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Selected
Writings
Ana Pararajasingham, Australia
Ana
Pararajasingham has a master’s degree in management from the University
of Technology, Sydney, and works as a Management Consultant. He is also
a Fellow Member of the Australian Society of Certified Practising
Accountants (FCPA) and
Associate Member of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (ACMAUK).
He worked with the World Bank (as a Consultant) to assess the needs of
the war torn NorthEast on behalf of multilateral donor agencies in 2003
and to help assess the
needs arising from the damage caused by the tsunami in 2005. He appeared
before the Australian Parliament’s Joint Parliamentary Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence on several occasions to present the
case for international action in the conflict in the island of Sri
Lanka. In 2002/03 he developed and delivered a course on Project
Management for personnel working for Non Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) in the North East of Sri Lanka, a project funded by UNICEF.
He has served on the Editorial Board of the ‘Tamil Nation’ fortnightly
and has written extensively on the conflict in the island of Sri Lanka
and on related human rights issues, and has presented papers and
participated at several conferences. He is the Chairman of the
Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations - an umbrella
organisation of Tamil Associations in the Australasian region. [see also
Heard in Internet Circles]
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| 30
March 2007 |
நண்பர் மாமனிதர் ஜெயக்குமாருக்கு வீரவணக்கம்
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| 17 December 2006 |
A Tribute to Anton Balasingham |
| 14 October 2006 |
The Strategy
of 'Containment' |
| 17 September 2006 |
A Tribute to Adrian Wijemanne |
| 23
July 2006 |
Remembering Black July
1983 - Address at a public meeting in Sydney attended by Australian
Parliamentarians |
| 18
March 2006 |
A Response to Human Rights
Watch |
| 11
December 2005 |
Required: Paradigm Shifts
"..It is vital that the Tamils seek a deeper understanding of the
factors which drive this (Sinhala) intransigence. A clue to this is to be
found in a speech by S W R D Bandaranaike, the founder of the
Sinhala Maha Saba and the architect of the Sinhala Only policy of
1956 which marked the beginning of the Tamil struggle for
self-rule. According to the Daily News of 8, November 1955, Bandaranaike made
the case for the Sinhala Only bill by arguing that "With their
books and
culture and
the
will and strength
characteristic of their race, the Tamils (if
parity were granted) would soon rise to exert their dominant
power over us” It was not just the Mahavamsa
inspired notions of 'primacy' that have been the impetus, but
also something else-the fear of domination. .".
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| 24
October 2005 |
The EU Ban: Impact on the Peace Process
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| 17
September 2005 |
Dhanapala: Defending the Indefensible |
| 21
July 2005 |
The Failure of the Joint Mechanism:
Lessons to be Learnt |
| 20
July 2005 |
A Review: Portrayal of a
President: Sri Lanka’s Chandrika Kumaratunge
First Broadcast on 12th July on ABC TV’s Foreign Correspondent
Program
"...Michael Maher, the
interviewer, had little trouble drawing the Sri Lankan President
into revealing her personality. Maher’s intention was to
enlighten rather than sensationalize. His approach was
friendly, polite to the point of being deferent but probing. The
Sri Lankan President obliged by speaking her mind out..."
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| 13
December 2004 |
India’s Sri Lanka Policy:
Need For A Review
“It appears evident, then, that that the
Indian State failed to take the political force and mass appeal
of Tamil nationalism seriously If the violence and perfidy of
the Sri Lankan State had given rise to Tamil nationalism in the
first place, the popular commitment to Eelam was cemented and
solidified by the Tamils bitter experience with the Indian
State. The current policy of supporting the unity and integrity
of Sri Lanka while not addressing the spectre of Tamil
nationalism will therefore have to be construed as a policy not
much different from that which resulted in the physical
intervention by India in support of Colombo. The question that
needs to be asked is how realistic is it for the Indian
Government to persist with such a policy when ground realities
have changed significantly during the intervening period."
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| 23 September 2004 |
International Community Can Help Forge Peace
"Given the credentials of both writers, (Sathananthan
is a political scientist with a Ph.D. from Cambridge and a
visiting research Scholar at the Jawaharlal Nehru University of
International Studies; Taraki is the pseudonym of Sivaram who
has written extensively on the armed struggle of the Tamil
people for well over a decade), one needs to give serious
consideration to the essential thrust of this argument, i.e.
that the international community is pursuing a plan to weaken
the LTTE and prop up Colombo. .."
more
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| 23 July 2000 |
State Terror - Black July'83 Revisited
"....July 2000 marks the 17th anniversary of the worst
anti-Tamil pogrom. While it was the
years of discriminatory
administrative and legislative measures that drove
the
Tamils people into staking a political claim for a federal form of government and
subsequently independence, the main impetus
for the armed struggle is the direct consequence of
these state assisted/orchestrated pogroms during the first twenty-five years of Sinhala
rule.. It was
state terror that finally drove the Tamil
people into taking up arms. The war is the result of the Sri Lankan political
establishment's policy of seeking to beat the Tamil people into submission. Perhaps it is
time the international community is reminded of those
events which took place seventeen years ago..."
more
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| September 1999 |
East Timor & Tamil Eelam |
| 28 March 1997 |
Militarisation of Sri Lanka
"The growth in the Sri Lankan Governments military expenditure between 1983 and
1996 could only be described as astronomical. In 1983, the Sri Lankan Governments
military expenditure was US $74 million In 1996 it was well over US
$842 million¾ a eleven fold increase! Not surprisingly, this
exponential growth in the military expenditure of the Sri Lankan Government was
accompanied by a growth in the size of its armed forces. The combined armed forces (army,
navy and airforce) of the Sri Lankan Government which stood at 15,000 in 1983 now stands
at well over 106,000 - a seven fold
increase..."
more
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