"Sikhs in the
diaspora, especially the Sikh communities of Canada, the United States and
Britain, have played a considerable role in the political, economic and social
life of Punjab, as well as being affected by events in the Punjab and India.
Through remittances, exchange of ideas and ideology, visits and pilgrimages to
ancestral homes and kin, the Sikh diaspora communities have kept a lively
cultural exchange. They have also nurtured political associations. Their
richer sections have invested in a range of projects from economic assistance
to considerable donation for religious, educational and charitable
works.
While the overseas
Sikh communities do not meet sufficient conditions to be described as a
diaspora, they do seem to have acquired certain necessary elements of a
psychological and sociological nature which are essential to its
consciousness. First-generation overseas migrants are obviously related to the
homeland in many ways, but the events of June 1984 had a “traumatic”
effect and generated considerable response and solidarity among the second and
third generations.
In the aftermath of
the army action in the Golden Temple, the role of British and North American
Sikh communities has been significant in popularizing the idea of a Sikh
homeland. Support for organizations campaigning for the Sikh state has been
substantial, both material and moral. It has internationalized the issue of
a Sikh homeland.
Reaction to the
Punjabi crisis has led to a sustained campaign for Khalistan among a section
of the Sikh leadership abroad. The mode of mobilization and the formation of
new organizations have been informed by cultural, moral and religious
traditions of the Sikh society. This study highlights the complex nature of
identity formation and the developmental process of an ethnic community. While
a broader loyalty towards India probably still exists, the events of the past
decade have caused perceptible changes in their loyalties, and they have also
affected their relationship with the host societies. The Punjabi crisis has
probably generated a realignment of Sikh identity towards Punjab in small yet
perceptible ways, though such shifts are inherently difficult to quantify.
The impact of the
Punjabi crisis has enabled them to redraw a strict definition of Sikh
identity, highlighting the religious tradition
and collective symbols of the community instead of the geography, language and
cultural traits. These developments within the community serve to
underline the “situational” nature of ethnic consciousness, while the
articulation of the demand for a “homeland” is seen to be anchored in the
primordial givens. The reaction also shows how the events of 1984 have been
seen and interpreted as a threat to the collective entity of the Sikh
community, a humiliation for the community’s pride. A somewhat ambiguous
and complex set of attachments towards an imaginary homeland has been
reinforced by the “crucial” event, which posed a challenge to the deeply
held beliefs and feelings.
The characteristic
call for mobilization has been to avenge this humiliation and to achieve a
secure homeland where such a threat could not arise in the future. Thus, in
its reaction there appears to be an interplay of culture, group consciousness
and the uncertainty of migrant status in the host society. With the settler
countries providing a limited expression of their cultural and religious
traditions, conditions have perhaps existed for such frustrations to be
channelled into the cause of yearning for a homeland. The “Khalistan
movement” abroad may also indicate Sikh migrants’ alienation from the host
societies. Neither equal citizens, nor having enough power to express their
cultural ambitions, the aspiring community leaders have looked back on their
“land of origins” for prestige and honour. Such a reaction ought not be
brushed aside as the brainchild of a few misguided zealots.
In terms of geography
and mobilization characteristics there are clear parallels with the Gadr
movement. The formation of the Gadr movement was attributed to the
exclusionary policies of the Canadian and American governments, coupled with
an uncaring attitude of the Indian colonial state towards the plight of its
overseas peoples. The Khalistan movement may also be located within those
parameters. The home government’s unsympathetic attitude towards a minority’s
aspirations, seen through an unparalleled attack on its religious centre and
the host states’ policies, coupled with a sense of alienation from those
societies, may have provided all the ingredients necessary for the
mobilization towards a secure and independent homeland.
A sovereign “homeland”
offers the possibility of becoming a substitute for an alienated diaspora
elite. Contemporary evidence suggests this is the case for a small section of
the Sikh diaspora of Britain and North America. However, the strength of an
alienated elite could grow in the future. An independent Punjab was an “imagined
homeland” for few Sikhs until the 1984 army action in Amritsar. But the
subsequent crisis and its handling by the Indian state, and its pressure on
host states to contain the Sikh diaspora’s expressions of sympathy, might
have converted the dream of homeland into a serious and attractive scenario
for many Sikhs. A distinct minority of Sikhs are now committed to the
achievement of an independent country. Whether the silent majority would be
convinced of the minority’s arguments depends upon two factors:
the sense of
security they feel in their new homes in Britain and North America,
and
the future
developments in their homeland, the Punjab.
That both of these
factors are beyond the diaspora’s control points towards the dilemma of a
diaspora’s ambivalent attitudes and loyalties. The Sikh diaspora’s
reaction to the events in Punjab and its characteristic pattern of
mobilization provide a clear example of how, through one “crucial event”,
a confident and “secure” diaspora can become conscious of a “threatened
homeland” and mobilize in its defence."
