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Reflections on the shedding of Tamil blood
for fifty years
in Sri Lanka
Beginnings of State oppression of the Tamils Many people in the international community seem to blame the
Tamil side for not talking, negotiating and settling the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. They don’t seem to understand
the complexity of the problem. My view is that the Sinhala
side has been so intransigent throughout – Sinhala
chauvinism more and more assertive during the last two years
-that there is no basis for negotiating any just solution
for the suffering Tamils.
The latest ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’
speaks about finding a solution within a unitary
constitution; President Mahinda Rajapakse is talking about
‘maximum devolution’ within a unitary constitution. This is
euphemism for cosmetic changes within Sinhala Buddhist
hegemony. To get justice for the Tamils, the constitution of
Lanka should be structured differently; it should be
acceptable to mainstream Tamil opinion.
On certain matters,
the situation in Lanka in the forties and fifties should be
taken into consideration when finding a solution today. The
history of mainstream Sinhala political parties after
independence does not give any hope for the Tamils that they
can pin their hopes on one of the two main Sinhala political
parties. Even though it is arguable that the UNP has done
less evil, it is responsible for sliding the country towards
Sinhala Buddhist hegemony, immediately after independence.
Even though it had a historic opportunity in 1977 when it
came to power with a huge majority and introduced a new
constitution, it failed miserably to find a solution to the
ethnic problem, even though it spoke eloquently of the need
to find a solution in its election manifesto. It is now 58 years since Sri Lanka attained independence
from British rule in 1948. Oppression of the Tamils in
various forms by the Sinhala dominated State started in 1948
itself. The UNP government was in power till 1956. It was
not interested in building up a modern secular democratic
country for all the people of Lanka. It was more interested
in restoring the ancient Sinhala kingdom. At that time,
Sinhala Buddhist hegemony was not the ideal discussed in the
political platform. It was just national interests, securing
the welfare of Lankan nationals like the Sinhalas, Lankan
Tamils, Lankan Muslims, etc. About 10% of the population of
Lanka, who were mainly Tamils,
were deprived of citizenship
and franchise, because they were considered recent arrivals
from India during the British rule in the 19th and early
20th centuries. At the time of independence, Lanka had
roughly about 70% Sinhala speakers and 30% Tamil speakers.
Depriving the franchise of a big segment of Tamil population
has reduced the Tamil share in the political process of
Lanka to an insignificant level. The Sinhala dominated State went a step further to increase
its grip on the political process in Lanka. The
disfranchised Tamils were counted for the purposes of
demarcation of electorates but were not allowed to vote.
What this meant was electorates with majority or substantial
Tamil population and with insignificant or minority Sinhala
populations elected members of parliament with pro-Sinhala
or anti-Tamil platforms. Thus, this step of the UNP
government seems to have set up the stage for the future
politics of Sinhala Buddhist hegemony. Most of the Tamil
members of parliament supported the Sinhala dominated
government on this issue as they didn’t want to raise a
communal cry. At the time of independence, the Northern and the Eastern
Provinces of Lanka were just Tamil-speaking. The Sinhala
populations even in the border districts were less than 10%
of the population of those districts. The UNP government
wanted to develop irrigation and agriculture and to settle
people from over-populated districts. The Tamil speaking
Eastern Province was found to be sparsely populated. Massive
irrigation schemes were developed in the East and Sinhala
populations were settled in different parts. Trincomalee
district was a focus for Sinhala governments because of the
importance of its natural harbor. Seasonal migrant Sinhala
fishermen were encouraged to settle there, the Sinhala State
providing all the necessary facilities.
Lands not owned
privately in Trincomallee district were also given away, to
be developed by private enterprenuers, a vast majority of
them were Sinhalas. The Sinhala State
has changed the
demographic pattern of the East. Some of the Sinhalese claim
that at present the East is multi-linguistic and
multi-cultural because of this development. From the Tamil
perspective, the East has to continue as part of the Tamil
traditional habitat as Sinhala colonists after independence
could not be rewarded for their aggrandizement.
The Sinhala
colonization had been slowed down after the ethnic civil war
began. If the Tamils decommission their arms, it will be a
signal for large scale Sinhala colonization. The talks
cannot lead to any solution as the gap between the
expectations of the Sinhala and Tamil sides remain huge. The
international community, if it really cares for peace,
should come forward to impose some parameters on which peace
talks could start.
Just insisting on the Tamil side starting
talks with the Sinhala side so that at the end of the tunnel
there could be a glimmer of hope, seems to be very
unrealistic. The Tamils giving up arms and declaring that
they will seek only a negotiated solution may end up in
genocide of the Tamils as the solution for the ethnic
problem.
1956 was the first year Tamil blood was shed by the Sinhalas
in independent Lanka. It also marked the historic 2500 years
of the birth of the Buddha, according to Lankan records. The
SLFP, which started as a splinter group of the UNP, came to
power on Sinhala communal platform. Sinhala only was to be
the official language of Lanka while reasonable usage would
be allowed for Tamil. Finding that that there was a wave of
support for the SLFP, the UNP also changed its policy from
parity of status to Sinhala only. Many Tamils who trusted
the UNP felt let down by the opportunistic change of UNP
policy. There was an ethnic polarization from 1956.
Both
main Sinhala political parties joined in supporting Sinhala
only as official language. All the sixteen members of
parliament from the Northern and Eastern Provinces opposed
this move. Two Marxist political parties- the LSSP and the
CP- joined in the opposition, prophesying the doom of united
Lanka from ethnic polarization. Most of the Tamil members of
parliament from the North-East were elected on Federal Party
ticket, demanding the creation of a Tamil state within
united Lanka. They organized peaceful Gandhian type
Satyagraha protest outside parliament building protesting
against ignoring the claim of Tamil language to official
status. The Sinhala hoodlums cannot tolerate the protest of
the Tamil leaders. The Tamil leaders were manhandled in
Colombo. Some of them were injured and some Tamil blood was
shed in Colombo. There were also instances of killings of
Tamil civilians by footloose Sinhala laborers/ Sinhala
colonists in sugar-cane plantations in Gal-Oya Scheme and
Padaviya Scheme in the Eastern Province. This is also the
beginning of the Lankan tradition- there was no attempt to
bring the Sinhala criminals against the Tamils to justice. What started in 1956 has been going on intermittently during
the last 50 years, even though it has taken different forms
at different times. There was a
huge explosion in 1958 when
Sinhala hoodlums went on rampage against the Tamils. Many
Tamils had to be ferried to their historical habitat of the
North-East for their personal safety. The Tamils were made
to understand that the Lankan State was really a Sinhala
State and the Tamils had to accept a subservient status to
preserve peace. After watching these developments, B.H.Farmer, a Professor of Geography at Cambridge
University, published a book under the title,
‘Ceylon- A
Divided Nation’.
The country had been divided emotionally
and sentimentally from that time. Sinhala people could not
produce real national leaders who could rise above narrow
Sinhala nationalism and who could unite the country for the
past fifty years. Tamil people could not put up armed
resistance for many more years. Political leaders of the
Tamils were trying to talk to the Sinhala leaders on
compromises. Each time, they were rebuffed. Could the international community point out how the
situation is different now? |
