

False Opposites in Nationalism:

An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe.

by

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ABSTRACT:

This study is an examination of the exercise of nationalism as the assertion and/or reassertion of the mutual (political) sovereignty of a community in the form of a nation-state. My thesis aims to explore two theoretically different routes and forms of exercise of nationalism focusing specifically on modern Europe. These two routes are civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. This classical dichotomy, I agree, is a misleading division for though the two are theoretically separate, in practice they are collaborators in the journey towards nationhood and in the pursuit of the establishment of a nation-state.

For nationalism to be successful it must involve an interplay of the principles of both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, rather than these components acting as mutually exclusive concepts. The nature of this interplay will be examined throughout the thesis and the collaboration will be explored via the two competing perspectives: that held by the modernists and that proposed by the ethnicists, both operating within the framework of modernity. The key distinction between the two is their focus and the point at which they identify a

group imagining themselves as a community and society. Their respective cases will be critically examined with respect to those elements that determine that an interplay occurs.

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INTRODUCTION

The Exercise of Nationalism: Exploring its Civic and Ethnic Components

Nationalism is an umbrella term covering elements such as national consciousness, the expression of national identity, and loyalty to the nation. This study will examine the political and social exercise of nationalism as an ideology and subjectivity through the theoretical avenues of civic and ethnic nationalism as represented in literature. The exercise of nationalism is the assertion and/or reassertion of the mutual (political) sovereignty of a community in the form of a nation-state. The examination will be confined to nationalism in contemporary Europe. As an ideology it is a form of political expression; as a subjective element it defines the nature of the relationship of a person to a collectivity. The -ism in nationalism is a practice, a process of development, an activity, "a mechanism of adjustment and compensation"¹, acting as a vehicle of delivery for both the mass and elite within a community. In one of its modern expressions, nationalism is the self-identification of a community of people who see themselves as having an observable sovereignty and identification of a political unit housing a culturally homogeneous group. What this means is that there is a relative congruence of a political unit and a high culture where a certain kind of homogeneity is necessary for a cohesive nation-state.² The nation-state is a power body in which community and polity come together.

This thesis aims to explore two theoretically different routes and forms of the exercise of nationalism, focusing specifically on modern Europe: civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. It will argue that though theoretically separate, in practice the two forms of nationalism are collaborators in the journey towards nationhood and in the pursuit of the establishment of a nation-state. This collaboration will be explored via two competing perspectives: that held by the radical modernists and that proposed by the ethnicist-modernists both operating within the framework of modernism. My own position also works within the framework of modernism recognising a change in the perception and role of culture from the premodern to the modern age, but it seeks to explore the theoretical consequences of an all-too-obvious claim: that culture in modernity contains both political components and ethnic components.

Nationalism is a part of the developmental process of modernity (and perhaps now post-modernity) for a group of people who regard themselves as culturally (which may mean politically or ethnically) homogeneous, exercising this in the form of a nation-state. The focus of

the thesis will be on nationalism as not only a stage of development in modernity but an ongoing process of development within modernity³ indicative of the framework of modernity within which nationalism operates. The civic and ethnic components of nationalism are not the only pressures which push nationalism in a particular direction, but their representation in the literature on nationalism leads to the notion that they are two mutually exclusive forms of nationalism, existing on opposite ends of the nationalism spectrum.

Civic Nationalism versus Ethnic Nationalism

Civic and ethnic nationalism are the classifications to be used in this examination, but they are respectively analogous or highly similar to political, core or Western nationalism, and blood, peripheral, Eastern, or cultural nationalism. My argument is that civic and ethnic nationalism are not, as often presented, part of a dichotomy of nationalism set against one another but are two intermingling components of the one ideology and subjectivity of modern nationalism. The key distinction between the two is their focus, the point around which people begin to identify and imagine themselves as a community:⁴ that is, the inception of the national community relative to congruent state development and the conception of nationhood.

The idea is that civic nationalism is exercised in those areas where there exists a civil society. That is, a group of people who feel they belong to the same community, are governed by law and respect the rule of law. The sovereignty of the people is located in the individual (the citizen) whose national identity is a sense of political community within a demarcated territory defining the social space that houses a culturally homogeneous group. It requires that people and territory must belong together, and that the people are in possession of a single political will. It demands that one must belong to a nation, which in turn belongs to a state, and an individual has the option of choosing which nation she/he wishes to belong to and enjoys legal equality along with the other members of the nation. National dignity is derived from the individual/citizen who in turn defines the national community. There is a government that respects the law, rather than existing above the law, which indicates that civic nationalism is complementary to liberal democracy. Being such, civic nationalism as a social movement is said to be more democratic than the populism of ethnic nationalism. The mass are more inclined to be incorporated into a high culture (via education), which gives them the same right of political decision as the elite. The role of the elite then is to manage (rather than crudely manipulate) the mass.

Ethnic nationalism refers to nationalism as determined by descent.

Attachments are inherited and not chosen, representing the exclusivist element of nationalism. Those groups who exercise nationalism clothed with the ethnic element are considered to be nations that have had to come to terms with the political developments of alternative civilisations elsewhere. Feeling the dominance and perceived superiority of these other nation-states (who would have their own demarcated territory that defines them), these more inferior-feeling groups may increasingly feel the need to become a part of this civilisation in order to survive, progress, modernise, and be successful. To achieve this and become equals in this new modern civilisation (as a part of the process of modernity), the people in these regions must unite as groups that would be politically recognised in the form of a nation-state. In the absence of institutions or other tools that may unite these people (such as class), these groups turn to themselves identifying their own unique characteristics that set them apart from foreigners in order to assert their sovereignty.

Ethnic nationalism "was active on behalf of a high culture not as yet properly crystallized, a mere aspirant or in-the-making high culture."⁵ These are the groups that needed a short cut towards a high culture necessary for modern development. Since there was not the required foundations and institutions in place in society, they had to create one from what they had. This was likely to be language, culture, skin colour, religion, etc., drawing what they could from the Volk (the people). Therefore the belief is that ethnic/blood consciousness rather than the civic/civil consciousness dominates the newly emerging political culture. The ethnic concept of nationalism incorporates a more collectivistic identity. Nationality is not voluntary but by birth and native culture, considered an inherent characteristic defined by descent as opposed to choice. These distinctions illustrate the lack of latitude in the classification of ethnic nationalism and its exclusivist nature. This can actually impede progress towards liberal democracy, even though it was probably first instigated as a drive towards it (or rather a drive towards modernity that contained the liberal democratic feature).

Therefore the difference between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is said to lie in the beginnings of the imagining of the community, relative to the actual development of a political unit. This is the classical division in political and sociological theory on nationalism. Many theorists use this dichotomy in their writings on nationalism. Plamenatz uses the unsophisticated categories of Western and Eastern nationalism, thereby creating two Europes.⁶ Kearney takes this division and carries it to a "postnationalist" level,⁷ whilst Conversi on the other hand has disputed this classical division only to create three more new ones: homeostatic, transactionalist, and the ethno-symbolist.⁸ Plamenatz views nationalism as primarily a cultural phenomenon where "the belief

in progress is strong" though a recourse to non-progressive measures, particularly nationalism taking illiberal and undemocratic forms, is common.⁹ He labels the division of nationalism as Western and Eastern: Western nationalism demonstrated best by the nationalisms of France and England (and interestingly Plamenatz also includes Germany and Italy in the same category). They were nations that possessed a progressive culture and were conscious of that. They were equipped with the correct instruments with which to progress. The nations of the East however were drawn into a new civilisation needing to adopt new values, ideas and practices – i.e. Western ones – in order to be equals in this new civilisation of modernity.¹⁰ Theirs was an imitative and fiercely competitive nationalism, prone to hostility and illiberal behaviour, whose "ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards."¹¹ Nationalists of the East recognised both their "backwardness" and their need to overcome that.

More recently Kearney promotes the dichotomy claiming that by separating nationalism one can then gather what is good and progressive and develop that into a postnationalist model (particularly concerning Irish and British nationalism). All those who subscribe to the nation's political principles or constitution exercise civic nationalism.¹² Ethnic nationalism on the other hand is inherited and the bond is blood rather than law. Kearney gives us Germany as an example of a nation-state that defines itself ethnically. In offering this example he goes on to suggest that the nation-states that developed in nineteenth-century Europe looked to Germany as a model and thus committed to ethnic nationalism. Plamenatz makes the same claim, though Germany appears on the other side of the dichotomy in his demonstration. The major difference between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism according to Kearney is in the different sources of identity. Unfortunately he perpetuates the ethical falsehood that these categories generate by claiming that as one emancipates the other incarcerates, and if nationalism is ever to be good it should undergo a "decoupling" from ethnicity.¹³

Kearney's central focus as mentioned is postnationalism. Though not explored in this study postnationalism is worth a brief comment. Kearney considers that the union formed between politics and culture at the onset of modernity should be redefined in postmodernity, with specific reference to Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Britain represents all that is positive in nationalism, the "civic, secular, pluralist, rational and multicultural" and Ireland the negative "irridentist, ethnic, primitive, reactionary."¹⁴ However, in this postmodern world there is, according to Kearney, a "revised Irish nationalism"¹⁵ that is a rational extension of the past, which is a consequence of postnationalism. Nairn also suggests that there is "a new civic nationalism" in Ireland that could

easily be emulated by Scotland or Wales.¹⁶ Postnationalism in this context is the vehicle of "new paradigms of political and cultural accommodation"¹⁷ suggesting fresh separations of nationalism. Kearney seeks to do this by separating nation and state and by doing so separating culture and politics. Culture and politics are conjugal elements joined at modernity but Kearney seeks to divorce culture from politics calling this process postnationalism.

Turning to a more cultivated division in the literature, Rogers Brubaker offers a sophisticated approach to the splitting of nationalism in this way. He uses France and Germany to demonstrate two types of nationalism. The 'type' of nationalism in these two countries is determined by whether the national feeling emerged before or after the development of a nation-state. In France the national feeling occurred after the nation-state developed thus according to Brubaker national feeling grew out of the state and its institutions – an example of civic nationalism. But in Germany national sentiments preceded the emergence of a state and adopted the character of the Volk, meaning its development into a nation-state was not a political development but an ethnocultural one.¹⁸ And so the division, according to Brubaker's theory, is determined by the manner in which a society is bound. This will in turn determine the criteria for membership. Society in France is politically bound and membership is politically defined via the formal method of citizenship. In Germany, society is bound according to ethnicity and membership is along blood ties.¹⁹ These different criteria then differentiate the type of relationship an individual has with a state, and the relationship of society to state in modernity and thus the relationship to nationhood. The understanding of nationhood in France, according to Brubaker was political, in Germany it was ethnocultural.²⁰ In his own words:

In Germany the "conceived order" or "imagined community" of nationhood and the institutional realities of statehood were sharply distinct; in France they were fused. In Germany nationhood was an ethnocultural fact; in France it was a political fact.²¹

This study disputes the dichotomising use of this distinction. Civic and ethnic nationalism appear in the literature as two mutually exclusive concepts, however this study will suggest that the exercise of nationalism in modernity is an interplay of components of both civic and ethnic nationalism. The dichotomy is fallacious and misleading for it does not represent the true nature of nationalism as both political expression and cultural declaration, it perpetuates notions of Western and Eastern nationalism and 'good' and 'bad' nationalism. Certainly the two can be distinguished theoretically, and certainly we can find instances where one or other comes to the fore as the dominant

expression of national allegiance, but the practice of nationalism, both politically and culturally, involves a criss-crossing of these two theoretical routes.

The Modernists and the Ethnicists

Recognising that civic and ethnic nationalism are theoretically distinct but intermeshing in practice, I will examine the theories presented by the modernists and ethnicists in explaining the process of nationalism within the framework of modernity. The modernist argument will be primarily drawn from Gellner who defines nationalism as "about entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population."²² In addition to Gellner the modernists are represented by the theories of Tom Nairn, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, among others. It is the modernists, collectively, who offer the closest thing there is to a theory, or partial theory, of nationalism. Gellner is at the forefront stressing that nationalism is a sociological necessity based upon the kind of social structure and culture engendered by modernity rather than an awakening of a slumbering nation, as some of the primordialists (working outside the framework of modernism) for example would have us believe. Instrumental to the modernist theory of nationalism is the existence of the state. Nationalism is contingent upon the existence of a state, it is "parasitic on a prior and assumed definition of the state: it also seems to be the case that nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted."²³

John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith will be used as the ambassadors for the ethnicists. Hutchinson's definition of the nation focuses primarily on the ethnic group, where their characteristics are more likely to be inherited. "The nation is thus an ethno-cultural community shaped by shared myths of origins, a sense of common history and way of life, and particular ideas of space, that endows its members with identity and purpose."²⁴ Who actually is an ethnicist, a primordialist or a perennialist is debatable. Tom Nairn classifies Anthony Smith as a primordialist thereby representing a 'soft' definition of primordialism where ethnicity transmitted by culture is the essence of a nation. But Smith regards primordialists²⁵ as far more radical, where the belief of ethnicity being the essence of the nation is one rooted in biology. Smith believes that the "proponents of this view claim that nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience."²⁶ He defines himself as an "ethno-symbolist". He is not a primordialist in that his theory does not essentialise the ethnies, but does stress its importance to both the nation and nationalism. His is more a culturalist position in response to the modernists; he is a modernist with

ethnic claims, or a reflexive modernist.

Therefore in examining the arguments put forth by both the modernists and ethnicists I do not seek to disprove either camp, rather to show that both contribute to our understanding. Though the modernists and ethnicists appear to represent two opposing camps in explaining nationalism, I will seek to establish that both theories are encompassed by all European nationalisms, but to varying degrees. The core of nationalism in modern Europe is the modern nation-state, which does have pre-modern claims. That is, though there has been a definite change in the perception and role of culture with the onset of modernity, as espoused by modernists such as Gellner, the ethnic rationale is still very important to the motivations and perpetuation of nationalism, as emphasised for example by Smith. Each of their theories state a particular route towards nationhood as paramount (the civic one for modernists and the ethnic one for ethnicists). But by showing that these routes are crossed by a network of connections this thesis will argue that both theories must compromise.

Identity

The psychological influences of nationalism and the idea of nationalism as pathology will also be mentioned but not deeply discussed. Rather a reflection on the rational and non-rational elements of nationalism will be explored, incorporating notions of pathology. In the literature ethnic nationalism is represented as the reactionary element of nationalism, and the emotionalism more fervently attached to this classification means that it is perceived as the more non-rational element of nationalism. This is not to suggest that non-rationality is exclusive to ethnic nationalism alone. Non-rationality, irrationality and a-rationality are all present throughout the theoretical spectrum of nationalism; it is just more concentrated on the ethnic end. The ethnic component of nationalism allows for a greater "retreat from rationalism"²⁷ though nationalism itself demonstrates "national belonging can be a form of rational attachment"²⁸ important to all members of society.

The acquisition of a national identity and the act of nation formation are processes and not occurrences of nationalism as stipulated by Connor.²⁹ Nationalism is a "compulsive necessity for a certain socio-political form".³⁰ It can be progressive and regressive, constructive and destructive. It may initially emerge in a society as a part of its developmental process, but it does not disappear after this, rather it becomes imbedded in the functioning of that society in the future. It is a pursuit and manifestation of a national identity, or rather the pursuit of a national identity trying to manifest itself politically, exercising a collective psychological need made political: the politics of identity as

opposed to the politics of interest. Nationalism "corresponds to certain internal needs of the society in question, and to certain individual, psychological needs as well. It supplies peoples and persons with an important commodity, 'identity'." [31](#)

Nationalism is essentially a mass movement, volatile and dynamic, given direction and governed by the elite who in turn is fuelled by the mass. There exists an interdependence between the elite and the mass, their behaviour and relationship will determine (or be determined by) the character of the nationalism, that involves a particular interplay of civic and ethnic nationalism (though these are not the sole components). The character of a nationalism will be predominantly determined by the initial motivations for its emergence, whether it be a 'natural' process of a nation's development, or a reaction to another nation's development. And whether the inception of the national consciousness occurred within a politically demarcated territory, or is separate to state development. Theoretically the nature of the emergence of the nationalism (i.e. whether it is classified as civic or ethnic) will determine the ongoing nature of the nationalism and the national character of the people it possesses. The national character provides for a sense of self whilst the political culture creates the political environment in which the national character is to assert itself. Each nationalism is subjective, but nationalism is the objective exercise of it.

Conclusion

Nationalism is not the rite of passage to modernity, but goes beyond this. It is a cultural and political reaffirmation of a group within modernity and towards post-modernity. Collectivities are dynamic and new or altered high cultures always have the potential to still emerge. The exercise of nationalism is a result of a set of social conditions that produce a situation where the pervading culture is the high culture. This does not just effect the elite minorities but the entire population and 'constitutes very nearly the only kind of unit which men willingly and often ardently identify' in modernity.[32](#) Nationalism as a function of modernity (and post-modernity) is used by the elite as a vehicle for social mobility - a method of redefinition. It is the role of the elite as intellectual awakers to mobilise the mass, and by doing so nationalise them, either through management or outright manipulation. This process sees the birth of a new high culture, whether via education or by inherited characteristics, which either replaces some previously dominant cultural group or creates a new one 'recreated by political will and cultural engineering, based on elements drawn from a distant past.'[33](#) The elite governs and the mass follow, but the elite must be moved from below.

The route towards nationhood has in theory been divided into two possible categories: the pursuit of a national identity as housed in a nation-state; or the exercise of national identity as the (re)assertion of a culture as being politically legitimate. This thesis is not seeking to disprove these routes to nationhood rather to show that in the exercise of nationalism these routes are not exclusive roads. Rather, regardless of the inception and conception of nationhood by a community of people, the actual process of nationalism involves an intermeshing of both forms. This is the theme throughout.

The following chapters will first explore the dichotomy of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism set up in theory, and the interplay of the two in practice. The arguments of the modernists will be critically examined followed by the arguments of the ethnicists in Chapter Three. Chapter Four will derive the finer points from both perspectives demonstrating that in examining the exercise of nationalism both the modernists and the ethnicists working within a modernist framework make valid and important contributions to the theory of nationalism. From this it will be demonstrated that civic and ethnic nationalism are not mutually exclusive elements but that in practice they are collaborators in each nation's own nationalism. The focus here will be limited to that of modern Europe.

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CHAPTER ONE

Ethnic Nationalism and Civic Nationalism

The discrimination between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is common in writings on nationalism and nations, whether it be as the civic-ethnic division, the political-cultural, or the Western-Eastern division. Writers, both modernists and ethnicists working within the paradigm of modernity, such as Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, John Plamenatz, John Hutchinson, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith have all included this distinction in their writings. The historical differences in the development of the nation-state between the West and the East in Europe have enforced these theoretical-cum-practical divisions. In fact the East-West divide is less a geographic divide than an historic one. I am not disputing this historic divide, but my argument is that this divide does not justify the theoretical schism in writings on nationalism, nor does this divide extend to perpetuating the notion of two types of nationalism in practice. A "definitional antithesis" does exist but this should not lead, as it has done in literature, to the "set of analytical cliches" of which it does¹ denying 'civic' nations of ethnic virtues and denying those nations categorised as 'ethnic' of 'civic' virtues.²

According to modernists (with the exception of Benedict Anderson), Britain and France, as the first examples of modern nation-states in Europe, developed the rational, civic, political units of modernity and followed later with the development of a unique national consciousness housed within this.³ The nation-states of the East however, such as Germany and Russia, began as more fluid apolitical units whose national consciousness developed first, only later to seek to enclose it within a political form, in aspiration of the progress achieved by the West.⁴ These two separate routes to the nation-state are apparently the original examples of the exercise of the two separate types of nationalism.

The argument behind this discrimination poses that though the end result for both sides was the modern nation-state the routes they took differed, which would terminally ordain the manner in which these nation-states expressed themselves as a unit of modernity. That is, the formation of a nation would determine the national expression of a community. Therefore the basis of the nationalism is determined by whether the national *feeling* among the population emerged before or after the

development of a nation-state. And since every nation-state is inherently nationalistic⁵ the timing of this development will in turn determine the motivations of continuity of the nation-state, thus its nationalism. This chapter will initially present the principles of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism separately and then provide suggestions of how the interplay of the principles of each is necessary to certify the success of the practice of nationalism. I shall conclude by examining culture (high culture and popular culture) as the common ground forming the foundation for both the categories.

The first thing we need to do is briefly examine the relationship between civic and ethnic nationalism and the connection to cultural homogeneity. The proposal by those whom I will term the dichotomists (those who divide nationalism into two types) is that both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism pursue mutually exclusive forms of cultural homogeneity. Within civic nationalism cultural standardisation is achieved via a particular level of communication and education, what Gellner labelled the 'high culture' and which we will use here. In communities where these tools are unsuccessful or unavailable the elite draw elements from the people developing a populist movement driven by the seduction of myths and symbols deliberately forming a shared memory and shared destiny with which to unite the people. The minimal appearance of high culture is compensated with an over-zealous popular culture. They manufacture a social glue from the *Volk* in the absence of other instruments. Cultural standardisation is then achieved through the *ethnie* and so the theoretical aim of ethnic nationalism is ethnic homogeneity.

In this modernist view, the 'true' exercise of nationalism within modernity is a social condition where political practice is married with a cultural phenomenon. Culture "introduces a mode of transmission of traits or activities from generation to generation which is no longer dependent on being inscribed into the genetic constitution of the members of the group."⁶ This means the association of culture with geneticism is completely removed in modernity. The removal of this dependency indicates the cultural break that modernity heralded and which modernists argue is crucial to the understanding of the functioning of nationalism. Ethnicity is perceived as linked to this genetic constitution of culture, or at least the perennial component of it. This explains why (as a consequence of this cultural break) modernists such as Gellner rule out the necessity and relevance of ethnicity in determining nationalism.

The problems is that ethnicity is not just an example of a continuum in culture from premodern times. It is both a part of culture and a part of politics within modernity. Gellner removes it from the core of nationalism, whilst still acknowledging that it may influence the nature

of nationalism.⁷ But if ethnicity influences nationalism then will it not in some way determine the nature and character of nationalism, and thus the exercise of nationalism? Gellner tells us that "[n]ationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond."⁸ Ethnicity is an element that can provide this required similarity of culture, though not to the extent of crowding out the civic elements of nationalism in order to possess one of its own. The proposal by some more extreme ethnicists⁹ is that ethnicity possesses its own form of nationalism absent of any civic elements. This would mean a nationalism that is unsuccessful and unfulfilled. By contrast, it is the argument of this thesis that nationalism is a political and cultural phenomenon, and embedded in this is the influences of ethnicity. The ethnic rationale is as much a component of nationalism as the civic. Both demonstrate methods by which culture is unifying.

One particular practical example is the Basque lands of Spain whose nationalism may be categorised as ethnic nationalism, but also possesses representations of civic nationalism. Membership of the Basque society is based on descent but the nationalism would not exist were it not for the strength of some of the principal features of civic nationalism. The nationalism is most virulent in regions where economic development and prosperity is greatest – a decidedly civic feature. In fact the epicentre of Basque nationalism has shifted this century, and particularly since the 1970s, in an eastward direction following the movement of economic wealth. This is a direct reflection of the importance of heavy industry and the generation of wealth.¹⁰ It is the significance of the components of civic nationalism and the existence of a civil society that is vital for this nationalism to have survived and to continue. The institutions that are integral components to the development and functioning of a civil society are also necessary components of Basque nationalism in Spain. Hence the more potent regions of Basque nationalism are not necessarily those that carry particular historical significance, or are the cradle of its inception according to myth, as ethnic nationalism would suggest.

The argument can be generalised. Nationalism in Europe, particularly that exercised in the second half of this century, is proving not to be compatible with the civic-ethnic dichotomy. The dichotomy itself is far too normative. The ethnic rationale in nationalism is becoming more and more prominent, however it still does not solely define nationalism, but it is certainly demonstrating that it is not just a method of classification nor an apolitical component. Not only has culture, and with it ethnicity, been politicised in modernity, ethnicity itself has become a form of politics, not unto itself, but in conjunction with the civic elements of the politics of nationalism.

The Difference – Civic Nationalism

Civic nationalism in its classical modern form represents the pursuit towards attaining a unified culturally homogenous group housed within already existent specific political boundaries. The starting point for civic nationalism is the state, and *nationalism* is the pursuit by this state of its own nation congruent with its territorial borders. Until this is achieved nationalism will remain a noisy component of society. In pursuing the establishment of a nation the role of the state is elevated, for it is no longer just a territorial region but a unit whose function is to house and protect its culturally homogeneous inhabitants. The political nation-state then is the starting point for civic nationalism and pivotal to its definition. The nation-state, as the nucleus of civic nationalism and the focus of the modernist camp, is defined by Gellner as:

the protector, not of a faith, but of a culture, and the maintainer of the inescapably homogeneous and standardizing educational system, which alone can turn out the kind of personnel capable of switching from one job to another within a growing economy and a mobile society, and indeed of performing jobs which involve manipulating meanings and people rather than things. [11](#)

The principles of civic nationalism – the state-to-nation route – were those that provided the first modern notion of the nation-state and the first experience of nationalism. [12](#)

The focal point of civic nationalism is the nation-state promoting the belief in a society united by the concept and importance of territoriality, citizenship, civic rights and legal codes transmitted to all members of the group. Significantly, all the members are now equal citizens and equal before the law. No longer are the mass a part of the 'low' culture and the elite a part of the 'high' culture, rather modernity has eliminated these cultural cleavages and formed a new 'high culture'. What the onset of modernity signified was a cultural break with the past, which subsequently meant an end to these cleavages. Public culture of this type is one that is a product of the modern world – the culture that emerges from factors such as advanced communication and education, rather than the vernacular characteristics of the people, or an ethnic group. This means that nationalism is "about entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit, and its total population."[13](#) The social glue is provided by a commonality based upon shared traits not of the genealogical type but a fraternity of shared language, experiences, rules, law, food, education, etc. The fraternity requires no common paternity but a bond formed out of exposure to these same elements.

In practice, however, this civic model of nationalism cannot succeed

without more substantial elements of the above principles. Citizenship for example is more than just a legal identity and a matter of common rights and codes within a society. It is about allegiance, participation and residence within the territory, and a feeling of solidarity and affiliation towards the community. As Smith points out, the will to participate in this community could only be found among those who were themselves residents and, just as importantly, whose parents were residents also.¹⁴ This is an important point, as nationalism in this form – where the emphasis is on an historical community based not only on an individual's residence but their own ancestry, and hence their own genealogy - moves beyond the structure of civic nationalism in its pure form and towards that of the principles and characteristics carried by the theory of ethnic nationalism.

Within civic nationalism, citizenship can be elected and is what determines one's nationality. But this does not rule out nationality determined by other elements and it is difficult to locate an example of where it might actually do so. Britain and France, historically, are the main contenders for where citizenship determines nationality, but more contemporary examples demonstrate just how much their nationalism can deviate from the confines of civic nationalism as they place importance on the ethnic rationale. In Britain, for example, in order to obtain a British passport by someone who is not born in Britain nor is a citizen one need only to prove that one's grandparent is/was a British citizen, which lays weight to the importance of ancestry. But the true importance of genealogical descent is pushed even further. Recently a young woman seeking a British passport in the above mentioned manner was refused because she was adopted and so her grandparents were not her biological grandparents, thus she had no real genealogical ties to Britain and hence no claim to a passport.¹⁵ Of course there are numerous such examples throughout Europe, but they have been generally attributed to the more central and eastern nation-states. The point here of course is that though a nation-state may have taken one particular route towards their formation and development they are not confined to these principles. In fact in order to survive, in order to practice nationalism successfully, they *must* move beyond the boundaries of civic nationalism set up by theorists.

The components of civic nationalism are not new. Notions of citizenship and territoriality existed in many cases in premodern times as with the existence of the state and notions of patriotic consciousness. The pursuit of uniting these components into one entity, the territorial association of citizens that share one public culture,¹⁶ is what differentiates it with past examples. Citizenship is the foundation of civic nationalism that "conveyed the sense of solidarity and fraternity through active social and political participation."¹⁷ It is perceived as the political definition of

nationality.¹⁸ However, the *exercise* of civic nationalism where the emphasis is on territory, and the actual *practice* of citizenship, indicates a shift away from the authority and sovereignty of citizenship based solely on social and political participation. The exercise of nationalism requires a communal attachment that transcends the sovereignty of the citizen for nationalism requires more than just social and political participation, it necessitates social and political attachment also.

An attachment to a specific land and to a specific community is necessary for there to be a will to participate socially and politically. But the particular attachment by a community is usually not one randomly chosen (though an individual may choose their nationality, their attachment or feeling is not often a rational choice); it is the feeling of nationality by a whole community (rather than just focusing on an individual) from which the attachment must derive from and is something that must develop over time. So where an individual may choose their nationality and be embraced by their new nation-state as one of their own (a citizen), the exercise of nationalism by the whole community is not one selected, but one developed. This means that this affiliation by a whole people, this sense of kinship, is something inherited and was felt in some form by the parents and grandparents of the current generation.¹⁹ This suggests that citizenship, as nationality in practice, does not exist in its pure definitional form as it possesses concepts that move beyond the rational notion of choice.

Ethnic Nationalism

The principles of civic nationalism represented the first experience of the nature of national*ism* as a movement, it is the principles of ethnic nationalism, however, that have become the more powerful and vigorous elements of national*ism* this century. Ethnic nationalism lends popular appeal to the nationalist movement drawing its ideological bonds from the people and their native history. Subsequently, in its ideal state this second route to nationhood is undertaken under the power of popular mobilisation. Appealing to elements 'naturally' unique to a group gives the movement an emotional allure. The elements that are at the core of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism - memory, value, myth and symbolism²⁰ - draw from blood ties, bonds to the land and native traditions inferring that ethnic nationalism represents that which is subjective within nationalism. Nationality is embodied in the individual whereas in civic nationalism the individual "can move in and out of pre-existing national space."²¹

This path towards nationhood possesses a different grounding than civic nationalism and thus occupies a different perspective of the nation, and a

different structure of national identity. This is due to the different core conceptions of each ideal. Ethnic nationalism is presented as a nationalism that perceives the nation as a community bounded by genealogical descent. The national identity in turn draws its characteristics from the ethnic identity, myths and memories make up national identities imprisoned in the community's ancestry. Thus national identity is defined as a perennial feature within the theory of ethnic nationalism, and is a reflection of the populist nature of ethnic nationalism.

In explaining populism, Anthony Smith claims that he approaches the definition in the same manner that Tom Nairn does by describing it as a coalition between the masses and the elite.²² It is a product of their interaction and contingency upon one another, i.e. they are dependent upon one another to progress. In the birth of ethnic nationalism the mass is left out of the high culture - it is only the elite who can participate, manipulating the masses rather than managing them, in order to mobilise them. But this mobilisation must take place in response to the demands of the mass - the demands for progress. Hence the contingency. Mobilisation could only take place with the tools available or via methods that would compensate for the tools unavailable such as the necessary economic and political institutions. The use of compensatory tools often meant the use of the uniqueness of the people themselves - characteristics that they regarded as distinguishing themselves from others. "The peripheric elites had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their own hands."²³ Elite manipulation then serves to crystallise mass discontent.

However, this mobilisation towards progress and as a process of development was a reactionary measure against the dominance (and nationalism) of the 'Western' or civic nations, as proposed by the theory of ethnic nationalism. The foreign element of the 'West' was made attractive by the dignity it lent to the people and became a necessity for the preservation of communities. Reacting against this foreign element meant that it was also reacting against the progress it was aspiring towards.²⁴ Therefore this drive towards progress, the motivation of nationalism, was consequently then a reaction to other dominant forces (perhaps even other civic nationalisms), particularly as the concept of the nation for these type of nationalisms is predominantly an imported idea. The presentation of ethnic nationalism, or similar nationalisms, as reactionary is one promoted by writers such as Greenfeld and Nairn, though the nature of the reaction varies amongst writers. Greenfeld labels this importation as *ressentiment* - a reaction to external elements as a result of repressed existential envy.²⁵ Thus it is not just the importation of ideas but a reaction to the mere implantation of foreign ideas. And as Nairn identifies, this meant that nationalisms which were

born out of reaction are marked by profound ambiguity and ambivalence.²⁶ Hutchinson is another writer who has occasionally suggested ethnic nationalism to be a reactionary nationalism, construed as negative.

This borrowing of ideas however meant that these groups had to fit their social character into the desired foreign social form. This necessitated a level of invention in order to create a history that made their aspirations appear natural and legitimate and intrinsic in their inherent development. This required mobilising the masses not just in response to their demands, but to meet their demands by issuing a history to them. Just as they needed a shortcut towards a high culture they also needed a short-cut to a history which would lend the necessary legitimacy to this nationalism. "The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood."²⁷ Forcing this process of development and creating a high culture and history due to necessity suggests that the role of the elite in more ethnic-flavoured nationalisms was more conscious and manipulatory. This further suggests a requirement to rise above the law, which is why ethnic nationalism is seen to sometimes act as a bulwark to liberal democracy and lend itself more easily to authoritarian rule. Being vulnerable to these influences also impacts on the character of nationalism and the psychology of the group.

Nationalism has a great psychological depth. It appears to individuals of all types who are members of a nation and evokes emotion beyond that which may be considered just patriotic. The psychology of nationalism is important for the group as a unit for what it inspires and motivates from the group. Exploring the psychology of nationalism is important for the group as a unit for what it inspires and motivates from the group. Exploring the psychology of nationalism and what it may or may not promote exposes those nationalisms classified as ethnic to be regarded as potentially or actually pathological.²⁸ It is a careless assumption that it is a 'natural' part of human behaviour to fight and resort to violence in order to defend territory and family, and that ethnic sentiments are intrinsic in the human psyche. Scholarly theories do steer away from such assumptions, unfortunately to such an extent that psychological understanding of nationalism is little explored.²⁹ One still has to account for the emotion provoked by nationalism, the will of people to partake in nationalistic behaviour and the loyalty it demands. This, complementing the structural components of the theory of nationalism, helps to explain its perpetuation, and more importantly the national character and national consciousness of each group which distinguishes it from the next. Perhaps then we may understand better the national consciousness of areas such as the Balkans, rather than reducing it to a consequence of 'ancient ethnic hatreds'; or the passion behind the Irish Republican

movement without declaring it as simply religious xenophobia.

National consciousness in Eastern Europe formed prior to the politicisation of the community (including both the elite *and* the mass). Due to this different point of inception the focal point of nationalism has meant a greater emphasis is placed on the components of the prepolitical time – namely the *ethnie*. Under the theories that dichotomise the practice and ideology of nationalism they are sentenced to practise ethnic nationalism. What this means is the recognition and "demand that the natural divisions within the nation – sexual, occupational, religious and regional – be respected, for the impulse to differentiation is the dynamo of national creativity".³⁰ This is paramount in the exercise of nationalism by those nation-states whose political formation was preceded by its national formation. But does this condemnation mean that the 'Eastern' nation-states will always practice only ethnic nationalism, with no access to the civic components of nationalism merely because of their conception? Hutchinson believes so when he states that cultural nationalists reject "the ideal of universal citizenship rights of political nationalism"³¹ for the nation is a living whole and continuous. Politics cannot give justification or legitimisation to this. It was not that the nationalists of the East "rejected" these ideals, but that these ideals developed at a different time, at a different pace, and consequently took on a slightly different form to that of the West. To Hutchinson the nation in Eastern Europe, and thus the nation-state, was not a political fact but an ethnocultural one.³² It was an ethnocultural fact in search of political legitimacy. If we are to succumb to distinctions this was the nationalism of the East.

The emphasis on the *ethnie* and the belief in its continuity from agrarian to modern times is the main distinction between the two ideals of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The ethnic rationale has little weight in theories of civic nationalism and is also not supported by the modernists (to be explored in the next chapter). Whereas the primordialists and perennialists see no break between the agrarian and the modern age and see nations as built upon the pre-existing structures of ethnic identities. By recognising continuity with the past greater importance is attached to history. Ethnicists working within the modernist framework acknowledge a change in culture with the onset of modernity but rather than regarding it as a cultural break perceive it as the politicisation of culture, therefore still acknowledging the importance of history and of the ethnic rationale. The principles promoted by civic nationalism, principles born out of modernity, demonstrate a definite cultural break with the pre-modern age. Within the ideal of civic nationalism the national identity stems from the concept of an ideology based on the imagined political community united by their public culture, and not by native history.

Interplay

Though the starting point for various nationalisms is varied civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism became overlaying dominant ideologies such classifications exclusively applied are false. In practice it would mean that the actual *exercise* of nationalism would ultimately fail in attaining and reaffirming the goal of a nation-state. The 'pure forms' of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism stem from different reference points and different concepts of the nation. For example, observing ethnic nationalism in this scenario and using the position of the primordialists (and temporarily stepping out of the modernist framework), the theory suggests that the ethnic groups of the past would naturally evolve into nations as a part of the 'natural' process of a community, or an extension of kinship ties. The process of nationalism however lends a twist in the conception for it implies the desire to detain a nation within a state. The nation-state having a civic quality in order to achieve this civic quality would mean adopting characteristics of civic nationalism. In this way ethnic nationalism – in practice as a mongrelised form of its theoretically pure self – accommodates to the concept of abstract territoriality in order to satisfy its goals. An interplay is necessary for the nationalism to be successful.

Similarly, as mentioned above, civic nationalism must draw from the characteristics of ethnic nationalism to confer popular appeal, drawing upon myths and symbols, and recognising the importance of heritage in the will to belong and participate both socially and politically in a group. So in order to be accomplished and fulfilled each nationalism in practice must borrow from one another. Thus in various combinations the first route of nationalism, civic nationalism, "joined hands"³³ with the second route of nationalism, ethnic nationalism. These borrowed elements are not just elements of influence but are essential components necessary to make the nationalism work.

Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism as demonstrated may be analytically different but in practice they are intermeshing. Every individual nationalism is a hybrid construct, a synthesis of the civic and the ethnic. This means that each nationalism is civic and ethnic to some extent in that they carry different elements and characteristics of civic nationalism and different elements and characteristics of ethnic nationalism. Using France and Germany again as representations of the classical division, France representing civic nationalism and Germany ethnic nationalism, they are each perceived as archetypal examples of each respective category of nationalism. Though decidedly civic in principle or ethnic in flavour they are not purely such. The sophisticated dichotomists do not dispute this dilution, but they rarely follow through

the consequences of the interplay. Brubaker himself acknowledges that each nation-state does not represent a purely political or purely apolitical understanding of nationhood. In Germany for example political authority was so limited that it could not enter into the understanding of nationhood, this responsibility was thus carried by ethnicity.³⁴ But this was only at the period of nation formation. As Germany developed to form one united national unit its political authority also developed. Initially in Germany identification with the instruments and institutions of the state were absent, as modernity progressed they developed and were integrated in the overall understanding of nationhood, even if led by the ethnocultural conception. Nationhood in Germany was then perhaps predominantly an ethnocultural concept at its inception, but the understanding, and more importantly the exercise of nationalism in Germany was never purely ethnocultural or just a dilution of it, but an interplay of the dominant ethnocultural feature of nationalism with its civic components. Likewise in France, the inception of nationhood was never purely political, though its foundations were based on political understanding. For France as a nation-state to progress and for its members to practice its nationalism – for the members to possess the will to partake in it – the emotive features possessed by ethnicity as a form of culture were necessary. France and Germany perhaps exercise different variations of nationalism, but the fact remains that they both do exercise and partake in nationalism. They both partake in this ideological movement in order to progress in modernity, thus rather than examining what differentiates the two nation-states, there is something that both France and Germany possess that makes their nationalism successful. This similarity is the successful interplay of the pressures on nationalism, which include the civic components and the ethnic components.

The degree of concentration of each category of nationalism varies widely. It is these variations in the make-up of each nationalism that distinguishes them from one another, and consequently sentences the ideology of nationalism to no clear-cut theory. Thus the ideological movement of nationalism is a hybrid of the civic character and the ethnic character of nationalism, meaning a hybrid of history and culture, the territorial and the genealogical, the engineered and the discovered. Writers who dichotomise nationalism use various European examples to demonstrate the schism, in much the way that Brubaker does with France and Germany. But by over-focusing on the differences in nationalisms within Europe, and attempting to categorise them, often the similarities are overlooked. It is the similarities that make nationalism successful and why, contrary to literary opinion,³⁵ has still failed to fade away. The more fervent type of nationalism experienced in the latter half of the twentieth century in Europe has been categorised as ethnic nationalism.

Modernity has meant that culture has been politicised. Claiming that one nationalism is cultural and another political (or ethnic and civic, or Eastern or Western) refutes this unmistakable link. I am not disputing that the nation-states we know today formed in different ways – this is not the thesis – different routes do and did exist unique to each community. What I am stressing is that nationalism is the same sport on both sides of the fence – the civic and the ethnic, the political and the cultural, are all components of this game and not exclusive to any particular side, regardless of how the game originally emerged. Certainly, as we are witnessing towards the end of this century, some nationalisms concentrate more heavily on some components than others – but without all the components together *there would not be a nationalism*.

Perhaps the most challenging nationalism with which this may be difficult to reconcile is the case of the Balkans today, particularly the former Yugoslavia. Serb nationalism has infiltrated destruction in Bosnia and now in Kosovo (though Croat nationalism, Bosnian nationalism and Kosovar/Albanian nationalism has been just as potent at times). These nationalisms and their violent consequences are attributed to perennial conflicts in the region based on ethnic divisions. However, these conflicts were never perennial. Past prejudices were not motivated by ethnic or religious difference but were "largely a socio-political one, involving the exercise and abuse of local political power for the sake of political gain."³⁶ Ethnic divisions did not become issues of tension and conflict until they were politicised and in the Balkans this did not occur until the nineteenth century. Therefore the nationalisms in the Balkans were not the consequence of perennial ethnic tensions. The conflict-ridden nature is attributed to the manipulation and exploitation of ethnic divisions and history and the creation of myths and cults for ideological purposes. Nationalism in this case is not the ideology itself but acts as a vehicle by which the ideology can survive. The nationalism then is a modern phenomenon in the Balkan region and without elements of the civic components of nationalism it would not survive nor would this nationalism have been so successful.

As I will argue later in more detail, the exercise of nationalism would not exist in the Balkans, and in other regions of Europe were it not for the interplay of both the civic and ethnic components of nationalism. The interplay of the ethnic and civic components of nationalism is centred on the need for cultural homogeneity. A community enclosed in a political space must be united by uniformity in culture and this is what the intermeshing of the ethnic and civic components strive towards in order for a successful exercise of nationalism.

Culture

The ground linking modern civic and ethnic nationalism is culture: not 'culture' understood as a perennial unchanging base, but culture as emphasising a changing form of social relations. A common culture is a necessary feature of nationalism (both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism), and is also the link between the modernists and the ethnicists. It is the concept of what this common unifying culture represents and what it is comprised of that differentiates the two camps and leaves them unable to reconcile their respective perspectives. Adopting Ernest Gellner's definition of culture it is "a shared style of expression in words, facial expression, body language, style of clothing, preparation and consumption of food, and so forth."³⁷ According to him there are two types of culture, those that are "patterns of conduct transmitted through emulation" and those that are the "interaction of genetic endowment with the environment".³⁸ This second type of culture is disregarded by most modernists for it is not one from which a 'high' culture can emerge, an essential component of nationalism in the modernist framework. Therefore the two types of culture exist on different planes and only one is politically and socially relevant in modernity. There certainly is a clear distinction between cultural transmission and genetic transmission, and it is cultural transmission that makes nationalism possible. It is this, and not genetic ethnicity, that perpetuates the phenomenon.³⁹ But can this cultural transmission be organic?⁴⁰ Perhaps not, but surely if culture is transmitted then some of its characteristics can be reproduced from pre-modern times with remnants of its 'genetic' base. Existing remnants may not have been eliminated with the onset of modernity, but they have certainly been politicised. A "specific genetic base is required before culture is possible: once it is possible, it permits developments unconstrained by the usual rules of governing genetic change."⁴¹

What Gellner recognised as linking a people together was not some genetic, biological or ethnic trait that make a people physically similar, but rather culture, or more specifically, a 'high' culture that made people socially alike and was capable of creating and maintaining a political bond. What differentiates high cultures from each other is decided by the development of a group and their specific response to the introduction of modernity. In particular, this may be a consequence of whether the population is at the core of industrialisation or a peripheral society. Their historical development and experiences act as a precursor to how nationalism will be exercised. The method of elevation of both the elite and the mass to a high culture, that is the elected educational process, is what inevitably distinguishes one high culture from the next. Societies are different due to the different circumstances of a political/cultural nature experienced by them. Therefore, societies are not 'essentially'

different but their reactions to "questions forced upon" them generate differences.[42](#)

The politicisation of culture has meant that what were once purely cultural concerns in the past have in the modern age become social and political concerns, involving territory, economy and society. And if we align ourselves momentarily with the primordialists and agree that the nation is a 'natural' formation, then modernisation has meant that the nation is not just a community of people sharing the same culture but now a population that are bounded in political space as well. This belief however does not require the primordial conviction that nations are 'natural' formations. Whether what existed before modernity is a nation or not is debatable, what is more important is what carried through into modernity and how these inherited elements do or do not effect the way in which a nationalism is exercised.

The politicisation of culture is the abdication of "the realm of culture" in preference to politics. Politics is now no longer just the domain of the elite and intelligentsia but open to all members of a society.[43](#) Former "objects of history" are now "subjects of history", and the passive are now participants.[44](#) They now all form a 'high culture'. The politicisation of culture has meant a collective change of attitude in each population sharing the same culture. The change in attitude that represented the "conjunction of culture with politics" is demonstrative of the core of nationalism and a key element in the process of nationalism itself.[45](#) These changes may be produced either via substantive changes in the economic, political and religious atmosphere of society, or more covertly by the manipulation of the elites, and most likely as a combination of these factors.[46](#)

Those components of a people that are reproduced in modernity will undoubtedly be elements unique to a people, namely their ethnic elements. This also bonds a people by their shared features of an *ethnie* embedded in a culture within modernity. The *ethnie* is a feature of culture that may or may not serve to be the unifying homogeneous component. At the times when the *ethnie* is a dominant feature of culture it may sometimes be confused as overriding culture and being *the* unifying feature of a community of people. This is when a nationalism is considered ethnic, and when other components of a culture, particularly if there are signs of a 'high culture', are overlooked. In the latter half of this century this classification of nationalism has been mainly attributed to the nation-states of Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, particularly since the end of the Cold War, changes occurred in a variety of ways and found vents through a variety of outlets, whilst "simultaneously exciting tensions along latent axes such as those of an ethnic nature".[47](#)

The Balkans in particular has leant itself as an example of the virulent

nature attributed to ethnic nationalism. Certainly the battles and wars fought since 1989, the movement of peoples under the term of ethnic cleansing, and the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia itself has provided ample evidence. However, were it not for the civic components of nationalism the nationalisms exercised in the former Yugoslavia would not have been successful. And by success I mean success in the establishment of political units as a motivation and consequence of the action of the nationalisms. Croatian nationalism would not have achieved a Croatian nation-state if it did not consider also the importance of democratic development and an economy independent of the Yugoslav regime. The nation-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, though propped up by the international arena, would not have been imagined two decades ago but is a civic and ethnic response to the nationalism encountered by both the Croats and the Serbs on either side of it.

As a consequence of the nationalisms exercised in this region, some only emerging as a response to the hostile and imposing nature of other nationalisms, we now have the establishment of individual nation-states, fulfilling the goals of most of the nationalisms exercised in this region. The absence of a specifically 'Yugoslav' culture – ethnic or other – despite a whole generation growing out of it, meant it was vulnerable to the other nationalisms that existed within it, and ultimately overcame the state of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, as the name itself suggests ('land of the South Slavs') was never one nation in one state, but many nations and potential nations sharing the one state-space. The violence during its break-up can be attributed not to the classification of ethnic nationalism but directly to the clash of nationalisms as they competed for state space and asserted their own cultural homogeneity (along ethnic lines) which often conflicted with that of their neighbours.

By allowing culture to possess such elements as *ethnie* introduces matter that may extend beyond the definitions of reason and rationality – in extreme cases giving its mystique quality. As a representative of the modernists Gellner reconciles the issue of nationalism as a "spell" by housing it in his definition of culture (i.e. a high culture). He sees nationalism embedded in the social life of the modern age, and the "raw material" of this social life is culture and organisation.⁴⁸ Culture is found universally and perennially, which cannot be said about nations, states or nationalisms.⁴⁹ Therefore not only is culture a raw material of nationalism, it was present prior to modernity. But it is a 'high' culture that Gellner's theory asserts is the necessary condition of nationalism. High culture is achieved only via advanced communication and literacy attained through education. This 'high' culture must be homogeneous and it is from here that the political bond is formed and a nation born. Nationalism is the homogeneity of one high culture (which encompasses public and popular culture), or the act of creating a high culture by a

population that does not yet have one.⁵⁰

The nature of the culture prior to the onset of this change will influence the nature of the nationalism should it emerge. For this reason it becomes important to locate the "state of the cultural identity" of the population prior to their politicisation. That is, in order to identify a unique national identity, and thus locate the character of a nationalism, the key is the group's cultural identity prior to being politicised. And the key to discovering this is by using what cultural remnants remain, which is most probably the population's ethnic component. As Smith states:

Hence it becomes important to enquire into the 'state of cultural identity' of a given community on the eve of its exposure to the new revolutionary forces, in order to locate the bases of its subsequent evolution into a fully-fledged 'nation'.⁵¹

Modernity meant that equivalent identities were necessary in order to elevate or catch up to meet other advanced populations at the level they were at. This was to be done collectively and these identities were to be decided "along whatever fault-lines were available."⁵² This would include cultural fault-lines that may be ethnic. The identity of a community would be determined by the unifying feature of their culture, which would define their national identity representing the nationalism they exercised. National identity is the dominant and operative identity under modernisation.

Conclusion

The interplay of the characteristics of civic and ethnic nationalism can be viewed through either civic or ethnic spectacles. For example, 'citizenship' is the unifying force under civic nationalism and once possessed it is assumed there is a sense of solidarity among the people. In practice however possession of the rights that citizenship pertains and participation in the community is attached to a greater menagerie of elements.

Core elements of ethnic nationalism are used to build on the foundations of civic nationalism in order to fulfil its goals. The main goal is the formation of a nation within an already existing state. To achieve the cultural homogeneity sought after by civic nationalism requires shared values and the use of myths and symbols, particularly if the state lacks a dominant *ethnie* from which they can establish a political community. Similarly delivering ethnic ties to the form of a nation is accomplished by the establishment of a state. That is, by seeking to encompass a particular national group within a demarcated territory, thereby

practising nationalism on an ethnic base using some civic ingredients. Therefore, all nationalisms are in some way a combination of both engineering and discovery – an intermeshing of the classifications of civic and ethnic nationalism. Alone they are unsuccessful.

Due to the disparity of the nationalisms practised throughout the world, especially in Europe, and the difficulty in providing a comprehensive theory on the exercise of nationalism has led to the acquiescence to this misleading division. Let us now identify the arguments presented by the modernists and the ethnicists in the next two chapters in observing the ideology and practice of nationalism. This may bring to light the reason why this division is perpetuated in the writings on nationalism, even though it does not represent its contradicting nature.

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CHAPTER TWO

Nationalism as Perceived by the Modernists

The last chapter examined the fallacious dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism and how culture is the central unifying force within both classifications. It is culture that demonstrates how the two classifications are in practice intermeshing, even if their perceptions of culture differ. When explored as separate entities of nationalism the arguments presented by both civic and ethnic nationalism are quite convincing. In this chapter we will examine the arguments presented by the radical modernist camp in nationalist discourse, a discourse whose potency is congruent with the strengths of civic nationalism. My approach in this chapter is to demonstrate that the generally convincing modernist argument is weak in terms of its over-specificity on the determinants of nationalism and its over-generalisation concerning the consequences. It is also weak in its inability to explain nationalism beyond the terms of rationality and reason (i.e. failing to explain the non-rational emotive factor of nationalism), thus falling short of being a comprehensive theory.

There are a number of writers that may be classified as radical modernists ('modernists' as a shorthand description). Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism is arguably the most comprehensive; Tom Nairn provides the Marxist spin on nationalism; and Benedict Anderson, who views the onslaught of modernity, and with it nationalism, as a process that has taken many stages over a lengthy period of time, being a product of capitalism. In no way does this mean that each of their theories is equivalent. Gellner focuses on civic society from the perspective of liberal pluralism. Tom Nairn is more critical of the materialist aspect of nationalism and views the uneven development of capitalism as a cause for the continual rise of nationalism. His is a more internationalist perspective, and his theory occasionally criss-crosses from the modernists to the ethnicists. Benedict Anderson recognises the social construction of nation-states and presents them as "imagined communities".

Despite their differences however it is possible to recognise a common framing set of assumptions amongst these theorists. Firstly, they all recognise a cultural break between premodern and modern times; there is an elevation of the members of a community to being both social and political participants; nations are viewed as political units that are products of industrialisation and capitalism; and finally they all view nations as social constructions. As Gellner tells us, "[n]ationalism is

neither universal and necessary nor contingent and accidental, the fruit of idle pens and gullible readers. It *is* the necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions".¹ It is predominantly Gellner's theory and representation of nationalism that this chapter will address. Modernists adhere to the notion that divisions are not inherent in human nature but are the social product of modernity. Indeed divisions are not inherent in human nature, but neither are the workings of modernity equal and identical throughout humanity. The different reactions to modernity at different points in time have created differences in culture within politics. In modern Europe it is these different reactions that have developed divisions based on differentiation in experiences and history – *not* just in geography.

There is no clear formula of social conditions that generate nationalism beyond a united cultural base that, with the advent of major changes (such as industrialisation), strives towards nationhood. According to the modernists, particularly Gellner, this striving is in order to locate a congruence of nation and state – the principles of national self-determination. With no formula each nation or potential nation follows its own unique path toward nationhood, which may perhaps explain the absence of a clear theory of nationalism. The modernists fall short of providing a theory for a number of reasons. Anthony Smith (an ethnicist modernist who will be examined in the next chapter) provides us with a few weaknesses in the modernist argument.

1. Their generality means they cannot be easily applied to specific areas or cases.
2. Their materiality is overemphasised and misleading.
3. Nationalism as a product of modernisation overlooks the "persistence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments". Modernists in fact disagree at the degree, if any, of connection between ethnic ties and cultural sentiments.²

The latter point is perhaps the most important when criticising modernisation theory for though the modernists do present a valid exploration of nationalism, their conscious expulsion of the ethnic rationale in their theory leaves nationalism under modernisation theory unfulfilled. It is the first point however that is the key to locating what form the structure for the modernists and what these elements mean to nation formation and the reproduction of nationalism. The modernists are able to locate the causes of nationalism but are not successful at locating the reproduction. This chapter will begin then by examining these structural elements, the changes they have undergone and how this represents changes in subjectivity as perceived by the modernists. Other elements also to be explored include time and consciousness, and culture and ethnicity, as perceived by the modernists.

Structural Elements in Modernist Theory

Modernists rely heavily on the determinants of nation formation – those elements they believe underwent and were a part of the structural changes contributing to the nation-state, as we know it. I have already pointed out the framing set of assumptions in modernist theory: an underlying structural change, nations as political units and social constructions, and nations as products of modernity. The structural elements that comprise these framing assumptions include the market, the economy, industry, capital, and print capital. Their relationship to one another is varied and complex, likewise their respective relationship with the nation-state and nationalism is also complex. Together they introduced tools which allowed groups to proceed onto a new level of co-existence which included new levels of communication, new perceptions of time (including history and memory), and new perceptions of land and territory. In all its various manifestations this served to elevate groups to a 'high' culture.

These new perceptions instigated a change in the nature of the subjectivity, which in turn provoked a cultural/structural shift. This is the premise of the theory of the radical modernists. The cultural shift in particular is the basis of Gellner's theory where culture becomes a more self-conscious active element that is now politicised due to this structural shift. This politicisation is a consequence of the change in subjectivity and elevates all members of a community now bounded by political borders to a new role of political participants, mass and elite alike. But this is where Gellner, in particular, over-generalises the consequence of these changes. Not all communities are politically bounded, and though they are now self-conscious communities they seek self-determination, but nationalism is not just national self-consciousness/determination but rather it is the determination of the unit by others.³ Gellner places great emphasis on this political reality, and on the notion that not only are self-conscious communities to be recognised, but also that these same communities are to be culturally homogeneous. Therefore the nation is considered a culturally homogeneous unit, and the nation and the state are required to be congruent – a necessity of industrial society. However this, as Smith's first point of criticism addresses, cannot be easily applied to specific areas or cases.

In Europe there is perhaps no case of a nation-state that is culturally homogeneous and where the nation and state are completely congruent. Members of a community who consider themselves as one group are in reality not likely to be politically enclosed in the one physical space, there may be many communities existing in the one physical space. In Great Britain there are effectively four culturally distinct communities in

the one political space – the Welsh, the Scottish, the Irish and the English. In addition members of these four culturally distinct communities exist beyond the political physical space of Great Britain. Diaspore communities reside in other regions of the world with strong allegiances with the homeland, whether it is Irish communities in the United States or the English in Australia. Throughout Europe there are numerous examples of communities that ‘spill-over’ from the political space that encloses the majority of their community to neighbouring political units. German communities are common in many areas throughout Eastern Europe, Russian minorities exist in the Baltic States and in Ukraine, Hungarian minorities reside in Romania and in rump Yugoslavia. These are communities who are self-conscious of their nationality, which may or may not be equated with ethnic categories. Whether these communities consider themselves a part of the greater society in whose political space they reside will determine whether they pose a national threat through the desire to attain their own nation-state or join the nation-state of origin. Additionally, these communities must be recognised by the host society as members of their society. Estonia for example does not recognise the national minority of Russians as citizens of Estonia but as foreigners in their land.

The progression of a group from considering themselves (and being recognised by others) as a community to being a self-conscious society is the subjective change that the modernists view as vital to the understanding of nationalism, and is pivotal in the structural change that accompanied modernity. It is the move of a group from *Gemeinschaft* (literally community) to *Gesellschaft* (society) – the great sociological dichotomy. These changes are determined by the structural elements introduced and brought to significance by modernity. Capital and industry, two such structural elements, have proliferated throughout the globe over the past two centuries, they have landed in different ways and in different places at different times, meaning they have effected different groups in different ways. As structural elements of modernity the introduction of modernity therefore varied from region to region, depending on the formation of the structural change and how they were received. Whether a group pursued modernity, or modernity infected it will also determine the temper of nationalism within particular societies.

Modernist theory contends that nations can only exist in modern societies, that is, in a *Gesellschaft*, and the process towards attaining this generates nationalism. Gellner believes any existence of nations prior to the modern era is merely accidental. It is only in modernity that concepts like the nation, and the nation-state can exist and where activities such as nationalism can take place. They are born out of the transition from the premodern agrarian era to the modern more urban one as societies develop and emerge through the rubric of industrialisation.⁴ The

emerging new society would be centred on a literate high culture, assimilating any newcomers into it. If industrialisation is not thorough enough in assimilating the smaller groups into the larger more dominant ones, then there is the potential for another nationalism to emerge. Particularly if there is a lack of consensus on what culture(s) the political borders of a state do house.

An interesting example of a nationalism that did not completely submerge into the dominant society, but nor is it seeking to establish its own complete state is Scotland. National autonomy does exist and the nationalism that is practised is consciously civic in character; comparing its nationalism to that of its neighbours, Ireland and Wales, Scottish nationalism *appears* less 'ethnic'. Some explanations for this is that industrialisation was more thorough in Scotland than it was in Ireland and Wales. More specifically, agrarian change was more rigorous in Scotland so as to disembowel peasant society, thus removing the "blood-and-soil" feature from their nationalism.⁵ In this case, according to modernisation theory, industrialisation was thorough enough to involve the Scottish society in the larger more dominant British one. They subscribed to the literate high culture of Britain. Thus Scottish nationalism still exists, but within the workings of Great Britain.

The modernists restrict nationalism to being "a series of adjustments demanded by entry into the era of modernity"⁶ but what is their fuel and what gives them strength? And why do they not go away? This is what the modernists do not have a handle on and do not clearly address. The modernist thesis contends that economic forces are responsible for modernity and modernity is responsible for nationalism. Therefore by deduction economic forces are responsible for nationalism. Clearly with industrialisation, a force of economics, the character of politics, and that of political activity, has changed. The root of this change is situated in the changes in subjectivity and thus structural changes that gave rise to new factors of significance. With the rise of capital industry there has been the emergence and rise of a middle and working class that have become new actors in the social arena, consequently altering the nature of the political arena. Industrialisation has meant that politics has progressed to become "a non-elite, then a majority, concern".⁷ By politics now becoming a majority concern and moving beyond an elite-only venture, these majorities have formed together in culturally homogeneous and politically aware groups where their social concerns are similar and thus as a group they can aspire for the same goals.

This only explains the core of nationalism in its early formation and says nothing of what perpetuates the phenomenon. Under the modernist argument nationalism should both diminish in importance and become banal, or if it persists it is as a result of changes in the economic make-up and strengths of nation-states. Thus the perpetuation of

nationalism would be a consequence of competition between socio-political units who are fighting for resources, capital development and economic superiority. From an objective internationalist perspective this may be so. But how does this permeate to the masses that share the will to exercise the nationalism? Being a product of modernity it could be argued that the initial emergence of nationalism possessed many of these economic motivations and so to the masses within these units the exercise of nationalism meant the act of grabbing the benefits and/or spoils of modernity by a group of people linked together by some similar characteristics.

This still does not explain the will to do so. The desire to improve materially is a consequence not of competition but of such a large economic disparity that the mass in one group recognise the obvious and *feel* the difference between them and their political neighbours. The economic disparity that became ever obvious in the 1980s in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe relative to Western Europe is such an example. But nationalism was not then, and it certainly is not now, solely motivated by factors of material and economic disparity. Certainly in some circumstances economic factors may play a role, but the perpetuation and exercise of nationalism cannot be attributed to this.

Observing instances of nationalism in the latter half of this century in Europe there are many other more emotive elements that have inspired acts under the banner of nationalism – some good, some bad. In Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War there have been various manifestations of nationalism. The violent forms of those in the former Yugoslavia, such as the Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians and now the Kosovars; to the more peaceful of the Czechs and Slovaks; to other virulent and potentially virulent in the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine. In each of these cases nationalism was not motivated singularly by the desire for economic progress, it was (and still is in some cases) also an issue of self-determination. This is not to discount the importance of economics in the equation. In many of the former Communist countries the primary goal of the masses was to advance economically and materially so that they could experience the same benefits as those of the West. This included the proliferation of commercialism; privatisation offering profit incentives on a more immediate level; even to the more consumer oriented demands such as McDonalds, Pepsi, Nike and access to conveniences already available in the Western countries. But it was not this that spurred the drive for individual groups to seek nationhood. Self-determination ensured that the immediate demands, and the first priority, was political recognition of sovereignty.

Economic development was a contributing factor to the desire to break away from the Soviet shadow but was not a strong factor in nationalism.

A case in point is the former Yugoslavia. Economically it would have been more advantageous for this country to remain intact, for of all the former communist countries it was probably the one first in line to join the 'West', and especially be a contender for membership to the European Union. Instead the struggles of the various nationalisms within this region meant that all, save for Slovenia, are having difficulty re-establishing infrastructure, welfare, medical needs, etc., which has meant that economic growth and development is minimal and much damaged by the activities of the past decade. This is not to suggest that Yugoslavia was an economically prosperous country before the break-up, but the fragmentation of this country has yet to prove an economic advantage to any of the new nation-states (except for Slovenia). By comparison the break-up of the former Czechoslovakia was far less disruptive and has probably aided the Czech Republic to become more economically advanced. In addition to any economic desires particular groups may have is often coupled with wishes for democratisation also. However it was not the economic factor or the issue of democratisation that caused the break, rather it was more a consequence of individual Czech and Slovak desires for national self-determination.

It is such desires that modernisation theory over-generalises. Though Gellner recognises a subjective change in the political, social and cultural sphere, he considers these subjective changes to be objectively determined, and it is these objective elements that are over-emphasised. These objective elements are those that contribute to the structural change that occurred in modernity. But these same elements are not necessarily objective. Economics in particular may be either objective or subjective, depending on the way economic changes and situations are interpreted by any given society. Therefore subjective changes may sometimes be objectively determined or the objective may determine the subjective depending on the nature of the structural change and hence the nature of the modernity. Other structural elements also contribute or are effected by objective or subjective determinants. For example, the uneven development of industrialisation was not deliberate but it objectively determined the direction, or fates, of various groups, from centre to periphery.⁸

Civil Society and the State

The subjective changes in perception and structural changes are not the only contributors to the formation of nations and the initial development of nationalism. States are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the formation and stabilisation of nations. It serves to maintain the high culture via its ability to sustain an educational infrastructure, making

culture (a high culture) a necessary and shared medium. The nation-state is an essential element of the modernisation theory, for it is one of its central and necessary institutions. And since the nation is a social construction and the state a political one, neither are perennial. This supports the modernists' argument of nations not being perennial, and more specifically, nationalism as a solely modernist element. Nationalism is not just the development of nations, but the development of nations to fit within demarcated states.

Modernists assert that in modernity a nation can only survive with its own state, and a culture can only be truly preserved with its own nation. Therefore nationalism is the link between state and culture⁹ as "one of the tasks of the state becomes to administer the difference between strangers for inclusion and strangers for exclusion",¹⁰ according to their cultural attributes. This is formally accomplished via citizenship, which acts as a method of social closure.¹¹ Citizenship bestows privileged rights and benefits on being a member of a politically bounded society such as freedom of movement within the bounded territory, residence, suffrage, etc. What is actually enclosed by society and the way society is bounded distinguishes one nation from the next and one nation's nationalism from the next. France and Germany offer good examples of differentiation in citizenship, particularly when examining access to citizenship by migrants. According to Brubaker the "rate of civic incorporation for migrant workers and their descendants is more than ten times higher in France than in Germany."¹² The form of access to a particular society however does not commit the nationalism to be of a particular type, though it may influence the national character of a population.

To counterbalance the link between state and culture there must also be a civil society to make for a smooth and 'good' nationalism, as the modernisation theory propagates. Civil society is an eternal circumstance, a "set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society."¹³ Civil society is the passage of rites – a series of adjustments in between two eras.¹⁴ This is the ticket in the transitional process, the move from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. The passage was taken by the 'West' or core societies almost two centuries ago, but in other cases is just being experienced now as societies cross the bridge from the Cold War to "wherever it is we are living now."¹⁵ A civil society may be seen as both a circumstance to be aimed for and a transitional process. It suggests a strong society less vulnerable to change. Societal strength means the ability to counter the state as an autonomous body – it is "Leviathan's antithesis".¹⁶ The society at large must know or have access to information about the social and political processes of their society; there must be an educated public

(the existence of a high culture); this public must be mobile (not tied to the land as under rural conditions); and their must exist "the ability to organize autonomous organizations free from government surveillance". These points are definitive of a civil society. [17](#)

Civil society is required to instigate a 'civic' social order, which subsequently aligns the modernist argument with the theoretical concept of a civic nationalism, perpetuating the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism. By essentialising the importance of industrialisation and the break with pre-modern times, all the factors of pre-modern societies are not given value. Their strength is not acknowledged. In examining current influences it is decided that only elements of modernity influence modern societies, suggesting then that it is only the modern national character that determines the social, and hence moral, order of a society.

Civil Society is needed for non-destructive progress and in the absence of both democracy and civil society nationalism is malleable enough to be an instrument of absolutism. Therefore a brief comment needs to be made about democracy in this context. There is a connection between strong societies and civil societies and democracy, but this is not to say that democracy is the key to developing a strong society. Rather, history has shown that democracy has emerged from strong urban centres. With the collapse of the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe there has been the gradual emergence of a democratic culture, or at least a democratic alternative – "the reconstruction of civil society from below."[18](#) However it may not be the reconstruction of a civil society for there may never have been the foundations of one from which to reconstruct, which suggests no experience in democracy by a given society. This is often the case with some of the nations of Eastern Europe. Only a few have had an experience with a democratic culture, such as Poland and the Czech Republic to a limited degree, thus the development or emergence of a civil society may be completely different. Even if these new nation-states do successfully democratise, democracy alone is not enough in these societies as it supports nationalism.

In cases where civil society is being reconstructed it is from the ruins of old societies. The Czech Republic must not only search its history to tap into experiences of democratic culture in the past, but must also work to salvage the remnants of any civil society that may have developed under Czechoslovakia. The new nation-states of the former Yugoslavia must also do the same. A Yugoslav culture barely existed, so too a civil society. Nevertheless, though immersed in false consciousness and the promotion of folk culture, the former Yugoslavia represented tools by which a civil society was being developed and nurtured. This included mixed-market socialism and the absence of restrictions as imposed on

the other communist countries in Eastern Europe. However, with the dismantling of the former Yugoslavia all these possibilities have been dismantled, the upside being that the Yugoslav false consciousness has also been dismantled. The ensuing 'democracies' are now faced with the task of 'reconstructing' via new methods and with new instruments. This reconstruction is to involve the development of a civil society, structural change in the form of the nature of the market, the functioning of economics (particularly with the development of the European Union) the growth of industry and capital, as well as technology. In adopting these forces however as the foundation of nationalism, this philosophy becomes restricted to being only a forward-looking ideology (that is, it draws only on the need to progress and look forward without examining why nationalism also looks to the past for strength). In this context the use of time is important to the nature of and nationalism and especially the nature of its perpetuation.

Time and Consciousness

History and memory are often what lend strength to the present and what fuel nationalism. With this in mind time becomes an important component in understanding the exercise and vigour of nationalism, particularly in the observance of the past and when appealing to the collective consciousness. The aim is to ensure that this collective consciousness is not a false one. False consciousness is any involuntary abdication of civic and political rights and activity in the belief that the state or some higher being can act in their stead. It exists in the absence of a social framework independent of state bodies. Though a population may be educated they are not social and political participants of the community. False consciousness must be overcome for a civil society to develop and a high culture to emerge. According to Gellner the development of a civil society is also a case of less false consciousness. But less false consciousness does not immediately imply clear and concise consciousness. To acquire a coherent consciousness would mean the acquisition of a unitary one.¹⁹

False consciousness exists in societies where there has been socio-political collapse, the un(der)development of democracy, or the rule of authoritarian regimes. Industrialisation, according to the modernisation theory, served to progressively eliminate false consciousness as it permeated successfully throughout society. Though depending on what variants of industrialisation were undertaken would also determine the extent of elimination of false consciousness. A liberal democratic viewpoint suggests that there is greater false consciousness within Marxism than capitalism – "capitalism seems considerably more efficient, and commits the society undergoing it to far less false

consciousness concerning its own organization, than does socialism."²⁰ Even more important than the elimination of false consciousness is the acquisition of a unitary consciousness. Industrialisation made this possible via print capitalism. As Benedict Anderson points out, it was the newspaper and the novel that made the nation imaginable.²¹

Communities need a vehicle by which they can maintain a sense of immortality. Anderson claims that print-capitalism provided the means by which people could first 'imagine' a community and secondly identify with this greater community via the advanced means of communication, regardless of the anonymity of the other members.²² A general consciousness exists whereby members of the community are aware that they share the same homogenous culture, the same time and memory, and identify the same space as belonging to their own imagined community.²³ Though the existence or absence of false consciousness does not make a society more or less susceptible to nationalism, the existence of a general and unitary consciousness does.

Within nationalism it is the "ism" that is a "general consciousness" shared by a population.²⁴ Whether this general consciousness is a false one may depend on other influences and subjective features in the society. Namely, other ideologies that may permeate a population, and demand social conditions that may be misrepresented to the masses via false consciousness.²⁵ By affecting a population's consciousness the sense of "now" is changed, where the past becomes the future and time is now. It makes nationhood, which is imbedded in this, perennial. As Nairn tells us:

All cultures have been obsessed by the dead and placed them in another world. Nationalism rehouses them in this world. Through its agency the past ceases being 'immemorial': it gets memorialised into time present, and so acquires a future. For the first time it is meaningfully projected on to the screen of futurity.²⁶

History then plays an important role. It must be interpreted in a particular manner and remembered in a particular way so that there is a uniform and unitary memory amongst the people of the one nation. This unitary memory is necessary to form a unitary consciousness. Therefore time is a vital component of nationalism and an important tool for nationalists. Attachment to the past and aspirations for the future are combined with a homogeneous high culture to create a concrete social bond within a population. As James states: "The past becomes a place to be visited either for verification of contemporary progress or, more recently, as a source of comparative knowledge for humanists, anthropologists and tourists."²⁷ History gives the people of a nation, both the elite and the mass, their strength and provides the devices used to

shape a unitary memory. This is achieved via emotional appeal. It is precisely this area that is not explored thoroughly enough by the modernists.

Collective memory plays an important role in cultivating and defining a national identity and provides a major link to cultural pasts. If there is no memory, then there is no identity, and with no identity there is no nation. This is the key to making the process of nationalism successful.²⁸ Along with collective memory there is also the notion of "collective amnesia"²⁹ in trying to detach oneself from a past and "collective immortality"³⁰ in trying to salvage all connection with the past (real or not). This occurs when new nation-states form in retaliation to a dominant force. Theorists often identify collective memory, collective amnesia and collective identity as products of ethnic nationalism.³¹ It certainly features in nationalism where ethnicity plays a strong role.³² But it also appears in typically civic nationalisms. France possesses a unitary (collective) memory of 1789 and Britain possesses a unitary memory of its colonial power days – unitary/collective memory does exist in cases typically defined as being examples of civic nationalism. However, mixed with emotion the memory becomes more malleable. This allows the memory to be utilised in perceiving the people themselves as superior to others, the dominant race. Such was the example of a unitary, collective memory in Germany under Hitler.

It is only by remembering the past that a collective identity, an imagined community, can be given life.³³ So where Gellner, for example, looks forward and regards progress (particularly economic) as the quintessential motivation of nationalism, it is in fact the past that gives the people the will to partake in and exercise nationalism. The past is delivered to the present for the masses to re-experience – to partake in the emotions of past glories again. Memory makes the history instant. Memory leads to identity which leads to the imagining of the nation. And this coupled with Gellner's desire for the growth of political units leads to the inspiration for a group to obtain their own nation-state.

Therefore, history becomes instant because time is now. This instant history is an amalgamation of the positive history, or more accurately, selective history of the past, which provides the state and the elite with a usable past by which to achieve their objectives.³⁴ This is done more often in instances of the existence of a false consciousness, and a lack of experience of liberal democracy by a society in the past. Therefore this instant history is often filled with reflections on past societies, and the lamentations on the values of the past, in order to give the present substance. But as pointed out by the Slovenian sociologist, Slavoj Žižek, these lamentations "over the forgotten past Values is itself oblivious to the fact that these Values had no existence previous to our lamenting – that we literally invented them through out lamenting over their

loss...".³⁵ When the past is valued in such a way, particularly as a way to compensate for current absences, the easiest and most popularly appealing tools are used. This is often the modern construct of past ethnic groups.

Culture and Ethnicity

Where civil society is the institutional *Geist*, it is ethno-nationalist behaviour that is the spirit of the peasant. It is the rural haunting the urban.³⁶ For nationalism to emerge and be exercised as a true product of modernity, as the modernists assess, and not have to resort to factors inconsistent to modernity in order to deliver the desired results of a nation-state (such as ethnicity) modernists require the existence of a civil society. This would provide the correct environment and instruments by which nationalism could flourish. It is still culture however that provides the foundation of any nationalism possibly emerging.

"Men have always been endowed with culture" – and so begins Ernest Gellner's final book on nationalism, published posthumously. It is the *type* of culture that a population possesses that is important to whether a people are conducive or resistant to nationalism. Most cultures that have actively pursued to preserve or assert their culture in the modern age do so by seeking to house it in a nation-state. This pursuit, or activity towards nationhood and statehood, means that the manifestation of nationalism is possible and likely. The nature of the culture will also determine to some extent the nature of the nationalism. According to modernists the nature of the culture is determined by factors that include literacy, levels of communication, social relationships and social conditions unique to particular groups. These stem from the changes that motivated industrialisation.

A perception of what culture is maintains the divide between the modernists and the ethnicists and likewise of conceptions of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. This is especially true concerning the role of ethnicity in nationalist discourse. It is not wholly true that modernists do not take into account ethnicity as asserted by the primordialists, rather, they recognise fault-lines and the importance of culture. The key is recognising the link between culture and ethnicity and the brevity of this link. The question then arises, does ethnicity produce a particular type of culture, or is it cultural *diversity* that is important, thus demonstrating the importance of ethnicity in providing a method of diversity?

Culture is detached from genetic transmission but allows for traits, activities, language, food, etc., to be carried on from generation to generation.³⁷ Culture then is no longer dependent on genetics. Ethnicity

however is seen by the modernists as a representation of the genetic constitution of a group of people. So the removal of the dependency of culture on genetics rules out the necessity and relevance of ethnicity in determining nationalism under the modernisation theory, removing ethnicity from the core of nationalism, while not necessarily from the influence of nationalism. What modernisation theory fails to identify is that the cultural break instigated by modernity produced a change in ethnicity also. It too was politicised, and to some extent a break in ethnic *perceptions* occurred. But in examining nationalism we are not only interested in what lies at its core, but also in the factors that perpetuate it. This is where the modernist theory falls short.

Certainly ethnicity offers some explanation to the nature of some nationalisms, but it in itself is not a comprehensive explanation thus modernists reject the claim outright. Ernest Gellner, in defending the modernist camp against the idea that those elements important in the pre-modern era are primary and definitive to the meaning and nature of nationalism in the modern era, asked, "Do nations have navels?" What he was referring to was whether nations have a point in which they began, and if so what relevance does this point hold in determining the nature of the nation's nationalism.³⁸ The question refers to the relevance of ethnicity to the body of nationalism (the navel representing ethnicity in relation to the human body as a metaphor for the nation). Gellner's argument was that after a nation is born the navel is merely a decorative feature of its body and holds no functional purpose. What Gellner declined to acknowledge as being important was the issue of where we come from, where our origins lie. Ethnicity is no longer just a measure of what genetic group we belong to, it now represents a unique feature of a community transmitted organically, ultimately characterising a society. Ethnicity is a variant of culture, and as culture was politicised with the onset of modernity so too was ethnicity.

Whether we have a navel or not will not effect our well being but it does represent our origins, which influences the nature of our behaviour. Likewise, the origins of a population will influence the nature of the nationalism practiced. More importantly this representation of the past is more a symbolic feature than a physical one. The core of a nation may not predispose it to a particular type of nationalism, but the *way* in which it is remembered and the way it is transmitted into a society acts as a particular motivator in the exercise of nationalism. This is the importance of the ethnic rationale. Adam did not have a navel but a scar, and this scar and the navels of his descendants represents that element within us that threads us to the past.

The ethnic element of nationalism is a tool of mobilisation used by the elite. But the incorporation of this ingredient directs us towards one of the problems with Nairn's thesis, which is also the primordialist problem

of essentialism. Though categorised as a modernist, elements of Nairn's theory possess characteristics of ethnicism, and perhaps then a softer 'soft primordialism' than that of Smith. It is Nairn's consideration of ethnicity, rurality and peasant culture in his theory that demonstrates weaknesses with some elements of it and keeps his theory unfulfilled. In criss-crossing between the ethnicist-modernists and the radical modernists Nairn fails to identify explicitly with what he regards as the core or essence of nationalism leaving the foundation of his theory slightly equivocal. Nairn, in framing his theory, recognises the historic existence of states, and from it the emergence of nations and the importance of ethnicity as a tool of nationalism. But accepting that the state and nation are historically embedded elements pits Nairn with the perennialists who assert the antiquity of the phenomenon of the nation. The impotency of this factor impairs the theory of nationalism as a function of these agents.

Conclusion

Nairn claims that industrialisation is an accident that occurred to some populations and those who were "unblessed" "reacted" to it. It was this reaction that "injected the ' -ism' into nationhood."³⁹ However nationalism is not accidental nor reactionary, nor is it premeditated in its foundations. The theory of nationalism must not diverge away from the thesis that nationalism is a manifestation of modernity – here the modernists are correct. The method by which modernity arrived will determine the character of the nationalism. Its flavour may occasionally be accidental or reactionary, but by no means does this denote the core of nationalism. The process of nationhood is a manifestation of modernity, but the –ism of it is the response.

Though Gellner is a stern modernist he still never fully resolved the role of the pre-modern in nationalism, despite rejecting any responsibility on the part of pre-modern societies in engendering nationalism. But throughout his theory, and that of other modernists, he suggests that this was not a fully resolved issue. "Bureaucratic centralisation by the Enlightened Despots of the eighteenth century certainly *helped prepare the ground for nationalism*."⁴⁰ (My emphasis) What if it had not "prepared the ground" and industrialism emerged anyhow (for the sake of argument) would nationalism still have emerged? What if industrialisation emerged but there was no division of society according to culture or ethnicity? It is true that nationalism is the product of industrialisation but the way in which it is exercised is determined by elements that exist both within and without the modernist framework. As Gellner admits, nationalism "was indeed our destiny".⁴¹

It is true that the –ism did not exist in agrarian societies, mainly because the high culture was restricted to the elite only. 'Politics' then was confined to these quarters. It was not until politics became an aspect of the social lives of the majority that nationalism was introduced, and this only occurred with modernity. It is an essential feature of modernity, along with industrialisation. It is precisely the setting of nationalism and industrialisation within modernity and the relationship between the two that may determine whether modernist theory will remain inflexible and uncompromising to the ideas proposed by those in the ethnicist camp. Most theorists, on both sides, will agree that there are flavours of both sides in a true and comprehensive theory (if there really is one) of nationalism. It is just the degree of importance associated with these factors that is disputed.

This is not to disprove the modernists, but rather to highlight the main problem with their thesis, and that is acknowledging the importance of the ethnic rationale as an element of culture. This problem acts as a constant obstacle to applying the modernisation theory of nationalism in specific cases. More specifically, the theory of nationalism from this perspective fails to recognise the importance of ethnicity in nationalism, particularly in contemporary Europe where it is becoming a more pressing feature rather than a redundant one.

The assumption of this chapter is that nationalism is indeed rooted in modernity. It is modernity that carries the foundations of the necessary conditions that were to give birth to nations and oversee the subsequent activity of nationalism. However, the characteristics of nationalism are drawn from not only modernity but from features that preceded it. Without these features there would be nothing to fuel the continuum of any particular nationalism.

Culture to the ethnicists is the mainstay of a community, and a politicised culture is the centre of a political community. The modernists, and particularly Gellner, who places paramount importance on a high culture in the development of a society in modernity, also acknowledge this. The ethnicists however perceive culture as the thread to what ties the nation to the past, delivering it to the future, locating the ethnics as the nucleus of a society's culture and what makes one culture different to the next. The major schism between the ethnicists and the modernists occurs in the perception of history's relationship to culture, and the degree of importance of ethnicity within culture. On the flip side, by over focusing their energies on the virtues of ethnicity, ethnicists have undermined the importance of culture in the relationship and detached themselves from explaining nationalisms where the most prominent factor is not ethnicity. Consequently, ethnicists have reduced themselves to providing a theory concerning ethnic nationalism only. This will now be examined in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER THREE

Nationalism as Perceived by the Ethnicists

In the previous chapter we examined the inability of the modernists to provide a comprehensive theory of nationalism which links the formation of nation-states to continuing assertions and reassertion of nationalism. Anthony Smith, an ethnicist working within the modernist framework, claims that a theory of nationalism should not be sought, for it is in fact an approach rather than a theory. Adopting this stance in this chapter our aim is to discover what are the common features of the approaches to nationalism as recognised by the ethnicists. The first common feature would be the aim: states to have their own nation and nations to have their own state. The next common feature would be the manner in which they seek to obtain this goal. That is, the nature of the exercise of nationalism. The manner in which nationalism is exercised is unique to each society, but the tools they use are available and common to all. Some tools are just more readily available than others.

In this chapter we will explore issues from the perspective of the ethnicist-modernists (ethnicist will be used in shorthand throughout) and those ideas they regard as primary in discussions concerning nations and nationalism. In the previous chapter it was acknowledged that nationalism was born out of modernity but that the character and motivation of nationalism is located both within and beyond this realm. Moving then out of the confines of the structural elements of modernity we locate issues primarily dismissed or over-generalised by the modernists but embraced by the ethnicists whilst still working within the modernist framework. The modernists possess one set of boundaries and the ethnicists another within modernism. The key element of the ethnicist's theory is ethnicity as the cultural basis of nationalism. Though not leading naturally or directly to nationhood, it does impact on the shape and content of nations and their nationalisms and provides an instrument useful in mobilising and motivating support towards nationhood.

This chapter will examine the theory presented by the ethnicists and the strengths and weaknesses of their argument. I will examine the importance of the *ethnie* (that apolitical ethnic component of a community) to the ethnicists and also its value to the European communities – both those who are classified as practising either civic or

ethnic nationalism. The value of the *ethnie* is also important when charting the development of a community from premodern times to the politicised modern age. The relationship of nationalism and ethnicity (a politicised *ethnie*) will be examined in the second part of this chapter with reference to the presence of chauvinism in some nationalisms, and the importance of the use of time and the content of history. A brief comment will also be made on citizenship.

The Ethnicists and the Importance of the *Ethnie*

The ethnicists are a milder version of what some term primordialists and perennialists. The latter believe that the nation is not a construct of modernity but an entity that has formed out of the continual developments of society and therefore a natural evolution. Within the category of ethnicists we may include certain segments of the primordialists, though I have deliberately chosen not to explore the primordialists in detail as they verge on examples too extreme to be incorporated in a comprehensive approach to nationalism. The ethnicists do however look to the past and see today's nation as a part of a perpetual process of self-realisation.¹ Ethnicism, and with it primordialism and perennialism, view the nation as rooted in ethnic groups. Primordialism and perennialism in particular perceive modern-day nations as the natural outcomes of the ethnic communities of the pre-modern stage. This theory is represented by the cultural theories of Clifford Geertz, Walker Connor and John Hutchinson, among others. Culture, according to perennialists, is a continuum transmitting ethnic groupings in history into the nations of modernity, and will continue in some form into the future.

The essence of the ethnicist's argument is the importance of the *ethnie* in the exercise of nationalism. Much of the modernist discourse focuses on the relationship of the state to the nation, which subsequently confines the argument to the structural elements of modernity. Examining the nation as a stage in societal development gives the construct better sociological strength and provides an avenue by which to examine the influence of the past to specific nationalisms. The link to past societies or past versions of the current society is via culture and variants of it, which may include the *ethnie*. The *ethnie* is an ethnic community – referred to in this discussion as the ethnic component of a community without consideration of whether it has been politicised or not.²

Therefore the ethnicists work within the modernist framework acknowledging nationalism to be a product of the structural change that occurred with modernism but also recognising that elements that existed prior to modernity exist within modernity also, without belonging to any apparent form of continuum. That is, nationalism is a wholly modern

phenomenon, but nations are not solely such.

An example of an ethnicist is Anthony D. Smith (often set up against his teacher and theoretical foe Ernest Gellner). Smith argues in his text *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* that the "unitary concept" of a "natural" nation is their ethnic make up.³ Smith's peg for measuring when nationalism first emerged is not confined to industrialisation, or even to specifically one aspect of modernisation. Instead he uses as a benchmark what he terms the "three revolutions".⁴ These are the transition from feudalism to capitalism (or the revolution concerning the division of labour); the "revolution in the control of administration"; and the cultural and educational revolution.⁵ The latter of which was probably the most fundamental in determining the emergence of nationalism. The process of moving towards nationhood arises out of a crucible of these three revolutions, which, though not explicitly stated, are implied to be modernist in flavour.⁶ However, the *characteristics* of nations and their nationalisms are found both within these revolutions and in elements existing prior to these revolutions, which have undergone a metamorphosis as a consequence of them. These characteristics are located in a group's *ethnie*, as embedded in the culture.

The three revolutions politicised culture, meaning a change in the function of culture within society. The politicisation of culture meant both the elite and the mass were now considered members of the one society, and in particular, sisters and brothers in their own nation. This community-turned-society is united by a common culture, and in practice this common culture possesses elements of ethnicity. In order for a nationalism to be successful it is essential that it utilise these ethnic components. As Smith states:

While this does not of itself lend sufficient weight to a 'perennialist' thesis, it does require us to amend 'modernist' positions significantly. For it suggests that not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components.⁷

For ethnicists, ethnicity is the key to uniting a group of people and is the social glue of a nation. The main problem they face however is that the best models they have for demonstrating their theory are those nations that formed *after* the first wave of nation formation. Those formed in this second wave are regarded to have followed the second-route to nationhood, comparable to the classification of ethnic nationalism. These second-generation nation-states not only relied on ethnicity as a binding force, but used the elements of ethnicity to compensate in areas where key features of a developed society, or *Gesellschaft*, were absent. Using

ethnicity in this way meant over-stretching the element to be an all-encompassing instrument attempting to deliver the ultimate goal of a nation-state in whatever way possible. This often meant that concepts relating to ethnicity, such as genealogy, were over-emphasised in their importance. Unable to resort to a political framework these nations used whatever means they had to preserve their identity. In places such as the Balkans these were ethnocultural definitions, but places in Western Europe also fell into this category. Ireland, the Basque and the Catalan cases resorted to religious identification as a method of preservation in response to the victimisation they were experiencing from the centralising authority of Great Britain and Spain respectively. Their exercise of nationalism may differ to examples of Western European countries such as France and Britain, but in the majority of cases they were following the modernist principle of self-determination as an ideology. This was particularly so in Ireland after World War I when self-determination was considered an international right.

The desire to attain the goal of nation-state via ethnicity meant that preserving the *ethnie* became for some of the utmost importance, culminating into the desire for ethnic homogeneity and supremacy. Obvious examples include Germany during the 1930s and the Balkans in the past decade. Cultural preservation took the most extreme form where culture was totally infused by ethnicity, and the preservation of the *ethnie* meant the removal of other *ethnie* by whatever means. In Germany and the Balkans this meant genocide and/or ethnic cleansing. It is easy to see why these nationalisms are classified as ethnic nationalism. But rather than classify them as such, it would be more accurate to say that their exercise of nationalism was ethnic in orientation therefore not denying them the ability to access and exercise civic virtues. The usual presentation of ethnic nationalism precludes the exercise of civic nationalism, and as explored in Chapter One, each on their own constitutes an unsuccessful nationalism (meaning that the goal of nationhood is unattainable in their definitionally exclusive states). Recourse to considerations of ethnic homogeneity and cultural unity is still of significance in the most recent states even when their societies are culturally plural. For new nation-states to emerge successfully some form of cultural unity is necessary, unfortunately it is the insistence that cultural unity take the form of ethnic homogeneity that makes the nationalisms of these states so damaging for this leads to cases of ethnic cleansing and, in extreme circumstances, genocide in order to achieve this type of homogeneity.⁸

Ethnicity cannot be chosen (as say nationality sometimes can) for it is a culture that is bestowed at birth. If a society uses *ethnie* as the unifying variant of culture then not sharing in the dominant *ethnie* means exclusion from society. The *ethnie* is often a last resort option for nations

who do not possess a developed high culture that they can use as an instrument of unification. These are often nations whose historical development differed to that of nation-states that have already formed. Historical development differed between Western and Eastern Europe, which meant that the timing and method of the introduction of the features of modernity differed, sometimes dramatically, between the two sides. There was not just a geographical divide but an historical one also. Key variations in the type of changes to the structural elements of modernism include the agrarian revolution that occurred in different ways and to different degrees; the second serfdom was a circumstance experienced by the East but not by the West; industrialisation occurred at different times and again to different degrees between Western areas of Europe and Eastern; and more recently Eastern Europe has experienced communism while the West was immersed in the principles of liberal democracy. In order to survive in the modern world the *ethnie* (now politicised in modernism) takes on the attributes of a society, a *Gesellschaft*, as a consequence of this politicisation.⁹ In the absence of the components that were readily available to the West those in the East had to resort to "alternative models of the nation" and to "different modes of national integration".¹⁰ This often meant resorting to the ethnic characteristics of a group, drawing from the unique features of the *Volk*. New nation-states do not therefore seek political viability through national citizenship, education, etc., but rather seek it via the avenue of culture, with ethnicity elevated within this. Hence, political legitimacy arrives through cultural affirmation.¹¹ This inevitably perverts the ethnicist's theory as it posits ethnicity above culture rather than a description of it and so aligns it with the classification of ethnic nationalism.

It is such a convolution of the ethnicist's theory that has seen its relevance pertain to only ethnic nationalism. Where, in the absence of those elements that have provided the basis for the 'first' modern nations, or in scenarios where they are not as eminent in the concept of a nation, such as citizenship, legal codes and institutions, ethnic concepts of the nation have acted as substitutes. Ethnic demography is "the basis of the unit in question" and the "ethnic conception produced a counterpart of that ideal of citizenship to which territorial nations had resorted."¹² Additionally, in allowing for a fellowship between the mass and the elite ethnic nationalism has involved a popular and mass mobilisation. The populism has emerged as a product of their interaction and contingency upon one another (i.e. they were dependent upon one another to progress which in turn is a modernist concept).¹³ Thus the problem for the ethnicist's theory is that it is reduced to being a populist description of ethnic nationalism rather than a comprehensive explanation of nationalism.

More recent empirical examples may to some extent undermine (or misshape) the theory of the ethnicists. Specifically, examples of nationalism in the past decade have been particularly ethnic in flavour to suggest that ethnic nationalism does exist and the ethnicist's theory promotes this. This ultimately crowds out the essential elements that form the principles of civic nationalism. It is primarily issues of self-determination, and the formation of nation-states based on this that has directed the focus on issues of ethnicity acting on behalf of culture. This was the case of the new nation-states that formed out of the former Yugoslavia, and is the case now of the Kosovars in the rump Yugoslavia. Interestingly, these areas did experience at particular times some form of autonomy within the political space of Yugoslavia. However, the removal or reduction of this autonomy, as when Milosevic revoked the status of autonomy from the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, served to threaten the cultural preservation of these units and provoked Kosovo in particular to seek complete autonomy in order to preserve and affirm their self-determination and this self-determination is based on their ethnic differences to the dominant culture in that society.. The Basque region is also an example of an autonomous region within the political space of Spain, likewise Scotland and Wales possess some autonomy within Great Britain. This autonomy is not fixed and the terms are often adjusted to meet the requests of the region to ensure cultural (and political) preservation without immediately threatening the existing form of the political space.

Many of these regions are ethnic and/or religious minorities within larger nation-states. As they develop to become politicised societies, their demands increase also. In this way, particularly since the end of the Cold War, these ethnic minorities are forming nation-states founded upon their ethnicity. Many of the republics of the former Soviet Union formed in this way, and it was perhaps the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that set this post-Cold War trend for political recognition to be bestowed in this way. Their demands for self-determination over-stretched itself to become demands for international political recognition. Ethnicity was quickly elevated to identify not just communities, but be the form of identification for whole societies. Elevated to such an extent political recognition did not seem like such an extreme request. Interestingly, the Bosnian Muslims were not even formally recognised as an ethnic minority in Yugoslavia until the early 1970s. There are instances where Muslim was used as an ethnic rather than religious identification in Bosnia throughout the past century, but it was not until 1972 that they were formally recognised as such (and importantly culturally *and* politically). Their demands for self-determination were minimal until they came under threat in the late 1980s and early 1990s by neighbouring ethnic communities. Here is a case of a small ethnic community skyrocketing in less than a generation

to a level where political self-determination is a reality.¹⁴

The impact of ethnicity as stressed by the ethnicists is important despite its occasional overuse. With a more recent historical example, the revival of nationalism since the end of the Cold War is particularly ethnic in character, but *not* because ethnicity is at the core of nationalism or that 'ancient ethnic hatreds' are being uncovered and are now erupting. Rather, as each society is at a different moment of history each must use the instruments at hand to achieve the ultimate goal of a nation. From those experiencing nationalism now (as a hand-me-down version of nationalism) ethnicity is both the 'natural' unitary concept, and almost solely the most useful instrument for political and social mobilisation. But this is where the role of ethnicity should be limited. It is precisely an instrument of mobilisation but should not be the sole guarantor of the establishment of a nation-state. Ethnic homogeneity does in no way guarantee this. Development of an education system, literacy, government, infrastructure, a functioning economy – characteristics of civic nationalism – is what, combined with the motivation that ethnicity provides, will deliver the nation-state.

It appears paradoxical that in order to achieve nationhood comparable to the civic model there is a need to create what is absent from what tools are present. This means that one's ethnic traits must be used to create a unique history, a common culture and the myths that make it such and their role must be expanded beyond an ethno-cultural form to a measure of citizenship.¹⁵ It is as if a community playing political 'catch-up' must create the necessary ingredients in order to achieve the final sought after product of a political community united by a common element. The ethnicists use of ethnicity is broad and gives it value. They suggest that the *ethnie* determine the character of modern nations and the nature of nationalism, which is to be honoured by the elites when they use it to achieve their short-term goals.¹⁶ This is not so different to the modernists who regard *culture*, but not ethnicity, as the element that casts the flavour of nationalism (for example, Gellner's high culture). This in turn effects the instrumentalist approach. However, the weight attributed to ethnicity differs between the modernists and the ethnicists. Ethnicity to ethnicists is the core of the cultural thread that ties the past to the modern age, culture is equated with ethnicity, but to those actors in modernity ethnicity is reduced to being merely a tool of influence rather than deliverance. Culture is the key link between the two camps. It is instrumental to both in determining nationalism and the nature of nationalism.

The theoretical classification of ethnic nationalism as a representation of the ethnicist's theory, suggests not only an alternative route to nationalism, but also a route that in order to catch-up must by-pass some

of the key features of 'Western' nationalism. In this way it may be regarded as a last resort option (that is, a last resort towards nationhood). The ethnicists, however, refuse to confine their theory as a consolation prize or theory of last resort proclaiming that their theory goes beyond this. Ethnic roots are important to all nationalisms and the key element to a unique culture. This only manifests itself into ethnic nationalism when ethnic characteristics are used for purposes beyond uniting and differentiating culture. When the key feature of culture is the *ethnie*, cultural politicisation sees the use of the politicised *ethnie* as a means to achieve a political end. The politicisation of the *ethnie* involves using the *ethnie* and adopting territorial components in order to emulate a civic model to some extent. The problem generates when ethnicity is such a focal point that it is no longer the *ethnie* being politicised but politics being ethnicised. Therefore the fundamental weakness with the ethnicists' theory is the often-overemphasised ethnic element of culture to the extent that it replaces culture in the theory of nationalism. Perhaps due to the virtual disregard of ethnicity by the modernists, the ethnicists make such a point of emphasising it.

Ethnicity and Nationalism

What role does ethnicity itself play? As mentioned previously it acts as a social glue in uniting a group of people via the vehicle of culture and also providing a method by which to distinguish one culture from the next. Ethnic differentiation becomes very particular when a cultural distinction is attempted between two very similar neighbours, for example the Serbs and Croats, the Russians and Byelorussians. This drive towards differentiation becomes paramount as a consequence of cultural preservation and assertion. In its politicised form, the drive towards cultural preservation and ethnic differentiation becomes a pursuit for the establishment of nationhood and manifests itself into nationalism. In order for an *ethnie* to survive in this modern world it must politicise, whether it is pursuing the establishment of its own nation or not, and/or whether it is seeking independent statehood. So "the old classical notion of a transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* finds confirmation in the more limited but vital sphere of ethnicity". [17](#)

The internal need to preserve one's culture grows into a state where cultural differentiation is demonstrated in a variety of ways, no longer just culturally (and therefore ethnically as it is ethnicity that often describes the culture). To enclose this new political community, and separate it from any cultures that threaten to dilute it, a nation is sought to act as protector of a fragile cultural element, whether this element be religious, dialectical or otherwise. For example, Irish nationalism, categorised both as a rural and as a religious nationalism used religion in

order to protect and preserve its culture from the threatening authority of Britain. Differentiation is needed politically and economically also to ensure total preservation from the threat of external cultures. Nationhood is an assertion of independence and equality amongst other cultures already recognised in this modern form. But why the need for differentiation? And is it internally or externally determined?

The need for differentiation is more a case of a cultural assertion that arises out of the desire to preserve the current state of a community as it transforms into a society (that is the process of *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*). When faced with change, particularly such as that heralded by the age of modernity, the immediate reaction is to preserve what remains, but this change can arrive in many other ways also such as invasion or war. This means cultural preservation, and as culture becomes deferential to other factors of modernity, and the weaker, smaller or just unfortunate cultures assimilate into the more dominant ones, cultural preservation and differentiation becomes more pressing.

If cultural differentiation is internally determined then so too is nationalism, determined by either the mandate of the elite or by the will of the mass (the *Volk*). However this assumes that nationalism is *only* a case of cultural assertion, but there are political and social pressures to be considered also. This sets nationalism as just a consequence of subjective changes with no consideration of the objective features. To ethnicists it is a case of internal self-determination, where differences are located according to those chosen by the elites or the mass of that culture. Often when something is internally determined and consciously elected, the most obvious and malleable tools are used, which is ethnicity. This alleges that nationalism is subjectively determined. Nationalism is, particularly as an ideology, both objectively and subjectively determined. Ideology is the relationship between the objective and subjective,¹⁸ thus the ideology of nationalism is about the objective and subjective relationship(s) that go on within a society. A nation is lived as more 'natural' than nationalism. A nation is a society framed politically, but it is nationalism that describes the nature of relationships within and without this society and how they are played out. It is this that distinguishes one society from another.

Tom Nairn, a Marxist, but with hints of perennialism, regards internal self-determination as a reaction to the goings on of the surrounding states. His theory assumes the existence of historic ethnic communities – which is essentially a perennialist/ethnicist assumption. From this his theory states that elites in peripheral areas were faced with the advancement in the metropolitan centres of Western Europe as a result of industrialisation. Not wanting to be left behind these elites in the peripheral regions emerged as a new intelligentsia that then mobilised

others (which included the *Volk*). The tools of this mobilisation were the unique characteristics and particularities of their community, their *ethnos*. Thus the uneven development of the social and structural formations of industrialism, capitalism, economics and the market that necessitated the elite of the peripheral areas to mobilise the *Volk* by nationalising them in order to deliver them to progress. The masses became a necessary component with the "project of creating nations"¹⁹ and were given "for the first time definite form and a clear role."²⁰ And since they were a necessary component, elements of popular appeal were indispensable in mobilising them, which meant drawing from that which the masses could most easily and clearly identify with – themselves.

The ethnicists see the nation as a 'natural' evolutionary phenomenon developed out of ethnic groups – they identify continuity between the agrarian and industrial eras. Benedict Anderson, a modernist, recognises the need nations have to develop a never-ending past, but does not regard the nation as an organic development. Instead, with the onset of modernity, the needs of groups still needed to be met, but the instruments used in pre-modern times, namely religion, were no longer available to the same extent. Communities needed a vehicle by which they could maintain a sense of immortality.²¹ Their history and their memory provided the means of immortality and their culture provided the sense of everlasting life.

Chauvinism

Due to the virulent nature of nationalism in the twentieth century, particularly since the end of the Cold War, nationalisms classified as ethnic are often viewed as the evil head of the two-headed monster of nationalism – Nairn's Janus that continually looks towards the past.²² Consequently such nationalism is aligned with chauvinism. Chauvinism is an "ego-enhancer."²³ Thus those with low self-esteem for whatever reason are likely to be more attracted to chauvinism. Ramet is correct in identifying that groups that display chauvinistic characteristics are additionally attractive to members as they provide a "route to social bonding."²⁴ Having an enemy, or defining an out-group as inferior, also provides for a sort of "social glue".²⁵ Those who are attracted by these features are those most likely to "gravitate" towards false consciousness particularly in the absence of a civil society. The suppression of civil society in the former communist societies and the superego of the communist regimes constituted part of the present national phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately only negatively. In this respect the perspective of the "return of the repressed" prevails.²⁶

By defining out-groups chauvinism also describes in-groups "which thus

provides a ready-made basis for interpersonal identification and group solidarity."²⁷ Those lacking a social framework, particularly those that have been subject to a collapse of a socio-political system, are vulnerable to the "remedy" of chauvinism with the creation of enemies, or "out-groups" in order to strengthen the "in-group". Unfortunately a common "out-group" throughout the former communist countries of Europe are the Roma. With no membership of their own nation they are often denied the civil, political, economic, social and often human rights that national citizenship bestows. They are a common enemy to various regions of Europe. Violence towards the Roma is prevalent in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, where their presence is threatening to the dominant ethnic communities. These new societies are seeking to reassert their legitimacy in the postcommunist era and reducing that to chauvinism is easily exercised on an obvious and immediate out-group such as the Roma.²⁸

Elites use ethnicity as an instrument of manipulation and mobilisation, but this is only its utility in its reductionist form. It may be a deliberate tool used by elites and almost certainly manipulated by chauvinists. In fact, elites that choose to use ethnicity as a tool to further their own objectives are themselves chauvinists. Chauvinism is often a "part of a strategy designed to mobilize group hatred and resentment" formulated by the elites in order to shift attention away from whatever real issues the elite want to avoid – "to create artificial issues that will deflect public attention".²⁹ This is truer when discussing the utility of ethnicity in the nationalisms of the twentieth century, but is not the case for all nationalisms, and only serves to detract from the real meaning of the ethnicist's theory. Certainly elites may use ethnicity in this fashion – but this is not its only service.

Chauvinism of a specific ethnic-national character focuses primarily on the "promotion of a myth of *threat to the nation*"; the "perpetuation of notions of a *hostile conspiracy*"; and "a persistent tendency of *glorification of the national past*".³⁰ A good contemporary example is the situation percolating for the past decade in the Balkans. The leaders of Serbia and Croatia provide apt examples of modern-day chauvinistic leaders using ethnicity to further their own objectives. The glorification of the past is embraced by Serb mythologists and Slobodan Milosevic (leader of Serbia), for example the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman invasion.³¹ This same battle promotes the myth of a threat to the nation and perpetuates the notion of a hostile conspiracy against the Serb people. The Serb leadership has used this myth as deliberate government policy to influence public opinion towards a paranoia and distrust of all non-Serbs. Whatever is foreign is threatening, born from the seeds of Kosovo six hundred years ago.

Franjo Tudjman, leader of Croatia, emphasises the use of national energies in order to combat Serb threats, other policies are not considered useful and "any efforts to highlight other social needs, such as legislation to protect gender equality, is covert treason."³² The elites and leaders in this fashion steer the moral order of the society. Anything that is not in tune with "saving" the nation "is automatically defined minimally as moral decrepitude, if not treason."³³ Though ethnic hatreds and chauvinism are present in Eastern Europe, this does not suggest that they were there all along. Those who argue that what is occurring in the Balkans is a consequence of "ancient ethnic hatreds" are then "positing ethnic hatred and chauvinism as eternal verities" only for the East Europeans and not for all humankind.³⁴ Other chauvinists include Hitler in the past attempting to rid Germany of the Jews, and Zhirinovskiy more recently promising to cleanse Russia of Muslims.

Chauvinism offers a "release from stress, an escape from the cruel...to a realm of irrational fantasy".³⁵ Thus once chauvinism is included in the equation of the theoretical classification of ethnic nationalism, any nationalism that is placed into this category is then accused of irrationality. But why is this irrational path then chosen? What functions does it perform for the individual and the community?³⁶ It has to do with the psychological implications of modernity and the emotionalism associated with the ethnicity, particularly in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War where there is a search for some common social and intimate identity far removed from its communist past.³⁷ This search for a post-communist identity has been so powerful as to require the dismantling of any suggestions that communism ever existed in the region. From the removal of statues of past leaders such as the great Lenin statues in the former Soviet Union; to the renaming of buildings, streets, towns and cities throughout all of Eastern Europe; to the complete dismantling of countries such as the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the break in these cases having occurred along the only cultural lines that exist, these being ethnic.

There is no universal "quest" for identity, the search for identity is not continuous, and national identity belongs to no apparent form of continuum.³⁸ Identities can be multiple but in the modern era the national identity becomes the primary one. Identity is what lends purpose and it is memory that provides identity through psychological depth and substantiality. Memory serves as tools by which a collective can take form as one united society. A collective needs a common past to have a common destiny. A shared memory is the subjective element of a nation. This is what provides for the passionate identification with the nation by the individual citizens, as opposed to "only a generalised calculating loyalty to the state." ³⁹

Time and History as Content

The state of the culture and its response to change means that each nation, and potential nation, is liable to experience different histories. Thus the onslaught of modernisation has had varied effects contingent upon what tools each entity had to combat and to deal with. Divisions then occur along *historic* lines. Focusing solely on Europe, these divisions are sometimes congruent with the geographic divisions and perpetuate the East-West divide of nations and nationalisms in geographic terms. Ideally it would be a case of historic classification instead of division. For the ethnicists history supports their perennial claims, for the modernists it is the basis of myth. It is through the use of history that the ethnicists see the nation as the search for "collective immortality",⁴⁰ where 'history' becomes *the* focal point. The way in which the history is remembered provides for the nature of collective memory within a society, often a malleable tool used by the elite to manipulate and mobilise.

The experiences in Western Europe that led the way towards the pursuit of nationhood (in this instance we will recognise Smith's three revolutions as these experiences) arrived much later and unevenly in Eastern Europe leading to a different pursuit of nationhood by them. The nation is an integral element of modernity (though itself not a direct product of it), and the trend towards this pursuit as an exercise of progress was set by Western Europe. Eastern Europe strove for the same goals, and attempted to emulate Western Europe in the achievement of them. Since the histories were different, and the East was to some extent playing a game of catch-up, the process towards creating a political entity of the nation by the East was "a thoroughly conscious programme of mass education and propaganda by the new faction of nationalists".⁴¹ This new faction of nationalists was made up of the intelligentsia and elite in general. But this struggle towards statehood by different *ethnie* under this programme "bred a reaction among more educated sections of the culturally different lower strata".⁴² Due to the differences in experiences the path towards the goal of progress, via the formation of nations as the units by which to progress, the path taken by the East differed to that of the West. Because most of the empires of the East that pursued nationhood were not structured as those of the West, they were left to use the components they had and remained of some use. This meant "the increasing recourse to ethnic, especially linguistic, criteria, crossed however with historical memories of former statehoods in the area."⁴³

The adoption of vernacular languages as languages of the state was one important step in inviting the *Volk* to share in the affairs of the state.

They were now members, citizens, of the same political unit as the elite. The use of language - both the administrative languages (important to the elite) and vernacular languages (important to the masses) - adds to the stimulation of nationalism. Administrative languages were important in that it made possible the imagining of some unity and homogeneity by the educated classes. But it was the shift to using vernacular languages in the conduct of state affairs that welcomed the masses into the political fold. Even the *use* of language today is perceptive of nationalism today, particularly those with an ethnic character. Use of this language is indicative of what nationalism of an apparent ethnic inclination can inspire. Again, this reduces the ethnic component in nationalism to only an irrational and emotive tool open for abuse.

Ethnicity in nationalism is so prominent in this Post Cold War period not just for its alleged upsurge and emotive appeal to the people, but for the recognition bestowed upon it by the wider international community. Nation-states are being recognised not by any formal development of a set of legal codes and institutions that separate one region from another state. Rather groups defining themselves ethnically and seeking self-determination upon these grounds are given legitimacy, against the auspices of the Charter of the United Nations. By legitimising groups this way (and in no way has there been a uniform method of recognition) the international community is endorsing societies formed in this manner and encouraging them to continue to do so.

A Brief Comment on Citizenship

As the motivation, struggle and pursuit of nationhood and statehood gained momentum incorporating more segments of society, and as these segments slowly began to learn their role and become active members in this new entity, they were in fact contributing to the development of a citizenry and their own citizenship. "Essentially, 'citizenship' conveyed the sense of solidarity and fraternity through active social and political participation."⁴⁴ However, territorial nationalism, and also the actual practice of citizenship, indicates a shift away from the theoretical concept of citizenship – or rather away from the authority and sovereignty of citizenship based solely on social and political participation. There is the

assumption that the will to participate...was predicated upon an attachment to the land and an affiliation with the community, a sense of brotherhood which could only be found among those whose parents (and perhaps grandparents, even ancestors?) had done so.⁴⁵

This suggests that citizenship in practice does not exist in a pure

ideal-type form, as it possesses concepts that move beyond the rational notion. It is true however, that citizenship is far stronger in theoretical cases of territorial and civic nationalism than in ethnic nationalism. When applying the ethnicist's theory to some of the earlier examples of nations and nationalisms, they are faced with the counterforces of the strength of citizenship set up against the mandate of ethnicity.

Conclusion

The ethnicist's are constricted by the absence of some elements in their theory or by the over-emphasis of others. Consequently, their theory is reduced to being a description of the ideal-types of ethnic nationalism and thus serves to perpetuate the dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism, rather than reconcile the two in one comprehensive theory or approach. In short, the two types of nationalism sprang out of the different experiences of nations in their path towards nationhood and statehood. These differing paths were largely determined by the condition of the culture prior to the changes that occurred throughout the societies and hence their differing reactions to change. Thus the different histories shared by different regions divided their nationalisms into East and West – or in a more simplified manner – civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

What the ethnicists are promoting is the notion that each nationalism has a cultural basis (agreed by the modernists also). This cultural basis is unique to each group according to their culture prior to the changes that occurred over a few centuries (whether directly from modernisation or a combination of Smith's three revolutions). This culture was that which was carried by the *ethnie*; that is, the ethnic component of a group is what differentiated them from the next group, and any remnants of this that were carried into the new age have become the politicised *ethnie* that characterises each respective nationalism. That is the perennial feature of nationalism, though nationalism itself is purely a product of the modern age. The politicised *ethnie* is not a nation but is that component of a culture and so of a nation, and hence its nationalism, that helps to distinguish it from the next.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion – A Critical Overview

Post-Cold War events have brought factors to the surface that are almost demanding to be recognised when examining the roots and influences of nationalism. Namely, ethnicity, emotionalism and post-emotionalism, the importance of a civil society (and not just democracy), the differences between rural and urban cultures within modernity, and the differences in consciousness amongst different peoples. Identifying the broader elements of modernism and the generalisation of culture provides for a greater opportunity in incorporating elements important to the nationalist discourse that may have formerly been disregarded by the modernists as irrelevant but now allows for the introduction of elements pertaining to the ethnicist's thesis into this equation.

The nation is a form of social integration. Nationalism provides the movement and process towards the autonomy and unification of one society and is the reassertion, support and preservation of the culture housed by this society in a national identity. Each route taken towards nationhood and nation formation is unique, or at least each individual group would like to believe theirs is unique. In fact each nationalism does contain its own unique combination of characteristics often represented by the ideals of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (remembering these are not the only pressures on the theory of nationalism). Ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are ideal types not found in isolation in practice. It is therefore false to label or set up the series of dichotomies that is built-up from this for it is "both normatively and analytically problematic." [1](#)

We have looked at the principles of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, and their intermeshing. The radical modernists and the ethnicist-modernists have been examined along with their respective correlation to civic and ethnic nationalism. This chapter will finally look at those elements that determine that an interplay must exist between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. We will observe the objective and subjective elements of nationalism for *nationalism* is subjective, but *nationalism* is the objective exercise of it, consequently. Nationalism contains factors beyond and within the realm of rationalism and has the possibility of a powerful emotional appeal which provides for its psychological depth. It is also a movement not confined to areas where modernity has taken on full force – it exists in industrialised urban areas as well as in rural areas. Because of this diversity this chapter will conclude the thesis with the claim that for nationalism to be practised

successfully an intermeshing of the principles of civic and ethnic nationalism is necessary.

Objectivity Versus Subjectivity

The paths that peoples have followed or pursued towards modernity are determined by the nature of the social context and the make-up of the group prior to the onset of modernity. These two points are the important clues to firstly the core and then the perpetuation of nationalism. The onset of modernity is over-determined by the way the various structural elements of modernism were introduced - the unique combination of factors that implanted itself onto this group to introduce it to modernity. These structural elements are in this way objective factors acquainting groups with modernity, hence also with nationalism. By objective features I am referring to these elements determined by situation and circumstance, such as the onset of modernity. However the nature of the nationalism is determined not only by the nature of the modernity, but also by the type of group it is infecting. These are the subjective features defining the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state, and the society and the state. It has more to do with perceptions. How a group adopts the pursuit of nationhood (and in fact whether they pursue it or follow it at all), and how they react to its features leads to the development of this group's own unique nationalism. It is this that determines the subjective features of nationalism and the variance between the subjective features of different nationalisms. Therefore societies and nationalisms are congruent in their objectivity but differ in the phenomenal experiences of their subjectivity. That is, a citizen of France is regarded as a member of a nation-state, just as a citizen of Germany is internationally recognised as such. The generalised objective determination is the same in both cases. The method of incorporation used by each nation-state does not effect a citizen's status externally. That is, though the method of membership to society differs in France and Germany - i.e. the subjective features of their society differ - the objective features (in the context of nationality) do not.

In practice each nationalism has both objective and subjective elements. The objective features are those determined by the existence of a state and its features that includes economic resources, population size and make-up, infrastructure, etc. The subjective elements are "memory, value, myth and symbolism"² -these give us an insight to the national character and "distinctive qualities" of a national community. Any subjective elements are dependent upon people's understanding of them. Concepts like tradition and modernity contain a subjective element to them and contain a utility as "cultural constructs".³ It is the subjective features that expose a stronger relationship to political conflict than the

objective. This would account for the accusations of ethnicity, a predominantly subjective element, leading to conflict or more generally, ethnic nationalism being regarded as the more violent nationalism. This however is an over-generalisation, but we can admit that the subjective elements of nationalism, whether they be the ethnic components or otherwise, to lend it to be more vulnerable to emotion and conflict. ⁴

Modernisation theory fails to reconcile the objective with the subjective, though both Gellner and Nairn claim that it is precisely the objective that determines the subjective. In fact, the objective element is the vehicle that introduces a population to nationalism, and carries the subjective element that is determined by forces beyond that only of modernity. Thus, the roots of nationalism do lie in modernity, but the elements that fuel the continuation of nationalism are located beyond modernity. In addition, the characteristics that distinguish one nationalism from another are determined by factors unique to each individual group, and it is these subjective factors that will govern whether nationalism carries a predominantly civic, ethnic, emotive, violent or a placid orientation.

What is more critical is the strength or weakness of a society that will determine the impact of subjective and objective elements. A strong society is one that is "capable of defending itself against tyranny in whatever form it might take"; a weak society is one "that is not capable of such self-defense."⁵ The functioning of a society is more important than that of the state for it is the society that determines the ultimate direction of its members. Ramet states:

an intolerant society is more threatening to the preservation of personal autonomy than an intolerant state. For in the intolerant state the individual is unfree in the political sphere but autonomous, perhaps even in some sense "free," in the social sphere. In an intolerant society, however, probably regardless of the specific institutional forms of government, the individual is unfree in society itself, and without freedom in society no constitutional provisions for the political sphere can make much difference.⁶

Not only is societal strength consequential but so too is the presence of a civil society. A civil society is a "set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society."⁷ It is Leviathan's antithesis and as such is unlikely to exist in a developed form in the presence of an authoritarian regime. With the collapse of authoritarian rule there is the potential for a civil society to emerge, particularly if the region has had some experience in the past with a democratic culture conducive to the development of a civil society. Unfortunately this is not the case with many regions in Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the Czech Republic and Poland to some extent can claim to have experienced versions of democracy in their history, as discussed in Chapter Three. Consequently the development or emergence of a civil society may be completely different.

It will be accepted that a strong society is one with a civil society present. A civil society is less likely to be vulnerable to change and unlikely to be present in a weak society. The extent of the impact of changes on a society will ascertain the changes that occur within society and whether these changes are substantial enough to alter societal attitudes. If they are then this suggests an alteration in the relationship between culture and politics within the society, which can then lead to the people of the apparent threatened culture seeking political self-determination if the culture is perceived to be threatened by them. This in turn is liable to manifest itself into nationalism. The cultural threat may arise not just from societal change or breakdown, but also as a consequence of the dominance of an alien culture. This was certainly the case with the Republic of Ireland reacting against the dominance of the British Empire, likewise with the Basque region in Spain. A recently overt case is that of the Bosnians of the former Yugoslavia. Bosnian ambitions for their own state may not have existed so actively were it not for the strength of Serb aggression and expansionism.

Note also that it is not the weakness of a society itself that will spur on change, rather it is the degree of weakness that is likely to make a society more vulnerable to both internal and external factors. Adopting Ramet's guidelines, external or objective factors that may contribute to cultural change and differentiation include the mobilisation of new groups, "the defection of the intellectuals" and "inefficiency and corruption in the system". The subjective factors, those that are internally determined, are the "loss of credibility by the regime", "the loss of self-confidence by the ruling elite and the appearance of fissures and factions within that elite" and "the inept use of force".⁸ Economic deterioration of a society may be either a subjective or an objective element, depending upon the way economic circumstances are construed by any given society.

It is perhaps the subjective internally determined factors that are most suggestive of change within a society, and the cultural permutations that take place for it is changes in perceptions, changes in subjective elements that will instigate changes in the structural elements of society. Reiterating Smith's identification of "memory, value, myth and symbolism" as the distinctive subjective features of a community, we can locate that which motivates nationalism. Myths are perhaps the most indicative and insightful to a society's nationalistic direction. Myths are needed for external consumption and internal mobilisation. The elites use myths, and fashion new ones, "by their own ideals and the logic of

the ethnic situation",⁹ to successfully steer the society along the quickest path to nationhood. When the road is to be short, the elite will use whatever is most malleable and popularly appealing to divert attention from other issues and achieve their goal. The most direct route to generating popular mobilisation is to appeal to the emotions of the people.

Emotionalism and Reductionism

Perhaps the most contentious issue that the modernists struggle with is the emotive element of nationalism, or as Nairn refers to it, the "spell". Both Nairn and Gellner have attempted to reconcile this issue.¹⁰ As already mentioned, to the modernists the subjective elements of nationalism are determined by objective factors, namely the economic forces of modernity, but not necessarily wilfully or deliberately.¹¹ For example, the uneven development of industrialisation was not deliberate but it objectively determined the direction, or fates, of various groups, from centre to periphery. But this does not explain what determines the nature of these subjective elements that all too often fuel nationalism beyond the realms of rationale and reason.

The process of nationalism may be described by the modernists, but the appeal that draws people to nationalism, its substantiality, and that which provokes emotion and sometimes violence is encapsulated by the ethnicists. They explore the psychological and emotive explanations of nationalism. It is this that carries the "spell" that Nairn refers to and provides "emotive authority".¹² This is located in the non-elite, the masses, including the peasants. Within modernity the elite and the mass, both belonging to the high culture, rationalise their motivations, aspirations and frustrations through the exercise of nationalism. However, even in the discussion on ethnic nationalism, the psychological aspects of nationalism are not traversed deeply enough. Nationalism has such psychological depth and provokes such emotion not because of the particular national identity an individual may have, but the fact that the individual must partake in the *process* of identification.¹³ This process is a political one, which thus introduces the individual to political activity, and to the exercise of nationalism.

Indeed the emotive element of nationalism is potent to the virulent nationalism experienced in the twentieth century, particularly in the form of postemotionalism. Postemotionalism is "the manipulation of *emotionally* charged collective representations of 'reality' on the part of the culture industry" and "an improvement on postmodernism" – (Mestrovic, who keyed the term postemotionalism, believes theories of postmodernism have neglected emotions and their impact, particularly

on the mass society).¹⁴ It mixes emotional memories with mythical historical events. But this does not fit into the modernist camp, ruled by the values of the Enlightenment marked by rationalism and the regard of emotionalism as insensible and of no value.¹⁵ Nationalism is not a rational entity, but it does represent a process towards rationality. It is the process by which the emotional is turned into the rational. Irish nationalism may be such an example, particularly as its nationalism is ceasing to be regarded as irredentist but representative of a new and revised civic form of nationalism. Consequently, theories of nationalism must include both explanations for the rational *and* the emotional.

A further reason as to why the modernists are not all embracing of the emotive element of nationalism is the disagreement in reducing nationalism to this level. Gellner is anti-reductionist, particularly concerning nationalism, and those that reduce nationalism to the "[s]tanding of being the emotive manifestation of social concerns" and certainly nationalism is far too complex to be reduced to this.¹⁶ Gellner's point constitutes part of his rebuttal of the ethnicists. Gellner does recognise that the emotive element should be acknowledged when examining nationalism, but his own construct of modernity, built on the "raw materials" of culture and organisation which in turn generates nationalism, is suspiciously absent of any explanation of the emotive element of nationalism.¹⁷

This is not an attempt to dispute Gellner's stance on this issue, rather to rectify the absence in his and the modernisation theory overall of precisely how the emotive element does fit in and to what extent. We know what it is not, but the acknowledgement of a null hypothesis does not complete the experiment. Rather than reducing nationalism to the emotional manifestation of social concerns, nationalism is a consequence of overall social conditions and the responses (emotional and otherwise) to them. It is a case of consequence and perception. As the modernists advocate nationalism does not represent only the emotional, for it does belong somewhere in the discourse. It appears that modernists remove themselves from acknowledging too much importance on the issue of emotive authority for that lends legitimacy to the ethnicist thesis. In their attempt to resolve this and move towards explaining the different flavours of nationalism, the modernists endorse the importance of culture, which may be the key to explaining the emotive.

The modernists fail to pursue this angle of nationalism, regarding this purely subjective element as mere "noise".¹⁸ If the irrational is occasionally chosen with nationalism, then why? The irrational is aligned with the emotional and psychological segments of nationalist theory. Discussions on emotive authority for example are contained in ethno-nationalist discourse, but notably absent from most modernist theory. I say most for Nairn, a modernist with ethnicist leanings, does

enter into discussions about the emotive element of nationalism. This is an important factor in describing the motivations behind nationalism.¹⁹ Nairn implies that this emotive feature may come from the peasants, suggesting that the violent element of ethnic nationalism stems from here, however he fails to say why and how. This is more applicable to the emotive nationalisms we have witnessed this century.

In areas where urbanisation has occurred later in Europe the nationalism expressed has tended to be more passionate and emotive. Ireland, particularly from the Easter Rising of 1916 to the signing of the Republic, is a good example. The new nation-states of the former Yugoslavia are another. But peripheral regions like Ireland and the former Yugoslavia that undertook nationalism in this fashion may also have been doing so as a reactive measure to other more dominant nationalisms. In the Irish case it would be British nationalism, with the new nation-states of the former Yugoslavia it would be the Yugoslav regime (and perhaps Serb nationalism towards the latter period).

The emotional appeal combined with cultural depth is what makes the possession of a national identity and the practice of nationalism so appealing. The exercise of national identity is a psychological need made political. The psychological element of this equation is the need for an identity; the political component is the search for one's own nation. Thus nationalism is the "psychological manifestation" of modernity.²⁰ Nationalism is to a group united around a nation (or the idea of a nation) what Freud's id is to the sense of self. "Just as the id cannot be eliminated, national sovereignty is an irrational component of the collective make-up of groups that cannot be eliminated."²¹

Rural and Urban Groups

The issues of emotionalism and ethnicity are eliminated from modernist discourse, as they do not fit into what is most valued of modernity. They represent the non-rational and so the modernists resign them to the primordialists that then aid in sustaining the fallacious dichotomies that are endured in writings on nationalism. By persisting in keeping it absent and underdeveloped the modernists construct their own theory to only particular types of nationalism. The nationalism of the modernists is one where institutions dominate and indeed are taken for granted whose followers belong to a civil society and to promote another false dichotomy, their's is most often an urban nationalism. It follows then that there is a correlation between ethno-nationalist conflict (and thus ethno-nationalism) and rurality. The rural mass look to the past as much as to the future, though as they move to the urban areas (without the development of a civil society) there are reinventions of what is lost,

especially as the link to the land is no longer direct.

The urban mass has a "parallel if different motivation" for they "are 'seeking' to mobilise lost-world psychology in order to build a new world".²² Civil society is the institutional *Geist* and ethno-nationalist behaviour is the spirit of the peasant. Any behaviour that is violent, emotive or seemingly "tribal" is now a case of the rural haunting the urban. "Ethnic nationalism is in essence a peasantry transmuted, at least in ideal terms, into a nation."²³ These cases occur in cities where peasants who have moved there or their conflicts have spilled over have penetrated them. The origin is provincial, which suggests that the transition from rural to urban may actually aggravate the conflict further, as with the 'troubles' in Ireland.²⁴ This is the modernist explanation for the element of emotionalism which their theory has difficulty in explaining. The Belfasts and the Sarajevos fit well into this.

To the modernists, the rural represents the past and the urban the future, and modernisation represents the struggle between the two.²⁵ One can only be a victor with the death of the other, and if this is so nationalism is not a side-effect of this struggle but its essence. So nationalism is promoted from being "a series of adjustments" to an all out struggle between two eras.²⁶ This is suggestive of the notion that nationalism is a case of the good versus the bad and enforces the fallacious civic-ethnic dichotomy. But it is not. Nationalism is neither of these and both. As discussed, it is a manifestation of modernity, and the different elements of and within modernity mean that each society concentrates on different components, and the differences in theories are just differences in emphasis.

This is an important revelation when exploring the ideas that the ethnicists emphasise and the philosophy of the modernists. What it should be is not a difference of emphasis, but a recognition that societies that are at different levels of history and development will respond to circumstances in different ways. Particularly with respect to what tools they have to respond with (i.e. what are their primary methods of communication) and how many dimensions, or rather what is the ultimate dimension, these societies operate in. From here emerge the dichotomies of East and West, Rural and Urban, Concrete versus Abstract. However, these items should not be treated as dichotomies but as descriptive categories for variations of emphases. Modernisation theory concentrates on the onset of the urban – that is material industry. But what it fails to examine is the other still predominant raw material of this society that is "the peasant masses who underwent the change".²⁷

The Marriage of Two Sides – the Intermeshing

It has been argued throughout that civic and ethnic nationalisms are not two different ideologies, rather they are analytically different conceptions of the one ideology and movement (or "ideological movement")²⁸ of nationalism. They do however provide different subjective or "ideological bonds" for their members,²⁹ that provides the glue by which a community of people regard themselves as belonging and sharing a feeling of kinship, solidarity and unity. Citizenship is the key to the bonds within civic nationalisms, and ethnicity within ethnic nationalisms; the cement of civic nationalisms are legal codes and institutions, but within ethnic nationalisms it is customs, myths and symbols. This correlates respectively with the theories proposed by the modernists and ethnicists.

The perspective and approach of each camp is different and varied, and though theoretically they represent two separate ideals of nationalism, neither is complete on its own. In their pure forms both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are mutually exclusive concepts stemming from the disagreement between the two as to what constitutes the essence or primary focal point of nationalism. As mutually exclusive concepts both are destined to terminally fail to satisfy a successfully functioning nationalism that achieves what it espouses towards. In practice, as intermingling concepts, they are not opposing and are not at polar ends of a spectrum. Rather they are intermeshing concepts that borrow from one another in order to see each individual movement of nationalism achieve its goal.

Whether observing the rural and religious nationalism in Ireland, the ethnic and blood nationalism in the Balkans and the Basques in Spain, civic nationalism in Britain, or territorial/ethnic nationalism in Germany they all belong to the one ideological movement. The classifications merely serve to restrict each nationalism to being backward or progressive, positive or negative, without the opportunity of being both and developing toward their ultimate goal of a nation-state.

As discussed in Chapter Two, modernists see a definite break (particularly cultural) between the agrarian age and the industrial, utilitarian era. The nation to them is only 'natural' insofar as it is a necessary product of capitalism. The nation is contingent upon the development and growth of capitalism, utilitarianism, and industrialisation, economics and the market, all of which demonstrate the essence of modernity itself. The problem with the modernisation theory is what lies at its core. It regards as central a free or capitalist or industrial market. Nairn, in criticism of Gellner, does come close to shifting the nucleus of the modernist theory as his own theory criss-crosses from the radical-modernists to the ethnicist-modernists. He

claims that Gellner has only chosen the market as a point of reference due to the unreliability of other elements: "Having declared nationalism as perilous and democracy as insufficient, he [Gellner] tends to end up with the market as sole guarantor."³⁰ The more abstract social interaction then the more civic the nationalism, and the less likely it is to be violent, backward-looking and emotive. The nation carries with it both the rational and non-rational elements that motivate all the various features of modernity, both the idealised rational elements, and the often ill explained non-rational.

In some ways ethnicism is a rejection in extreme cases, or a dispute in milder ones, of the modernisation theory. It promotes the theory that the communal ties that existed in the pre-modern era are embedded in history and pivotal to the formation of the nation. This process is considered to be a 'natural' phenomenon. Blood ties, soil and tradition are seen to be closely linked to the fabric of the modern-day nation, how closely they are linked to its formation is debatable. The link between an ethnic identity of the pre-modern era transforming into a national identity in modernity via the vehicle of ethnicity, where ethnicity represents kinship which provides for the normal passage of cultural transmission.³¹ This link is not a direct one and the vehicle of ethnicity works under the guise of culture. But it does place the primacy of components like blood, race and language in the evolution towards a nation at a higher level.

By being representations of separate theoretical forms of nationalism both the modernist and the ethnicist arrangements fail to provide a comprehensive theory of nationalism. But, if in practice each nationalism is an intermeshing of the different theoretical forms of nationalism, then providing an ample approach to nationalism an agreement on common and key features between the modernists and ethnicists should be made. A good starting point would be culture as both regard culture as an important foundation for the establishment of nationalism.

According to modernisation theory there is a definite cultural break with the pre-modern age, with the emergence of a literate "high culture" and the plausibility of a political unit – these are the fundamental elements of this theory of nationalism. The ethnicists, particularly Smith, accuse modernisation theory of being too confining to be able to encapsulate the varieties of nationalism that exist.³² However, modernisation theory is confining only to the extent of what is excluded, namely the absence of the ethnic rationale in the theory. The absence means that the theory only tells part of the story. Modernists argue that the absence of the ethnic rationale is justified for it is a "redundant" element of nationalism and inessential to the theory.³³ As Gellner states:

My main case for modernism...is that on the whole the ethnic, the cultural national community, which is an important part of Anthony's [Smith's] case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don't and in any case it's inessential. (My emphasis) [34](#)

But ethnicity is not just a disposable element of nationalism. As a variant of culture (even with the cultural shift that modernity brought on) it represents a link to the past and more importantly, provides for the motivational element of nationalism which is essential if it is to be exercised successfully and survive. Ethnicity, as a variant of culture that has been politicised with the onset of modernity, is the fuel of nationalism.

Tom Nairn's theory locates nationalism as a product (or a cost) of the uneven development of history.[35](#) Nationalism to Nairn is a "developmental history",[36](#) an historical process into which groups of people (communities) are forced. In Nairn's words:

The ' -ism' they are then compelled to follow is in reality imposed upon them from without although of course to make this adaptation, it is necessary that the usual kinds of national cadres, myths, sentiments, etc., well up from within.[37](#)

Though elements in Nairn's thesis appear sympathetic to the theories of Smith and 'soft primordialism' he keeps his distance by ensuring that the "causation of the drama is not within the bosom of the *Volk*",[38](#) but declines in recognising that the *perpetuation* of the "drama" is.

It is perhaps a case of the uneven development of capitalism, rather than history, as encountered by those who have experienced different histories. The different histories experienced by the 'East' and the 'West' expose them to different experiences and different reactions to development, which also espoused the differences between the nationalism of the 'West' and the nationalism of the 'East'. The societies upon which capitalism was implanting itself, and the period and duration by which this was being done, were markedly different in structure, culture and experience to one another. In the 'East' the elites in the periphery were faced with the advancement experienced in the 'West', from this confrontation a new intelligentsia emerged whose role it was to mobilise the mass so not to be left behind.

The differences in history have also divided nationalism within this geography. In the 'West' there had already been established in society the importance of advanced communication, legal codes, civil rights and other factors which served to unite those anonymous strangers who shared these values into one group. But for the 'East' these

developments were still un(der)developed, so when the need came to unite the masses on the path towards industrialisation the elites needed to resort to that which they already possessed and shared. These unifying factors were the myths, symbols, language, tradition and sometimes religion that were shared by the people. The tools of this mobilisation were the unique characteristics and particularities of their community, their *ethnos*. Thus the uneven development of industrialism and capitalism necessitated the elite of the peripheral areas to mobilise the *Volk* by nationalising them in order to deliver them to progress. This is where this type of nationalism began, the moment at which these same elite realised that they were at a disadvantage and needed to progress in order to be made equals in the new civilisation heralded by modernity.³⁹ In this way the concept of 'Western' nationalism and 'Eastern' nationalism is made synonymous with civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism respectively. This division is perpetuated with the labelling of regions such as the Slavic lands as backward and needing to emulate the Western nation-states in order to find a way to progress.

Conclusion

Those in the 'East' had to resort to the *ethnos* in order to unify the people in absence of other tools, and hence the link with ethnic nationalism. The civic qualities used in the 'West,' such as the development of the state and the modern concept of citizenship, has linked it to civic nationalism, France and Britain being examples of such. But the tools that played an important role in the initial establishment of a nation-state are not the only tools available in the practice of nationalism, especially in the twentieth century where both "types" of nationalism have progressed. It is truer to say that the nationalisms of this century are still subject to the forces of the civic and the ethnic rationale *but they are not confined to it*. Rather, modern nationalism is an interplay of these components.

Consequently, due to the variety of divisions of nationalism, and the variety of definitions within these divisions, Smith regards nationalism as an approach and perspective, but not a theory.⁴⁰ However the possibility of a theory of nationalism should not be easily dismissed nor limited to the process of being just an approach or a perspective as it goes beyond this. Nationalism is also a motivator, demonstrated most explicitly by Greenfeld, though she carried this idea a bit too far. Her claims are that it was nationalism that motivated modernity and not nationalism as a product (or cost as Nairn would have it) of capitalism. Smith also recognised nationalism as a motivator. The "ethno-symbolic" as Smith labels it, helps to explain nationalism's popular appeal. In fact, it is perhaps the ethnic element of nationalism that gives it its greatest

motivational power, and this is what Gellner failed to recognise by leaving out the ethnic element in his theory. Nationalism as an *approach* is a part of the *process* of nationalism and thus a part of the theory. It is Smith's analysis in this manner that is "Euclidean" by limiting nationalism to being just an approach and a perspective. The approach is pivotal in describing the nature and content of the nationalism to be practised by a group of people. That is, the path taken (whether it be that which is elected or that which is 'natural') will impel a group of people towards a particular type of nationalism, unique to themselves but capable of being broadly defined as a hybrid of both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism.

No exercise of nationalism is the same, but they are all an exercise of the one phenomenon. Nationalism is an interplay of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism and all their characteristics. The civic and the ethnic demonstrate two broad categories of concentration, but neither is exclusive. They are analytically different, but each nation, or group of people that consider themselves a nation and practise *nationalism*, carry elements of both. Just as the ethnicist and modernist theories are not complete on their own, so too their correlated ideals of the ethnic and the civic are not complete either. Neither is sufficient on its own to forge a nation. A civic nationalism must crystallise the ethnic components of its members in order to provide vigour and appeal to the nationalism, and thus be able to succeed onwards towards the establishment and perpetuation of nationhood. Likewise, ethnic nationalism must institutionalise to realise its goals. Ethnicity transmitted by culture carries with it the tools and in some cases the foundations of new nations they do not work on their own however and are not the root of the nationalism. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon that should not exclude the persistence of ethnicity as a popular motivation that fuels it.

In order for either nationalism to be fulfilled they must each adopt characteristics from one another. Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism only provide the nature of the route towards their goal. To accomplish this journey various elements must be undertaken from the menu of options from both civic and ethnic nationalism. It is a matter of adding some of the ingredients of ethnic nationalism to the character of civic nationalism, or vice versa. The importance of the starting point of this route is one that determines the initial concept of the nation, that is, what elements are most emphasised as important to the fabric of the design of the nation. Thus a successful practice of nationalism is one where the process is an interaction of both civic and ethnic nationalism, an intermeshing of the two.

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FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1) Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, Second Edition, London, New Left Books, 1977, p.334.

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2) Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1983, p.1.

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3) As argued by Tom Nairn, *op. cit.*

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4) The idea of communities as imagined is drawn from Benedict Anderson's anthropological view of nationalism, where a nation "is an imagined community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991, pp.6.

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5) Gellner, *op. cit.*, p.100.

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20) Ibid., p.4.

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2) Ibid.

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3) The development of a nation-state with its own citizenry presupposed centuries of state-building and state-membership.

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4) The mimicking of the West is taken up by Tom Nairn and more strongly by Liah Greenfeld who terms it resentment. See Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, Verso, London, 1997, p.3, and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.15-17.

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5) Brubaker tells us that "Every state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular bounded citizenry, usually conceived as a nation." Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.x.

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8) Ibid., p.3.

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9) More specifically those who work outside the framework of modernity when discussing nationalism such as Clifford Geertz, in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*, New York, Free Press, 1963.

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10) Robert P. Clark "' Rejectionist' Voting as an Indicator of Ethnic Nationalism: the Case of Spain's Basque Provinces, 1976-1986" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.10, no.4, October 1987, p.437.

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11) Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p.110.

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12) This is not to suggest that the pure form of civic nationalism was the first nationalism practised, nor that it ever has been practised.

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15) "In Brief", *Guardian Weekly*, June 11, 1998, p.5.

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23) Nairn, op.cit., p.339.

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24) Ibid.

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25) Greenfeld, op. cit., p.15.

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28) A preliminary examination of this is undertaken by Frank B. Tipton, "The Pathology of Nationalism", Colloquium, Macquarie University School of Modern Languages, Centre for Slavonic and East European Studies, March 1995. A more thorough study of the pathological elements of ethnic nationalism is by Dusan Kecmanovic, *The Mass Psychology of Ethnonationalism*, New York, Plenum Press, 1996.

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29) Some good examples of where there have been explorations into nationalism and the psychoanalytical theories include Slavoj Zizek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor*, London, Verso, 1991; Dusan Kecmanovic, *op. cit.*, and Alan Finlayson "Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories of Nationalism" in *Nations and Nationalism* vol.4, no.2, 1998, pp.145-162.

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31) *Ibid.*

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32) Brubaker, *op. cit.*, p.x.

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34) Brubaker, *op. cit.*, p.4.

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36) Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, New York, New York University Press, 1998, p.xxix.

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38) *Ibid.*

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39) *Ibid.* p.2.

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40) By organic I mean a biological transmission.

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42) Nairn, op. cit., pp.82-83.

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43) Though really only men who had come of age were regarded as citizens. Women entered the equation much later.

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38) He asked this during a well-known debate between himself and former student and colleague, the ethnicist Anthony D. Smith. [The Warwick Debate](#): Nations and Nationalism vol.2, no.3, 1996, pp.358-365.

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2) This is taken directly from Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, passim.

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3) Ibid., p. 8.

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4) This benchmark is used specifically for nationalism in Europe.

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5) Smith, op. cit., pp. 131-134.

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6) "This, then, is the goal and content of the new national imaginings: to present a vision of ethnic fraternity of elites and masses through a historical drama in which a unified past is uncovered and re-presented, in the fashion of a museum, and thereby to evoke deeper meanings of collective destiny and community in the face of the dangerous fragmentation and alienation that modern industrialism and science unfold."

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7) Here Smith almost admits to it being a subject of modernity as he briefly departs from his "three revolutions" theory. Ibid., p.173.

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8) Ibid., p.17.

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13) Smith, op. cit., p.137.

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14) Ibid., p.137

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15) For a detailed discussion on the Bosnian Muslim ethnic community and the history of the Bosnian region see Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, London, MacMillan, 1994.

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18) Ibid., p.157.

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20) Smith, op. cit., p.155.

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23) As the title of Tom Nairn's book suggests.

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28) Ramet, op. cit., p.432.

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29) For a good discussion on the plight of the Roma/gypsies see Isabel Fonesca, *Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and Their Journey*, New York, Vintage, 1996.

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30) Ramet, op. cit., p.435.

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33) Ramet, op. cit., p.437.

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35) Smith, 1986, op. cit., p.169.

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40) Smith, op. cit., p.16.

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41) Ibid., p.384.

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42) Ibid., p.169.

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43) Ibid., p.142.

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44) Ibid. Smith was specifically referring to the cases of Poland and Hungary.

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2) Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p.3.

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7) Ernest Gellner, *The Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*, New York, 1994, p.5.

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8) Ramet, *op. cit.*, p.5.

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9) Smith, *op. cit.*, p.147.

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10) Ernest Gellner most recently in his book *Nationalism*, New York, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997.

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11) Ramet points out that economic factors are not necessarily just objective. Ramet, *op. cit.*, p.5.

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12) Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, London, Verso, 1997, p.105.

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13) For further discussion on this process see Alan Finlayson, "Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories of Nationalism" in *Nations and Nationalism* vol.4, no.2, 1998, pp.145-162.

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14) Stjepan G. Mestrovic, "Introduction" in Stjepan G. Mestrovic (ed.), *Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War*, London, Routledge, 1996, p.30. This idea, though introduced by Slaven Letica, was born out of the Balkan War(s).

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18) Gellner as mentioned in Nairn, op. cit., p.2.

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32) Smith sees Gellner's theory as Euclidean. Smith 1996, op. cit., pp.358-365.

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33) Ernest Gellner, "Ernest Gellner's Reply: 'Do Nations Have Navels?'" in Nations and Nationalism, vol.2, no.3, 1996, p.367.

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40) Smith states: "I doubt whether we are in a position yet to offer a theory of so protean and many sided a set of phenomena as ethnies, nations and nationalisms, except at a very general level." Smith 1996, op. cit., p.362.

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