Annan Plan For Cyprus Settlement

The Annan Plan was a United Nations proposal to bring about the reunification of the divided island nation of Cyprus as the United Cyprus Republic. It was named in recognition of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who largely devised the proposal in conjunction with Didier Pfirter.

The Annan Plan proposed the creation of the United Cyprus Republic, covering the island of Cyprus in its entirety (except for the British Sovereign Base Areas). This new country was to be a loose confederation of two component states – the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State – joined together by a minimal federal government apparatus.

This federal level, loosely based on the Swiss confederal model, would have incorporated the following elements:

A collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated according to population (per present levels, four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots), and selected and voted in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1.
A President and Vice President, chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members, one from each community, to alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council's five-year term of office.
A bicameral legislature:
- A Senate (upper house), with 48 members, divided 24:24 between the two communities.
- A Chamber of Deputies (lower house), with 48 members, divided in proportion to the two communities' populations (with no fewer than 12 for the smaller community).
A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges; to be appointed by the Presidential Council.

The plan included a federal constitution, constitutions for each constituent state, a string of constitutional and federal laws, and a proposal for a United Cyprus Republic flag and national anthem. It also provided for a Reconciliation Commission to bring the two communities closer together and resolve outstanding disputes from the past.

It would also have established a limited right to return between the territories of the two communities, and it would have allowed both Greece and Turkey to maintain a permanent military presence on the island, albeit with large, phased reductions in troop numbers.

Negotiations

In January 2002, direct talks under the auspices of Secretary-General Annan began between the Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash.

In November 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It was revised in early December. In the lead up to the European Union's December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, intensive efforts were made to gain both sides' signatures to the document prior to a decision on the island's EU membership. Neither side agreed to sign. The EU invited the Republic of Cyprus to join on 16 December 2002.

Following the Copenhagen Summit, the UN continued dialogue with the two sides with the goal of reaching a settlement prior to Cyprus's signature of the EU accession treaty on 16 April 2003. A third version of the Annan plan was put to the parties in February 2003. That same month the Secretary-General again visited the island and asked that both leaders agree to put the plan to referendum in their respective communities. Also in February 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected as the fifth president of the Republic of Cyprus. On 10 March 2003, this most recent phase of talks collapsed in The Hague, Netherlands, when Denktash told the Secretary-General he would not put the Annan Plan to referendum.

In February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktash accepted the Secretary-General's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on 19 February 2004. The two community leaders, Rauf Denktash and Tassos Papadopoulos, met nearly every day for negotiations facilitated by the Secretary-General's Special Advisor for Cyprus, Álvaro de Soto. In addition, numerous technical committees and subcommittees met in parallel in an effort to resolve outstanding issues. When this stage of the talks failed to reach an agreed settlement Rauf Dentaksh refused to attend the next stage of meetings which were scheduled to take place in Bόrgenstock on 24 March 2004 and sent Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktash as his agents. The talks collapsed and no negotiated agreement was reached by the two communities. The Secretary-General then stepped in as arbitrator and on 31 March presented to the two sides a proposed final settlement. Rauf Dentaksh rejected Annan's proposal immediately and Tassos Papadopoulos rejected the plan a week later while Mehmet Ali Talat supported it.

Rejection

See: Cyprus reunification referendum, 2004

The plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum of 24 April 2004. Whilst the proposal received a 65% favorable vote from the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it by over 75%. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, reunification did not take place. Had there been a positive vote on both sides, a unified Cyprus would have acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004.

Reasons for Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan

The Plan did not include a settlement regarding the repatriation of Turkish settlers living on Greek Cypriot owned land in the 'Northern Cyprus', while after 19 years, the possibility of abolishing the derogation of 5% of Greeks and Turkish citizens who could settle in Cyprus, is obvious, and the danger of a permanent mass settling of Cyprus by Turkey is visible.
The Plan did not deal in full with the demilitarisation of the de facto 'TRNC', and Greek Cypriots felt they had no reason to believe Turkish promises concerning the withdrawal of troops.
Many Greek Cypriots interpreted the Right of Return policy as to be seriously flawed, meaning only 20% of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return over a time frame of 25 years, whereas Turkish Cypriots would have had full right of return.
Turkish Cypriots would have gained all the basic demands it made, from the first day of the implementation of the solution. To be exact, 24 hours after the holding of the referendum. In contrast, everything that the Greek Cypriots were aspiring to achieve, would have postponed without guarantees and depend upon the good will of Turkey to fulfil the obligations it undertakes. They are also subject to the precondition that all would have gone well.
The return of the Turkish occupied land will take place in the period between three and a half months and three and a half years from the moment the solution is signed with no guarantees whatsoever that this shall be implemented. The Cypriot-Greek proposal of placing these areas under the control of the UN Peace Keeping Force and not the Turkish army has been rejected.
The Plan did not address the issue of the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) on the island, although parts of the SBAs would be transferred to the governments of the two consituent states.
The functional weaknesses of the Plan endanger, inter alia, the smooth activity and participation of Cyprus, with one voice, in the European Union. While the Greek Cypriots have with many sacrifices achieved Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Greek Cypriots could very easily be led to the neutralization of the accession until the adoption of all necessary federal and regional legal measures or the loss of the benefits of the accession or the facing of obstacles in Cyprus participation in the Economic and Monetary Union and other European institutions.
The Economy of Cyprus would have been separate with the plan. There will be no common monetary, fiscal policy and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.

Recent developments

(1) On 6 April 2005 the European Court of Human Rights decided that, "even the adoption of the plan would not have afforded immediate redress" of the Greek Cypriots property rights.

Loukis Loukaides the Cypriot judge on the European Court of Human Rights, has since called on the Greek Cypriot political leaders to stop backing the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations, because its basic philosophy violates fundamental human rights and the EU acquis. (Cyprus Weekly 15 April 2005)

He recommends the following action be taken:

1 - The drafting of an official information bulletin on the violation of the EU acquis by the Annan Plan.

2 - To declare clearly that the Plan is incompatible with the European Human Rights Charter and other International Human Rights Treaties, which are already binding on us and also as a result of our EU accession.

3 - To cease at last to refer to the Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement, or negotiations. So long as this continues, foreign officials and organisations that could assist us achieve a good settlement, will not do so.