Home >
Tamil National Forum > Dharmeratnam Sivaram (Taraki)
TAMIL NATIONAL FORUM
Selected
Writings -
Dharmeratnam
Sivaram (Taraki)
தர்மரத்தினம் சிவராம்
(1959 - 2005)
"..நாம் இன்று அனுபவிக்கும் உரிமைகள் அனைத்துமே பேசிப்
பெற்றவையல்ல, அடித்துப் பெற்றவையே.."
"..the conduct of modern warfare is not only about
troops, weapons, generals and battlefields - it is also about
perceptions. The manner in which a war is perceived by states and their
populations today can have a strategic impact on its conduct..."
Dharmeratnam
Sivaram, One Hundred Tamils of 20th Century
|
2005... |
Ceasefire Agreement Year IV
2005 - 2006 |
27 April 2005 |
JVP’s war on NGOs and
fears of neo colonialism
|
24 April 2005 |
‘Don’t raise false hopes
amongst our people’ |
13 April 2005 |
The writing is on the
wall, and it is in red |
30 March 2005 |
TV images: LTTE's next
strategic dimension?
"It is now generally accepted that the conduct of modern
warfare is not only about troops, weapons, generals and battlefields - it is
also about perceptions. The manner in which a war is perceived by states and
their populations today can have a strategic impact on its conduct. Real
time images of a battlefield, flashed round the world can shape strategic
decisions about the war and the mindset of one's strategic allies. For many
years, the role of media as an indispensable component of modern war making
has been conceptualized and discussed in military journals and symposia as
the "CNN effect. Analyses in LTTE journals and the tenor and content of
discussions that Pirapaharan has had with some foreign media consultants in
recent years clearly indicate that the Tigers have been making an extensive
study of the "CNN effect". .."
|
27 March 2005 |
முப்படைகளுக்கும்
மரபு வழி போர்த்தகைமை உண்டா?
Do Sri Lanka's
defense forces have conventional warfare capability? |
23 March 2005 |
Are Tigers militarily
weak?
"...We read and hear numerous suggestions as to how the
armies of Pakistan, the US or India should be persuaded to join the battle
against the Tigers. One strategist speaks of a joint USAF-SLAF air exercise
over the LTTE's so called airstrip in Iranamadu. The clamour for strong
defence agreements with India and Pakistan betrays this strong desire to get
a foreign army to fight the LTTE in case of another war.If the Sri Lankan
armed forces have a tangibly patent military advantage over the Tigers, how
does one account for this harping on foreign intervention?.."
|
9 March 2005 |
What is the
larger picture in Pirapakaran's mind |
Ceasefire Agreement Year III
2004-2005 |
22 February 2005 |
War Remains an Option
Three Years After Cease-fire |
2004... |
26 November 2004 |
Pirabakaran at Fifty -
the political legacy
"It is not my intention here to interrupt the unceasing
labours of those who love to hate him. There is little I can add to the
invectives that Sinhala nationalist politicians, academics, opinion makers
and editorialists relentlessly heap on the LTTE leader. To them he is the
main enemy. But little is understood of him.
The Sinhala polity is always ready with neat but
simplistic categories to condemn the man and explain him and his actions.
Knowledge about him is still so superficial and anecdotal that even informed
writers in Colombo assume the LTTE’s Great Heroes’ Day falls on
Pirapaharan’s birthday on November 26. He is presumed to be so self centred
that one writer thinks that his birthday is the “grand climax” of the Great
Heroes’ Week. Nothing could be further from the truth. The desire to despise
him is so great that the oft reiterated fact that Great Heroes’ Day falls on
November 27 in memory of ‘Shankar’, the first LTTE’s to die in the war, is
forgotten. And what does Pirapaharan do on his birthday on November 26? Cuts
a big cake? No. He fasts the whole day in remembrance of one of his
lieutenants who died 22 years ago..."
more
|
21 November 2004 |
இலங்கையின் தேசிய செல்வத்தை
பங்கிட மறுக்கும் சிங்கள தேசம்
English Translation:
Sinhala Nation, refusing to share national wealth |
7 November 2004 |
இராணுவச் சமநிலையைப்
பேணுவதாயின் அரசியல் மயமாக்கல் தேவை
"நீண்டுசெல்லும் அமைதிச் சூழலில் புலிகள் தமது
மரபுவழிப்படைபலத்தை சிதைவின்றி பேணுவதற்கு தமிழ் சமூகத்தை எந்தளவிற்கு அரசியல்
மயப்படுத்த தயாராயிருக்கின்றார்கள் என்ற கேள்வியே இலங்கையின் இராணுவச் சமநிலையை
எமக்குச் சாதகமாக வைத்திருப்பதற்கு முக்கியமானதாகிறது."
|
5 November 2004 |
தினக்குரலும் சிவராமும்
"..நாம் இன்று அனுபவிக்கும் உரிமைகள் அனைத்துமே பேசிப்
பெற்றவையல்ல, அடித்துப் பெற்றவையே என போர்நிறுத்தம் ஏற்பட்ட காலத்தில் நான்
திருமலையில் பேசியதை தினக்குரல் முன்பக்கத்தில் வெளியிட்டதை நான் இங்கு
நினைவுபடுத்த விரும்புகிறேன். .."
|
31 October 2004 |
ஜனாதிபதி தேர்தல்
வியூகத்திற்குள் பலியாகப்போகும் சமாதானம்
"இடைக்கால தன்னாட்சி அதிகார சபைத் திட்டத்தைத் தொட்டாலே மகா
பாவம் என சிங்கள தேசத்தில் நாளாந்தம் புதுப்புது பரப்புரைகள் செய்யப்படுகின்றன.
பல சிங்கள மேலாண்மைக் கருத்தியலாளர்கள் புலிகளின் தன்னாட்சி அதிகாரசபை வரைவை
படிக்காமலேயே அது கிழித்தெறியப்பட வேண்டுமென காரசாரமாக எழுதிவருகின்றனர். "
|
24 October 2004 |
சிங்கள பௌத்தத்தைப்
புரிந்துகொள்வது பேச்சுவார்த்தைக்கு அவசியம் |
10 October 2004 |
விடிந்த பின் இராமர்
சீதைக்கு என்ன முறை..? எனக்கேட்கும் சிங்கள தேசம்
On the
psyche of the Sinhala Nation
"..By allowing my friends and me to stay in their house in
Colombo, Chandrika and her husband helped us to do our work in Southern Sri
Lanka. During that time Chandrika used to tell me, "Do not speak to anyone
who does not accept the
rights of the Tamils for self-determination." ( Her husband, Vijaya
Kumaratunge, was kind and supportive of our people and our liberation
struggle, but he was assassinated by the JVP).What happened to this kind of
Chandrika, the President? Why did she unleash the horror of the "War
for Peace" on Tamils? If we have to find explanations for all these,
then we have to do an in-depth analysis of the psyche of the Sinhala Nation.
Based on that alone can we firm up our approach on how to deal with the
Sinhala nation..."
|
6 October 2004 |
Geo-Strategic Implications of Sethusamudram
The Sethusamudram Project has a very important
geo-political dimension.It would give India a firm grip on one of the
world's most strategic and busiest sea-lanes. This would eventually give
India very remarkable leverage in its relations with China, Japan and the
US.
|
3 October 2004 |
தமிழர் பிரச்சனையை சிங்கள
தேசத்திற்கு விளக்க முனைவது பயனற்ற செயல்
|
26 September 2004 |
உங்கள்
செல்லிடத் தொலைபேசியின் குருதிக்கறை
|
12 September 2004 |
Sinhala nation once
again desires a military solution
இராணுவத் தீர்வின் மீது மீண்டும் ஆசைகொள்ளும் சிங்களதேசம்
"மேற்கூறிய அனைத்தையும் கருத்திற் கொண்டு
பார்க்கும்போது, சிங்கள தேசம் எந்த முயற்சி எடுத்தாலும் இந்தியாவைப்
புலிகளுக்கு எதிரான நேரடி இராணுவ நடவடிக்கையில் இறக்குவது மிகக் கடினம் என்ற
முடிவு பெறப்படும். இது சிங்கள மேலாண்மையாளருக்கும் புரிகிறது. அதனாலேயே
அவர்கள் தற்போது அமெரிக்காவை நாடத் தலைப்பட்டுள்ளனர்."
|
5 September 2004 |
Sinhala Nation seeks
Foreign Military Intervention
அந்நிய இராணுவ தலையீட்டை விரும்பும் சிங்கள தேசம் "இதுசம்பந்தமாக
மூன்று விடயங்களை விரிவாக ஆராயவேண்டியுள்ளது. ஒன்று - தமிழ்த் தரப்பிற்குச்
சார்பாக இலங்கையின் படைவலுச் சமநிலை கணிசமான அளவு திரும்புகின்ற ஒரு நிலை
ஏற்படும்போது இந்தியா அதைத் தடுக்க எந்தளவிற்கு இராணுவ ரிதியாகத் தலையிட
தயாராகவுள்ளது என்ற விடயம். இரண்டு - மேற்படி நிலை ஏற்படும்போது இந்தியா
தலையிடாவிடின் அமெரிக்காவும் அதன் கூட்டு நாடுகளும் சிறிலங்கா அரசின் சார்பாக
தலையிட எந்தளவு வாய்ப்புண்டு என்பது. மூன்று - எந்தவொரு வெளிநாடும் இங்கு
இராணுவ hPதியாகத் தலையிட முற்றாகத் தயங்குமளவிற்கு தமிழர் தரப்பிடம் சமச்சீரற்ற
முன்தடுப்பு வலு (யுளலஅஅநவசiஉயட னுநவநசசநnஉந ஊயியடிடைவைல) எந்தளவிற்கு உள்ளது
என்ற விடயமாகும். இவற்றை வருகின்ற கிழமைகளில் பார்ப்போம்."
|
29 August 2004 |
அந்தரத்தில் தொங்கும்
இலங்கையின் படை வலுச் சமநிலை |
25 August 2004 |
ISGA bashing: Much ado
about nothing
"The JVP has found in the ISGA a convenient means to take
forward its political mobilisation to another level, steadily cutting grass
under the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's feet. The ISGA, by and large, is a
four-letter word in the south. It agitates many. It is an irritant to many
more. All this is much ado about nothing. The ceasefire is the only tangible
reality of the peace process. All talk about talks is empty rhetoric. All
those who do not accept this fact are either scoundrels who are using the
chance to push their own ulterior agendas or are genuinely misguided gulls
who sincerely believe that things would start moving in the right direction
if only the Tigers and the UPFA sit across the negotiating table. The ISGA,
like all and sundry proposals and plans prepared and submitted by the Tamils
since 1978, cannot be implemented neither in part nor in full, come what
may..."
|
18 August 2004 |
Tigers dominate decades
of Tamil militancy
"...A US army officer covering South Asia whom I met in
Washington many years ago asked me why the Sri Lanka army is unable to raise
paramilitaries in the northeast that are large enough to curtail the spread
of the LTTE's influence in those regions considered key to the counter
insurgency campaign against the Tigers. He had in mind paramilitaries like
the right wing AUC that controls large areas in Columbia and terrorizes
peasants who support FARC, the main Marxist guerrilla organisation fighting
the state in that country. The AUC is estimated to be about ten thousand
strong. It plays a key role in the Columbian military's counter insurgency
campaign against FARC..."
|
15 August 2004 |
சுயநிர்ணய உரிமை,
ஒட்டுப்படைகள் கிழக்குத் தீமோர் தரும் பாடம்
|
8 August 2004 |
சூடான் - தமிழ் ஈழம்;
அமெரிக்கா இரட்டை வேடம் போட இயலாது
|
4 August 2004 |
ISGA
entails concepts and structures of final solution
"The peace process has
reached an absolute deadlock. But all parties involved in the attempt to
make permanent peace in Sri Lanka - the UPFA government, the LTTE, sundry
conflict resolution experts and the Norwegians - continue to say nice
things. There is no doubt that the ceasefire is there to stay for a while
despite the killings, attacks and the renegade factor. But the peace process
(if one may still call it so) is at a dead-end..."
|
25 July 2004 |
காலத்தின் தேவை அரசியல்
வேலை |
27 July 2004 |
கருணா ஓடியது எதற்காக? |
21 July 2004 |
Strategic positioning
vital for military advantage |
19 July 2004 |
நான் ஒரு மட்டக்களப்பு
பிரதேசவாதி |
14 July 2004 |
Can the renegade Karuna
deliver his Big Magic?
"...Life goes on as usual in Batticaloa town and in its
interior. The Army has stepped up patrols and occasional checks on the main
roads of the town. But no one appears to be too hassled by this. But
whenever I run into friends, acquaintances or relatives, they invariably
tell me that I am foolish to be back. "You would be shot dead like Nadesan.
Leave now", they say. But Batticaloa is my home. This is where I was born
and grew up. This is the only place in this wide world where the evening air
is sweetly suffused with memories of the girls whom I once loved and the
bars where I made merry in my first heady forays into manhood. This has been
my home despite years of a deadly internecine war between the LTTE and
another Tamil militant organisation to which I belonged, despite years of
threats posed by the (formerly) much-feared 'Razeek Group', despite the dire
uncertainties of life in the east during Eelam War III. (I am a reluctant
sojourner of Colombo)..."
|
7 July 2004 |
Karuna affair: The
military connection
|
May/June 2004 |
Audio-Video Presentation on
Himself & his Work
German Human Rights Server Interview with Sivaram
Dharmeratnam, May/June 2004 "Mr. Sivaram
Dharmeratnam is well known for his role in the web site
tamilnet.com. He spoke to us about his work and the
repression faced by Tamil journalists a few days before
his colleague
Mr. Aiyathurai
Nadesan was assassinated in the east of the island -
the first 5 clips are of this interview. Part 6 was made
after Mr Nadesan was murdered."
Part 1 -
Part 2
-
Part 3
-
Part 4
-Part
5
-
Part 6
|
29 May 2004 |
India will not court
regional instability by taking on Tigers
"...It is also obvious that no western power has been able
to manipulate the Tigers despite the presence of large Tamil Diaspora
communities in the developed countries. The lesson that Colombo refuses to
learn from the Indian intervention in 1983-87 is that Delhi's primary
concern in Sri Lanka is to preclude outside powers from strategically
positioning themselves on this island in a manner detrimental to its
interests here. Therefore as long as the LTTE does not actively promote
separatist sentiments in Tamil Nadu and as long as the LTTE refuses to
become a pawn in the hands of outside powers, India may not find reasons
compelling enough to do what many southern politicians and opinion makers
would want it to do against the Tigers..."
|
22 May 2004 |
LTTE develops
asymmetric deterrence to stall foreign intervention
When the Tigers say that the balance of forces between the
Sri Lankan military and their armed forces sustains the ceasefire they mean
that it is their military power that deters the Sri Lankan state from
considering war as the chief means of dealing with the conflict despite the
overwhelming Sinhala sentiment in favour of doing so. Here deterrence is not
based on symmetry of military power on either side. Actually there is an
asymmetry if one calculates the armed strength of the Sri Lankan state and
that of the LTTE in terms of their military assets and access to war
resources...Yet the LTTE has been able to achieve strategic parity of
military force with the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE did this by pooling all
its resources to launch a relentless assault on the military forces that the
GOSL had disproportionately concentrated in the north between 1995-1999.
This neutralised the defensive and offensive capability and debilitated the
resolve of the main component of the Sri Lankan ground forces, which were
massed up in Jaffna and the Vanni. However, the GOSL's resolve to continue
the war was finally broken when the LTTE hit Katunayaka..."
|
14 March 2004 |
கருணாவுக்கு ஒரு கடிதம் |
13 January 2004 |
Indo-Lanka Defence
Cooperation Agreement: A matter of routine |
Ceasefire Agreement Year II
2003-2004 |
4 February 2004 |
Is Sri Lanka Truly
Sovereign? |
27 January 2004 |
LTTE will negotiate only with
Parity of Military Status
"I formulated the concept of the balance of forces
between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces as the basis for the
ceasefire agreement in a paper presented at a conference in Switzerland
in April 2002. (Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva presented the Army's point of
view. But Chatham House rules prevent me from discussing details of the
matter here). I argued that the LTTE leadership decided to start
negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka because they were
unequivocally satisfied by December 2000 that they had achieved a
strategic parity with the Sri Lankan armed forces and were in a position
to sustain that parity, barring an overwhelming and sustained external
military intervention...Here one should emphasise that the Tigers
consider military power first and foremost as a means to negotiate
political ends. To negotiate effectively one should have a clear
understanding of the 'negotiating behaviour' of one's opponent...."
|
2003... |
13 June 2003 |
Tokyo & the Cost of the Unitary State’s Internal Colonialism |
5 May 2003 |
The folly of Eelam punditry
|
2002... |
Ceasefire Agreement Year I:
2002-2003 |
19 December 2002 |
What is India’s stand
on the peace process?
"...The US led coalition is doing the job of trying to
settle the conflict through Norway. And Delhi is assured of keeping
abreast of the developments by virtue of its legal status vis-à-vis the
Tamil question which is guaranteed by the Indo Lanka Accord. We must not
forget India has come to wield such decisive say on Sri Lanka’s
strategic status in the region by managing and mediating Tamil militancy
between 1983 and 1987 in its so called attempt to settle the ethnic
conflict here. The US and its allies are doing exactly the same here
now, though by subtler means. It is obvious to everyone that they are
not making peace for peace’s sake. There is nothing called a free lunch
in international diplomacy and power politics. Therefore, India may just
keep watching the peace process and blessing it towards fruition as long
as it does not give the US coalition great leverage in the affairs of
the island – the kind of leverage that could undermine what Delhi feels
are its “non negotiable strategic interests” in Sri Lanka..."
|
29 November 2002 |
Sinhala nationalists should rejoice
"Sinhala nationalists should rejoice now rather than
gripe and whine ad nauseam that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and
his men have perfidiously betrayed the Singhalese people to the
LTTE. The world's sole superpower has reiterated its commitment to
firmly support the Sri Lankan state to stop the LTTE from undermining
its sovereignty. Richard Armitage could not have been more lucid when he
called on the LTTE to renounce violence and to accept the authority of
the Sri Lankan state in all parts of the island..."
|
28 November 2002 |
Creeping pogrom
against Muslims in the South |
21 November 2002 |
LTTE’s law and order
machinery: drawing the line |
31 October 2002 |
HSZ renders Jaffna IDPs in
vulnerable position
A US state department official who visited Jaffna
after it was captured by the army said that the peninsula provided a
window of opportunity for reconstruction and development. Even today
there is much hype about rebuilding Chavakachcheri, Jaffna town,
improving telecommunication facilities, roads and tourism in the
north.Thousands of tourists from the south visit Jaffna today. Ministers
and diplomats come and go. New banks and insurance companies from the
south have started business in Jaffna and are reporting handsome profits
already. Business seems to thrive. Flashy new Indian motorbikes are on
the roads everywhere. All this leaves the impression in one’s mind that
Jaffna is almost fine. Little would the average visitor know that there
are thousands of refugees living in run down refugee camps amid squalor
and official negligence. This is the other side of Jaffna, a reality
that the government pretends not to see..."
|
24 October 2002 |
A
Hidden Hand behind Akkaraipattu Incidents
"There is a simple formula today for bringing down the
UNF government by manipulating Muslim politics. One can precipitate a
crisis in the east by instigating Muslims to protest against the LTTE.
Then build on the crisis to make it difficult for the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress to remain in the UNF. Or, prod the SLMC or sections of it to
make demands that the LTTE and the UNF cannot meet at this juncture. The
incidents that led to the Police clamping a local curfew in the
Akkaraipattu – Addalaichenai towns on the southeastern coast should also
be scrutinised in this light..."
|
17 October 2002 |
What lies behind the uprising in
the East
"The incident in Kanjirankudah in which fifteen
civilians were wounded and five were killed by STF fire on Wednesday has
once again given a boost to those who argue that the LTTE is
deliberately and systematically provoking civilians into attacking
military camps. They see a sinister pattern in such incidents where
civilians have raised not only their voices but also their fists against
the presence of the Sri Lankan armed forces in several key points in the
northeast. They also argue that the LTTE is using civilian unruliness as
a cover to push the army out of strategic positions..."
|
3 October 2002 |
Rumour as weapon |
21 September 2002 |
Demobilising is Irrelevant to Peace |
6 September 2002 |
International Safety
Net - You can't have the cake and eat it
There are no permanent alliances but only permanent
interests that inform the affairs between states. Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe appears to be sure of an international safety net to
deter the LTTE from going back to war. In securing this safety net, he
is attempting to do what many consider impossible in international
politics. He is getting the support of countries whose strategic
interests in this part of the world are diametrically opposed and hence
in conflict. Can Mr. Wickremesinghe and his team of peace negotiators
have the cake and eat it as well?
|
24 August 2002 |
The East: LTTE's
Achilles Heel or Military Asset?
The Hindu newspaper's Sambandan asked what was in my
view the most useful question at Prabhaharan's press conference in
Kilinochchi on March 10. Clearly Sambandan did not realise the import of
his question at the time. ˜What would you consider the greatest military
challenge that you had to ever face?' was his question. The LTTE leader
pondered the matter for some time... the Tiger leader after the long
pregnant pause said it was Op. Jeya Sikurui....The answer was
Prabhaharan's unique way of acknowledging to the world the importance of
Karuna, the eastern commander who was seated by his side at the press
conference. Karuna was the overall commander of the LTTE's defensive
operations and counter offensives against Jaya Sikurui. It was Karuna
who commanded the LTTE forces that drove the army out of the Vanni..."
|
2001... |
Eelam War III 1995-2002 |
23 November 2001 |
Western Mediation: How effective
can it be?
"...persuading or coercing the LTTE into a dialogue is
not the primary role that Colombo expects the west to play in resolving
the conflict. The PA (the UNP and the JVP too), first of all, wants the
western governments to arrest and deport known LTTE activists in their
countries. Secondly, it wants them to ban the organisation as India and
the US have done. And thirdly it urges them to stop the Tigers from
collecting money. The LTTE has learnt from its Indian sojourn that all
foreign hosts are invariably inclined, for very pragmatic reasons, to
view its assets on their soil including manpower as the means by which
they may eventually be able to exert diplomatic pressure on the
organisation...."
|
2000... |
13 December 2000 |
What is really wrong with the
counter insurgency methods?
"Western counter insurgency methods have succeeded in
putting down or effectively containing the armed struggles for social
emancipation or for carving out separate states in the majority of the
countries which adopted them under the tutelage of the Americans and the
British. This is a fact that more often than not is buried by the third
world's persistent fascination with the success stories of Vietnam and
Cuba. The American and British governments have spent vast resources to
study and constantly improve on their common and specific counter
insurgency methods unlike the Cubans or the Vietnamese whose cash
strapped economies would brook no such luxuries..."
|
19 October 2000 |
Lanka's climbing war budget gets
diminishing returns |
1999... |
1 December 199 |
Towards a rigorous election campaign:
Can CBK get the minority vote? |
22 May 1999 |
Media Bias and Censorship in Conflict Reporting in Sri Lanka |
9th May 1999 |
Tigers short of manpower ? |
2 May 1999 |
Whispers of conspiracy find hot
market |
25 April 1999 |
Tiger hunt: Delhi's changing faces
|
11 April 1999 |
PA can't have it and eat it
|
4 April 1999 |
Kosovo strikes stir Eelam lobby
|
21 March 1999 |
Eelam War: Growing more complex
|
14 March 1999 |
Suspicion and mistrust, reality of
Jaffna |
21 February 1999 |
Where the bold dare to tread
|
14 February 1999 |
Towards a global Tamil village on
internet |
7 March 1999 |
Relations with Chennai will continue
to trouble |
3 March 1999 |
So why did the chicken cross the
road? |
17 January 1999 |
Those who wear the Tiger mask
|
10 January 1999 |
What the cats missed… |
3 January 1999 |
Did President meet Gopalasamy? |
1998... |
27 December 1998 |
The year ahead, a tough story all
over again
|
20 December 1998 |
Rations: the ludicrousness of logic
|
13 December 1998 |
The PA angel and a diabolical Tiger
|
29 November 1998 |
TULF: Stage set for new leadership
|
25 November 1998 |
Diplomatic Safari in S. Africa:
Tiger-hunt in quagmire
|
18 November 1998 |
War is far from over -
Whats behind LTTE"s recent recruitment drive?
"The LTTE's recent recruitment drive provided another
opportunity for predictions about the organisation and its intentions.
Those who nurture an inveterate hatred for the Tigers on either side of
the Palk Strait, saw in the recruitment campaign a desperate bid for
survival, a pathetic attempt to replenish the ranks depleted by Op.
Unceasing Waves II. The Hindustan Times which seems to have developed a
penchant for gleefully insisting that the Tamil cause has run out of
steam, described the Kilinochchi attack as "a flash in the pan" for the
LTTE struggling as it were on its last legs..."
|
22 March 1998 |
LTTE moves on despite global
isolation
|
8 March 1998 |
Tamil question knocking on the doors
of Delhi
|
22 February 1998 |
Changing strategies and Kilinochchi
gamble
|
15 February 1998 |
The Operation
Checkmate in Kilinochchi – LTTE style
|
8 February 1998 |
The deepening theatre
of operation - the Kilinochchi factor
|
25 January 1998 |
'Curiouser
and curiouser'
|
11 January 1998 |
Jaffna:
still on paper
|
4 January 1998 |
Why Prabha
would reduce resistance |
1997... |
21 December 1997 |
Jaffna: where nothing
is certain!
|
14 December 1997 |
Is there a future for the moderates? |
7 December 1997 |
The scramble for
candidates begins! |
23 November 1997 |
Creeping advantage:
can the government hold on to it? |
16 November 1997 |
Counter- offensive
quagmire in Jaffna |
9 November 1997 |
LTTE takes battle to
the US courts
|
2 November 1997 |
Tailing the Tiger
trap |
12 October 1997 |
Battle on A9: a battered theory of
war
|
5 October 1997 |
Package won’t work
|
27 July 1997 |
Ten years after the Indo-Lanka
Accord: not even the 'kovanam'
|
29 June 1997 |
Blinded in the Wanni quagmire
|
22 June 1997 |
These people have little choice
|
15 June 1997 |
The bloody lessons of
Thandikulam
|
11 June 1997 |
To hell with the environment |
8 June 1997 |
'Surprise' in Prabha's strategy |
25 May 1997 |
Geographical dimension of Operation
Jaya Sikurui |
11 May 1997 |
UNP ponders direct talks with LTTE?
|
4 May 1997 |
Sojourn to Vanni tells all |
May 1997 |
The Cat, a Bell
and a Few Strategists
"Many arguments about the
best and most effective way of defeating or suppressing armed Tamil
separatism in Sri Lanka have been ventured in earnest since the
beginning of the Eelam War almost fourteen years ago. The latest of
these can be stated thus: ‘The LTTE’s recruitment base is showing clear
signs of diminishing such as the fact that they are relying more and
more on women and children for new recruits. This is an irreversible
trend given the social and economic realities of the northeast, whereas
the army can continue to draw recruits from a population which is at
least sixty percent larger than the one on which the Tigers have to
depend. Furthermore, the total strength of the Tigers being one tenth or
slightly higher than that of the army, manpower losses which they
sustain in battles will have ten times the impact such losses can have
on the security forces. Therefore, ‘manpower’ shortages will, in the
foreseeable future, impel the LTTE to abandon the military option or
reduce it to an insignificant and marginal guerrilla organization.’..."
|
6 April 1997 |
Tigers think: Why talk, when we are
riding high
|
23 March 1997 |
All roads don’t lead to Jaffna
|
9 March 1997 |
Forward march, many more miles to go
yet |
1996... |
20 October 1996 |
After Prabha: question of succession |
6 October 1996 |
LTTE has own 'medical corps'
|
29 September 1996 |
EPDP goes on offensive
|
15 September 1996 |
Playing roulette with interim council |
8 September 1996 |
Govt. clings on despite stiff opposition |
18 August 1996 |
Tussle for Titanium |
11 August 1996 |
Target Prabha |
4 August 1996 |
Nine years on,
nothing to show
|
28 July 1996 |
Unceasing waves
unleash terror unknown
|
30 June 1996 |
Playing politics with
the Package |
16 June 1996 |
PA's new bank |
9 June 1996 |
UNP gives nod for
greater devolution?
|
2 June 1996 |
Pacification: key to
end war |
26 May 1996 |
Alliance plays
politics with Tamil parties |
19 May 1996 |
In search of solution
but with honour
|
12 May 1996 |
Tamil Nadu Connection,
Again |
21 April 1996 |
Riviresa II and opening up of the
8th front
"One year has gone by since the LTTE began Eelam War
Three on April 19, 1995. The major operation to capture Vadamaradchi and
Thenmaradchi has begun. The Tigers have withdrawn all their bases from
the region leaving behind a large number of attack groups which will
harrass the army once it has established its positions there. An
assessment of the first year of Eelam War Three will give an indication
where things would be headed once the Vadamaradchi-Thenmaradchi
operation is complete..."
|
7 April 1996 |
Give up east, at what
cost?
|
31 March 1996 |
How free is the East today ?
|
3 March 1996 |
Game Plan for a
Grand Slam
"..Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte has said
that the war would be brought to an end by April this year. It is clear
from the actions and statements of the Tigers that they have more or
less assumed that the next major operation in Jaffna would be into the
southern part of Thenmarachchi with a view to cutting off the peninsula
from the mainland completely - a large scale version of Operation Yal
Devi. (The LTTE's International Secretariat claimed recently that the
government is delaying the operation because some senior officers in the
army are reluctant to sanction it). It is also evident that the LTTE is
not going to resist the offensive. It has pulled out almost all its
vital military assets from both Vadamarachchi and Thenmarachchi and
seems to be digging in for a long haul in the region..."
|
1994... |
9
October 1994 |
Thondaman's Dilemma |
15 May 2004 |
Govt's
Counter-Insurgency Programme and LTTE's Military Response |
8
May 1994 |
The Exclusive
Right to Write Eelam History |
1993... |
15 June 1993 |
What went wrong between
the Tigers and Premadasa |
1992... |
Eelam War II 1990-1995 |
1
May 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 1
Origins and Dispersion in
South India and Sri Lanka "Tamil nationalism in
South India and Sri Lanka can be described in terms of two sets of ideas and
beliefs. The one, the purity and uniqueness of Tamil language and culture;
the other, Tamil traditions which exalt military virtues and ideals..."
more |
15 May 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
2
Tamil Military Castes
"..For many years,
until he became chief minister, Karunanidhi wrote under the pen-name
Maravan. His weekly letter to party cadres was known as Maravan Madal – the
Maravan’s epistle. Tamil militarism thus became integral to the Dravidian
movement..."
more |
1
June 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
3
Tamil Militarism – The Code of Suicide
"Pulla Vazhkai Vallan Pakkam
– the martial attitude of the warrior who goes forth into suicidal
battle is mentioned by Tholkappiyam. The other works refer to it as
Thannai Verttal. Duarte Barbosa describes the practice among
the Nayar (of the Chera kingdom). It was later noticed by British officials
as well. It was also prevalent among the Maravar (of the Pandya kingdom)
from whom the suicidal Aapathuthavi bodyguard was selected."
more |
1
July 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
4 Militarism
and caste in Jaffna "Tamil secessionism and Tamil militarism are
two sides of the same coin. Both are legacies of the attempt by the British
to demilitarize Tamil society in the 19th century. Tamil militarism arose
from the grievances of the disfranchised Tamil military castes. Tamil
secession was the result of the political ambitions of the classes which
were promoted by the British to consolidate the gains of demartialization.
Therefore it is necessary to understand the colonial strategies which were
aimed at depriving the traditional power and status of the Tamil martial
castes in Tamil society."more |
15 July 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
5
The suppression of Tamil military
castes "..One of the first concerns of the British as soon as they
conquered the southern parts of India was with the ancient and ingrained
“habits of predatory war” among the Tamils. The extirpation of these
“habits” and culture was considered essential to establishing their
authority in Tamil society. The Tamil region was ceded to the British in
July 1801; a proclamation was issued by them in December the same year,
whereby the use of arms was suppressed and the military service
traditionally rendered by the Tamil military castes was abolished..."
more |
1
August 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
6
Bishop Caldwell and the Tamil
Dravidians
"Robert Caldwell (1819-1891) was the father of the Dravidian movement.
He was the Bishop of Tinnevely – the heartland of the Maravar Poligars –
during the times when the British were engaged in suppressing the Tamil
military castes in the Tamil region...The intention of this study however is
to show that the fundamental tenets of the nascent phase of the Dravidian
ideology were essentially linked to the political and cultural legacies of
the British attempt to demilitarize Tamil society.The writings of Bishop
Caldwell presuppose a teleological project which was not uncommon to what
were conceived as great intellectual undertakings in that era of empire
building..."more |
15 August 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
7 The Tamil
Soldier and the Dravidian Diaspora |
1
September 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
8
The Twin Narratives of Tamil
Nationalism |
1
October 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part
9
[Subramanya] Bharathy and the
Legitimation of Militarism |
1
November 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 10
Warrior Sons and Mothers |
15 November 1992 |
On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 11
The Legend of Cheran Senguttuvan
together with Post Script
by Sachi Sri Kantha on the Significance of Sivaram’s study on the
Maravar Caste and Tamil Militarism, 6 May 2005 |
15 November 1992 |
LTTE's Eelam Project and the Muslim People |
30 July 1992 |
Counter-civilian
strategies |
10 June 1992 |
SL Government's speak
soft, hit hard policy |
7
June 1992 |
Govt.'s Dual Strategy Against the Tigers |
31 May 1992 |
Can Indians wipe out LTTE |
23 May 1992 |
The ban on LTTE and Tamil
Nadu politics |
20 March 1992 |
LTTE admits it
holds political prisoners |
3
March 1992 |
LTTE gearing
up for battle of Jaffna |
1991... |
1
November 1991 |
On Cutting off
Supply Lines |
12 September 1991 |
Future of
Tamil Nadu Politics |
31 July 1991 |
The LTTE’s New Concept-
Confederation |
12 June 1991 |
War and Peace-
LTTE way |
9
June 1991 |
The Government has to talk to
the LTTE at Some Point of Time |
19 May 1991 |
Coercive Airpower in the
Eelam Conflict |
1990... |
Eelam War I, Indo-Eelam War 1976-1987,
1987-1990 |
6
May 1990 |
On Vadamarachchi & Anton
Balasingham |
14 March 1990 |
The Idea of Eelam |
18 February 1990 |
Karunanidhi's
Novel: Payum Puli Pandara Vanniyan |
3
December 1989 |
Tigers two pronged
strategy |
29 October 1989 |
Waning importance
of the rearbase in Tamil Nadu |