Executive Summary
As part of the project of analyzing the role of
non-state actors in building human security, this paper reviews
the role of armed groups in the protection of civilian
populations in internal armed conflicts. It addresses the need
to develop effective strategies to enhance the receptivity and
compliance of armed groups to international standards. Various
factors influencing the receptivity of armed groups are
analyzed, including military, political, economical and cultural
issues. Strategies of building the capacity of armed groups to
protect civilians and putting pressure on armed groups are also
reviewed
Foreword
Human security has recently emerged as an innovative
approach to address in a holistic manner the sources of insecurity
affecting people worldwide. From the human security standpoint, the
security of the individual is no longer defined exclusively within
the realm of states and as a consequence of state security. The
origins of today's insecurities are diverse, relating among others,
to social, economical, environmental, and health factors. These
insecurities increasingly transcend state borders and have global
consequences.
The term "human security" may be new but the ideas that inspired it
have developed over the last century and a half from the founding of
the ICRC in the 1864 through the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Human security takes the
safety of people as its point of reference. For humans to be secure,
their lives must be free from pervasive threats, violent and
otherwise, to their rights and safety. The human security approach
addresses non-traditional threats to people's security related to
economic, food, health, and environmental factors as well as issues
such as drugs, terrorism, organized crime, landmines and
gender-based violence. It does not offer a single definition of the
content of human security but aims to bring a more diversified
perspective to security interests. Human security is about
recognizing the importance the security needs of the people side by
side with those of states, minimizing risks and taking preventive
measures to reduce human vulnerabilities, and taking remedial action
when preventive measures fail.
Non-state actors, from armed groups to private corporations and NGOs
play a critical role in heightening or lessening human security. The
measures required to enhance human security often call for action
from numerous non-state actors, particularly NGOs, in addressing,
for example, the needs of the displaced populations, advocating for
stronger control of the arms trade, or assisting governments in
preserving and restoring fragile environments. Human security can
act as a platform to engage non-state actors, along with state
actors, in addressing the causes of global insecurity.
Non-state actors are particularly well suited to engendering human
security in the new world context. Indeed, in the case of failed
states, they are the only actors who are present to do so. During
internal conflicts, non-state actors benefit from closer involvement
with the local community and greater potential for local capacity
building than traditional actors. Non-state actors can and do play
many roles in the protection of human security. For example,
organizations such as the ICRC or Oxfam act as relief agencies when
governments are unable to respond to emergency needs; NGOs such as
the Community of SanEgidio facilitate negotiations between warring
parties, and media efforts aim to rebuild peace, such as Radio
Ijambo in Rwanda. The Internet community is an emerging and original
actor engaged, for example, in the reunification of families1.
These actors function without the constraints of a
narrow foreign policy mandate of state institutions, with increased
access to areas inaccessible to official actors. They can talk to
several parties at once without losing credibility. They can deal
directly with grassroots populations and operate without political
or public scrutiny. In addition, non-state actors can more
effectively build a network with civil society representatives and
focus with them on longer-term perspectives. They are less subject
to complaints of outside interference or breaches of sovereignty. In
short, these actors are often more flexible than state actors
especially in internal conflict situations.
Evidently, the term "non-state actors" amalgamates a large number of
very different actors with distinct roles in societies in conflict.
Non-state actors include armed groups, NGOs, corporations,
educational institutions, private donors, religious organizations,
the scientific community, private individuals, the media and,
increasingly, the internet community. Their few shared
characteristics result from their distinct "unofficial" nature as
compared to state actors, their greater flexibility and often
unaccountability under national and international laws. There is an
acute need to distinguish better the various types of non-state
actors.
We can already observe the critical role played by non-state actors
in various key areas of human security, including the illicit trade
of small arms, the recruitment of child soldiers, and the use of
landmines. The lead taken by non-state actors in the establishment
of the International Criminal Court and the adoption of the Ottawa
Treaty on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines are only
illustrations of the growing importance of their role. Efforts
should be devoted to understand this role better and to identify
strategies to take full advantage of their contributions to the
elaboration and implementation of international standards.
This paper focuses on the armed groups as non-state actors engaged
in violent action. It deals specifically with the role and
responsibility of armed groups with regard to the implementation of
international humanitarian and human rights standards in situations
of internal armed conflict. The paper is limited to this particular
type of non-state actor and these circumstances to illustrate the
requirements and benefits of a strategy engaging non-state actors on
human security issues. It is hoped that this exercise will inspire
further attempts to develop new strategies to engage these and other
non-state actors on human security issues.
In a first section, this paper examines strategies to engage armed
groups in adhering to humanitarian law, a result that would greatly
improve human security among the population at risk. It then
examines the complexity and diversity of armed groups and the
inherent vagueness of international law regarding non-state actors,
analyzing the opportunities and difficulties encountered in engaging
armed groups on humanitarian and human rights standards. In the
final section, the paper reviews the main strategies for seeking the
implementation of international standards by armed groups.
Armed Groups in Internal Armed Conflicts
Currently, one of the most dramatic threats to human
security is internal armed conflict. In 1998 alone, violent
conflicts took place in at least 25 countries. Out of these armed
conflicts, 23 were internal, engaging one or more non-state armed
groups2. A key feature of internal conflicts is the widespread
violation of humanitarian and human rights by armed groups, from
rebel movements to private militias3.
With the proliferation of weapons, especially small
arms and land mines, and the erosion of state control, threats to
human security are increased both as people are the direct targets
of violence, and as a result of the organized crime and random
violence which occurs in these chaotic conditions. Armed groups are
certainly not accountable for all violence perpetrated against
civilians, but their presence among civilians plays a definite role
in blurring the dividing line between combatants and non-combatants,
the basic concept on which humanitarian protection rests. In this
context, understanding and promoting the responsibilities of armed
groups toward civilians has become a crucial element of protection
strategies4.
Despite the increased role of non-state armed groups in internal
conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights
standards offer only limited opportunities to engage armed groups
toward compliance, whereas a collection of legal instruments has
been developed to supply state actors with a comprehensive framework
guiding the conduct of their combatants in armed conflicts. This
discrepancy between state and non-state actors reveals the extent to
which the development of humanitarian law has been subjugated to
political considerations, denying any significant protection
function to armed groups compared to state actors. Despite the
critical role of armed groups in internal conflicts, human rights
law is de jure applicable only to state entities and IHL offers only
general principles of protection under common Article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions and some rules of engagement in Additional
Protocol II. Moreover, the conditions for the application of IHL are
often not met in low-intensity conflicts
Most armed groups have been barred from participating in conferences
on international standards applicable to armed conflicts and
contacts with armed groups remain under intense political pressure
from many sides. The Rome Conference on the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court provides a recent illustration of
States' reluctance to recognize the role of non-state armed groups
in the implementation of international standards.
While hundreds of non-governmental organizations
were represented at the Rome Conference among the more than 130
state delegations, several in an official capacity, no
representatives of armed groups were present. The Statute adopted at
the Conference in July 1998 offers very few provisions for engaging
armed groups, imposing obligations only on States and individuals.
In particular, the Statute confers no legal authority on non-state
actors in the prosecution of war crimes despite the fact that the
leadership of armed groups is often the only body that could
actually exert control over non-state combatants. One can
legitimately question the practical relevance of these legal
developments in situations where governments have lost their
capacity to bring non-state criminals to trial, or have relinquished
this authority as part of a peace process, as in Sierra Leone
regarding the RUF combatants.
Arguably, most armed groups would probably be unable to fulfill
adequately their obligations under international treaties, due to
their lack of capacity or willingness to respect these standards in
their operations. As this same observation also applies in large
part to many state actors, particularly in complex emergencies, the
opportunity to engage armed groups actively in the protection of
civilians in situations of armed conflicts should nevertheless be
sought. Armed groups are essentially involved in the use of force
outside legal and legitimate frameworks. Efforts to engage these
groups in the respect of national or international standards may
appear at best naive, at worst corrupted by political
considerations. Yet, the long-standing experience of humanitarian
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and other major humanitarian organizations engaging with
various armed groups has demonstrated the potential benefits of such
a dialogue for the civilian population. From a practical
perspective, armed groups remain key actors for protection
strategies:
as
de facto
governments within the territory under their control;
as
military entities active in
combat;
as
authorities responsible for the
protection of humanitarian operations; and,
as
political entities which may eventually be party to a peace
settlement.
Strategies for Seeking the Adherence of Armed
Groups to International Standards
Many practitioners argue that one should distinguish
two basic steps in approaching armed groups on humanitarian issues.
First, one must assess the main characteristics of the group to be
approached and make a first determination of its cohesion to
evaluate the opportunity to engage in a productive dialogue with the
group. Although this determination may sometimes require preliminary
contacts with the group, the aim is to develop a critical outlook on
the merit of a dialogue with an armed group aside from the stance of
its leadership on humanitarian issues. Once this preliminary
determination has been made, plans to engage the group on a
humanitarian dialogue should be elaborated, taking into account
various factors influencing the group's receptivity to international
standards
Defining the main characteristics of armed groups
Most practitioners agree that the main characteristics of armed
groups should be identified prior to engagement. However, as armed
groups differ considerably, from Mafia-like militias to religious
movements and corporate armies, common descriptions should not be
elaborated too specifically. Furthermore, the purpose of the
definition should not be to exclude particular groups from
protection strategies but to identify minimum organizational
standards that would make contacts worthwhile. In this context, the
main characteristics of armed groups can be described as follows:
a) A basic command structure:
The combatants are organized according to a unitary command
structure and follow its instructions. The commanders have at least
a minimum of control over the conduct of the combatants,
particularly regarding the group's behavior toward civilians. A
dialogue on humanitarian issues with fragmented groups and groups
with strong internal dissension are likely to be unproductive, if
not counterproductive.
b) The use of violence to achieve political ends:
The group is engaged in a political struggle, that is, an attempt to
redefine the political and legal basis of the society through the
use of violence. Violence is often employed not as a military tactic
aiming for a takeover, but as a means to render the political status
quo unsustainable. Violence in this context can take innumerable
forms, particularly toward civilians, including killing, raping,
kidnapping, torture, extortion, attacks on crops or water sources,
local markets, and toward civilian infrastructures such as attacks
on schools, administrative offices, ambushes on commercial roads,
power lines, etc. Combatants often engage in parallel criminal
activities, using force to extract resources for their own benefits,
through extortion, drug trafficking, illegal timber or diamond
trade, etc. In many conflicts, such as in Colombia or in Myanmar,
the dual character of the combatants' activities questions the
cohesion of the group as a political entity. The extent to which
combatants are allowed to engage in independent criminal activities
is a fair indicator of the degree of control of the leadership over
the group.
c) Independence from state control:
The issue of state control is often problematic. In some situations,
it may be difficult to distinguish between autonomous pro-government
forces, such as paramilitary groups in Colombia, and
government-controlled paramilitary forces, such as the South
Lebanese Army in Israeli-occupied Lebanon. Government control of
paramilitary groups is difficult to assess since it is often
designed in part to make the government unaccountable for the acts
committed by these forces. Logistical support from government forces
to paramilitary groups, such as air transport, is an important but
partial indicator of government control. The degree of the control
of the leadership over the conduct of the combatants remains a key
indicator of the independence of the group.
Practitioners generally encourage caution with
groups whose characteristics fail to meet one or more of these
criteria, particularly with the newly created groups, which often
emerge within collapsed states. Armed groups that are unable to
command their combatants and impose restraints over their conduct
are unlikely to engage constructively in a dialogue on humanitarian
issues. Such a dialogue may also be dangerous for those conducting
it. Groups to which this applies include irregular and disorganized
combatants, criminal-type gangs, bandits and looters. Inevitably,
the violence perpetrated by these types of groups requires a more
coercive response, which falls primarily under the responsibility of
states to restore and maintain public order within their territory.
International actors may also be involved under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter if the national government is unable or unwilling to
fulfill this responsibility. Humanitarian organizations have learned
through bitter experience the risks incurred with the presence of
these loose groups, where humanitarian personnel represent an easy
prey for predatory groups.
Similarly, some have argued that the willingness of armed groups to
abide by fundamental humanitarian principles should also be examined
before engaging in contacts, particularly with violent armed groups
notorious for ruthless and wanton conduct toward civilians. Contacts
with these groups may only provide them with political legitimacy
without any realistic hope of improved behavior. Others, such as the
ICRC, believe that the evaluation of this characteristic requires at
least a minimal exchange of views with the leadership of the group
and one should not forfeit from the outset any opportunity to seek
compliance to humanitarian standards from armed groups from this
consideration alone.
Evaluating the receptivity of armed groups to international
standards
Once an armed group has been selected to be
approached for a dialogue on humanitarian issues, the success of the
strategy depends largely on a thorough analysis of the group's
receptivity to humanitarian and human rights standards. The group's
receptivity appears to be contingent on military, political,
economic, social and cultural factors. Understanding the dynamic of
the group in each of these areas is essential for an evaluation of
the willingness and capacity of the group to abide by humanitarian
and human rights standards.
Military factors
Beyond the organizational characteristics of the groups mentioned in
the preceding section, there are additional military factors to be
considered, in particular relating to the military and tactical
position of the group in the field.
From a military perspective, the principle that combatants should be
separated from civilians often makes little sense to non-state armed
groups. On the contrary, non-state armed groups rely heavily on
their proximity to civilian populations:
to avert attacks from other parties (e.g.
Sri Lanka);
to sustain themselves in economic and human terms (e.g. Sierra
Leone, Sudan);
to consolidate their control over a territory and its resources;
(e.g. Colombia, Myanmar); and/or,
to exert pressure on the adverse party, by terrorizing and
displacing populations (e.g. DRC, Burundi, Uganda)
Arguably, the receptivity of armed groups to
humanitarian standards in military terms involves a capacity to
dissociate to some extent the groups' combatants from the
surrounding civilian population. This capacity depends on factors
including:
the vulnerability of the group to attacks,
aerial or otherwise;
its dependency on domestic resources as opposed to foreign
support (e.g. human resources from refugee camps in border areas
rather than local villages);
the group's control over a territory; and,
the military advantages to be gained from displacing large
populations.
Humanitarian organizations and other actors seeking
the adherence of armed groups to international standards may not be
in a position to influence these factors significantly. However, an
analysis of the military position of the group within these
parameters facilitates the planning of negotiations with armed
groups. Humanitarian organizations can hardly expect armed groups
under strong pressure in the field to make landmark concessions
regarding their distance from the civilian population. However,
armed groups may be inclined to consider practical measures to
sustain the population in time of crises to prevent forced
displacements of population by government forces. The extent to
which humanitarian organizations should consider or even participate
in such operations is always controversial. Engagement with armed
groups should always proceed with full awareness of the military
reality. Humanitarian organizations should be prepared to propose
innovative arrangements (e.g. "humanitarian zones", "zone of
tranquility", humanitarian corridors, etc.) when engaging with these
groups to avert the worst abuses of principles of humanitarian
assistance by the parties to the conflict
Political factors
The receptivity of armed groups to international standards also
depends on their organizational structure. Armed groups can hardly
be designated as a single political category considering the extreme
diversity of their objectives and modus operandi. Interestingly, the
willingness of armed groups to engage on humanitarian issues depends
partly on the internal political dynamic of the group. More
sophisticated groups tend to be more inclined toward standards and
codes of conduct whereas groups with vaguer political objectives are
more reluctant to engage on standards they find counterintuitive.
Some groups have clear political objectives (e.g.: FARC or ELN in
Colombia), whereas others are filling a political vacuum left by
disintegrated states (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan). A critical aspect
of efforts to promote the protection of civilians is the extent to
which armed groups are seeking to gain and maintain basic political
legitimacy within their constituency such as tribal area, ethnic or
social group, region, or within the international community.
Some would argue that the political legitimacy of armed groups
depends on their respect for certain norms of behavior and the
conformity of their action to societal values, including basic
humanitarian values. This legitimacy is likely to be harmed by the
brutal behavior of the group's combatants against civilians. To
enhance their political stance, some groups will seek to develop
humanitarian and social services for the population and refrain from
attacking civilian targets. This explains the PLO's change of
strategy after the deposition of its signature of the four Geneva
Conventions in 1989. Other groups, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone
and UNITA in Angola, to the contrary, entirely disregard issues of
legitimacy and focus solely on access to natural resources for their
sustainability.
Finally, the receptivity of armed groups to international standards
relies to a certain extent on the structure of their leadership.
Armed groups with a single cult-like leader,
such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka,
are unlikely to engage in a dialogue on humanitarian standards
whereas armed groups with a broader political leadership are more
likely to be willing to comply such as the FARC in Colombia or SPLA
in Sudan. Leaders who are authoritarian in their treatment of their
own members often behave in a similarly suppressive fashion toward
the civilian population under their control. Conversely, a group
with a broadly democratic leadership structure, which aspires to be
a viable political entity, will be more open to reform and dialogue
on the conduct of its combatants.
Humanitarian organizations can have a significant influence on the
political dynamic of an armed group. They can maintain and nourish
contacts within more progressive segments of the group. They may
favor the establishment of internal processes for dialogue on
humanitarian issues5. In this context, one might consider
encouraging armed groups to establish a "humanitarian wing" to serve
as the basis of a group's "health and social services" with which a
dialogue on technical matters could be engaged. Such a dialogue may
promote stricter compliance to international standards within the
ranks of the group
Economic factors
Although their influence seems evident, little attention has been
given by humanitarian organizations to the economic motives of armed
groups. The reason for this is that wars have been traditionally
approached as tragic events, described in terms of human and
economic costs. To understand and develop protection strategies on
the basis of the economic motives of armed groups requires a
singularly different perspective on war, where not only costs but
also benefits are acknowledged. Evidently, many humanitarian
organizations are not comfortable with this type of calculation.
The prevalence of economic motives challenges the traditional
assumption that wars are conducted primarily to defeat the enemy. In
many cases such as Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola, winning the war by
defeating the enemy has become a secondary goal. Wars, and internal
wars in particular, have become lucrative enterprises where
combatants are more likely to survive and prosper than civilians.
Understanding the political economy of civil wars becomes as
critical to the planning of protection activities as understanding
political and military motives.
Fortunately, governments and international organizations can
interfere substantially in the cost/benefit analysis of armed groups
in support of protection strategies through, for example, the
imposition of trade embargoes or financial sanctions. Threats of
coercive economic measures by the group's sponsors may also provide
considerable leverage on the conduct of the group's combatants. The
increasing interaction between governments, the private sector and
humanitarian and human rights organizations may also provide
indications of practical measures to seek a greater compliance of
armed groups to international standards based on their economic and
commercial affiliation.
Social and cultural factors
Armed groups are inherently social entities and their existence has
to be understood within their social environment. A critical
objective of protection strategies is to embark armed groups on a
path of compliance based on their social and cultural values,
without interfering with the political issue at conflict: their
recognition as legitimate political actors. For example, although
Taliban fighters and Northern Alliances forces in Afghanistan have
been fighting each other for years on ideological and religious
grounds, they are far closer to each other in social and cultural
terms than with any other groups or entities in the world.
Understanding the social and cultural nature of armed groups is
undoubtedly the most important asset of protection strategies. To
exert influence on the perception of armed groups of their
obligations under international law, humanitarian organizations, and
the international community in general, must be in a position to
appreciate the social and cultural environment of these groups. In
many situations, the basic principles of protection strategies can
be presented to armed groups in a way that makes sense in social and
cultural terms. Interpreting international standards in social and
cultural terms does not require their perversion. On the contrary,
it may provide numerous ways of enticing armed groups toward
compliance. In these terms, compliance to international standards
involves:
saving the life and preserving the dignity of
civilians as an essential aspect of the long-term accomplishment
of the armed group;
improving the social stability in the zones under their control
and promote peaceful behaviors;
improving the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the armed group
as a social organization and reinforce its social cohesion;
improving the group's legitimacy as a political actor at the
regional, national and international level.
Some organizations, particularly human rights NGOs,
tend to oppose tactics that emphasize the social and cultural
perspectives of armed groups, especially when this perspective
contravenes fundamental human rights standards. Although a
constructive dialogue on humanitarian issues should allow all
parties to express their perspective and explain their position,
humanitarian organizations should remain cautious when engaging
armed groups on cultural grounds and avoid providing legitimacy to
practices that are considered illegal under international law.
Agreements signed with armed groups should always recall from the
outset the prevalence of international standards.
Ensuring respect for international standards by armed groups.
Strategies to gain the adherence of armed groups to
basic humanitarian standards must include a series of practical
steps for all parties to ensure compliance to these standards. The
real test of the compliance of armed groups takes place in the
field. Without mechanisms to follow-up and monitor a group's
commitments, most of the provisions of humanitarian agreements are
likely to remain lettres mortes. The most complex and underdeveloped
aspect of these strategies pertains to the actual implementation of
humanitarian standards by armed groups.
Similarly to interactions with governments, humanitarian and human
rights organizations can proceed on the basis of two distinct
approaches to the implementation of international standards by armed
groups. Once the armed groups have agreed to comply with
international standards:
They can engage in a dialogue with the armed
groups and assist them in building their capacity to respect
humanitarian and human rights norms; or,
They can aim at building pressure on armed groups by shaming
them in front of the international public and their own
constituency for violations of international standards.
Each of these approaches has its protagonists and
its own record of proven successes and deplorable failures. The two
approaches differ with respect to their perception of the main
obstacles to the implementation of international standards. The
first considers the main problem to be a lack of capacity to ensure
respect for international standard which requires buttressing; the
latter considers a lack of willingness as the obstacle, indicating
the need for the exertion of political pressure to obtain respect
for the rules. Shaming an armed group that is unable to implement
the rules of IHL, for example because of ignorance of the rules by
the combatants, will serve no useful purpose. Assistance to a group
that is unwilling to respect these rules, for example by providing
dissemination services to the combatants, will be used only by the
group only for its political value. Therefore, a careful analysis of
the most promising path (building capacity vs. building pressure)
should be made at the outset.
Building capacity
Practically, responsibility for the instruction and supervision of
field commanders lies with the political leadership of each group.
Equally, responsibility for the enforcement of the rules and the
prosecution of violators also lies with this leadership. This
responsibility is the basis for the group's accountability for the
respect of international standards. It involves the ability to
investigate the alleged violations and the capacity to impose
corrective measures, including the prosecution and punishment of
accused violators. The participation of the group's leadership in
this effort helps re-enforce its sense of accountability.
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides a
practical framework for this type of exercise. It calls on all
parties to internal armed conflicts to take part in the
implementation of the fundamental provisions of IHL with no
influence on "the legal status of the Parties to the conflict".
Under Common Article 3, an organized armed group is considered a
full Party to the implementation of the fundamental provisions of
IHL and an equal stakeholder to States with regard to humanitarian
issues, without being conferred full legal status under
international law. Armed groups can sign official agreements under
IHL with international actors, such as the ICRC or UN humanitarian
agencies, and engage their responsibility on humanitarian issues,
providing some international legitimacy as far as humanitarian
issues are concerned. More recent examples of this approach can be
found in various agreements and memorandums of understanding with
armed groups on humanitarian standards7.
Strategies to build the capacity of armed groups to implement
international standards begin with the establishment of a dialogue
with the leadership. Personal links with the leadership and the
development of contacts over time are often required to build at
least a minimum of trust. Third parties, such as members of the
Diaspora, churches, political parties, or NGOs, may provide useful
assistance in establishing these contacts. This process must be
clear in its objectives and principles of engagement both in
relation to the armed group, and with respect to the international
community that may raise doubts or set obstacles to such endeavors.
Building the capacity of armed groups to respect international norms
requires the ability of the international community to deliver such
assistance. An organization should avoid promising support it cannot
afford. In this context, for example, the demobilization of child
soldiers requires not only withdrawing their weapons, but the
provision of educational and nutritional programs for years to come.
Building pressure
International public pressure ("name and shame") is a preferred tool
among human rights NGOs. Shaming armed groups essentially questions
their legitimacy within their own constituency or domestic support
group, their Diaspora and the international community in general.
This action may have a significant impact on the behavior of groups
that are particularly dependent on international support for their
war efforts such as the Rebel movements in Southern Sudan and their
support from the US government and American Christian support
groups. It has a much more limited impact on groups that rely on
local constituencies that are not responsive to international public
opinion such as the Taliban Movement. Some have argued that the
indiscriminate use of shaming may be counterproductive and encourage
armed groups to rely increasingly on forms of local extortion for
their sustainability (e.g.:
LTTE in
Sri Lanka, RUF in Sierra Leone).
Human rights organizations and humanitarian agencies are in fact
complementary in their approach. Without the pressure of advocacy
groups, most offers of humanitarian agencies to engage with armed
groups would have little impact, or this impact would quickly erode
in the face of military, political and economic factors previously
mentioned. To ensure that both strategies are used in an optimal
manner, efforts should be made to distinguish humanitarian
organizations from advocacy groups, in terms of institution and
mandate. The establishment of a dialogue with armed groups is a long
and tedious operation. Any reference made to shaming acts in this
context by similar organizations only complicates the work of
humanitarian organizations engaging into this process.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to elaborate a set of strategies to engage armed
groups in the implementation of humanitarian and human rights
standards. These strategies will remain largely experimental as the
type of situations and armed groups evolve constantly. Therefore,
these observations should not be seen as a recipe for engaging armed
groups, but rather as a series of reflections from practitioners on
their own experience.
However, engaging armed groups on humanitarian issues should not be
considered an experience of limited value. On the contrary,
establishing a concrete and sustainable dialogue with armed groups
on the protection of civilians may well represent the most important
challenge facing human security. Among all sources of insecurity,
the threats posed by internal armed conflict to civilians are the
most tangible problem to be addressed, far simpler than issues
related to poverty, global warming, or the arms trade. It is because
of the tangible and humane character of the benefits of this
engagement that we are summoned to approach armed groups with a new
perspective on people security.
Several strategies are available to engage armed groups on
humanitarian issues, from building pressure on the groups as
political entities to building their capacity as administrative
organizations. Each of these strategies requires a careful analysis
of the vulnerabilities of armed groups and their receptiveness to
international standards. More importantly, they require serious
efforts in coordinating the actions of the international community
to avoid neutralizing each others' progress with respect to armed
groups. The international community is unlikely to adhere to such a
comprehensive agenda in a concerted manner. Ultimately, the
effectiveness of such action relies on the professionalism of state
and non-state actors in the field.
