Rights Watch interview with S. Puleedevan, Secretary
General, LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi, August 13, 2004.
[166]
Human Rights Watch interview with R. Sivapragasam, Vocational
Training Expert, Vocational Training and Skills Development for
Children – North-Eastern Province, International Labor
Organization, International Programme on the Elimination of
Child Labour (IPEC), Colombo, August 3, 2004. Several former
child soldiers Human Rights Watch interviewed expressed regret
that the vocational training programs available did not offer
them the opportunity to further develop non-military training
they received in the LTTE, for example, medical training.
[167]
Both transit center and UNICEF staff informed Human Rights Watch
that as a matter of policy, counselors and other transit center
staff did not ask children questions about their experiences
while in the LTTE.
[168]
Human Rights Watch interview with transit center staff,
Kilinochchi, August 13, 2004.
[169]
Human Rights Watch interview with Save the Children, Batticaloa,
August 10, 2004. Save the Children conducts follow-up
social work, not only for children released through the transit
centers, but also for children who are released directly to
their families.
[170]
Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, “Our Mission,” n.d.,
http://troonline.org/en/?menu=about (retrieved October 13,
2004).
[171]
Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, October 2004.
[172]
Stewart Bell, “Groups Act as Fronts for Terror: CSIS: Tamils
reject report, deny any part in covert operations,” National
Post, December 9, 2000. The National Post cites an internal
Canadian Security Intelligence Service report which stated
“[M]ost funds raised under the banner of humanitarian
organizations such as the TRO are channeled instead to fund the
LTTE war effort.”
[173]
UNICEF informed Human Rights Watch that the actual construction
costs for the three transit centers totaled US$287,538, and that
the operation costs between October 2003 and August 2004 were
US$97,321. E-mail communication from UNICEF Colombo, October 26,
2004.
[174]
Human Rights Watch interview with Harendra de Silva, Chair,
National Child Protection Authority, Colombo, August 4, 2004.
[175]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff, Sri Lanka,
August 2004.
[176]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff, Kilinochchi
office, August 13, 2004.
[177]
Human Rights Watch interview with G. Edwin Rosairo, TRO
consultant, Kilinochchi transit center, August 13, 2004.
[178]
Human Rights Watch interview with TRO staff members, Batticaloa,
August 10, 2004.
[179]
UNICEF,
Action Plan for Children Affected by War Progress Report
January – June 2004, September 2004, p. 9.
[180]
Human Rights Watch interview with Save the Children, Batticaloa,
August 10, 2004.
[181]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff, Trincomalee
district office, Trincomalee, August 12, 2004.
[182]
Human Rights Watch interview with Save the Children, Batticaloa,
August 10, 2004.
[183]
UNICEF,
Action Plan for Children Affected by War Progress Report
January – June 2004, September 2004.
[184]
Ibid.
[185]
Ibid.
[186]
Human Rights Watch interview with international NGO staff,
Batticaloa, August 9, 2004.
[187]
Human Rights Watch interview with local activist, Batticaloa,
August 2004.
[188]
Human Rights Watch interview with human rights activist,
Batticaloa, August 2004.
[189]
Email communication from Andrea James, Head of Office,
UNICEF-Batticaloa to Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2004.
[190]
Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, “Child Security and Protection is the
First Step Towards Rehabilitation,” press release, July 16,
2004.
[191]
Email communication from Andrea James, Head of Office,
UNICEF-Batticaloa to Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2004.
[192]
UNICEF,
Action Plan for Children Affected by War Progress Report
January – June 2004, September 2004, p. 27.
[193]
Human Rights Watch interview with Ted Chaiban, UNICEF
representative, Colombo, August 17, 2004.
[194]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF staff, Trincomalee
district office, Trincomalee, August 12, 2004.
[195]
Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Duly, country director,
Save the Children, August 4, 2004.
[196]
Human Rights Watch interview with UN official, Batticaloa,
August 6, 2004.
[197]
Action Plan for Children Affected by War Progress Report January
–June 2004, UNICEF, p 28.
[198]
Ibid, p 13.
[199] Human Rights Watch interview with senior government
official, August 14, 2004. For example, although the
government technically administers the schools, the rule of the
LTTE is such that they can enter government schools and conduct
propaganda lessons (under the guise of history lessons) at will.
Many parents, even if opposed to the LTTE, feel that the
government is not teaching their children the correct version of
Tamil history. In the words of one parent: “Our children
have scarred minds, we have to tell them what happened….The
government teachers are neglecting their duties, so it is good
that the LTTE come in and teach our children about our history.”
Human Rights Watch interview, August 2004.
[200] For example, ninety percent of the Trincomalee
district police is Sinhalese. Human Rights Watch interview
with Upali Hewage, Senior Superintendent of Police, Trincomalee,
August 11, 2004.
[201]This was a concern repeated by several witnesses who
spoke with Human Rights Watch. Even though most witnesses
said that the security forces were now behaving better than
before, they still found it intimidating to pass through
security checkpoints on the road, which are manned largely by
Sinhalese speakers.
[202] Ibid.
[203] Human Rights Watch interview with Upali Hewage, Senior
Superintendent of Police, Trincomalee, August 11, 2004.
[204] Human Rights Watch interview with Sri Lanka Democracy
Forum member, London, September 29, 2004.
[205] Asian Human Rights Commission, “Two Sri Lankan police
sentenced to death over Tamil prisoner massacre,” press release,
July 1, 2003,
http://massacres.ahrchk.net/bindunuwewa/main_file.php/The+Bindunuwewa+Massacre/151/
(retrieved October 9, 2004).
[206] Human Rights Watch interview with international NGO
staff, Batticalao, August 2004.
[207] Human Rights Watch interview, London, September 30,
2004.
[208] Human Rights Watch interview with NHRC Trincomalee
member, Trincomalee, August 2004.
[209] Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation
Tiger of Tamil Eelam, (hereinafter “Cease Fire
Agreement”),February 22, 2002.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Cease Fire Agreement, art. 2.1
[213] Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, “Summary of recorded
complaints and violations from all districts, Period listed:
February 1, 2002 – September 30, 2004.” See
http://www.slmm.lk/OperationsMatter/complaints/2004_AllDistricts.pdf
(retrieved October 26, 2004). During the same period, the SLMM
received one complaint of child recruitment against the Sri
Lankan government, but the case was not ruled as a ceasefire
violation.
[214] Human Rights Watch interview with Helge Lyberg, SLMM
monitor, Trincomalee, August 12, 2004.
[215] Human Rights Watch interview with Suzanne Pederson,
SLMM monitor, Batticaloa, August 5,2004.
[216] Human Rights Watch interview with Helge Lyberg, SLMM
monitor, Trincomalee, August 12, 2004.
[217] Human Rights Watch interview with Suzanne Pederson,
SLMM monitor, Batticaloa, August 5,2004.
[218] Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, “Killing of Members of
LTTE & Government Forces – A serious threat to the Ceasefire and
the Peace Process,” press release, May 10, 2004; “Killings of
Members of Political Parties & Government Forces – Threat to the
Ceasefire,” press release, May 7, 2003.
[219] Human Rights Watch interview with SLMM monitor, early
August 2004.
[220] Human Rights Watch interview with Suzanne Pederson,
SLMM monitor, Batticaloa, August 5, 2004.
[221] Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of
Sri Lanka, June 9-10, 2003, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka/conf0306/
(retrieved October 26, 2004). A total of fifty-one
countries and twenty-two international organizations attended.
There have been follow-up meetings to the conference, with the
most recent one at the time of writing in Washington D.C. on
February 17, 2004.
[222] The LTTE boycotted the donors conference because
their demand for an interim administration in the North and the
East on its own terms had been rejected by the government.
It did not attend the follow up meeting in September 2003 in
Colombo.
[223] Declaration of the Tokyo Conference; Government of Sri
Lanka, “Tokyo Donor Conference Ends,” June 11 2003,
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200306/20030611tokyo_donor_conference.htm
(retrieved October 1, 2004).
[224] Ibid.
[225] “Joint Press Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo
Declaration,” June 1, 2004,
http://www.dellka.cec.eu.int/en/press_office/press_releases_pdf/s/cochair_meeting_03062004.pdf
(retrieved October 4, 2004).
[226] Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. State
Department, “The Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” press statement,
October 1, 2004. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36692.htm
(retrieved October 4, 2004).
[227]
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by
all states except Somalia and the U.S.
[228]
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, A/RES/54/263,
adopted May 25, 2000, entered into force February 12, 2002. Sri
Lanka ratified the protocol on September 8, 2000.
[229]
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No.
182), art. 3 (a), 38 I.L.M. 1207 (1999), entered into force
November 19, 2000.
[230]
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts.
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, adopted
July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.
[231]
Summary of Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga
Norman, Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, May 31, 2004, Case Number SCSL-2003-14-AR72 (E).
[232]
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38.
[233]
Ibid., art 39.
[234]
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, art 4.
[235]
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No.
182), art 1.
[236]
Ibid., art 7.
[237]
Recommendation 190: Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labour, para. 2, ILO No. R190, June 17, 1999.
[238]
U.N. Security Council resolution 1379, S/RES/1379, (November 20,
2001), para. 9 b.
[239]
U.N. Security Council resolution 1539, S/RES/1539, (April 22,
2004), para. 6
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